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SRI BHASHIYAM

(TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH)

Released by Maran's Dog ,Toronto, Canada

By

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Released by Maran's Dog ,Toronto, Canada

(Chapters I—IV)



Published by

SRIRANGAM SRIMATH ANDAVAN ASRAMAM

21, Sir Desikachari Road, Mylapore, Chennai-4

2002 Released by Maran's Dog ,Toronto, Canada

First Edition : 1930

Second Reprint Edition : 2002

Price ~~Rs 200/-~~ **Rs 300/-**

Rs 300/-

Lasertypeset & Printed at :

V.K.N. ENTERPRISES

8/1, Dr. Rangachari Rd., Mylapore, Chennai-4 Ph: 495 07 75



प्रणामं लक्ष्मणमुनिः प्रतिगृह्णातु मामकम्

FOREWORD

In placing an English translation of the *Srī Bhāshyam* before the public a few words of explanation are needed. The view is held by western Sanskrit scholars that the *Veda* consists of portions written by different persons at different times, and that therefore conflicts of opinion must necessarily follow. This is not the view held by such eminent *rishis* as *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*, and by a host of other *rishis*, who have written *kalpa sūtras*, *smṛitis*, *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*. They were of opinion that the *veda* was not written by any one; that it is one work; and that therefore no text of the *veda* that *Bādarāyaṇa* wrote his *sūtras*; and that *Srī Rāmānuja* wrote his *Srī Bhāshyam*.

2. Readers of the *upanishads* will observe that reference is made in them to three *tatvas* or substances – matter, the *jeevas* and *Īśvara*. Certain texts state that they are different from one another in their *svarūpas* (substance) and in their natures. Matter serves the *jeevas* by undergoing transformations, and appearing as objects of enjoyment, as bodies in which the *jeevas* dwell, and as senses and organs of action, which they use as instruments of enjoyment. The *jeevas* utilise the bodies, the senses and the organs of action, and experience pleasure or pain from material products. And *Īśvara* gives the *jeevas* the fruits of their past *karmas*, and makes matter undergo such transformations as are needed for this purpose. Certain other texts of the *veda* state that *Īśvara* is identical with the universe, consisting of the *jeevas* and material products. How is this apparent conflict to be explained? The *veda* itself replies by stating that all objects are the bodies of *Īśvara*, and that He is their *ātmā*. It is usual in the world to speak of the body and *ātmā* as being identical, as in the statement '*Devadatta* is stout'. The term '*devadatta*' denotes a *jeeva*, and the term "stout" refers to his body. The *jeeva*, being atomic in size, cannot be said to be stout or lean. Similarly, the *veda* speaks of *Īśvara* and the universe as one, as they bear to each other the relation of *ātmā* and body. In this explanation all *vedic* texts are accepted as of equal validity; and there is no need to regard one set of texts as nullified by another set. Accepting this explanation,

which was that suggested by the *ṛishi* (seer) *Kāṣakṛitsna* (see *sūtra* I-4-22), the *sūtras* are interpreted in the *Srī Bhāshyam*.

3. Other commentators of the *sūtras* accept the texts affirming identity as stating the truth, and explain the texts stating the *tatvas* to be different from one another. *Ṣankara* is of opinion that *Brahma* alone exists; nothing else; and that the appearance of the universe, consisting of numberless persons that perceive, and of numberless objects that are perceived, is illusion; and that this is brought about by an unreal *avidyā* resting on *Brahma*. *Bhāskara* explains that *Brahma* Himself becomes *jeevas* by contact with *upādhis*, i.e., atomic substances known as *antaḥ karaṇa* (mind). The places in *Brahma* not so contracted is *Brahma*. *Yādava Prakāṣa* states that the same substance, which he calls *sat*, appears in three forms—as *Īṣvara*, as *jeevas* and as matter. The theories of these commentators are examined in *Srī Bhāshyam* in the sub-sections noted on the margin and shown to be untenable. This examination has been taken out and translated as a separate work with the title "The Three *Tatvas*". The *Srī Bhāshyam* is intended to be a practical guide to enable the *jeevas* to get rid of their *samsāra* (cycle of births and deaths), and to attain bliss in no way alloyed with pain and enduring for ever. It shows for this purpose that there is a Being known as highest *Ātmā*, who is free from every imperfection, and who is the seat of numberless, infinitely high, noble qualities; that the way to reach Him is by continuous, vivid and loving meditation on Him; and that when this meditation is established, all the *jeeva's* past *karmas* are destroyed; that such *karmas*, as are not consciously done, will not touch him; that with the grace of the highest *Ātmā*, who abides in his heart as his *ātmā*, he will rise from his body through a blood-vessel that goes to the top of his head; that he will travel along a path known as *devayāna*, and that on reaching the highest *Ātmā* in a place beyond this world of matter, he will attain his own nature, and thereafter enjoy the highest *Ātmā* and His noble qualities, and that he will never return to *samsāra*. Most readers will be satisfied with the *Srī Bhāshyam* without the controversial portion. It has therefore been taken out. Those, that wish to know how the other theories are unsound, may read "The Three *Tatvas*".

4. Certain followers of *Ṣankara* have criticised the interpretations of the *sūtras* given in the *Srī Bhāshyam*. They have been answered by *mahāmahopādhyāya* Kapistalam Desikacharyar, and Mr. A.V. Gopalacharyar, M.A. B.L. A third work is ready, having been written by Agnihotram Tata Desika Tatacharyar of



Kumbakonam. All these are in Sanskrit. If there is a general desire in the English-knowing public to know what they say, a brief *resume* of the contents of these works will be prepared with the consent of their authors.

5. With the omission referred to in para 3, the translation keeps close to the original. I have availed myself of some latitude in order to make the translation intelligible. Portions of the commentary known as *śrūta prakāśika* have been incorporated in the text, where the text would be unintelligible without the commentary. Portions of the text, which treat of small matters, or quote *vedic* and *smṛiti* texts, which are well known, have been put in the form of foot-notes. Not one grain of matter has been omitted, and the translation faithfully reproduces the original. The *vedic* texts considered in the various subsections have been separately translated, with an abstract of the contexts in which they occur, and with copious notes from the *upanishad bhāṣhya* of Ranga Rāmanuja. Sanskrit terms have been translated within brackets, wherever they occur; nevertheless a glossary of the terms has been appended at the end. It is difficult to prepare an index; but the table of contents, which will be found at the beginning, will serve the purpose of an index to some extent.

6. No pains have been spared to make the translation intelligible by itself. It was prepared several years ago; and it has undergone revision twice, not to mention minor alternations made in passing the proofs. My thanks are due to (1) Mr. K. Sadakopa Ayengar, Retired Salt Inspector, Kumbakonam for examining the translation with the original, and for correcting the proof sheets; (2) to Sinnāmu Srinivāsa Patrācharyar of the same place for valuable help in the elucidation of difficult points; (3) to Mr. A.K. Sitarama Sastriar, Superintendent, Vasantha Press, Adyar, Madras, for careful printing and neat execution; and lastly (4) to my Guru (Srimad Āndavan of Srirangam), who gave me permission to print the translation, and whose blessing has brought the printing to a successful end.

7. An explanation of abbreviations used in the work is subjoined.

V. K. RAMANUJACHARI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Adhi.</i>	Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali of Sri Desika.
<i>Aita.</i>	Aitareya upanishad.
<i>Āna.</i>	Ānandavalli.
<i>Bṛihad.</i>	Bṛihad Āranyaka upanishad.
<i>Bhāva.</i>	Bhāvaprakāṣika of Ranga Ramanuja.
<i>Bhṛigu.</i>	Bhṛiguvalli.
<i>Chāndo.</i>	Chāndogya upanishad.
<i>Īṣā.</i>	Īṣāvāsyā upanishad.
<i>Kaṭha.</i>	Kaṭhavalli.
<i>Kaushi.</i>	Kaushītaki brāhmaṇa.
<i>Muṇḍa.</i>	Muṇḍaka upanishad.
<i>Nārā.</i>	Nārāyaṇam of Taittirīya upanishad.
<i>Puru.</i>	Purusha sūkta.
<i>Śveta.</i>	Śvetāśvatara upanishad.
<i>Subā.</i>	Subala upanishad.
<i>Taitti.</i>	Taittirīya upanishad.

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CHAPTER II

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श्रीमते वेदान्तरामानुज महादेशिकाय नमः ।

SRI BHĀSHYAM

INTRODUCTION

Srī Bhāshyam is the commentary by *Sri Rāmānuja* on the *Brahma Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa* alias *Vyāsa*; and these *Sūtras* form a commentary on the later portion of the *Veda*, known as the *Upanishads*.

2. The *Veda* is the highest authority among the Hindus, and holds the same position in their estimation, as the New Testament does in the estimation of the Christian world. There is, however, a difference between them. While the New Testament was admittedly written by different authors, the *Veda* was never written by any one. It has been handed down without interruption from teacher to student, and its texts have consisted of the same words in the same order as at present. In this sense they are said to be eternal. This point is chapter considered in chapter I, Section 3, Sub-Section 7. Not having been written by any one, it is free from defects, which characterise human productions.

3. *What the Veda teaches*: It points out to every one the means to the ends which he has in view; and these ends are different for different individuals. If they identify themselves with their bodies, the enjoyments which they seek will be of the sensual kind, *i.e.*, what appeals to the senses. This is known as *aihikam*, *i.e.*, enjoyment here and now. If they learn that they are other than bodies, they will be disgusted with the pleasures of this world, as they are attained with effort; and are alloyed with pain. They will seek a superior kind of enjoyment, and will be willing to take very great trouble to procure it and to wait for its coming. This is known as *āmushmikam*, *i.e.*, enjoyment there, *i.e.*, in

svarga. This has its own defect; for it is short-lived and in most cases, those who go thither have to serve the heaven-dwellers. When the good *karma*, which took them to *svarga*, is expended, they return to the earth-world. If after wide experience, they are disgusted with this kind of enjoyment also, they will begin to enquire whether there is not enjoyment of a still superior kind, which will endure for ever. They will learn that there is such enjoyment, for ever. They will learn that there is such enjoyment, which is called *niṣ-ṣreyasam* or the highest good. All these fruits, which man may seek— *Aihikam*, *āmushmikam* and *niṣ-ṣreyasam* — are known as *purushārtha* (that sought by an intelligent being). To distinguish the last from the others, the term *parama* — *highest* — is added to the term. Each of these kinds of enjoyment has its appropriate means, which are pointed out in the *veda*. The means for attaining *aihikam* and *āmushmikam* are offerings of various kinds to *devatās*, and they are described with great minuteness in the earlier portion of the *Veda*. The means to *niṣ-*

śreyasam is various modes of meditation on *Brahma*, and this is dealt with in the later portion. All these means are collectively known as *hita*. The *veda* then gives instruction in regard to truth, the goal to be striven for and the means thereto, *i.e.*, in regard to *tatva—hita—purushārtha*. It does not deal with what one can find for himself; it shows only what he cannot know without it. Most men are unable to look far ahead, and they prefer the *aihikam* or *āmushmikam* and the portion of the *veda*, which deals with them, therefore comes first.¹

4. The texts of the *veda* are not always clear; and the meaning that is first conveyed is not always correct. The *Veda* being one work, it has to be interpreted in such a manner that one text may not conflict with the others. A critical examination is therefore necessary, and this was undertaken by three *rishis* (those who see far beyond ordinary men)—*Jaimini*, *Kāśakrītsna* and *Bādarāyaṇa*. They embodied the result of their examination in *sūtras*,—short condensed, yet clear statements in prose. The *sūtras* of the first two *rishis* deal with the earlier portion of the *veda*, and those of the third with the later portion or *upanishads*. The examination of the teaching of the *veda* as a whole is known as *mīmāṃsā*, the examination of the earlier portion being *pūrva mīmāṃsā* and that of the later portion being *uttara mīmāṃsā*. Both the enquiries or *mīmāṃsās* form one work. For, the subject of enquiry is the same in both, *viz.*, the *veda*; the same mode of enquiry is pursued in each and the the same result is reached, *viz.*, a correct understanding of its contents. The *Brahma Sūtras* are a continuation of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*.

¹In addition to the division of the *Veda* into the earlier and later portions, there are two other divisions. One is the division into *Brāhmaṇa*, *mantra* and *arthavāda*. The first consists of commands and prohibitions like the following: "Let one who desires *svarga* do *yāga*." (*Svarga* is a place of unalloyed enjoyment; *yāga* is the giving up of a material possession to a *devatā*; this is a Being superior to man and invested with certain powers by *Īśvara*.) "Do not inflict pain on any one." Certain other texts describe how a *karma* (act) that has been prescribed should be done, and they are recited when the act is performed, to remind the doer of what has to be done and how it should be done. They are known as *mantras*. The remaining texts either praise the *karmas* prescribed or condemn those that are proscribed. These are known as *arthavādas*. The other is the division into *Rik*, *Yajur*, *Sāman* and *Atharvan*. One who performs a *yāga* requires the services of helpers, known as *ritvik*, their number depending on the particular *yāga*. One of them known as *adhvaryu* does all the manual work, including the preparation of the materials, the handling of the instruments and the making of the offerings. The *Yajur Veda* instructs him. Another known as the *hotā* recites certain verses, when offerings are made; and these verses are collected and arranged in the *Rik Veda*. A third helper known as *udgātā* recites verses set to music, before certain offerings are made in *Soma yāgas*: and these songs form the *Sāma Veda*. The importance of these portions from the point of view of *yāgas* is so great, that the *Veda* is often known as *Trayī*—a whole consisting of three parts. The fourth, the *Atharvan*, is not now studied, except its later portions.

5. The conclusion stated at the end of the preceding para is not accepted by the *Mīmāṃsaka*, i.e., one has commented on *Jaimini's sūtras*. His objections are: First, the topic in the first enquiry is the nature of *karma*, i.e., *yāgas* of various kinds, while in the second it is the nature of *Brahma*. The result also is different. For, after the first enquiry one will turn away from *karma*; after the second he will be drawn towards *Brahma*. Again, the authors are different. *Jaimini* wrote the first twelve chapters and *Kāśakritsna* the next four chapters; while the author of the *Brahma sūtras* is *Bādarāyaṇa*. We reply. These considerations do not count for much. As the first twelve chapters treat of *karmas*, and the next four chapters of *Brahma*. As the first sixteen chapters are regarded as one work, so all the twenty chapters may be regarded as one work. If the topics are different, that is a reason for dividing the work into parts, chapters, sections, and so on, but not for making it in to as many works as there are topics. As to the difference in the authorship, we draw his attention to the analogous case of a tower —built by many persons working for different periods of time; but the tower is regarded as one piece of work. The *sūtras* of *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, were commented on by two persons, and yet their commentaries are treated as one work, known as *kāṣikāvritti*. This is exactly analogous to the present case.

6. Secondly, some of the conclusions reached in the former *mīmāṃsā* are repeated in the latter, which would not happen, if they formed one work. Reply— the repetition occurs in four cases; the object being to refute certain objections raised and to confirm the conclusions. In the first case, it had been decided that the *sūdra* was unfit to learn the *veda*, and he would therefore be unfit also for *Brahma-vidyā*, which requires a knowledge of the *vedic* teaching. In the *Chāndogya Upanishad*, a student, who applied to a teacher for instruction on *Brahma-vidyā*, was addressed as *sūdra*, and this raised a doubt as to whether a member of this caste could not obtain the requisite knowledge from sources other than the *Veda*. It is shown (Chapter I, Section 3, *Sūtra* 33) that the term *sūdra* does not mean a member of the *sūdra* community, and that it means merely one who is unhappy. The next two cases relate to the conclusion that a *smṛiti* opposed to the *veda* should be rejected. Nevertheless, two sub-sections are added (Chapter II, Section 1, sub-section 1 and section 2, sub-section 7) to show that the *sāṅkhya smṛiti* and the *Pāṣupata āgama* should not be respected in consideration of the high position and great repute of the authors. In the last case, it was shown in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, that two *karmas*, which formed the subject of similar injunctions, and which were of the same character, bore the same name and yielded the same fruit, were one; and this conclusion is equally applicable to two or more *Brahma -vidyās* subject to the same conditions. But as a text of the *Muṇḍaka Upanishad* appeared to prescribe a particular ceremony known as *sirovratam* as a preliminary to *Brahma vidyā*, the subject had to be examined again. (Chapter III, Section 3, sub-section 1).

7. Lastly, there are some points of difference between *Jaimini* and *Bādarāyaṇa*. They are briefly explained below :

(a) In chapter I, Section 2, *Sūtra* 1 *Jaimini* states that the purpose of the veda being to stimulate the doing of *karmas*, such texts as do not perform this function, but merely state facts, are no authority. This would mean that the texts in the *vedānta*, being mainly of this character, do not possess any validity. The explanation is that *Jaimini* laid down a general rule, and that *Bādarāyaṇa* pointed out an exception, when the texts mention a desirable fruit for which an intelligent person may strive. As *Jaimini* dealt only with *karmas*, he had no occasion to refer to the exception. This defect was supplied by *Bādarāyaṇa* in Chapter I, Section 1, *Sūtra* 4.

(b) *Jaimini*, it is stated, denied the existence of *devatās* in the form of intelligent beings. He had to contend with opponents to establish two points—the supreme authority of the *veda*, and the need for performing the *karmas* enjoined in it. He found it necessary to concede certain matters to gain his end, and he did so in the hope that when he won, they could be set right. That this was his real attitude may be seen by considering his view stated by *Bādarāyaṇa* in three *sūtras*. In the first (Chapter 4, Section 3, *sūtra* 11) *Jaimini* recognised the existence of *Īṣvara*, the supreme *devatā*; in the second (Chapter 4, Section 4, *Sūtra* 5) the possession of certain qualities by Him, and in the last (Chapter I, Section 2, *Sūtra* 32) meditation on Him as the means of reaching Him. This is proof that he believed in the existence of the lesser *devatās* also.

(c) In Chapter VIII, Section 1, *Sūtra* 32, it was stated that in copying from a model the ritual for performing a particular *yāga*, for which a special ritual has not been prescribed, one should be guided by the material to be offered in preference to the *devatā*, in case they indicated different models. This is held to imply a denial of the existence of *devatās*. This view is incorrect. The preference of the material to the *devatā* was based on the fact that the material is close to the act of offering, while *devatā* has to be thought of by the mind. In fact, the whole of the *mīmāṃsā* rests on the principle that what is recognised at once possesses a greater validity than another, in which there is some delay.

8. The foregoing disposes of the objection that there are points of difference between the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* and the *Brahma sūtras*. In the latter set itself *Jaimini* is stated to have held certain views, and they are shown to be erroneous. Here are some cases :

(a) In Chapter 3, Section 4, *Sūtra* 2 *Jaimini* is stated to have contended that the mention of fruit in the texts of the *vedānta* should be treated as *arthavāda* as in the earlier portion of the *veda*, and that the *vedānta* is subsidiary to the earlier portion, on the plea that it points out the real nature of the *jeeva*. This could not have been *Jaimini's* real view for the reason stated

in para 7 (b) *supra*. This view having been put forward by him in the context with his opponents, people might accept it as correct; and to prevent this *Bādarāyaṇa* first states the view and then refutes it.

(b) In *sūtra* 18 of the same section it is stated that *Jaimini* denied the existence of stages of life other than that of the house-holder. This is negated by the fact stated in *sūtra* 40 of the same section that he would not accept one fallen from these stages as qualified for *Brahma Vidyā*. His real intention was, one may therefore presume, to discourage the entry of one on these stages, unless he was really disgusted with the world.

(c) In Chapter 3, Section 2, *sūtra* 39, *Jaimini* is stated to have held the view that *karma* through *apūrvam* yields its fruit. *Bādarāyaṇa* rejects this view, and states that all fruits are bestowed on the worshipper by *Īśvara* Himself. There is no material difference between these views. *Īśvara* bestows the fruits only with reference to the *karma*; but He is the principal cause, while *Jaimini* lays stress on the *karma*. This slight difference is not of such importance as to militate against the view that the two *mīmāṃsās* form one work.

(d) Lastly, in chapter 1, Section 3, *Sūtra* 30, *Jaimini* denies the fitness of *devas* for *Brahma vidyā*. This is not of importance; but it is proof of the fact that he recognises the existence of *devas*, in whom the *devatās* are included.

9. The conclusion that the two *mīmāṃsās* form one work has the support of the author of the *vṛtti*, who observes "This *śārīraka* is a continuation of the sixteen chapters of *Jaimini*. Hence the work is one". And the author of *Srī Bhāṣyam* also observes "The difference between the former and latter *mīmāṃsās* should be treated like the differences between the parts and between the chapters resulting from differences in the topics dealt with. The work begins with the first *sūtra* of *Jaimini* and ends with the last *sūtra* of *Bādarāyaṇa*. The order of the topics is determined by the connection between every two of them."

10. The author of the *Brahma sūtras* has accepted the conclusions drawn, and the rules of interpretation deduced, in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* and takes very many illustrations therefrom. For a full understanding of the *Srī Bhāṣya* it is necessary to know what the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* teaches, at least briefly. The following is a summary : The first chapter deals with *pramāṇas*, i.e., the authorities on which statements are accepted, or injunctions are obeyed. The *pramāṇas* are three—the *Veda*, *Smritis* and *āchāra* (the practice of great men). Of these the *Veda* possesses the highest authority. In the *Veda* itself the *Brāhmaṇas* are of themselves authority, and they require no proof for their acceptance. *Mantras* and *arthavādas* are authorities in so far as they are connected with the *Brāhmaṇas*, the former by showing how the *karmas* enjoined by them should be done, and the latter by praising the *karmas* (Section 2, Sub-sections 1 and 4). *Smritis* come next. They are works written by great *rishis*, who knew the *Veda*

fully. The presumption is that they are based on *Vedic* texts. It follows that a *Smṛiti* opposed to a clear text of the *veda* should be rejected (sub-sections 1 and 2). *Āchāras* come last. *Smṛiti*-writers have brought only the main points into their books, leaving the details to be gathered from their practice. It may be presumed that they remembered the *Vedic* teaching, and acted in accordance therewith. A practice which has sprung up in recent times in opposition to a *smṛiti* text should be rejected. (Section 3, Sub-sections 4 and 5).

11. In this chapter certain matters connected with words are discussed, and as reference is made to them occasionally in the *Srī Bhāshya*, they must be stated here. The meaning of a word established by usage should always be taken; for this comes to one's mind quickly. Where this meaning is not available, or where it is unsuitable in a sentence, the meanings of the root and termination are taken and put together, and the meaning of the word as a whole is ascertained. In the *darṣa* and *pūrṇa māsa ishtis* the *adhvaryu* gives this direction—Place the *prokshaṇī* (on the *vedi*). *Prokshaṇī* is a basin of water, which on being placed on the *vedi*, is purified and is used for sprinkling. Obviously the word *prokshaṇī* cannot denote the purified water, when the direction was given. As there is no meaning established by usage, the meaning by derivation is taken. A word is said to denote its meaning by *rūḍhi*, when it has been established by usage; and by *yoga*, when it is derived from its etymology (Section 4, Sub-section 9).

12. What do words denote, leaving out those that are arbitrarily fixed as the names of things ? Take the word "go" (cow) for instance. Does it denote a form common to all cows (*ākṛiti*) or an animal having this form ? In the opinion of the *mīmāṃsaka* the primary meaning of a word is the *ākṛiti*; and when it is used in a sentence "Bring the cow" it is used in a secondary sense, and means an animal having this *ākṛiti*. If it did not do so, the direction could not be carried out. The extension of the meaning of a word in this manner is known as *lakshana* ; and the reasoning on which it is so extended is *ākshepa* (Section 3, Sub-section 10).

13. Chapter 2 treats of *karmas*. First, in all finite verbs there is a common element, The word *yajati* means "does a *yāga* "; the word *pachati* means "does cooking"; and so on. This common element is denoted by the termination in the verbs; and it is an action that serves to bring about what is desired. It is known as *bhāvanā*. In connection with it three questions arise — what does it produce; with what instruments; and with the help of what. In the three offerings known as *darṣa ishti* what is produced is *svarga*; the instruments are the three offerings; and those which help them are other offerings known as *prayājas*, *anuyājas*, *ājyabhāgas* and *svishtakṛit*. These are denoted by the following sanskrit terms—*svarga* is *phalam*; the three offerings are *karaṇa*; and the other offerings are *itikartavyatā*. The injunction *yajeta* means with a *yāga* bring about:

what is desired. The *bhāvanā* being important, every word in a sentence is directly connected with the termination, which denotes it (Section 1, Sub-section 1).

14. It has just been stated that by the three offerings *svarga* is produced. Now, these offerings disappear, as soon as they are made; and *svarga* will come at the end of this life. What is there to connect the *karaṇa* and the fruit ? The *mīmāṃsaka* therefore assumes that a capacity is created by the offerings in the person who makes them, which remains till it yields the fruit. This is known as *apūrva*. Each offering produces its own *apūrva*; so do all the subsidiary offerings; and they all combine to produce the fruit-yielding *apūrva* (Section 1, Sub-section 2).

15. *Karmas* are enjoined by different texts; and it has to be ascertained whether they are the same *karma* or different *karmās*. They are different in the following cases :

(i) When the words conveying the injunctions are different. For instance, the *karmas* enjoined by *yajati* (do *yāga*), *dadāti* (give) and *juhoti* (do *homa*) are different, the words being different (Section 2, Sub-section 1).

(ii) When the same word is repeated without difference. For instance, in “*Samidho yajati*” “*tanūna- pātam yajati*” the word *yajati* is repeated. Unless the *karmas* be different, one of the directions will serve no purpose, a fault which in the opinion of the *mīmāṃsaka* is a serious one, as every text of the *Veda* should serve some purpose. If the repetition be for the purpose of indicating a material for offering, or give some other direction, there will be no objection. In the present case it is not so (Section 2, Sub-section 2).

(iii) When a number is stated—for instance, in “make three offerings” each offering is different from the others (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 7).

(iv) When the names of the *karmas* are stated—as in “Now this *jyotis* ; now this *viṣva jyotis* ; now this *sarva jyotis*”. These are names of different *soma yāgas*. (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 8).

(v) When a *devatā* has to be found for an offering. Here is a text “on boiling milk drop curd; it is *āmikshā* for the *devatā viṣve devas* ; *vājinam* for the *vājis*.” The hard part, when the milk separates into two portions is *āmikshā*; and the watery portion is *vājinam*. Now, the *āmikshā* being connected with the *viṣve deva yāga* by the very text which prescribes it , its requirement is satisfied. The bye-product *vājinam* cannot therefore be combined with the *āmikshā* or be made to take its place. It requires a new *devatā*, and its offering is a different *karma* (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 9).

(vi) When the context differs—The daily offerings at sunrise and sun-set known as *Agnihotram* are prescribed in one place; and the following text appears

in place: "Having done the *upasad yāgas*, the *agnihotram* should be done for a month." The contexts being different, the latter *karma* differs from the former (Section 3, Sub-section 11).

16. *Karmas* prescribed in different places are the same *karma*,—when the six causes mentioned in the preceding para are absent. That is, if they have the same forms, yield the same fruits, have the same names, and are prescribed in the same words, they are one. The *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis* are of this description, the former being the name for three offerings made on the first day after the new moon, and the latter for three offerings made on the first day after the full moon. The forms of *karmas* are the *devatās* and the materials offered to them (Section 4, Sub-section 2).

17. At the end of Section 1 of this chapter, it is explained how, when a sentence is incomplete, the ellipsis may be supplied. The addition of a word, which appears in the previous sentence, is known as *anushanga*, and the addition of a new work altogether is *adhyāhāra*. In making the *anushanga* care should be taken to see that the word is in the mind. Take the following, which the *yajamāna* (one who makes *yāga*) addresses to the goat that is to be offered—“May your *prāṇa* unite with the wind; your parts with those who do *yāgas*; may the *yajamāna* with his wishes”. The verb *gacchatām* occurs in the first clause only and is in the singular number; in the others it is absent, the prefix *sa-* only being found. The same verb is added in these clauses, in the plural number in the second, and in the singular in the third; but these additions are not *anushanga*. For the word in the second clause, being in the plural, differs from the verb in the first clause; and the word in the third clause is separated from it by the plural verb in the second clause. These are therefore cases of *adhyāhāra* (Section 1, Sub-Section 18).

18. Chapter 3 treats of the relation of *anga* and *angi*. Whatever renders a service to another is an *anga*; and that which receives the service is *angi*. The terms *śesha* and *śeshī* also are used to indicate the same relation. This relation is indicated by six *pramāṇas* as shown below:

(i) *Śruti*. In the text “*dadhnā juhōti*” (make the *homa* with curd) the termination in the first word, which expresses instrument, is *śruti*; and it makes curd an *anga* of the offering.

(ii) *Lingam*. This is capacity (of a word to indicate something). In the *mantra* “I cut the *barhis* (*kuṣa* grass) the seat of the *devas*” the word ‘cut’ indicates that the *mantra* should be recited, when the grass is cut. The *mantra* is therefore an *anga* of the cutting (Section 2, Sub-section 1).

(iii) *Vākyam*. This is two or more words put together. “In the text with *rik* work is done in a high tone (*ucchais*); with *yajur* in an under-tone; with *sāman* in a high tone” the juxtaposition of the words *ucchais* and *rik*, which is

vākya, makes a high tone an *anga* of *rik mantras*, which should therefore be recited in a high tone (Section 3, Sub-section 1).

(iv) *Prakaraṇa*. This is two or more sentences connected by mutual need, which makes them a context. In the place where the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* offerings are prescribed, five *prayāja* offerings also are enjoined, but without mention of a fruit. They therefore seek the *yāgas*, which should receive their service; and the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* offerings seek helpers. This mutual need connects them together, and *prayājas* become their *angas* (Section 3, Sub-Section 4).

(v) *Sthāna*. The three *pūrṇamāsa* offerings are prescribed in one place, and their *mantras* in another. As two sentences are connected by mutual need, so the two places are connected by mutual need, and the *mantras* become the *angas* of the offerings—the first *mantra* of the first offering; the second *mantra* of the second offering; and the third *mantra* of the third offering (Section 3, Sub-section 5).

(vi) *Samākhyā*. This is the meaning of words by *yoga* (Para 11). The term *houtram*, referring to the *rik veda*, connects it with the *hotā*, who alone is authorised to recite its verses. Similarly *ādhvaryavam* connects the *Yajur Veda* with the *adhvaryu*; and *āudgātram* connects the *Sāma Veda* with the *udgātā* (Section 3, Sub-Section 6).

19. It often happens that more than one *pramāṇa* are applicable in the interpretation of a text; and the question arises which of them should be followed. It is laid down that of the six *pramāṇas*—*Śruti*, *lingam*, *vākya*, *prakaraṇam*, *sthānam*, and *samākhyā* each is weaker than the preceding one. For *śruti* being the highest authority, everything else should be connected with it. In regard to *lingam* it must be inferred that there is a *śruti* in its support; and this means delay, while the authority of the *śruti* is quickly accepted. *Śruti* therefore prevails over *lingam*. As between *lingam* and *vākya*, a capacity has to be assumed in the latter, which must then be connected with a *śruti* by inference. It is therefore weaker than the other. As between *vākya* and *prakaraṇam* two sentences must be connected to form a *vākya*; this must then be connected with a *lingam* and through it with a *śruti*. *Prakaraṇam* is thus removed from *śruti* by the intervention of *vākya* and *lingam*, while there is but *lingam* between *vākya* and *śruti*. *Prakaraṇam* is therefore weaker than *vākya*. Similarly with regard to the others.

20. The following is an illustration. ‘With *aindri mantra* praise the *gārhapatya* (One of the three fires maintained by the householder). The termination of *aindri* is *śruti*, and makes the *mantra* an *anga* of the praising. But the term means a *mantra* of which *Indra* is the *devatā*; and it cannot appropriately be used in praising the fire. Here the indication of the *devatā*

Indra is *lingam*, which is weaker than *śruti*, and is over-ruled. The meaning of the word *Indra* established by usage is abandoned, and the meaning by *yoga* is adopted. This is the highest ruler, and it is not inappropriate to the *gārhapatya* fire, which is of greater importance than the other two (Section 3, Sub-section 7).

21. In this third chapter four important rules are deduced, to which reference will be made in the *Srī Bhāshya*. They are :

(i) *Aruṇā adhikaraṇam*. Here is a text — “with a red, reddish-brown eyed, one-year-old cow purchase the *soma*” (creeper). In the *mīmāṃsaka*’s view the word *aruṇayā* (red) denotes a quality only. By its termination, which is *śruti*, it makes the quality a means for the purchase; and the question is whether it can be the means. The first view is that it cannot be, and that the *śruti* cannot indicate the relation of *anga* and *angi*. The word *aruṇayā* should therefore be separated from the text. Then the *prakaraṇam* will come in; the *śruti* in the word will refer to everything mentioned in the context, and the other part of the word will prescribe the quality for all of them. The final decision is that the quality being stated by the *śruti* as a means of purchase, we must accept it. This cannot happen except through something having a form, and this is available here in the form of the one-year-old cow (Section 1, Sub-section 6).

22. (ii) *Graha-ekatva rule*. Here is a text “With the *dasā pavitram* wipe the *graha*.” *Graha* is a wooden vessel in which the juice of the *soma* is received and offered to various *devatās* ; when it is filled, it should be wiped with a towel to prevent any drop from falling down. Here wiping is enjoined; and the only question is whether oneness also is prescribed. This cannot be; for then the meaning would be—wipe the *graha*, and the *graha* to be wiped is one. There would be two sentences, while the text can be understood as one sentence only. To make two sentences in such a case is a serious fault. Hence in giving the direction it was not the intention to refer to the number. The subject in regard to which an injunction is given is known as *uddeśya*; and the rule is—the number of the word denoting the *uddeśya* should be neglected (Section 1, Sub-section 7).

23. (iii) *Vājapeya yūpa rule*. “Seventeen-aratni high is the *yūpa* of *vājapeya*.” *Yūpa* is a post to which the goat to be offered is tied. The view that the first word should be connected with the word *vājapeya*, which is next to it, is overruled by the fact that it and the word *yūpa* have the same case-ending. The *yūpa*, though not an *anga* of *vājapeya*, which is a *soma yaga*, yet it is an *anga* of the *paśu yāga*, which is itself an *anga* of *vājapeya*. Hence the *yūpa* may be an *anga* of *vājapeya* through its *anga* (Section 1, Sub-section 9).

24. (iv) *Upakrama adhikaraṇa*. Refer to the text quoted in para 18 (iii) *supra*. It comes at the end of a context, while its beginning refers to the three

vedas thus— ‘The three *vedas* were born; from *agni*, *Rik Veda* ; from *vāyu*, the *yajur, veda*; from *āditya* the *sāma veda*’. The terms *rik*, *yajur* and *sāman* denote *mantras* ; this is their primary meanings. Though the commencement is *arthavāda*, and the text at the close contains injunctions, and therefore possesses greater force, yet the close should not override the commencement. The commencement created the first impression. The text at the end did not then exist; it attained an existence afterwards so as not to conflict with the first impression; for it forms with the beginning a connected whole. Hence the words *rik*, *yajur*, and *sāman* mean the respective *vedas* : and the high and under tones are connected with them through the *mantras*, which are contained in them. The result of this discussion is that under this decision, the *rik* (verse) in the *Rik Veda* alone should be recited in a high tone, but not the *rik* (verse) in the *Yajur Veda* (Section 3, Sub-section 1).

25. Chapter 4 deals with *prayukti*. That is, it determines whether a thing that is prescribed helps an offering or whether it confers a benefit on the person who makes it. An example of the first is *prayāja* offerings. Without them, the principal offerings will not be effective; but they confer no benefit on the *yajamāna*. An example of the second is given in the following text— ‘For one who desires cows — in the vessel in which cows are milked’. This refers to the carrying of water in a *chamasa* (a four-sided wooden basin with a handle) and placing it to the north of the *āhavanīya* fire for making fried rice flour into a ball. The *ishti*, in which this is done, may be completed without the milking vessel. Hence, the use of the vessel is only for the *yajamāna*’s benefit (Section 1, Sub-section 2).

26. Chapter 5. deals with the order in which principal *karmas* and their *angas* should be done. The order is determined as follows :

(i) By *śruti* or express statement, as by the use of the participle ending with the termination *tvā* or its substitute *ya* (Section 1, Sub-section 1).

(ii) By the nature of things.

(iii) By the reading in the *veda*. In the text.

‘He does the *agnihotra homa* ; he cooks gruel’ the order is that of the reading in the *veda* ; but as it is the gruel that is to be offered, it should be cooked first, and then the offering should be made. This order is determined by the nature of things (*artha-krama*), and it over-rides the *pātha krama*. (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 2).

The order of reading in the *mantras* prevails over the order of reading in the *brahmaṇas* ; for the work of the latter is done, when the injunctions are given; it is the *mantras* that are concerned with the performance (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 9).

(iv) By the order of the first operation. In the *vājapeya* seventeen goats should be offered to the *devatā prajāpati* ; and every one of them should be dedicated, then tied to a post, and sprinkled with water. Ghee should be rubbed on its head, and live coal should be carried round it. Each operation should be gone through for all of them before the next operation is taken up. The first operation may be done in any order; but when this order has been determined, it should be followed for all the other operations (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 5).

(v) By the place of the *karmas*. In a *soma yāga* known as *sādyaskram* the three *pasu yāgas*, which should be done respectively on the fourth day, on the fifth day and after the bathing, are done on the same day. The second *yāga* retains its place, while the others are shifted from their places. The second *yāga*, therefore comes first, and the others in natural order (*Ibid.*, sub-section 6).

(vi) By the order of the principal *karmas*, In the *Chitrā yāga*, a variety of the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis*, seven offerings are made, of which the fourth and fifth are to *Sarasvati* (a female *devatā*) and *sarasvān* (a male *devatā*). By a rule of grammar one word in the dual number denotes both the *devatās*, and this word is used in the injunction text. The order of the offerings is determined by the *hotā's mantras*, and the offering is made first to *Sarasvati* and then to *Sarasvān*. In the preparation of the offerings also, the same order should be followed (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 7).

27. One other case of order should be mentioned here. In the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis* the offerings commence with the placing of fifteen twigs on the fire, one after another, with a *mantra*, and the number of *mantras* is therefore fifteen. But in certain *yāgas* performed like the *ishtis*, the number of *mantras* is raised to twenty-one. The additional *mantras* are brought in from a place, which the *veda* indicates. The question is where they should be placed. As there is no reason why the order fixed in the *ishtis* should be broken, the new comers should be placed at the end. An exception is made in the case of two *mantras*, which by express direction should be placed between the eighth and ninth *mantras* (Section 3, Sub-Section 3).

28. Chapter 6 deals with the qualifications for the performance of *yāgas*. They are a desire for their fruits, a knowledge of their ritual, and capacity for doing them. Every one may desire the fruits; and a student of the *veda* and of the *Kalpa sūtras* will have the necessary knowledge. The question of capacity alone has to be considered.

(i) First, the blind, the deaf, the mute and the maimed are obviously disqualified. The first cannot see what is going on; the second cannot hear, when addressed by the *adhvaryu*; the third cannot recite the *mantras* ; and the last cannot move about (Section 1, Sub-section 2).

(ii) One labouring under a bodily infirmity, which can be removed, remains disqualified, until the removal takes place (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 9 and 10).

(iii) Poverty is not a disqualification. A poor man becomes qualified on obtaining the necessary means (*Ibid.*, Sub-Section 8).

(iv) Sex is no disqualification. In the text "One desiring *svarga* (*Svarga-kāma*) should do a *yāga*", the masculine gender of the word denoting the *uddeśya* was not intended; for the same reason that the number was not (see para 22 *supra.*). But the wife cannot perform a *yāga* apart from her husband; nor the husband apart from his wife; for each has to perform certain functions in the *yāga* (*Ibid.*, Sub-sections 3 and 4).

29. The *sudra* is not qualified; for he does not possess the requisite knowledge, which should be obtained only from the *Veda*. As there is no injunction to do *upanayana* for him, he cannot do *adhyayana*, of which this ceremony is an *anga*. The *yāgas* prescribed by the *Veda* do not seek him, as they find qualified persons in the other castes. (Section 1, Sub-section 7). There are, however, two exceptions :

(i) Here is a text "In the rainy season a *rathakāra* should do *ādhānam*' (establishing the three fires). One may take the meaning of the term *rathakāra* by *yoga*, and say it means "one who makes a car". But by *rūḍhi* it denotes a member of a mixed caste; and *rūḍhi* prevails over *yoga*. One born of a *Vaiśya* woman to a *kshatriya* is known as *māhishya* ; a woman born of a *sudra* woman to a *vaiśya* is known as *karāṇi* ; and born of a *karāṇi* to a *Māhishya* is a *rathakāra*. In his case there is express authority (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 12).

(ii) In connection with the offering of cooked rice to the *devatā Rudra*, there is a text "By this help a *nishāda-sthapati* to do a *yāga*'. The compound word may be taken to be *Tatpurusha*, and explained as meaning the *sthapati* or head of *nishādas*, and this head may be a member of the higher castes. The term *nishāda* would then be used in a secondary sense, meaning one connected with *nishādas* ; this would be *lakṣaṇā*, which is a fault. Hence the compound word should be taken as *Karmadhāraya* to mean a *nishāda*, who is a *sthapati*. Being a member of a mixed caste, he cannot learn the *Veda* ; but on the authority of the text, the requisite knowledge should be obtained from a teacher at the time (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 13).

30. Section 5 of this chapter lays down the *apaccheda* rule, to which reference is made in the *Srī Bhāshya*. On the principal day of a *soma yāga* the *yajamāna* and five helpers go in procession from the east door of the *havirdhāna* to the north-east corner of the sacrificial ground, and then sitting down the *udgātā* and his two assistants sing the *stotram* known as *bahish pavamāna*. In the procession they go one behind another, holding him by the hand, and until

they reach the place, the chain should not be broken. If the *udgātā* lets go his hold, the *yāga* should be completed without distributing the promised rewards to the helpers, and it should be re-done. If the offender be the *pratihartā*, the penalty is that the *yajamāna* should give away all his wealth as rewards. Now, if both the breaks (*apaccheda*) take place at the same time, one or the other penalty may be paid at the option of the *yajamāna*. If they take place one after the other, the penalty for the later break should be paid. Here the two breaks are in no way connected, and either may happen first, or may not happen at all (Sub-sections 18 and 19).

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31. *Chapters 7 and 8.* The first six chapters give all the instructions needed for the performance of *yāgas* and are known as *upadeśa* part. The next four chapters deal with *atideśa*—i.e., with the application of the ritual of *prakṛiti yāgas* to those known as *vikṛiti yāgas*. The *prakṛiti yāgas* are *agnihotram*, *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis*, and *agnishṭoma soma yāga* ; and for these the ritual is explained in full detail. For the *vikṛiti yāgas* the *Veda* states merely their *devatās* and the offerings, and gives the *mantras* for making those offerings. The ritual of some *prakṛiti yāga* has to be selected and applied to them.

This selection is made in the following ways :

(i) *By express direction.* *Ṣyena* and *ishu* are two *soma yāgas* to which the ritual of *agnishṭoma* is applied. Certain special items are prescribed for the *ṣyena*, and a special item for the *ishu* ; and it is added 'The others (*Itarat*) are the same as in the *ṣyena*.' Thus, the *ṣyena* is expressly stated to be the *yāga* from which the ritual should be taken for the *ishu*. Now, does this application refer to all items or only to the special items ? The reply is given that the term 'others' refers to something that has been stated; and that therefore it refers to the special items only (Chapter 7, Section 1, Sub-section 2).

(ii) *By the name of a yāga.* Refer to the text in para 15 (vi). The name *agnihotra* indicates that the ritual should be taken from the *agnihotra* done throughout one's life (Chapter 7, Section 3, Sub-section 1).

(iii) *By marks* showing closest resemblance to the *vikṛiti yāga*. In the offering of cooked rice to the *devatā Sūrya* the *devatā* is single, and the offering is a vegetable product. These marks are found in the first offering of a *purodāśa* to the *devatā agni* in the *pūrṇamāsa ishti*. Hence this is selected. *Purodāśa* is a ball of fried rice flour. In the offering of a *purodāśa* to the *devatā Indra cum Agni* the selection should be of the third offering in the *pūrṇamāsa ishti*, in which also the *devatā* is double—viz., *agni cum soma*. In the offering of a *paśu* (a four-footed animal) to the *devatā agni cum Soma*, which is an *anga* of a *soma yāga*, the selection should be of the offering of milk to the *devatā Indra*, the second *yāga* in the *darśa ishti*. The offering in this comes from an animal, and parts of an

animal's body are offered in the *vikriti yāga*. In addition to this mark, there are two others, viz., *prayāja* and *āghāra* offerings found in both (Chapter 8, Section 1, Sub-Sections 2 and 4, and Section 2, Sub-sections 2 and 3).

32. When a *prakriti yāga* is indicated by the offering, and another by the *devatā*, the former should be selected. The material to be offered is close to the act of offering, while the *devatā* has to be thought of by the mind, and is therefore remote. (Chapter 8, Section 1, Sub-section 17).

33. Chapter 9 deals with *ūham* i.e., changes to be made in *mantras*. When the ritual is taken along with *mantras* from a *prakriti yāga*, and is applied to a *vikriti yāga*, some *mantras* may be found to be unsuitable. For instance, the *mantra* for taking paddy from a bag contains the word *agnaye* (for *agni*). This being unsuitable to the *yāga* of the *devatā sūrya* referred to in para 31 (iii), the word should be replaced by the word *sūryāya* (for *sūrya*) ; and this change in the *mantra* is *ūham*. (Section 1, Sub-section 13). In most cases the only change that need be made is to change the number or gender of a word.

34. This chapter contains the *pāṣa* rule, to which reference will be made in the *Srī Bhāṣya*. When the goat in a *paṣu yāga* is killed by suffocation, the *adhvaryu* goes to the place and unties the rope on its leg, with the *mantra*, 'May *aditi* untie these ropes'. There being but one animal and one rope, the plural *pāṣān* is unsuitable. May it be changed ? Reply: Not necessary. The word consists of three elements—*pāṣa* (rope), the termination showing it to be the object of untying, and the termination denoting its number. Of these the first is the most important, showing the object to be dealt with. The next element shows its relation to the work, and comes next; and the third element is the least important. As the first and second elements are not unsuitable, to fix attention on the least important element, and hold the whole *mantra* as unsuitable is not legitimate. No change need therefore be made (Section 3, Sub-section 5).

35. Chapter 10 deals with *bādha*, i.e., the annulment of an item coming in by *atideṣa*. This will occur in three ways :

(i) By the service to be rendered by the item not being required. In an offering to the *devatā prajāpati* the material consists of a hundred *krishṇālas* (small pieces of gold) cooked in ghee. By *atideṣa* the husking with a pestle and mortar comes in; and its service is to remove the husk from paddy. As this is not needed, the husking operation is dropped (Section 1, Sub-section 1).

(ii) By the prescription of a special item. Regarding the *paṣu yāga* to the *devatā agni cum soma*, it is stated that the *prayājas* are eleven. This item comes in by *atideṣa* with the number five from the *darṣa isṭi* ; but by the number eleven the number five is annulled. (Section 3, Sub-section 1).

(iii) By the use of the negative particle *na*—Regarding the *soma yāga* known as *atirātra* there are two conflicting texts—‘Fill the *shodaṣi graha* in *atirātra*’; ‘Do not fill the *graha* in *atirātra*’. Here the injunction and prohibition relating to the same matter, option is given to fill the *graha* or not fill it (Section 8, Sub-section 3).

36. Option (*Vikalpa*) is considered to be faulty in eight ways, and is avoided, wherever possible. For instance, in the text “In *anuyājas* do not recite *ye yajāmahe*”, the particle *na* may be joined to the verb as in the translation of the text here, or it may be connected with the word *anuyājas*. In the former case, it prohibits the recitation of the *mantra*; in the latter the meaning will be “Recite the *mantra* in offerings other than *anuyājas*.” In the former case it is *pratishedha*; in the latter *paryudāsa* (*Ibid.*, Sub-section 1).

37. Chapters 11 and 12 deal with *tantra* and *prasanga*. The five *prayāja* offerings serve the three principal offerings in the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa ishtis*. They are offered at the same place and time and by the same person. Should the *prayājas* be offered separately for each? Reply. No; they serve them all by being done but once, as a dancer pleases the whole of an audience by dancing before it, but not separately for each person. To do a thing once in this manner is known as *tantram* (Chapter 11, Section 1, Sub-section 10).

38. In the case considered in the last para all the three offerings are of equal importance. Where an offering comes between two offerings and is connected with them, but is of minor importance, it profits by the service rendered to the principal offerings. In the *paṣu yāga* to the *devatā Agni cum Soma*, the first is the offering of the *vapā* (the membrane covering the animal’s stomach), and the second is the offering of two bits from each of eleven parts taken out of its body. Between them comes the offering of a *puroḍāsa* to the same *devatā*. This occupies a subordinate position; and it profits by the *prayāja* offerings made for the principal *yāgas*. The receipt of service in this manner is known as *prasangam*. The difference between *tantram* and *prasangam* is that in the former it is the intention to serve them all; and that in the latter the subordinate *yāga* is not considered, when the service is rendered. (Chapter 12, Section 1, Sub-section 1).

39. Sections 3 and 4 of the last chapter discuss the question whether two or more things prescribed should be combined, or whether one or another of them may be done at one’s option. Regarding *āghāra* offerings in the *darṣa* and *pūrṇa māsa ishtis* it is stated “Make the *āghāra* in a straight line; make the *āghāra* continuously”. Here as service is rendered in different ways, both the operations should be combined. Regarding the *ishtis* there are two texts—‘Do the *yāga* with paddy’; and ‘do the *yāga* with *yava*’ (another grain). The service to be rendered is in the making of the *puroḍāsa*; and this service being one, it

may be done by either grain. In this case there is no combination, but only option to be exercised at the *yajamāna*'s choice (Section 3, Sub-sections 3 and 4).

40. To proceed to the *Brahma sūtras*. They number 545, and are divided into four chapters, each of which is sub-divided into four sections. The first chapter establishes *Brahma* as the only cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the Universe, the cause being both operative and material. The second chapter confirms this conclusion by removing every objection that may be urged against it. The remaining chapters deal respectively with the means by which *Brahma* may be reached, and with the nature of the goal. The first two chapters are concerned with what already exists—i.e., *Brahma*, while the last two chapters relate to what has to be brought about—i.e., the means and the goal. Each section discusses a number of topics. The *sūtra* or *sūtras* dealing with one topic form an *adhikaraṇa* or sub-section. In each of them a *vedic* text is taken; the views which may be held regarding it are examined and a final decision is arrived at. The first or superficial view is known as *pūrva paksha*, and the final decision as *Siddhānta*. The number of sub-sections is one hundred and fifty-six, distributed as shown below :

CHAPTER	SECTION				TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	
I.	11	6	10	8	35
II.	10	8	7	8	33
III.	6	8	26	15	55
IV.	11	11	5	6	33
Grand Total					156

The distribution of the *sūtras* among the sections is as follows :

CHAPTER	SECTION				TOTAL
	1	2	3	4	
I.	32	33	44	29	138
II.	36	42	52	19	149
III.	27	40	64	51	182
IV.	19	20	15	22	76
Grand total					545

41. It will be convenient to the reader to take a bird's eye-view of the contents of the *sūtras*. The first four sub-sections are preliminary, and remove

four objections which bar the proposed enquiry. The objections are—(i) As the *Upanishads* state what is, but do not direct the doing of an action, they can convey no meaning ; (ii) The definition given of *Brahma* is faulty. (iii) As *Brahma* can be known from inference, there is no need to examine the *veda* ; and (iv) The statements made therein being mere praise, there is no guarantee that what is stated is true.

42. In the next three sub-sections creation texts are examined to see who *Brahma* is. Taking first the *Sat Vidyā*, (Chapter VI of the *Chandogya*), it is shown that *prakriti* (matter) cannot be the Being under enquiry. For 'He willed, I will become many' (*Ibid.*, VI, 2-3) and evolved successively as fire, water and earth. This clearly indicates an intelligent Being. In the *Ānandavalli*, the world-cause is stated to be *ānandamaya*, i.e., possessing by His nature, bliss in a degree beyond thought or speech (IV, 1) ; and this mark separates Him from the *jeeva*, whether bound or free. Sub-section 7 draws attention to an exquisitely brilliant body with lotus-like eyes, in which He appears both in the sun and in the eye as seen by *yogis*. A Being answering this description is *Nārāyaṇa* Himself. This body is not one made by *karma* ; for this Being is said to have risen above all evil ; which term evil (*pāpma*) includes both good and bad deeds.

43. The remainder of Chapter I, excepting five sub-sections, examines twenty-three passages taken from different places, and decides that reference is made in them all not to a *jeeva* nor to a product of matter, as contended by the *Sāṅkhya*, but to *Brahma* Himself. This examination is needed in support of the conclusion already drawn. The sub-sections are grouped into four sections, as the marks on which the *first view* is based are very indistinct in the first section; indistinct in the second; and distinct in the third; and as in the fourth passages resemble the descriptions in *Sāṅkhya* books. Of the omitted sub-sections, three deal with the fitness of the *devas* for *vidyās* in general, and for the particular *vidyā* known as *Madhu vidyā*, and with the unfitness of the *sudra* for all *vidyās*. These three sub-sections come in incidentally. The fourth affirms that *Brahma* is material, as well as the operative cause of the Universe. The last sub-section concludes by referring to the arguments set out in the preceding *sūtras* for explanation of passages, which have not received special attention.

44. Chapter II, Section I. The conclusion stated in the first chapter that *Brahma* was both the operative and material causes, brings a host of opponents upon the author.

(i) The first objection is that the *Sāṅkhya* and *yoga sūtras* should not be ignored, as they were purposely written to elucidate the *vedānta*. The reply is that the works of *Manu* and *Parāśara*, which are consistent with the *Vedānta*, are available; while the works of *Kapila* and *Hiranyagarbha*, which conflict with it, should be rejected. (Sub-Sections 1 and 2).

(ii) The *vaiṣeṣhika*, the *Saugata* and the *Ārhata* come forward, and however much they may cut one another's throat, they join hands in attacking the author for not accepting evolution from minute atoms. The author dismisses them contemptuously with the remark that mere speculation cannot lead to a final result. (Sub-Section 4).

(iii) The *Sāṅkhya* re-appears and contends that there must be similarity between the cause and the effect; and that this does not obtain between *Brahma* and the universe. The reply is that the similarity as understood by the opponent is not uniform; for a scorpion comes forth from a handful of cow-dung, and a wasp from a worm. (Sub-section 3).

(iv) The *vaiṣeṣhika* now appears on the scene, and urges that *Brahma* cannot evolve as the universe, as the cause and the effect are always distinct. His arguments are criticised, and the *Sat Kārya* theory is established. A bystander, who hears this decision, comes forward to say that if this be so, *Brahma*, and the *jeeva* being one, the evolution should be entirely different, and not be a matter of great disadvantage to Himself as the *Jeeva*. The author replies that *Brahma* is different from the *jeeva*, and that He is one with the *jeeva* in the sense of forming an aggregate evolves from the subtle to the gross condition. (Sub-Sections 6 and 7).

(v) The remaining objections consist of four items :

(a) The potter, though with a lump of earth before him, and though capable of making it into various articles, is yet helpless without his wheel and rod. Is not *Brahma* equally helpless in the absence of the necessary instruments. For before creation they did not exist. Reply. Being omnipotent, He evolves independently of help, as milk changes into curd, and water changes into ice. (Sub-Section 8).

(b) The potter's lump of earth is either wholly expended in the making of vessels, or a portion remains unworked up; and this alternative is possible, as it is divisible. Is *Brahma* fully expended, when He becomes the *ātmā* of every aggregate, or is any portion left over ? The latter alternative is out of the question, as He is indivisible. Reply. He is the *ātmā* of every aggregate, and has also a separate existence; for it is so taught. In a matter, which is wholly beyond the senses, the facts should be accepted as they are stated by the *Veda*. Being an unique Being, He should not be tested by what is seen in the world. (Sub-section 9).

(d) The potter works to earn his livelihood. Why does *Brahma* work ? Is it not stated that He has everything that one can ever desire to possess ? The reply is that it is mere play. This does not, however, imply partiality and cruelty on His part—partiality in making some *jeevas* as *devas*, others as men,

and still others as beasts or plants and trees; and cruelty in making them suffer misery now and tortures in hell hereafter. The reply is that He is a common agent, and rules impartially, giving to each what he has earned by his own *karma*. (Sub-section 10).

45. *Chapter II, Section 2*. In this, the author carries war into the opponent's camp, and exposes their faults, in order that one may not be deluded into thinking that there is something of value in their systems. He examines them as shown below :

	Sub-section
<i>Sāṅkhya</i> system	1
<i>Vaiśeṣika</i>	2
<i>Soutrāntika</i> and <i>Vaibhāṣika</i> 's	3
<i>Yogachār</i> 's system.	4
<i>Madhyamika</i> 's theory	5
<i>Arhata</i> system	6
<i>Pasupata</i> system.	7

In the last sub-section, he defends the *Pāñcharātra*, the teaching given by *Īśvara* Himself to several individuals at different times, and shows that the objections raised against it are due to misunderstanding.

46. *Chapter II, Sections 3 and 4*. In these, the question of evolution is examined from the point of view of the products. It is shown that everything evolves from *Brahma*, except the *jeeva*,—ether and air, and the instruments of the *jeeva*, the *mind*, the five sense organs, the five organs of motion and *prāṇa*. (Sub-sections 1 and 3).

(ii) It is also shown that the five elements evolved directly from Him, and it is affirmed very clearly that the meanings of words are primary, not secondary, when they denote *Brahma* (Sub-section 2).

(iii) This evolution is known as *samashṭi*—creation without diversity. In the evolution, which followed it also, known as *vyashṭi*, i.e., creation with diversity, it is He that works, but through His agent *Brahmā*. (Section 4, sub-section 8).

(iv) Some minor matters are dealt with. The number of senses is eleven, including the mind; these and *prāṇa* are of minute size; *prāṇa* is a product of air; but it is neither air nor its activity; it is an instrument of the *jeeva*, but not like the mind and the senses; for, its function is to regulate the vital processes; and though its activities are five-fold, it is regarded as one.

47. *Section 3, Sub-sections 4 to 6*. These deal with the *jeeva*, and come in incidentally in connection with the question whether he is made like ether or not. First, the view of the *Sāṅkhya*, that the *jeeva* is merely *jñānam* (self-revealed) and not a knower, and the view of the *vaiśeṣika* that he possesses the attribute *jñānam* only as an accident are refuted, and it is shown that he is both self-revealed, and is by nature the owner of the attribute *jñānam*. In

support of this conclusion, it is proved that he is atomic in size, that he abides in the heart, and knows everything with the attribute *jnānam*, which spreads all round him within the body. It is also shown that he acts, and is a responsible agent; but that this capacity is limited by the control of *Brahma*. The author refutes the *Sāṅkhya*'s view, that the *jeeva* does not act, having nothing to gain by action, and that what acts is matter in the form of the mind. His responsibility is not, however, incompatible with control by *Brahma*. For He first looks to the *jeeva*'s resolve. 'I will do this' and then accepting it, moves him. As the world-ruler He gives to each a body, and the mind and the sensory and motor organs, and confers on him the capacity to control them. He gives him the *veda* to know what *karma* is good and what is evil. He supports him by His presence within him, and except in the first choice he co-operates with him, every action being done by both. In so far as He does these things, He treats all alike and is thoroughly impartial. The *jeeva*, being thus helped, begins to do good or evil deeds, as his desire prompts him; and *Brahma* rewards or punishes him as he deserves.

48. *Chapter III*. This chapter deals with the means by which the *jeeva* may attain release; but a disgust should first be created for his condition of bondage and a yearning to reach *Brahma*. Section 1 has the first object in view. When the *jeeva* goes after death to *svarga*, he goes in a subtle body fashioned out of the last earthly body; and he returns in the same body, which forms the nucleus of the new earthly body (Sub-section 1). All his past *karma* is not expended; but he returns with a load of what has not yet matured (Sub-section 2). Even this short-lived enjoyment is denied to most *jeevas*, who quickly return to earth-life. All those who do not enter a mother's womb to be reborn are of this class (Sub-section 3). Sub-sections 4 to 6 explain that on the return journey the *jeeva* in his subtle body is merely in contact with various things, such a contact as prevents his being recognised. If he were a *devatā* controlling them, or had a body made of these materials, he might have had enjoyment of a sort; but this is denied; and he is said to be in a sleepy condition. If he were born as a plant or a tree, he might be useful to men and accumulate merit; this also is denied. This is sufficient to make any one be disgusted with material existence, if he turns his attention to the matter.

49. *Chapter III, Section 2*. The object of this is to create in the *jeeva* a yearning to reach *Brahma*. He creates a dream-world to the sleeping *jeeva*, as reward or punishment for *karma* of a petty kind. As his Inner Ruler he receives him during deep sleep and gives him a short respite from the turmoils of the day (Sub-sections 1 and 2). This union of the *jeeva* with his Maker is not final release; For he soon resumes his previous name and form (Sub-section 3). The next sub-section, shows *Brahma* to be free from all imperfections and to be the seat of every estimable quality. Though this is clear from numerous texts, several misconceptions have to be removed. These are—

(i) He must suffer pleasure and pain like the *jeeva*, as he is within his body. It was pointed out in Chapter I, section 2, *sūtra* 8, that not being the owner of the body, He remained unaffected. It is now urged that the *jeeva's* body, being in every way undesirable, entry into it, even of His own choice, must pollute Him. The reply is that this does not happen, as there are express statements to that effect.

(ii) As the maker of diverse names and forms, He himself is *Brāhmaṇa*, *kshattriya* and so on, and becomes subject to the performance of all the duties pertaining to them; this is bondage. The reply is that though He takes the forms and names, He is practically without them; i.e., He is free from their effects.

(iii) Being Himself *Jnānam* (self-revealed), he cannot possess qualities. The reply is that the text relied on merely makes an affirmation; and that no denial is implied. If he be accepted as *jnānam* on the authority of one text, He should be accepted as the seat of good qualities on the authority of other texts. The denial of attributes in a *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka* text means that the forms expressly taught in that place are not His only forms.

It is next shown that no being is higher than He, and that it is He who gives all fruits, not only release, but even worldly enjoyment. (Sub-Sections 7 and 8).

50. Chapter III, Section 3. The instruction conveyed in the two preceding sections should make one anxious to begin *Brahma vidyā*, and this is considered in this section. The first question is whether two or more places in the *Upanishads* teach the same *vidyā*. This is determined by four marks—the form of the injunction, the substance of the meditation, the fruit promised and the name of the meditation. If these be the same, the *vidyā* is one. This test is applied in 17 cases as shown on the margin :

	Sub-Sections
(i) <i>Udgītha vidyā</i>	2,17,22,26
(ii) <i>Dahara vidyā</i>	16,18,19
(iii) <i>Prāṇa vidyā</i>	3,5
(iv) <i>purusha Vidyā</i>	9
(v) <i>vaiṣvānara vidyā</i>	23
(vi) <i>śāṇḍilya vidyā</i>	6
(vii) <i>Other vidyās</i>	7,8,10,15,20

The remaining sub-sections deal with the following topics common to all *vidyās* :

(a) Those attributes, without which *Brahma* cannot be recognised, should form the subject of meditation in all cases (sub-section 4). This conclusion is

extended to the negative attributes enumerated in *Mundaka* (I, 1-6). (Sub-Section 14).

(b) As the meditator also enters into the meditation, he should think of himself as he would be in release i.e., as possessing eight qualities in common with *Brahma* (Sub-section 21).

(c) Along with the principal meditation, there should be two subsidiary ones—(i) on the *devayāna* (the path by which the freed *jeeva* goes up,) and (ii) on the separation of his good and bad deeds, when meditation is established, and on the transfer at his death of the good deeds to his friends, and of the bad deeds to his enemies. The transfer takes place at the point of death, but not some portion then and the remainder on crossing the *virajā*. The subtle body, in which he travels, though not originated by *vidyā*, is yet retained under its power as the necessary means of the journey (Sub-sections 11,12 and 13).

(d) The *Brahma vidyās* are not the same, though the object meditated on is *Brahma* in all of them; for the form of meditation is not the same, but differs in each case (Sub-section 24). But as the fruit of all is the same, viz., the getting out of the beginningless *karma*-stream, and the enjoyment of *Brahma*, it is left to each to choose any one *vidyā*. In the case of other fruits, which are limited, the combination of many means is intelligible; but *Brahma* is a fruit which is in no way limited (Sub-section 25).

51. *Chapter III, Section 4.* In this section, the helps to *Brahma-vidyā* are examined; but first the relative importance of *vidyā* and *karma* (*yāgas* enjoined in the earlier portion of the *veda*) is fully discussed. The helps to *vidyā* are of four classes :

(a) The duties of one's stage of life prescribed by the *veda*. (Sub-section 5).

(b) Control of the mind and the rest stated in the text 'Hence, one who knows this, controls the mind, controls the senses, withdraws from prohibited and fruit-yielding actions, bears with equanimity whatever comes, and preserves a serene mind, and thus equipped he sees *parama ātmā* in himself'. The helps of the first kind do not conflict with the control of the mind, as they relate to different matters. The former variety relates to what is enjoined, and the latter to everything else. Nor will the performance of *karmas* continue evil tendencies, if they be performed as worship of *Brahma* ; for it has the reverse effect (Sub-section 6).

(c) Control in the matter of food. This is a particular form of the control already prescribed; but its importance deserves special mention (Sub-Section 7).

(d) Three duties mentioned in the text—'Hence, one who has learned the *veda* should attain *pāṇḍityam* ; having done this, he should be like a child and

do meditation ; having acquired *pāṇḍityam* and child nature, he should become *muni*". The term *pāṇḍityam* means such a grasp of *vedic* learning, as will make one separate the wheat from the chaff, and produce a disgust for worldly things. To be like a child is to abstain from parading one's greatness; and to become a *muni* is ever to dwell on the object of meditation, whenever one is disengaged, the object being to prevent the mind from turning to worldly matters. (Sub-Sections 12 and 13).

52. In Chapter I, Section 4, sub-sections 7 to 9, the fitness for *vidyā* was examined, with reference to the main division of *jeevas* as *devas* and men, and the sub-division of men into castes (*varṇas*). It is now considered with reference to the stages of life. Men in all stages are fit, as also the widower, who remains outside. Examples of such men are found in *Bhishma* and *Raikva*. But one, who has fallen from the stages other than that of the house-holder, remains ever unfit, however much he may expiate his fall by penance (Sub-section 10).

53. Chapter IV, Section 1. The last chapter deals with the fruits of meditation; but the form of meditation is first described. It was not considered in Chapter III, Section 3, its proper place, in order to show that a loving meditation is itself a fruit. The meditation should be continuous.

(ii) *Brahma* should be thought of as the *ātmā* of the meditator, i.e., as one who rules him from within. For, this is the truth, and he must realise his position in release as dependent on that Being, and as existing only for Him. The meditation should be in the sitting posture. No other condition is prescribed. The point to be remembered is that the place, time and conditions selected should be such as will be conducive to one—pointedness. It should be continued up to the moment of departure from the world (Sub-sections 1,2,5 and 6).

54. The fruits of meditation are of four classes. Separation of *karma* from the meditator, his rising through the blood vessel going from the heart to the top of the head, his journey along the path known as *devayāna*, and his enjoyment in the highest heaven. Sub-sections 7 to 11 deal with the first variety. When meditation is established, past *karma* is destroyed, and future *karma* will not pollute the meditator. This is a very merciful dispensation. If all past *karma* were to be wiped out by enjoyment, there would be no release whatever; for such wiping out the possession of a body would be *sine qua non* ; and in that body the making of more *karma* would be inevitable. The non-attachment of future *karma* should be restricted to such as take place in sleep, and without intention (Sub-section 7). What has been stated is limited to the past *karma*, which has not begun to yield fruit. If all *karma* were intended, then the body should be thrown up at once; but its continuance for some time is a fact. The body therefore continues till *prārabdha*, that is *karma*, which has begun to yield fruit, is wiped out. (Sub-section 9).

55. *Chapter IV, Section 2.* This deals with fruits of the second class; but before considering them, it should be known for certain that the *jeeva* to be released departs at all from his body. For a doubt is created by a text of the *Kathavalli*, and it is removed (Sub-Section 5). The rising from the body is described in sub-sections 1 to 4, 6 and 7, and happens in this manner. The tongue and other senses unite with the mind; the mind with senses unite with *prāṇa*; this unites with the *jeeva*, and with him unites with the five elements of his body in a subtle form; and the whole unites with *Brahma* in the heart. As in the case of sleep the departing *jeeva* derives comfort after the turmoils of the earth-life which has come to end. So far the rising from the body is common to all *jeevas*. Here begins the difference. The *jeeva* to be released rises along the blood vessel going from the heart to the head. By the grace of *Brahma* the end of the heart begins to shine, and he is able to see the entrance into the blood-vessel (Sub-section 8). He then journeys to the sun along his rays, which connect this world and the sun, as a road connects two villages (Sub-section 9). There is no restriction in his case as to the time of departure; it may be the day or the night; the six months of the sun's northward progress or the other part of the year. These restrictions apply to one who is to be re-born; but in the case of the *jeeva* to be freed there is delay only till his body is thrown up. He has no more *karma* to be wiped out, and there is therefore no need for another earth-life (Sub-sections 10 and 11).

56. *Chapter IV, Section 3.* This deals with the third variety of the fruits. It decides that there is but one path known as the *devayāna*, and settles who are the beings that take the freed *jeeva* on, and in what order. The last sub-section shows where the freed *jeeva* is carried. The *rishi Bādari* was of opinion that he is taken to the creative agent *Brahmā*; and this view is refuted.

57. *Chapter IV, Section 4.* This shows that the freed *jeeva* attains his true nature, including the full expansion of his attribute *jnānam*. He realises his oneness with the *Brahmā*, and thenceforward he has no interest except in co-operating with him and serving Him. He is not merely *jnānam* (Self-revealed), but attains the eight qualities in common with Him. One of these is the capacity to compass anything by mere willing. He may take one or more bodies, as he needs for His service. If he does so, he may create such things as are required, as he did in the waking condition during bondage. If he does not take up any body, he derives enjoyment from things created by *Brahma*, as he did formerly in the dream condition. He has the same enjoyment as He Himself; and there is nothing excluded from such enjoyment, and the degree of bliss attained is the same. Finally, there is no return to this earth life; for having become all-knowing, there will be no desire on his part to do so; nor will *Brahmā* send him away, after all the trouble that He took to bring him to Himself. The bliss endures for ever.

58. In conclusion, the lines, on which the translation has been made, should be explained. The text of the original is not followed closely; but the substance has been taken and expressed in English. Repetitions have been avoided, wherever possible. The vedic texts, which are considered in the original, have been separately translated with the help of the *Upanishad Bhāshya* by *Ranga Rāmānuja*, and copious notes have been added therefrom. Hence, the portions of *Srī Bhāshya*, which quote the texts at great length, and explain them in detail, have been omitted; but are embodied in the translation of the vedic texts. Finally, minor matters, discussed at great length and breaking the continuity of the main topic have been taken out of the text and added as foot notes.

59. The detailed criticism also of the views of *Ṣankara*, *Bhāskara*, *Yādava Prakāṣa* and *Vāchaspati* contained in chapter 1, section 1, sub-sections 1 and 4, and chapter 2, section 1, sub-section 5 has been omitted. From its large size it should form a separate work. It has been translated with the title “*Three Tatvas*” and is ready for publication.

60. The *Srī Bhāshya* cannot be fully understood without the help of the voluminous commentary named *Ṣruta Prakāṣika*. It was written by a teacher, who was removed from *Srī Rāmānuja* by three teachers only, and who may therefore be supposed to have known his meaning fully. It deals with three matters. It elucidates the *Srī Bhāshya*, explains vedic texts, and critiques in detail the interpretations of the various *Sūtras* given by other commentators. The first has been embodied in the translation in the body of the text, or has been added as foot-notes. The second has been embodied in the “Vedic texts,” and the third has been omitted for the reason stated in para 59. It has not, however, been incorporated in the “*Three Tatvas*”. The *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali* of *Srī Desika* and the *Bhāva prakāṣika* and *sārīraka sāstrartha dipika* of *Ranga Rāmānuja* have also been largely utilised.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER I

SECTION 1

PRELIMINARY

The author in beginning his work offers a prayer to the highest Being

Verse 1:

May *Ṣemushī* (thought) in the form of loving meditation on *Srīnivāsa*, the highest *Brahma* (1), come to me, the Being to whom (2) the evolution, sustenance and dissolution and the like of all created things is mere play;

1. *Brahma* is a general term, and *Srīnivāsa* is a particular term, and when they are used together, the general term is synonymous with the particular term. This is the rule laid down in the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*. There is a direction: "Do the *yāga* with a *paṣu*"; and there is the direction to the *hotā* (one of the helpers in a sacrifice) to recite the appropriate *mantra* for the offering of the *vapā* of the *chāga* (goat). *Paṣu* is a general term, meaning any four-footed animal ; and the term *chāga* is a particular term. The general term *paṣu* therefore refers to the goat (*Mīmāṃsā*, VI-8-9). Following this rule, we should understand that the general term *sat*, *brahma*, *ātmā* and the like, which are used in the *Upanishads*, denote *Nārāyaṇa*, which is a particular term also found therein. Both the general and particular terms are used in the verse to point this out. The term *Srīnivāsa* by its etymology indicates that this Being appears with an exquisitely fine body in a world without changes brought about by time; and by its established usage, it exposes the error of the views held by some (i) that the three Beings—*Brahma*, *Vishṇu* and *Rudra*—are of equal importance; (ii) that they are one being in three forms; (iii) that *Brahma* is above them all; and (iv) that *Īṣvara* alone is *Brahma*, that He is other than the three beings mentioned, that he is ever bliss, and that the three beings are subject to him. The term highest (*parasmin*) qualifying the term *Brahmaṇi* indicates that no other Being need be approached by one for gaining his end, and that He who is the highest bliss is also the means thereto. It also indicates that He is free from all imperfections.

Similarly, the term *ṣemushī* (thought) in the original is a general term and *bhakti* (loving meditation) is a particular term; and their use in the verse is to show that the terms to know, to think and the like used in the *Upanishads* mean only loving meditation. By the term 'thought' the view that release is obtained by both *jnānam* (thought) and *karma* (action) is shown to be erroneous; and by the term *bhakti* (loving meditation) the view that the mere understanding of a text is such means is refuted.

(2) *The first adjectival clause* — created things': This is the meaning of the term *bhuvana* in the original. It means what becomes—i.e., evolves. All created things in whatever worlds they may be, and not merely in this our world, in which the creative agent, the four-faced *Brahmā* holds sway; also all things that existed in the past, that exist at present and that may come into being in the future. The Sanskrit for 'all' is *akhila*, which denotes that nothing is omitted from the scope of creation. It is therefore a stronger word than *sakala* (all). The term *nikhila* will perform the same duty; but *akhila* is better, as the first letter in it means *Vishṇu*, and is therefore auspicious in the commencement of a work. *Sustenance*: This is done by entry into all things, and by controlling them, by *avatāras*, and by influencing the world-rulers, *manus*, kings and parents. The words 'and the like' refer to the entry into every thing and its control. It

whose (3) main resolve is to protect all those who know Him and approach Him in all humility, and also all those who are related to them; and who (4) clearly shines in the principal portion of the *śruti* (*Veda*). (5), (6), (7).

does not include the giving of *moksha* (release from bondage to matter); for from its importance it deserves separate mention; and this is done in the second adjectival clause. The term 'play' indicates that this Being has every object of desire; that therefore He has nothing to gain for Himself by this work; and that He acts of His own choice, and not from compulsion by any outside agency.

(3) *Second adjectival clause* — 'Those who know Him': This is the meaning of the term *bhūta* in the original. Those who do not know Him may be said to be non-existent. 'Approach in all humility' refers to loving meditation on Him and to *prapatti*. This is to point out one's helplessness and to request Him to save him without the meditation. Those who approach Him in this manner are of many kinds — *devas* and men; among men they are in all stages of life — students, house-holders, forest-dwellers and those who have renounced the world. His love for them is so full, that it does not stop with them, but over-flows towards all those who are in any way related to them. To 'protect' them is to avert from them what is undesirable, and to give them what they desire. His main resolve is to do this work; for He regards it as of greater importance than any connected with Himself. The term *dīksha* in the original, which means 'resolve', indicates that this protection is His own gain, and that any failure in this matter is to His own detriment.

(4) *Third adjectival clause*. The term *śruti*—meaning what is ever heard—indicates that the *Veda* was not made by any one, that it is eternal and that therefore it is free from imperfections of every kind. The *Upanishads* form an important portion of the *śruti*, as the head is an important portion of the body; and this importance is due to their treating of the Highest *Brahma* as their main topic. He shines in the earlier part of the *veda*; for though it refers to *Agni*, *Indra* and other *devatās*, they are in reality the forms in which He appears. In the *Upanishads*, however, He appears in His own form. The earlier part again deals with the means to enjoyments of a petty nature, which are mixed with suffering; but the *Upanishads* deal with the highest *Brahma*, who is bliss beyond thought or speech, and who is therefore the highest goal, which man can seek.

(5) By the first clause the greatness of *Brahma* is indicated, and by the second his accessibility. Both these are necessary, so that one may approach Him and beg for release. There is a hill named *meru*, which is said to be pure gold; but it cannot be reached. Pot shreds abound in the street; but they are of no value.

(6) In addition to containing a prayer, the verse briefly indicates the contents of the *sūtras*—By the first clause the subject of the first chapter, which is that *Brahma* is the cause of the evolution of the world, and that nothing else is. In the second chapter all objections to this conclusion are answered, and this is indicated by the term play (*līlā*). The terms *vinata* (approaching in all humility) and *rakshā* (protection) in the second clause indicate the subjects of the third and fourth chapters. To evolve the world, and to give *moksha* (release) are peculiar functions of *Brahma*. The third clause indicates the first four sub-sections. If the words in the *Upanishads* do not convey any meaning, or if the definition of *Brahma* be faulty, *Brahma* cannot be said to shine in the *veda*. His shining clearly in the *Upanishads* indicates the fourth sub-section, which shows that *Brahma* is the highest bliss, and that therefore an examination of the *Upanishads* is highly profitable.

(7) The verse also indicates dissent from many erroneous views current in the country at one time or another. One view is that *Īśvara* merely looks on, while evolution takes place. Another is that evolution of the world does not take place at the same time, nor its dissolution. Still another view is that there are not many *jeevas*, and that

The author next states the subject of his work, and the need for writing it.

Verse 2

May the pure-minded on earth daily drink the nectar(1) of the words of *Parāśara*'s son, (2) which have been taken out from the middle of the milk ocean of the *Upanishads*, (3) and which are calculated to give immortal life to those, from whom *Brahma* has ever been absent owing to the continuous burning of the fire of *samsāra* (4) (cycle of births and deaths). Though the teaching given

the *jeeva* and *Brahma* are one. The *chārvāka*, *Bauddhas* and *jainas* do not accept the authority of the *veda*; the *Vaiśeshika* (the logician) holds the view that *Īśvara* can be known by inference. He advocates evolution of the world from atoms, without the control of *Brahma*; while the *Sāṅkhya* is of opinion that evolution takes place from *pradhāna* independently; and he does not recognise the existence of an All-Ruler. The *pāṣupata* regards *Paśupati* as the highest Being. All these views are held to be erroneous, and this is indicated by the several words in the verse.

Verse 2. (1) Reference is made to the puranic story of the churning of the milk ocean by the *devas* and *asuras*, of the coming out of nectar (*amritam*) from it, and of its being drunk by the *devas*, who thereby obtained immunity from death. The *Upanishads* are like the milk ocean; the *sūtras* of *Vyāsa* alias *Bādarāyaṇa*, the son of *Parāśara*, are like nectar; and the study of the *sūtras* and the adoption of the means therein pointed out will lead to freedom from the cycle of births and deaths, as the nectar gave immortality to the *devas*. The author invites all men, who are able to separate the essential from the non-essential, to read them with his commentary every day and enjoy them. For, they will give the same enjoyment, as the nectar did to the *devas*.

(2) Thus the subject of the commentary is the *sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*; their subject is the *Upanishads*, and their subject again is *Brahma*. Thus the commentary deals with *Brahma*, His nature and attributes, the attainment of immortal life and the means therefor.

(3) By stating that the *sūtras* were taken out from the *Upanishads*, it is indicated that other *sūtras*, like those of the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Vaiśeshika* are not based on proper authority. By reference to the older teachers, it is indicated that the author's commentary is based on their works, and that other commentaries on the *sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa* do not deserve respect. By comparing the *Upanishads* to the ocean of milk, it is shown that they are of greater value than the earlier portion of the *Veda*; by the word ocean (*abdhī*) they are shown to be numberless; by the word middle it is indicated that the primary meaning of no one text is departed from. For, the middle of a thing is at the same distance from the sides.

(4) By comparing *samsāra* to fire, it is shown that it is full of suffering—suffering caused by one's own body, by the elements and by the *devatās*, and that even in *svarga*, which is regarded as a place of pure enjoyment, there is the fear ever present that it

by them was carefully (5) preserved, by the older teachers, yet owing to many views, which have been put forward in recent times, and to the conflict among them and with it, it has stood at a distance. It is brought back by my commentary.

The author next explains why the works of older teachers are not resorted to, and why the trouble of writing a new work, and of publishing it is undertaken

Commencement

Bhagavān bodhāyana (1) wrote a voluminous commentary on the *Brahma sūtras* and this *Dramiḍa* abridged. Following (2) their views, the *sūtras* will be explained having regard to their wording (3).

SUB SECTION 1

In this sub-section it will be shown that the words in the *Upanishads* can convey their meaning, and that therefore the proposed enquiry into *Brahma* may be made :

1 . अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ।

After this and for that reason enquiry into *Brahma* should be made.

will come to an ? end. By the word 'burning', it is meant, that until one begins to meditate on *Brahma*, the fire is never extinguished, and that it causes suffering in many ways—bodily suffering and mental suffering. The original for "has been absent" is *vyapagata*; the prefixes therein show that this absence has had no beginning, and that it relates to many matters, knowing, seeing and reaching *Brahma*.

(5) *Preserved*— not merely by teaching, but by written works also; by the older teachers *Sankara* and other recent commentators are excluded.

(1) By the term *bhagavān* it is shown that *Bodhāyana* is our best friend, and that we may rely on him. By the term 'voluminous' it is meant that if one lived the full span of a hundred years, and if all his life he studied it, *Bodhāyana's* commentary would serve its purpose; but these conditions do not generally exist. *Dramiḍa*, on the other hand, went to the other extreme, and omitted the refutation of rival systems. If all men were naturally intelligent, this defect would not matter much. But they are not. Hence a commentary is needed, which avoids both the extremes, and which, while pointing out the faults in the other systems, is such as can be easily mastered.

(2) *Following their views*— but not putting forward a new view spun from his own brain.

(3) *Their wording*— Paying particular attention to the roots and terminations of the words in the *sūtras* ; but not attempting to suit the *sūtras* somehow to some view of one's own.

1. Meaning of the *sūtra* (1). The first word *atha* means in this place “after”, and indicates that something has been completed, and that another matter is (2) taken up. The next word *atah* (3) gives the completed matter as a reason for the next step. When one has learned the *veda*, including its later portion, (4) and the six branches of learning attached to it, he will examine the *veda*, beginning with its earlier portion. He will then perceive that the *karmas* therein enjoined can of themselves yield only petty and short-lived fruits. He will then desire *moksha* (release from *samsāra*), and will begin an enquiry into

Para 1. (1) The commentary on a *sūtra* consists of five processes : the breaking up of the *sūtra* into its component words, the statement of their meanings, the breaking up of compound words, the statement of the meaning of the *sūtra* as a whole and replying to objections. The author therefore begins by stating the meaning of the first two words.

(2) The word *atha* has many other meanings; but they are *not* suitable here. For instance :

(a) It indicates that a subject is begun. When a beginning is made, the fact is perceived, without its being stated. In such *sūtras* as *atha yogānuṣāsanam* (the teaching of *yoga* is begun) this meaning cannot be accepted, as it is not possible to point to some matter which preceded it.

(b) It marks an auspicious beginning. This it does by its very sound, and it can do this, while conveying some other meaning. If it be regarded as expressing auspiciousness, *atha* would qualify the term *brahma-jijnāsā*, and the meaning would be that the enquiry into *Brahma* is good. It would then praise the enquiry, and make the *sūtra* an *arthavāda* (page 3, note 1), not a statement of reason, which it is. If *atha* did not qualify the term, the meaning would be the enquiry should be made and it would be good. Thus, there would be two sentences, which is not legitimate, if the *sūtra* can be understood as a single sentence. (Intro., para 22.)

(c) It indicates the passing from one alternative to another; but it cannot do this here, as there are no alternatives.

(d) It indicates a question. The meaning would then be, should enquire into *Brahma* be made ? There should be an answer to the question; but there is no answer here.

(e) It expresses entirety; if the question were whether *Brahma* should be enquired into fully or only in part, the *sūtra* would reply—“not in part, but wholly.” But no such doubt has arisen. The only doubt is whether the enquiry should be made at all. Thus, the only suitable meaning is that stated in the text.

3. This is confirmed by the two words, which follow. In the term *atah* the root is a pronoun, and it makes reference to something, which has gone before. It therefore shows that something has been done, and that is assigned as a reason for the matter now taken up. The next term *brahma-jijnāsā* also leads to the same conclusion. *Brahma* is the subject of the enquiry to be taken up. Its being dealt with in the later portion of the *veda*, it leads to the inference that the completed matter was enquiry into the earlier portion.

(4) *Including its later portion.* This shows that the whole of the *veda* has been learnt. The six branches are : *vyākaraṇa* (grammar), *nirukta* (glossary of vedic terms), *Śikshā* (pronunciation of vedic words), *Chandas* (metre of vedic verses), *Kalpa* (ritual

Brahma, who is bliss unlimited in its nature and enduring for ever. Hence the completed matter (5) is an examination of the *karma-kānda* of the *veda* (6).

2. The third word is a compound, of which the first member is *Brahma* (1). From its etymology it denotes a thing which has the attribute of being immeasurably great in its substance and in its attributes. This is its primary meaning; and the Being, who answers this description, is *Purushottama*, the ruler of all. For by nature He is free from every imperfection, and is the seat of hosts of good qualities, the excellence of which has no limit, and which cannot be counted. When the word denotes any other thing, it is used in a secondary sense (2), as possessing a tittle of this attribute. This conclusion, which has been reached by considering the etymology of the word, is confirmed by the nature of things. The Being, who is approached for release by those, who are miserable, must by nature, be free from all imperfections; for a prisoner in chains is not approached for help by those similarly situated.

for the performance of the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda*), and *jyotisham* (so much of astronomy as is needed for determining the proper days for their performance). The learning of these would enable the student to understand the *veda*, though superficially.

(5) The completed matter is the enquiry into the nature of *karmas* and of their fruits. This will create a disgust for such *karmas*. The understanding of the later portion of the *veda* will create a desire to obtain the fruits, which it promises. Both the disgust and this desire will prompt the enquiry into *Brahma*. Both are necessary. In the absence of either it will not be taken up.

(6) It should be noted that the *karmas* referred to are such as are done without knowing that they are the worship of *Brahma*, and that they are therefore an end in themselves.

Para 2. (1) The word *brahma* denotes, besides the All-ruler, *prakriti*, the *jeevas* and the *veda*. In all of them the attribute of being great is found. Unless a limitation of some kind is expressly stated, words naturally denote a thing which has the connoted attribute in full measure. Hence, the primary meaning of the word *brahma* is as stated.

(2) *In a secondary sense*. The question may be asked why the word *brahma* should not denote the All-ruler and the other things mentioned in primary senses. *Reply*. The word would then have many meanings. This will not be legitimate, if all the uses of the word can be explained with one meaning. The word will denote a thing in its primary sense, when it has the connoted attribute in full measure, and the others in a secondary sense. It is only when this is not possible, that more than one meaning should be given to the word. The case of the word *bhagavān* is analogous. It denotes one who possesses *bhaga* or the six qualities—*jñāna*, *bala*, *aishvarya*, *vīrya*, *śakti*, and *tejas*. *Jñāna* is the capacity to know; *bala*, the capacity to support; *aishvarya*, the capacity to control; *vīrya*, freedom from fatigue by knowing, supporting or controlling; *śakti*, the ability to do what others cannot; and *tejas* the power to overcome others, and not being overcome by others. These six qualities are found in full measure in the All-ruler. For He can see all things at the same moment by sense perception, and He has this power, not as a gift from another. He supports the whole world and controls it. To Him this is mere play, and causes no fatigue. His *śakti* and *tejas* are unquestioned. The word *bhagavān* therefore denotes Him in its primary sense, and those who possess something of these qualities in a secondary sense.

3. The second member of the compound word means a desire to know. Knowledge here is the particular variety consisting of critical examination. The words “should be made” should be supplied to complete the sentence; and they should be connected with knowledge (1); not with desire; for desire depends upon the nature of the object, and is not amenable to an injunction; and as the desire exists for the acquisition of the knowledge, the latter is the more important of the two. The connection between the two members of the compound is expressed by the ending of the sixth case, which was dropped, when the compound was formed. It shows *Brahma* to be the object of the examination (2).

4. The *sūtra* therefore means—As the earlier portion of the *Mīmāṃsā* shows *karma* to be productive of only petty and short-lived fruits, and as the later portion holds out the promise of imperishable and immeasurably superior fruit to one who meditates on *Brahma*, on completing the former enquiry, and because it does not satisfy for this reason alone, the latter enquiry should be made. This is supported by *Dramiḍa* who observes “*Karma* has been examined; next comes the enquiry into *Brahma*”.¹

Para 3. (1) Connected with knowledge. Illustration “Having bathed, take your food”. “Take your food, sitting with your face to the east.” No one need be directed to take his food; he will do it of his own motion. Bathing before taking the food, and doing this in the particular posture stated would not happen, but for injunctions. A direction serves its purpose, when a thing would not happen without it. Similarly here also. *Question* : Why then is the termination added, which expresses desire ? *Reply* : It is to indicate that even to know *Brahma* will give pleasure.

(2) *The object of the examination.* This follows from *Pāṇini's sūtra*, II-3-65. *Question* : The ending shows relationship in general. If this be taken, the examination will relate to *Brahma* and to everything connected with Him. Why is it not taken ? That *Brahma* is the object of the examination will follow, as the verb in *jijñāsa* needs an object. *Reply* : Here the *sūtra* expressly states *karma* (object) to be the meaning; while by following your suggestion one must depend on mere implication. The former is preferable. For, that *Brahma* is the object will occur at once from the express statement in the *sūtra*; while by taking the suggestion one must first think of the relation, and then enquire what the particular relation in the present case is. This will involve delay. In every case that, which suggests a thing quickly, possesses greater strength than another, which suggests it after some delay. Hence, the *sūtra* cited is followed. *Brahma*, the principal thing, will be the object; and what is connected with Him will come within the scope of the examination by virtue of their connection with Him. *Further question* : When the sixth case is enjoined with reference to particular words, the compound cannot be formed. Is this not so (*Vārtika* under *Sūtra*, II-2-10). *Reply* : See the *Vārtika* (under *Sūtra*, II-2-8), which states an exception, and this comes under the exception.

¹ Here the original states that the two enquiries form one work. This is embodied in Introduction, para 9, which please see.

5. It only remains to refute certain views in regard to what preceded the enquiry under consideration. For this purpose it is necessary to explain more fully the natural order of things indicated briefly at the end of para 1. The injunction is given by the *Veda* 'Svādhyāya should be learnt by *adhyayana*'. *Svādhyāya* means the text of the *veda* or (as the original puts it) the collection of letters known as the *veda*. This is to be learnt only by *adhyayana* (1). Is it to recite a text but once or many times? May this be done by the student by himself, or only after recitation by another? In what manner should it be done? The following texts from the *Veda* and the *smritis* give replies "Do the *upanayana* (2), (3) ceremony to a *brāhmaṇa* boy in the eighth year of age; make him learn the *veda*" (4), (5), (6) (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇam*). "A *brāhmaṇa* should

(1) Only by *adhyayana*, but not by reading from a book. The *veda* may be learned in two ways—from a teacher or from a book. The former method is the one to be followed; but not the latter. A rule of this kind is known as *niyama vidhi* (restrictive injunction). The following example is given in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* — *vrīhīn avahanti* (They husk the paddy—i.e., the paddy taken out of a bag for making an offering). Though it is in the form of a statement of what is being done, it is really an injunction 'husk the paddy'. This may be done either by using a mortar and pestle or with the nails of one's fingers. The text requires that the husking should be done in the former way only. This is a *niyama vidhi*. (*Mīmāṃsā*, IV-2-11).

(2) *Upanayana*—The Sanskrit text is "*brāhmaṇam upanayīta*". The first word being in the objective case, it is clear that a qualification is given to the *brāhmaṇa* boy by the ceremony—i.e., fitness to learn the *veda*. The leading case on the point is again *vrīhīn avahanti*. By the husking in the manner pointed out, an efficacy is given to the paddy, and the husked paddy or rice becomes fit for offering (*Mīmā.*, III-1-4).

(3) The student receives a qualification from the *upanayana* and he does the *adhyayana*; hence, *upanayana* is an *anga* of *adhyayana* (*Mīmāṃsā*, II-1-3); for it renders a service to it by giving a qualification for learning it. Hence, the time prescribed for it—eighth year of age—though it is prescribed for *adhyayana* also. In other words, at an age at which the student is not fit for learning anything else, he is required to get the *veda* by heart.

(4) *Make him learn the veda*—This is not an injunction to the teacher? For he would himself seek students and teach them, prompted by the desire to earn money. No injunction is therefore needed. Further, if it were an injunction to the teacher, his qualification would be stated; but it is not. The intention of the text is therefore that the student should recite the vedic texts, after they are recited by another.

(5) Next, should the recitation by the teacher and repetition by the student be done once? No. It should be done as many times as may be necessary for his getting the *veda* by heart. Here again the leading case is '*vrīhīn avahanti*'. The object being to remove the husk, it is not sufficient to raise the pestle once and bring it down on the paddy in the mortar. This operation should be continued until the husk is completely separated from the grain. It is only when the end in view cannot be seen, to do a thing but once is sufficient compliance with an injunction (*Mīmā.*, XI-1-5 and 6) Applying this rule, as the end in view is to get the *veda* by heart, and as this is an object that can be seen, the recitation by the teacher and repetition by the student should be continued many times.

(6) Thus, the nature of *adhyayana* has been explained; also the time for beginning it; and some *angas*, for the qualifications of the teacher are practically for the benefit

begin in the prescribed manner in the *śrāvaṇī* or *proshthapadī* month, and learn the *veda* for four and a half months, living a life of discipline. After that he should read the *veda* in the bright fortnights and all its *angas* in the dark fortnights" (*Manu*, 4-95). The student should go to a teacher possessing the following qualifications : He must have come of a good family; he must know the *veda* ; he must possess good qualities, especially control of temper; and his conduct must be unexceptionable. Such a teacher should do the *upanayana* for him. He must begin in the month stated and observe certain restrictions; and as the teacher recites a text, he should repeat it after him. This is *adhyayana* contemplated by the *vedic* text. This should be done until the text is learnt by heart.

6. *Adhyayana* imparts an efficacy (*samskāra*) to the *veda* learnt by the student; for, in the first text quoted in the preceding para, the term *svādhyāya* (*veda*) would be in the objective case, if put in the active voice (*Mīmā.*, II-1-3). (1) *Samskāra* is the giving of a fitness for some work. And it is proper that the *veda* should receive a fitness; for it will then teach the four objects sought by men—*dharma*, wealth, love and release from bondage to *karma*—and the means for attaining those objects. And the texts themselves by being repeated a number of times (*japa*) give those fruits. Thus, the injunction regarding *adhyayana*

of the student. *Upanayana* is another *anga*. Other *angas* are stated in the *smṛiti* text. They are beginning it in one of the months stated and the observance of certain restrictions. The student should not recite in particular places as in the hearing of the *sudra*, or on prohibited days; and there are certain restrictions in regard to food and sleep. He should learn the whole of the *veda*; for the word denoting it in the text is in the plural—*Chandāmsi* ; and he should study the six *angas*, for which vide note (4) on page 59.

(1) This para removes a doubt suggested by the text '*Saktūn juhoti*' *Saktu* is rice flour; and the text directs that the rice flour should be taken by the doer of a *soma yāga* in both the palms joined together, and offered into the fire at the close of the *yāga*, when the sacrificial grounds are set fire to and burn. Here, though the term *Saktūn* is in the objective case, no fitness for work is imparted; for the rice flour is consumed in the fire and no longer exists. The offering, however, creates an *apūrva* (Intro. para 14). Is not the case of *svādhyāya* exactly similar ? The *adhyayana* will create an *apūrva* in the student, and lead to some enjoyment in due time. The text of the *veda* need not be learnt by heart; it will suffice to recite it but once. The reply is that the two cases are not similar. In the case of the rice flour, there is nothing to receive a fitness for future work; but in the present case the *veda*, when learnt by *adhyayana*, has some work to do, and this is pointed out in the para.

ends in the learning of the text only of the *veda*, as in the case of *mantras* (2) and the recitations under particular conditions. (3), (4)

(2) The paragraph concludes with the statement that by *adhyayana* the student learns only the text of the *veda* and not its meaning also. And two examples are given. In beginning *adhyayana* each day both the teacher and the student recite certain *mantras*, and they do not know the meaning, especially the student; nor is the knowledge of the meaning needed. The mere recitation suffices. Next, boys at the time of the *upanayana* are required to recite certain texts; and when they do the daily *sandhyā upāsana*, they recite certain other texts. But they do not know what they mean. Further, here is a verse defining certain terms— "By learning a little of the *veda* one becomes a *brāhmaṇa* ; by learning the whole of a branch a *śrotriya* ; by learning the *angas* also an *anuchāna* ; by learning the *kalpa* (ritual of *yāgas*) a *rishi* ; and by teaching *kalpa sūtras* to others, a *bhrūṇa*." One who learns only a portion of his own branch of the *veda* has no knowledge of the contents of the whole, nor can one know what the *veda* teaches, if he has not studied its *angas*. What then is the purpose to be served by *adhyayana* ? We reply—to get by heart the text of the *veda*. This is near at hand; and contains certain terms like '*hum*,' which have no meaning. On the other hand, knowledge of the meaning is one degree removed, and will not extend to the meaningless terms. Hence, the conclusion stated in the para stands.

(3) It may be asked why so much stress is laid on this point. *Reply*—only then will the enquiry into *Brahma* be needed. There are injunctions, which require the student on completing the learning of the *veda* to become a householder; and the householder's duty is to perform *yāgas* of various kinds. Hence the knowledge of the *veda* acquired will be regarded as obtained for the purpose of the *yāgas*. Now in this knowledge, the knowledge of *Brahma* taught in the *Upanishads* is included, and a text of the *veda* states "This *ātmā* is *Brahma*". The knowledge of the *ātmā* will thus become subsidiary to *yāgas* ; and *ātmā* will be connected with them through its knowledge. Example—The text '*vrihīn prokshati*' (Sprinkle paddy taken out for offering with water) makes sprinkling an *anga* of paddy, which is an *anga* of a *yāga*. Sprinkling will through the paddy become an *anga* of the *yāga*. Similarly, the *ātmā* will become an *anga* of *yāgas*, and an *ātmā*, who is this, is a *jeeva*. There will then be no proof that a Being exists, who is other than the *jeeva*, and the enquiry into *Brahma* will not be needed.

(4) Before leaving this subject, it is necessary to refute the view of *Prābhākara* (One school of *pūrva mīmāṃsā*) that *upanayana* is subsidiary to *adhyāpana* (teaching), but not to *adhyayana* (learning). *Prābhākara*— Your view stated in note 3, under para 5, is not correct. Here is my authority— 'One, who having done *upanayana* to a student, (*upaniya*) teaches him the *veda*, including *kalpa sūtras* and the *Upanishads*, is stated to be *achārya*.' Here the participle shows *upanayana* and teaching as the work of one person. Hence the first operation is an *anga* of the second. The termination "ya" in the participle is *śruti* ; while you rely on the qualification imparted by *upanayana* being in the student, who learns. This is *lingam* ; It cannot override *śruti* (Intro., para 19).

Reply. Your *śruti* is in a text of the *smṛiti*, and the text is an *anuvāda* (repetition); for it contains the pronoun *ya*. Being in a *smṛiti*, one has to seek the *vedic* text, which it reproduces; and being a repetition, the original text has to be found. There will be delay in both these respects. What you state to be a *linga* results from a *śruti* text, which is present. Again, the verse quoted by you is for the purpose of defining the term *achārya*, and cannot be authority in this matter. Further, in the term "*upanayita*" in

7. One, who has learned the *veda* along with its *angas*, will perceive (1), (2) that it points out the means (3) to the attainment of some desirable ends. For, it is the nature of words (4) to convey their meanings, and the *veda* is no exception. Even without a critical examination, he will see these things, and in order to know what they are, (5) and what are connected with them, he will himself (6) begin an examination of the *veda* ; this is the *mīmāṃsā* (7).

8. When the vedic injunctions prescribing *karmas* are examined, it will be observed that the fruits of *karmas* are petty and unenduring. The *Upanishads*,

the *śruti* text quoted by me, the root is *nī* and it has the termination known as *ātmanepada* ! and this by a *sūtra* (1-3-72) of *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, should be added, when the fruit of an action goes to the person who does it. Another *sūtra* (*Ibid.*, 36) requires the same termination to be added to the same root *nī*, in certain cases, of which the present case is one. The commentator on *Pāṇini's sūtras*, a high authority, states that in repeating the direction the intention was that the fruit in repeating the direction the intention was that the fruit of the action should go to one other than the person who does it. Hence, the fruit of the *upanayana* goes to the student, but is not reaped by the teacher. For these reasons the view stated is perfectly sound.

(1) The *mīmāṃsaka* puts a question—If one learns only the text of the *veda*, there will be no need to examine it. This paragraph gives a reply.

(2) Having learned the text, the student knows its contents; knowing its contents, he performs the *yāgas*, and attains *svarga*. Thus, *adhyayana* leads step by step ultimately to *svarga*. Even, in the view of the opponent *svarga* is not reached directly from the knowledge of the *veda*. The performance of *yāgas* intervenes.

(3) The *means* are *yāgas* of various kinds leading to enjoyment in the place called *svarga*. These are stated in the earlier portion. The means pointed in the later portion are diverse meditations taking one to *Brahma* in a changeless world.

(4) *Nature of words*. No injunction is needed for words to convey their meanings.

(5) *In order to know what they are*—Why is this examination needed ? If it be replied that the knowledge obtained may be liable to doubt or misconception, then the further question is—does not the *veda* show things as they are ? Reply—yes, it does; when helped by a critical examination. The eye shows the shape and colour of objects; but it requires the help of a light. So with the *veda* also.

(6) The opponent appears again, and raises an objection. You say, ‘He will himself begin ?’ This is not likely. The learning of the *angas* will, like the learning of the *veda*, be confined to the text only. Their meaning not being known, it will not be possible to know the contents of the *veda*. Reply—*Vyākaraṇa* (grammar) is an *anga* ; that is, it must render the *veda* some service; otherwise, it will not be an *anga*. It cannot be alleged that the service is *adrishṭam* (unseen); for, when a service, which all can see, can be pointed out, to fall back on *adrishṭam* is not legitimate. Hence, grammar and glossary should be fully learned, and the meaning of the *veda* being then perceived, the *mīmāṃsā* will be commenced.

(7) The opponent shifts his ground and puts forward another objection. If it be left to one to commence the *mīmāṃsā* of his own motion, i.e., without an injunction, it will not be begun at all. For, a *smṛiti* text states ‘Having learned, do the *samāvartana* ceremony’. This is a preliminary to the entry on the house-holder’s stage of life. Having learnt the text, he must become a house holder at once. When is the critical examination to be made ? Reply. The termination in the participle having learnt, (*adūya*) shows merely that the two operations should be done by the same person, and that one should

on the other hand, contain texts referring to immeasurably superior and enduring fruits in the form of immunity from death; and this being known, in order to ascertain whether they are so, the examination of the texts of the *vedānta* will be taken up, and this is *Śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. Here are some of these texts, which confirm what has been stated here.

(1) As the fruit earned by *karma* perishes here, so does the fruit of good deeds perish there (*Chando.*, VIII-1-6); (2) The *karmas* performed by him have surely an end (*Brihad.* V-8-10); (3) It is not attained by perishable *karmas* (*Katha*, 2-10); (4) These rafts in the form of *yāgas* are not strong (*Munda.*, I-2-7); (5) One who meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest (*Ānanda*, I-1); (6) He is not again haved over to *moha* (not knowing the *ātmā* as he really is); he sees him only; (7) The meditator does not see death (*Chando.*, 7-26-2); (8) He becomes his own master (*Ibid.*, 25-2); (9) One who meditates on Him here in this manner becomes immortal; No other path exists for going thither (*Puru*, 20); (10) Knowing the *ātmā* and Him, who controls him, to be separate, one attains immortality by such meditation, through the grace of that Being pleased with it (*Sveta.*, 1-6).¹

follow the other; but not that the second operation should be done immediately. There is therefore room for making the *mīmāṃsā*. Even if *samāvartana* takes place immediately, the examination may be done after it. Surely time can be found for it. The injunction 'All life one should do *agnihotram* does not prevent one's earning the means therefor, and this is not enjoined by an injunction. Similarly, the injunction quoted by the opponent does not prevent the examination, as it is needed for the due performance of the *yāgas*.

¹ (1) The question may be asked why the first four texts are quoted. The nature of the fruits yielded by *karmas* are already known from the *pūrva mīmāṃsa*. Reply : It is to confirm by these texts what has been learnt already; the statements regarding the fruits of meditation on *Brahma* will then be accepted as stating what is true.

(2) *Second text*. From the context it will be seen that reference is made to *karmas* performed without a knowledge of *Brahma*, even though they be done for a long time, and even though they be of many kinds. By the '*karmas*' having an end, reference is made to their fruits. Action disappear soon after they are done. This does not require to be taught. Hence the first text is stated first.

(3) It may be thought that the fruits earned by worldly men are perishable; but that by *karmas* enduring fruits may be obtained. The third text is quoted to remove this misconception. 'It'—enduring fruits.

(4) To explain the third text the fourth text is quoted.

(5) Here two verses from the *Mundaka Upanishad* are quoted in the original, which fully agree with the meaning of the *sutra* given in para 4. They are omitted here, but are embodied in the 'Vedic texts', which please see.

(6) *Fifth text*. In an *anuvāka*, which follows it is stated that the intensity of bliss of *Brahma* has no limit, which can be thought of or expressed in words. Hence it is clear that the fruit is immeasurably high and enduring.

9. We may now examine the objections. The first objection is : A student, who has learnt the whole of the *veda* with its *angas*, knows that *karmas* take one to *svarga*, and that this and similar fruits come to an end. He may then, if he desires release from *karma*, commence an enquiry into *Brahma* at once. Why is it necessary for him to enquire into *karma* ? We ask him in reply—why is even this enquiry needed. From the mere learning of the *veda* with the *angas* he knows everything. The objector replies—one cannot be sure that the knowledge acquired is free from doubt or misunderstanding. A critical examination is necessary. We answer : The same reasoning applies to the examination of the earlier portion also; and until this is done, one cannot be certain as to the inferior character of the fruits of *karmas*.

10. *Second objection*. What is invariably needed for enquiry into *Brahma* should be stated as having preceded it. It does not need enquiry into *karma* ; for even one, who has learned the *Upanishads*, (1) but not the earlier portion of the *veda*, and who therefore does not know about *karmas*, may fitly examine the *Upanishad* texts. Here a question is put to the objector. Certain meditations on *udgīta* are considered in the *Upanishads* ; *udgīta* is the second part of vedic verses sung by the helper named *udgātā* in a *soma yāga*. As the meditations are connected with *karmas* and their *angas*, how can they be considered by one who does not know about *karmas* (2) ? The objector replies—you do not know which

(7) *Sixth text*. It may be doubted whether the attainment of this fruit may not be merely temporary. To remove this doubt this text is quoted. The two texts may also be understood differently. The first shows that *Brahma* is reached by meditation; and the second that it is preceded by the disappearance of all impediments.

(8) *Eighth text*. His own master—no longer subject to *karma*.

(9) *Ninth text*. This indicates that immunity from death is not attained, as stated by *Sankara*, by knowing *Brahma* to be without differences and to be mere *jnānam* (light), or as affirmed by others, by meditating on other *devatas*.

(10) *Tenth text*. This indicates that the meditation, which is the means to release from *karma*, is not meditation that *Brahma* and *atma* are one.

(1) *Learned the Upanishads*. One, who has learned these, knows their contents, and may desire to examine them fully. He does not know *karmas*, and there is no question of an enquiry into them. This therefore does not precede the *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. Even though he has learned the whole of the *veda*, as the result of good deeds done in past births, he may desire to take up the later enquiry at once.

(2) The questioner's meaning is that though *karmas* are not known for the purpose of ascertaining which *karmas* should be rejected, they should be known at least for understanding the later enquiry.

is the main thing in the *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. I will tell you. Men are drowned in an ocean of misery, consisting of birth, old age, death and the like, which come round and round, and which are inevitable, so long as they are bound by matter; this misery is due to their perception of many different things (3), while *Brahma* alone exists; and this again is due to beginningless *avidyā* (ignorance). To remove this misperception (4), what should be grasped by them is that *ātmā* is one. Where is the knowledge of *karmas*, which are connected with differences, useful (5) in their case ? Far from being useful, it is an impediment (6). As to the consideration of meditation on *udgītha*, they serve only *karmas* ; because they are meditations, (7) their consideration is included here; but it is not directly connected with the main topic. Hence, what is needed by the main point should be stated as preceding the later *mīmāṃsā* ; it is not enquiry into *karma*.

11. Another question is put to the objector by a follower of *Bhāskara*. What is needed by the main point is knowledge of *karma*—the very thing which you say is not needed. It is by knowledge helped by *karmas* that release is obtained. So states the *veda*, and so does the author of the *sūtras* (3-4-26). If one does not know *karmas*, how is he to know which *karma* (1) will help knowledge, and which will not. Hence, enquiry into *karma* is what precedes *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. The objector replies : What you say is not sound. The goal in view is the removal of *avidyā* (ignorance), and this alone is *moksha* (2). This is effected only

(3) *Many different things*. Persons who know; things which are known; and perceptions; in each class numerous things are perceived.

(4) *To remove this misperception*. To one who imagines a rope to be a snake, what is required is the knowledge of the true nature of the rope; but not any particular *karma*. It is so here.

(5) *Where is the knowledge of karmas useful*. The meaning is that it is not useful anywhere—in creating the knowledge of oneness, in removing the misperception which *avidyā* creates, or in helping what creates the knowledge.

(6) *An impediment*. By strengthening the tendency to perceive differences.

(7) *Because they are meditations*. By their likeness to other meditations, they came into the author's mind, and he included them; but not as serving the main topic in any way.

(1) *Which karma will help*. In section 4 of Chapter 3 of the *sūtras* those who marry and live with their wives, those who do not marry, and widowers are stated to be qualified for meditation on *Brahma*. The *karmas*, which help meditation, are not the same for them all; but are different for each class. Reference is made to this in the text. The author may also have contemplated the distinction in *karmas* as compulsory (*nitya*) *karmas* ; those to be done on the occurrence of contingencies (*Naimittika*) ; those that are prohibited; and those that are done as the means to some fruits (*Kāmya*).

(2) *This alone is moksha*—but not the reaching of *Brahma*; for He is ever with the knower. The goal is therefore single; but not two-fold.

by knowing (3) *Brahma* to be an enemy to all differences (4) and to be only *jnānam*. *karmas* are the seats of endless differences. The *karmas* of each caste (*varṇa*) are different. So also are the *karmas* appropriate to each stage of life (*āśrama*); and each *karma* procures its own fruit, and is helped by its subsidiary *karmas*. This being so, how can they be the means to the removal of the perception of all differences and of its root—*avidyā* (ignorance). Next, the fruits of *karma*, being perishable, how can they procure *moksha* (5), which once attained endures for ever? Are they not opposed to *moksha*? Hence, knowledge alone is the means to *moksha*. The statements made are supported by the following *vedic* texts (6) :

(1) The *karmas* performed by him have surely an end (*Brihad.*, V-8-10); (2) As the fruit earned by *karma* perishes here, so does the fruit of good deeds perish there (*Chando.*, VIII-1-6); (3) "One who knows *Brahma* reaches the highest" (*Ānanda*, 1-1); (4) If one knows *Brahma*, he becomes *Brahma* indeed. (*Munda.*, III-2-9); (5) Only by knowing Him, one overcomes death (*Sveta.*, 3-8).¹

I have thus shown that *karma* cannot be the means to the goal along with knowledge; I will next show that it does not serve knowledge in any way. You referred to the author of the *sūtras*, who relied on the *vedic* text :

(3) *Only by knowing*. Similarly the means is also single; but not two-fold.

(4) *Enemy to all differences*. Differences from objects of other classes, and from objects of the same class. For instance, a cow differs from sheep, and from other cows. Similarly, if objects existed other than *Brahma*, he would differ from them. In other words their differences would be found in Him; but as He alone exists, He is without differences of any kind. He is *nir-viśeṣa*. By the term "enemy" it is meant that at no time is He fit to be *saviśeṣa* (with difference). By the term "only *jnānam*", it is meant that He is devoid of all attributes.

(5) *How can they procure moksha*. If *moksha* were attained by *karma*, it would not endure; if it endures, *karma* cannot be the means thereto; for it is the nature of *karma* to yield only perishable fruits.

(6) *First text*. See note (2) under para 8.

(a) *Fourth text*. This is quoted to show that one who reaches and that which is reached are one—that is, the *jeeva* and *Brahma* are one.

(b) *Fifth text*. This is quoted to show that the removal of impediments is effected by knowledge alone, but not by *karma*. The questioner had in his mind the *vedic* text "vidyā (knowledge) and *avidyā* (what is other than *vidyā*)—one who knows both these, overcomes impediments by *avidyā* and enjoys *Brahma* by *vidyā*". This is a single text; it is ambiguous; and is not supported by valid arguments. On the other hand, many texts have been quoted; their meaning is clear; and there are valid arguments in their support as stated in the text. Hence that text must be construed so as not to conflict with these texts.

Him students of the *veda* wish to know by continual recitation of the *veda*, by *yāgas*, by giving, by *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) and by fasting' (*Bṛihad.*, 6-4-22.)

Consider the wording of the text. the term 'wish to know' (*vividishanti*) by its termination shows desire, and to this desire the *karmas* mentioned are the means, through purity of the mind; but not to the attainment of the fruit (7). The incompatibility of *karma* with knowing has been already shown. When the desire is created, what conduces most intimately to knowing is control of the mind (*śama*) and the rest; and nothing else (8); and this is stated by the *veda* itself :

Controlling the mind, controlling the senses, withdrawing from worldly pursuits, taking good and evil with serenity and with the mind one-pointed, see the *Ātmā* in yourself alone (*Bṛihad.*, 6-8-23).

Thus by doing *karmas* in a hundred births without looking forward to any fruit, the mind becomes pure; and a desire to know *Brahma* springs up. Then vedic texts like the following (9) produce an understanding, which removes *avidyā* (ignorance) :

(1) "You, fit for *soma yāga*, this was *sat* only before'; one only; without a second (*Chando.*, VI-2-1); (2) unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma* (*Ana.*, I-1); (3) "Without parts, without action, and devoid of the six

(7) *Not to the attainment of the fruit.* The text states 'wish to know'; but not 'they are released'. By the term 'fruit' reference will then be made to release. It may also refer to the creation of the knowing; for it is the fruit of desire; and the *karmas* stated will be the means. It may also have been intended that when the knowing has been brought about, the *karmas* co-operate with it in the attainment of release. This will be on the analogy of the co-operation of the five offerings known as *prayājas* with the principal offerings in creating the fruit-yielding *apūrva*. The help rendered by the *karmas* may be in any of these ways; but such help is denied.

(8) *And nothing else.* This is the implication contained in the word 'eva' (only) in the original. Control of the mind is stated in the text; *karmas* cannot work along with it; for they require the mind to work in many ways along with the senses. *Karmas* are therefore incompatible with control of the mind. Nor can it be maintained that either control of the mind or *karmas* create the knowing; for they are not of equal strength. Control of the mind is stated by the text to be the direct means to knowing; and no consideration is needed. This relationship to the knowing is quickly perceived. On the other hand, the term *vividishanti* (they desire to know) naturally shows *karmas* to be the means to desire. If this be rejected and reliance be placed on the analogy of the sentence 'He wishes to kill with the sword', the relationship of *karmas* to the knowing will take time to be perceived. This will therefore possess less force. This view is implied in the words 'by the *veda* itself'.

(9) *Texts like the following.* The first text shows *Brahma* to be the cause of the universe; the second removes from Him the imperfections which may be presumed from

evils' (*Sveta.*, VI-19); (4) 'This *ātmā* is *Brahma*' (*Brihad.*, VI-4-5); and (5) 'That thou art' (*Chando.*, VI-8-7).

12. Here a question is interposed by one who heard the last words : Is it not enjoined that one should hear about *Brahma* ; that he should think about Him; and that He should meditate on Him ? If the mere understanding of a text or texts removes *avidyā*, does not the injunction become purposeless ? The objector replies : The hearing, thinking, and meditation are useful for the understanding of the texts. Hearing (*śravaṇa*) means to learn from a teacher, who sees the truth, that *Upanishad* texts show that the *Ātmā* is one. Thinking (*Manana*) means for the student to consider within himself with arguments 'This alone is fitting'. To think of this without a break is meditation (*nididhyāsana*), the object to get rid of the tendency to perceive differences, which has existed without a beginning. When by these the tendency is completely destroyed, the understanding of *vedic* texts removes *avidyā*. What is necessarily needed for a hearing of this nature should alone be started as preceding the enquiry into *Brahma*. And (1) that is—(a) The separation of what is enduring from what is perishable; (b) control of the mind and the other helps stated in the *vedic* text; (c) absence of desire to enjoy fruits here or in *svarga*; and (d) a desire for release. These four are the necessary qualifications; for without them the enquiry cannot take place. From the very nature of things, this alone should be stated as what has preceded the enquiry under consideration (2).

13. We reply to the objection stated in paras 10 to 12. You hold the view that the means to *moksha* is understanding of some *vedic* texts.¹ This is unsound. The means, which the *veda* teaches, is continuous, vivid, and loving meditation on *Brahma*, practised until one departs finally from this world. (*Vide* chapter 4, section 1, sub-sections 1 and 6.) The other view also that *karmas* are incompatible with *vidyā* (meditation) is unsound. If they are done without looking forward to their fruits, they make the mind pure, enable the *vidyā* to grow in vividness, and make the love for *Brahma* become more and more

His being the world-cause; the third text shows what these are; the fourth text shows *Brahma* and the *jeeva* to be one; and the fifth text is for the same purpose. It has the advantage of proving the oneness by six marks, which indicate an author's meaning. The last text shows *Brahma* and a particular *jeeva* to be one; to show that this is true of all *jeevas* the fourth text is quoted.

(1) *And that is*—The first qualification creates a dislike for the perishable fruits to be had in *samsāra*, and a desire for the goal which endures. One then goes to a teacher for instruction. The second qualification makes him fit to receive it fully.

(2) Here a summary of the points contained in paras 10,11 and 12 is given in the original; but it is omitted here to avoid repetition.

¹ The original here dwells on these very fully. This portion of the original is omitted here, and will be embodied under the sections stated.

intense. This point is established in chapter 3, section 4, sub-section 5. Hence *vidyā* needs all the *karmas* appropriate to each *āśrama* (stage of life). The knowledge of their nature and of their fruits being low and perishable, when they are done for fruits, should be obtained from an enquiry into the earlier part of the *veda*. This should therefore be stated as the completed work.

14. Your view that what precedes is the four qualifications is untenable. For they cannot be obtained without a study of the *pūrva* and *uttara mīmāṃsās*. (1) One should know the ends which are sought (2), the means to those ends, and what serve them in this matter; also who are qualified to perform them. Without knowing these for certain, one cannot understand what the *karmas* are (3); what are their fruits; which of them are enduring, and which are perishable, whether the *ātmā* is eternal and the like. Further, that control of the mind and the rest are helps should be known only by the means which determine which things render service and which receive the service. These means are *śruti*, *lingam* and the rest taught in the third chapter of *Jaimini's sūtras* (4). For this reason also the enquiry into *Brahma* cannot be made without the help of the enquiry into *karma*. This should therefore have precedence.

15. You referred to meditations on *udgītha*, and observed that their consideration in the *Brahma sūtras* was casual and not connected with the main

(1) *Pūrva* and *uttara mīmāṃsās*. The four qualifications will result only when both these enquiries are completed.

(2) *Ends which are sought*. Enjoyment or release; the means are *yāgas* or *vidyās*. What serves them are the offerings known as *prayājas* and the rest, or the seven qualifications; and those who are qualified are those who desire enjoyment or long for release.

(3) *What the karmas are*. The term *karma* here includes *vidyā* (meditation) also; for it is thought repeated continuously, and this needs effort.

(4) It is only when both the enquiries are completed that one can separate the enduring from the perishable; from this will result a disgust for enjoyment of fruits here and in *svarga*, and a longing for release. As to control of the mind and the rest it is in *śārīraka mīmāṃsā* that their nature is examined. If therefore it is contended that the four qualifications precede the later enquiry, it is open to this objection. When they are obtained, one may enquire into *Brahma*; after this enquiry they are obtained—that is arguing in a circle. Here the following questions are put :

(a) May not the first qualification be obtained from the first impression made on the mind by learning the *veda*? Reply: No; the earlier portion contains statements of enduring fruits being yielded by *karmas*; and later portion refers to perishable fruits coming from *vidyā* (meditation). Further while the first impression is common to both the enquiries, why should one neglect the earlier portion of the *veda*, which comes first, and proceed to the later portion?

subject. This view cannot be accepted. For though their object is to make *karmanas* more effective, yet as the *udgātā* has to meditate on the *udgītha* as *Brahma*, they require a knowledge of *Brahma*. Hence, the *Brahma sūtras* are the proper place for their consideration. The *karmanas*, for which *udgītha* is meditated on as *Brahma*, if done without a desire for their fruits, will bring about *Brahma vidyā* (meditation on *Brahma*) quickly, even though there be serious impediments. Thus, as *udgītha vidyā* needs knowledge of *Brahma*, and as *Brahma vidyā* needs the *karmanas* connected with the *udgītha-vidyā*, it is directly connected with the subject of the *śārīraka mīmāṃsā*. That *udgītha-vidyā* needs a knowledge of the nature of *karma* is admitted by all, however opinions may differ as to its connection with this enquiry.

To proceed to the principal topic of the sub-section, viz., enquiry into *Brahma*.

Pūrva paksha. This is urged by *Prābhākara*. The enquiry under consideration cannot be made. One obtains his first knowledge of the meaning of a word, when he hears that word in a command to do something and he sees that thing done. Thus, when the words "Bring a cow" are uttered, and the cow is brought, one who stands by understands their meaning as a whole. Next, if he hears the words "Bring the horse," and the horse is brought, he compares the two sets of words, and arrives at the meaning of each word. If on the other hand he hears the words "The jar is," as they are not followed by any action, he does not know what they denote. Nor will he form an idea, if at the outset, he is told "This word means this". Thus, he learns the connection between words and things which they denote first in connection with things to be done. If afterwards he is told that a particular word means a particular thing, he understands the connection between that word and that thing subject to the impression that he has already formed that words denote something to be done. The conclusion is that all words denote *kārya*—something to be attained by *kṛiti* (mental effort)

(b) May not the qualification be obtained from other sources ? Reply : No; for the student in the eighth year of age begins the learning of the *veda*, obeying the *vedic* injunction. If the other sources be the works of the *Sāṅkhya*, the *vaiśeṣika* or the *pāṣupata*, they advocate many matters opposed to the teaching, of the *Upanishads*, such as evolution of the world from matter uncontrolled by *Brahma* ; evolution from atoms; *Brahma* being the operative cause only, and not the material cause also. Hence it is not fitting that the qualification obtained from them should precede the enquiry into the *Upanishads*. Further, as they teach the knowledge of six substances or of sixteen substances as the means to *moksha*, the enquiry into the *Upanishads* would be unnecessary.

(c) If the other sources be *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*, one may learn about *Brahma* from them alone, and no enquiry into the *Upanishads* need be made. If the objector should give a reply similar to the one stated in para 9, we may turn it against him.

(1). As the *Veda* consists of words, the conclusion reached is extended to it. In the *Vedānta*, however, which deals with matters, which have not to be done, but which are settled, the connection between the words and their meaning cannot be understood, and the enquiry proposed is not therefore possible.

2. The following objections were raised : (a) The words "A son has been born to you" spoken to the father are understood by him, as may be seen from the expression of gladness appearing on his face. (b) When a person, going on a road, stops suddenly, mistaking a rope for a snake, and a bye-stander says "It is not a snake, it is a rope", his fear disappears and he resumes his journey. (c) A person hears a lark sing in the sky, and not knowing what the bird is, he asks "What is it that sings," and receives the reply, "the lark sings." He already knew the meaning of the word "sings", and with its help, he learns the meaning of the word "lark" also. (d) A person hears the words "He cooks food in a vessel with fuel". He knows the meaning of the word "cooks" and of the termination of the third case, which is translated here by the word "with". With this help, he understands the meaning of the word "fuel". Thus words which do not contain a command to do a thing, and which are not followed by action, are easily understood. (e) Words cannot be said to denote only *kārya* (action to be done); for they denote *kāraṅgas* also, i.e., the object of the work, the means with which it is done, the place in which it takes place and so on. Next they cannot be said to denote their meanings as connected with *kārya* ; for the termination containing command does not do so; it denotes *kārya* as connected with *kāraṅgas*, not with *kārya*. Lastly, they cannot be said to denote their meanings as connected with *kāraṅgas* ; for words denoting *kāraṅgas* do not do so; they denote *kāraṅgas* as connected with *kārya*. Hence, it must be concluded that words denote their meanings as connected with other things. They will then denote matters which are settled. To say that words denote only *kārya* is unsound.

3. *Prābhākara* replies to them. In the first case there may be many causes past, present and future, which may make one glad, such as the auspicious nature of the moment of confinement, easy delivery and the like; and it cannot be ascertained for certain that the cause was the fact mentioned to him, or that he understood the words. A similar remark applies to the second case; the traveller may have noticed that what he took for a snake did not move, or that it had no poison, or that it was an inanimate thing, and so on. In the third and fourth cases, the person, knowing that words indicate a *kārya*, will conclude that the words that he now hears also refer to a *kārya*, or something connected

(1) Both the person, who gives the command, and the person, who carries it out, know the meanings of words. The former thinks of the work to be done, when he gives the command; and the latter, when he receives it, understands that he has to do that work. The bye-stander, who desires to know the meaning of words, perceives these facts, and watches. He receives the impression that the words he hears are related to something to be done.

with it. The criticism in the last case is not sound. When words "Bring a cow" are uttered, action takes place. They must therefore denote a *kārya*, which prompts the action; for action is preceded by the understanding that it should be done. Hence all words have *kārya* in view, and denote only *kārya* as connected with its adjuncts. Here a question is put. Does not the understanding, that a thing is the means to a desirable end, prompt action ? Reply—Not directly; it moves one to action by the resolve that it must be done. No person will move, even though he has this understanding, if he knows that the means to his desirable end will be adopted by another. Until one feels "The end will not be attained without my effort; I must therefore adopt the necessary means," he will not act. Hence my contention is sound.

4. Further, you say that the proposed enquiry should be made : (i) because the fruits of *karmas* are petty and perishable; and (ii) because the *Upanishads* state the fruit of knowing *Brahma* to be unlimited and enduring. You rely on the *mantras* and *arthavādas* of the *Upanishads* ; but there are similar *arthavādas* in the earlier part also. Here is one *arthavāda*. "The good deed of one doing the *chātur-māsyā* is imperishable; this is well-known." Hence your first reason for the enquiry fails, and the enquiry is unnecessary.

Final decision. The foregoing view suppresses the well-known (1) mode, by which the connection between words and what they mean is ascertained, and maintains that all words denote one particular *kārya*, not pertaining to this world.

(i) Who does not know how parents (2) instruct their children by drawing their attention to various things with their finger and pronouncing the words by which those things are denoted ? When this has been done a number of times (3), the connection between words and the things which they denote little by little becomes well-established in their minds. They perceive that words are used to their minds. They perceive that words are used to denote things, as they have the power to do so; for they see no other connection (4) between them, nor are they aware of any person, who has fixed that such and such words shall denote such and such things.

(1) *Well-known.* The original has "known by all the worlds". The implication is that the opponent himself learnt the meaning of words in this manner.

(2) *Parents.* Parents send their children to proper teachers at an age, when they are able themselves to learn the meanings of words. Will they fail to teach them, when they are unable to do so ?

(3) *A number of times.* Until they are able to use the proper words to denote things, to think of the words, when they see the things, and to think of the things, when they hear the words.

(4) *No other connection.* Though all *pramāṇas*—sense perception, inference and testimony—make things known, there is a difference. The first makes a thing known by

(ii) Among the words, which are thus taught, words such as father, mother, uncle, etc., showing the relation of the children to those round about them, come first, and they must be taught by the relatives themselves; for others may not use the words with reference to these relations. These cannot be learnt on the method advocated by the opponent; nor will they be learnt first, as they are at present. Further, the mode referred to in the first view is casual, and all words cannot be learnt in this manner.

(iii) When a sufficient number of words has been learnt, elders use them to convey the meaning of other words, saying "This is the meaning of this word." Thus, children learn the meanings of all words; and to show to others that they do so, they use them in sentences, which convey those meanings.

(iv) The meanings of words may be learnt in another way. A person sends a messenger to *Devadatta* to give this message "Your father is doing well," and gives it by signs. The messenger delivers the message in words. A by-stander, who desires to know the meanings of words, and who knows like a mute person the meaning of signs, knows that a message is being conveyed, goes with him and hears the words. He concludes "these words convey that meaning". For these reasons it is unnecessary to hold that the method stated by the opponent is the only one by which the meanings of words can be learnt.

2. The replies given to the objectors are not convincing. In the first case, the cause of the gladness appearing on the person's face should be sought in what is present at that moment; and that is the confinement of his wife; and he would therefore take the words to refer to the birth of a son. If on hearing the words he bathes and performs the ceremony usual on such occasions, it will be evident that the words have been understood. It may be urged that the person cannot be sure that the birth of the son only is communicated to him; the words may refer to other matters also, as that the confinement was easy, that the moment of birth was auspicious and the like. We reply. Similar doubts may arise in regard to the injunction "Bring the cow". Does it refer to the cow only, or to the cow and something else ? After the order is issued, and before the cow is brought in, the person receiving the order may do many things—he may rise; he may cover his cloth with a towel; he may take up a stick; he may speak to a by-stander; and may go to fetch the cow. Does the order refer to any of these things ? The bringing in of the cow may be for aught one knows quite an accident, and unconnected with the order. In whatever way it is decided that the order refers to the bringing of the cow, the same method may be applied to the statement "A son has been born to you".

3. The question will arise how if words are taught by elders, when all persons die during cosmic rest, and a new evolution begins, the meanings of words are known. The reply is that men are not reborn with a clean slate; that the impressions received by them during the last earth-life before the cosmic

rest will survive, and that the connection between words and their meanings will remain as sub-conscious impressions, till it comes up into waking consciousness on the application of the proper stimuli, which must surely exist in abundance in the stream of existence. (*Adhi.*, verse 29.)

4. Even accepting your view, it does not follow that the enquiry regarding *Brahma* will be impossible. The *Vedānta* gives many injunctions to meditate on *Brahma* (1), and they refer to a particular kind of *kārya* as understood by you. The fruit to be yielded by the *kārya* is stated in other texts, viz., to reach *Brahma*. It is necessary to know, as serving the *kārya*, the nature of *Brahma*. His attributes, the universe, which He controls, and what obstructs the attainment of the fruit, so that it may be avoided. Hence it must be admitted that the whole of the *Vedānta* does convey its meaning. This conclusion follows the precedents set by the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* itself in three cases (2), in all of which the sentences contain no injunction, and there is merely a statement of facts; and yet as the injunctions given in separate texts require some information or service, the sentences are connected with the injunction, and it is held that they convey their meanings.

5. In sentences like "Bring the cow" words do not denote *kārya* ; for the opponent will not be able to explain what *kārya* is as understood by him. Let us ask him to state what it is.

the mere existence of the thing; inference by the knowledge that what is seen (smoke) is generated by the thing inferred (fire); and testimony by the mere connection between the words and the things.

(1) The following are the texts : (I) *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, be heard about, be thought about, be meditated on (*Bṛihad.*, IV-4-5); (II) "He should be sought; he should be meditated on" (*Chando.*, VII-1); (III) "Knowing, do meditation" (*Bṛihad.*, VI-4-21); (IV) "The small *ākāṣa* within it, and what is within it— both should be sought, and meditated on" (*Chando.*, VIII-1-1); and (v) "The small *ākāṣa* in it free from grief, and what is within it should be meditated on" (*Taitti.*, *Nārā.*, 10-23).

(2) *In three cases.* The first is texts like the following : "One who desires *svarga* should do a *yāga*. This does not state what the *svarga* is. The information is given in another place—"Where there is no heat, no cold; no disgust." This text is connected with the injunction text. The second is a text prescribing a *satra yāga* ; in which the *soma* offerings are made on twelve or more days. The text is merely "Do the *satra yāga*"; and its fruit is stated in an *arthavāda*, "Those who do this *satra yāga* are firmly established." The two texts are connected, and being firmly established is held to be the fruit of the *yāga* (*Mīmā.*, IV-3-8). The third is the following text—"He who raises his hand with intent to kill a *brāhmaṇa* should be made to suffer torture for a hundred years; hence let not one raise his hand against a *brāhmaṇa*". As doing what is prohibited here will obstruct the enjoyment of *svarga*, the injunction to do *yāgas* requires the service of this text. Similarly what conflicts with the means to release serves the injunction to meditate on *Brahma*. (*Mīmā.*, III-4-10.)

(i) *Opponent.* *Kārya* is *kriti-uddeśya*, and it comes after *kriti*. (*kriti* is mental effort in the form of willing.) We reply. *kriti-uddeśya* is the *karma* (object) aimed at by *kriti*; *karma* is what one most desires to obtain; and this again is pleasure or removal of pain, if it exists. This is not your *kārya*.

Opponent. *kriti-karma* is not the object aimed at by *kriti*, but what moves *kriti*.

Reply. What moves *kriti* is pleasure or removal of pain. If one desires it, and knows that it cannot be attained without his effort, he will wish to make the effort, and will make it. Hence, *kriti-uddeśya* is the object of desire, depending on *kriti* for its attainment. No other *kriti-uddeśya* can anywhere be seen.

(ii) *Opponent.* *Kriti-uddeśya* is *purusha-anukūla* (aggreable to man).

Reply. Pleasure alone is aggreable to man.

Opponent. The removal of pain also is agreeable to man.

Reply. No; what is agreeable in itself is pleasure. Pain is the reverse; this is how they differ. The removal of pain is desired, as pain is disagreeable; but not because its removal is agreeable. The removal of pain brings about a state in which there is neither pleasure nor pain.

Opponent. The means to pleasure is agreeable to man.

Reply. No. Nothing other than pleasure is agreeable, whether it be action, mental effort or anything else. For, their nature is to be disagreeable. In order to procure pleasure one desires to resort to them.

(iii) *Opponent.* *kriti-uddeśya* is the *śeshi* of *kriti*. We ask—What is *śeshi*.

Opponent. A *śesha* is what is fit to co-exist with *kriti* working for the sake of another; this another is *śeshi*.

Reply. Then *kriti* is not a *śesha*; the other cannot be *śeshi*; for, the relation of *śesha* and *śeshi* depends upon one of them being a *śesha*.

Opponent. I will amend the definition. A *śesha* is what is fit to work for another; and that another is *śeshi*.

Reply. In defining *uddeśya* you used the word *śesha*; and in the definition of *śesha* you use the word *uddeśya*. (See the definition in sanskrit.) This is moving in a circle. Further, what do you mean by "being fit to work for another" ?

Opponent. Working for another is found only in a *śesha*.

Reply. No. A master, who is a *śeshi*, works for his servant, who is a *śesha*.

Opponent. The master maintains the servant for his own sake.

Reply. The servant too for his own sake serves the master. Hence working for another is not found in him, and your definition fails.

Opponent. The relation of *śesha* and *śeshi* is what subsists between *kriti* and *kārya*.

Reply. As you have not explained what *kārya* is, this definition of *śesha* and *śeshi* is useless.

(iv) *Opponent.* *Kriti-uddeśya* is the *prayojana* or end of *kriti*.

Reply. *Kriti*, being unintelligent, cannot seek an end. It must therefore be the end of one, who has the *kriti* ; and this is what he desires to obtain—pleasure.

Thus, however you define the word *uddeśya*, you arrive at the object of desire; you have not been able to show that it is anything else. Hence the definition of *kārya* given at the outset fails; and our statement that you cannot explain it is borne out.

6. The opponent and his school define *kārya* as *kriti-uddeśya*, *Ishta* and *kriti-sādhya*. We have examined the first definition in connection with commands issued in the world like "Bring the cow". Let us now examine the second definition in connection with commands given in the *veda*. We ask the opponent what *kārya* is. Is it an end sought for its own sake, or a means to an end ?

Opponent. It is an end in itself; for it is to be attained by *kriti*.

Questioner. What is attained by *kriti* is *yāga*, and this is not an end in itself, but is a means to *svarga*. This appears from the sentence *Svarga-kāmo yajeta* (one desiring *svarga* should do a *yāga*), which shows *svarga* to be the end; and *yāga* to be the means; and this means is the *kārya* that is denoted by the termination. How can you say that *kārya* is an end ?

Opponent. As the *yāga* disappears in a moment, we require a means to *svarga*, that is other than *yāga*, and that will endure. This is *apūrva* and it is *kārya*.

Questioner. Then *apūrva* is other than the object directly desired, and sought, viz., *svarga*. It should be desired and sought only as the means to it. Hence you distinguish *apūrva* from *yāga*. Your first view was that *apūrva* was an end in itself; and in order to make out that it is so, you have to admit that it is a means to an end. Your first view was not carefully formed. Even at the outset the termination does not show an end; for, the word *yajeta* should be taken with the first word in the sentence. Further, one will think only of the end, pleasure or removal of pain, and its means; and *apūrva*, not being one of these, there is no reason for his thinking of it as a thing to be attained by *kriti*.

7. Next, let us ask what the nature of *apūrva* is, if it be an end.

Opponent. It is agreeable to man, as pleasure is.

We ask again. Is it pleasure ? That alone is agreeable.

Opponent. It is like pleasure, but of a different kind.

Again we ask. What is the authority for regarding it as such ?

Opponent. My own experience.

Question again. When you enjoy an object that appeals to the senses, you perceive the pleasure, which it gives. When you experience *apūrva*, do you perceive pleasure in the same way ? You will be unable to say that you do.

Opponent. *Śāstra* states it to be an end, that man will seek. when this is known, it will be enjoyed like pleasure.

Question. *Śāstra* is a command. What is the command that states *apūrva* to be an end ? It cannot be commands issued in the world; for they refer to actions, which are in themselves disagreeable. They show them to be only means to pleasure, or removal of pain, and to be capable of being attained by *kṛiti*. They do nothing more. It cannot be the injunctions contained in the *veda* ; for they too merely show *kārya* to be the means to the attainment of *svarga*. It cannot be texts of the *veda* that prescribe *yāgas* to be done throughout life (*nitya*), or on the occurrence of a contingency (*naimitika*); for in your view, that all *yāgas* bring about *apūrva*, the conclusion cannot be avoided that they too state them to be the means of attaining *svarga*. Certain actions like the taking of food, if unobstructed, yield fruits quickly in this world, and they are enjoyed, as good health is. If *apūrva* were a fruit like pleasure, it should be enjoyed in the same manner, and be perceived to be different from these worldly fruits; but it is not so enjoyed. Hence, we see no *śāstra* accepting the view that *apūrva* is a kind of pleasure. Nor do *arthavādas* describe the nature of pleasure in the shape of *apūrva*, as they describe the pleasure of *svarga*. We have not seen this, nor have you.

8. The last definition of *kārya*, that it is brought about by *kṛiti* is, like the other two definitions, untenable. In injunction texts, the termination denoting the injunction shows that the meaning of the root (i.e., *yāga* in the word *yajeta*) can be done by *kṛiti*. And this is supported by the *sūtras* of *Pāṇini*, the grammarian.

Opponent. If *kārya* be not *apūrva*, who gives the fruits ?

Reply. *Brahma* as the inner Ruler of *agni* and other *devatās*. That *yāgas* are His worship, and that pleased with the worship, He gives the fruits will be explained in Chapter 2, Section 2, *Sūtra* 37.

9. At the end of para 4 of the first view it was stated that the fruit of *chāturmāsya* is imperishable. This happens only, when it is done as the worship

of *Brahma*. Otherwise, it is stated to be perishable; and the term *akshayya* (imperishable) used in the text should therefore be taken to mean relatively permanent, as in the text "Air and ether—they are free from destruction" (*Brihad.*, IV-3-3).

10. The result of this discussion is that the *Upanishads* can give information about *Brahma*, even though He is a settled fact, and that therefore the proposed enquiry may be made (1).

SUB-SECTION 2

Who is this *Brahma*, regarding whom an enquiry is to be made ?

2. जन्माद्यस्य यतः ।

From Whom the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of this (universe) take place, He is *Brahma*.

Meaning of sūtra. (2) The term 'this' (*asya*) denotes the universe as seen. Attention is intended to be drawn to the diversity which characterises it. It consists of the two elements—*Jeevas* and matter existing together. There is diversity in the former element by the division into *devas*, men, beasts and vegetables; and by their limitations; for each is limited to a place, to a period of time and to the enjoyment of particular fruits. The other element also shows diversity by division into the primary products, and the formation of numberless objects out of the compounded primary products. By drawing attention to this diversity the intention is to indicate the greatness of *Brahma* in evolving and sustaining this wonderful universe (3).

Subject. The text for consideration is :

(1) There are five parts in a sub-section : (i) The subject to be considered; (ii) the doubt regarding it; (iii) discussion; (iv) decision; and (v) its use. Here the subject is enquiry into *Brahma* ; the doubt is whether it may be commenced; the discussion is that words convey no meaning regarding settled facts; decision is that they do; and the use of the decision is that the commencement of the enquiry may be made.

(2) The first word in the *sūtra*, meaning that of which *janma* (evolution) is the beginning, is a compound known as *bahuvrīhi* to the grammarian. There are two kinds of this compound. In one that which is denoted by the first word is a part of what the whole word denotes; in the other it is not. The compound word here comes under the first kind, known as *tad-guna-sam-vijnāna*. It denotes a group consisting of evolution, sustenance and dissolution; and of this evolution is a part. This explanation is needed to refute the objection that evolution not being included in the word, *Brahma* is not its cause.

(3) The vedic text, which is considered in this sub-section, uses the words *yataḥ* (from whom), *yena* (by whom) and *yad* (whom); and they indicate that the text repeats what is stated by other texts. These indicate certain attributes of *Brahma*, which are

From Whom these beings are born, by whom (as supporter from within) they live when born, and returning to whom they enter becoming one, know Him, He is *Brahma* (*Taitti.-Brigu.*, Section 1). See Vedic Texts.

needed in a creator, and in one who should be sought. These attributes, as being intended by the author of the *sūtras*, are enumerated in the *Bhāshya*. They are—(i) He is the ruler of all; (ii) He is an enemy of every imperfection; (iii) His will is unfailing; (iv) He possesses numberless good qualities like *jnānam* (shining) and *ānanda* (bliss); (v) He is all-knowing; (vi) He has the capacity to do anything; (vii) He is most merciful; and (viii) He is the highest *purusha* (person).

The meaning of these clauses is as follows : The second clause differentiates Him from matter, the substance of which continually changes, and from *jeevas*, who are subject to *karma* and suffer misery in various ways. By the term 'enemy' it is meant that no imperfection can ever touch Him. The freed *jeeva* has no imperfection of any kind; but before release he was subject to *karma*. The third clause shows that He can at His will subject *jeevas* to bondage, or release them, if they appeal to Him. This attribute accounts for freedom from imperfections, and is needed for creation and for being sought. The fourth attribute is needed for the latter purpose. He is bliss in the sense that He is agreeable, that is, to be with Him is bliss. The fifth and sixth attributes are needed in creation—being all-knowing for being the operative cause, and being almighty for being the material cause. This indicates that matter and *jeevas* form His bodies, and as clothed in them He evolves from the subtle condition to the gross condition as the universe. The two attributes are also needed for releasing bound *jeevas*; He must know what is in their way to reach Him, and must be able to remove it. The seventh is needed for both purposes. Seeing that *jeevas* in the state of rest are unconscious and sleep like matter, He is moved by mercy and creates the universe again. It is because He is merciful, that He is approached. The last attribute shows that He, who releases a bound *jeeva*, is the Being to be reached by him; it is not one that releases and another that is reached.

The termination in the term *yataḥ* (from whom) denotes cause, and the cause here is both material and operative causes. On this point there is some misconception, which must be removed :

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(i) *Opponent*. The termination shows only the material cause; for *Pāṇini's sūtra* (I-4-30) gives the name *apādānam* to that from which a thing is born; and another *sūtra* (II-3-28) require the ending of the fifth case to be added to the word, which expresses *apādānam*. Here the ending is of the fifth case. The term *yataḥ* therefore refers to the material cause; and as the word *yad* refers to *Brahma*, He is only the material cause; and the operative cause is different, and He is the being known as *Īśvara*.

Reply. Here the fifth-case-ending denotes cause in general; for the cause is common to evolution, sustenance and dissolution. It does not denote *apādānam* ; for *Pāṇini* does not give the name to the cause of sustenance and to the place of dissolution. It covers both the material and operative causes. Your conclusion is unsound.

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The question is whether from this text a conception of *Brahma* can be formed. The doubt arises from the mention of more than one epithet (1), from the singular number of the word *Brahma* and from its non-repetition.

First view. 1. A conception cannot be formed. For there are three epithets—the cause of evolution, the cause of sustenance and the cause of dissolution; and they must point to three *brahmas*, not to one.

2. Here an objection is raised. In the sentence "*Devadatta* is black, young, red-eyed, and of uniform dimensions," though the epithets are many we perceive that *Devadatta* is one only. Similarly, here too *Brahma* is one only. The opponent replies : In this case *Devadatta* is actually seen to be one by other means, and all the epithets are taken as referring to one only. If he were not known to be one by other means, the same impression would be created with regard to him also. In the case under consideration, *Brahma* is to be known only from this definition; and is therefore not known (2) to be one by other means; the epithets being many, *Brahma* must be many.

3. *Objection Again.* The term *Brahma* is used in the text but once. It has not been repeated; nor do these words "These *Brahmas*" occur. Hence *Brahma* is one. The opponent replies. From the sentence "broken-horned, hornless and full-

(ii) *Opponent.* In the vedic text, which is repeated by the *sūtra*, three words occur *yataḥ* in the fifth case, *yena* (by whom) in the third case, and *yad* (whom) in the second case; and each occurs in a separate clause. The word *yataḥ* is not common to all the operations. It relates only to evolution. The termination therefore denotes *apādānam*, and this agrees with the word *jāyante* (are born). Further, taking the termination to denote cause in general, it must be restricted to the cause of evolution, i.e., material cause; for the *sūtra* and the vedic text should state the same thing, and the word *yataḥ* in the *sūtra* should agree with the same word in the vedic text.

Reply. It is true that the word *yataḥ* in the vedic text is not common to the three operations; but it repeats what has been stated in other texts; and must not conflict with what they teach. One of them is "It was one only; without a second"; It willed "I will become many. It created fire" (*Chando.*, VI-2-2 and 3). This shows *Brahma* to be the material cause, and denies an operative cause other than He. The expression "I will become" means "I myself will evolve as the universe, that is characterised by diversity"; and the text states that He became as He willed. *Brahma* being thus both the causes, the term *yataḥ* in the text, which repeats the vedic texts, should indicate both the causes; and so should the word *yataḥ* in the *sūtra* also.

(1) *Epithet.* The sanskrit word for this is *viśeṣaṇa*. It is a word, which connotes an attribute, and through it separates an object which has the attribute, from other objects. The object separated is known as *viśeṣhya*.

(2) *Not known* to be one by other means. The opponent's view is this—It is useless to refer to the text—One only; without a second (*Chānd.*, VI-2-3); for that also has more than one epithet, and *sat* should be many. The term one (*eka*) may be explained as in the sentence "This paddy is one".

horned is the ox" one will conclude, in spite of the singular word "go" (ox) being used but once, that there are more than one animal; as the epithets are many.

4. *Further objection.* The word "go" being in the singular number, and being used but once, denotes of itself that the animal is one. In the example given this impression is shown by sense perception to be erroneous. *Reply.* Even if one has not seen oxen, he will conclude from the number of the epithets that the animals are many. For the same reason these three epithets cannot together form a definition.

5. In the next place, the text under consideration cannot be regarded as indicating *Brahma* by marks, which are only accidental. In this case He must have been known in one aspect already, and another aspect of His should be indicated by the accidental marks. For, in the example generally given on this point "The field, on which that bird sits, is A's field," the field is already known, and the further information that it belongs to A is now given. Here as *Brahma* has not been known in one aspect already, the text cannot be so understood.

6. The objector again appears and observes—*Brahma* has been known already from the text "Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*' (*Ānan.*, 1-1); and being the cause of evolution, etc., shows Him in another aspect. The opponent replies : In this text also there are many epithets, and the objection stated in para 1 holds. If reference be made to accidental marks, I ask what is the aspect already known. If you refer to a third text, I will repeat the question, and you must refer to a fourth text, and so on *ad infinitum*. You cannot refer to this second text, as it will be manifestly absurd. You must therefore refer to the text under consideration in this sub-section. Then, this text will depend on the second text, and that will depend on this text. This will be arguing in a circle.

Final decision. Neither objection¹ is valid. The number of epithets does not conflict with the unity of an object, unless they connote attributes, which are inconsistent with one another. In the instance of the ox, the epithets do connote inconsistent attributes, and plurality of oxen is inferred. In the other instance, the epithet "black" separates *Devadatta* from persons, who are white, red, or brown; but it does not deny the existence of other aspects not inconsistent with the black colour. There being no conflict, all the epithets apply to the same person. In the same manner as evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe take place at different times, the epithets do not connote inconsistent attributes, and the same Being may be the cause of them all. In cases like this the rules to be followed are these : (i) When attributes are invariably found in

¹ The original considers the second objection first, as it is in the author's mind. Here the order of the objections is followed.

different individuals, epithets connoting them imply plurality of objects; (ii) but when attributes are not so found, plurality of epithets connoting them is not inconsistent with the unity of an object.

2. In the *first view* it was stated that the three epithets together cannot form a definition. The reason for this remark has been disproved. One epithet only will suffice to form a definition; for it will separate *Brahma*, from every other thing; but the other epithets serve the purpose of showing that the same Being, who is concerned with evolution, deals also with the other operations.

3. The second objection also is invalid. It is not true that *Brahma* is unknown in any aspect to a student of the *Upanishads*. In the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya*, Section 2, it is stated that at the time of cosmic rest all the manifested world was *Sat* only; that He alone existed and without a second; that He willed to become many; and that He evolved successively as fire, water and earth. This evolution implies that *Sat* was all-knowing and all-powerful. This aspect of *Brahma* is referred to as a well-known fact in the text under consideration by the words "from whom", "by whom" and "to whom", and the additional information is given that He is *Brahma*, i.e., that He is immeasurably great in His substance and in His attributes, and that He makes others great.

4. In para 6 of the *first view* reference was made to the text "unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*". When He is known from the definition considered here, this text will differentiate (1) Him from everything else, and show Him to be a unique Being. There is therefore no arguing in a circle.

5. The result is that a conception of *Brahma* may be formed from the definition.

6. The first two *sūtras* do not fit in with the view of others (2) that *Brahma* is *nir-viśeṣa* ; for the term *Brahma* means a Being who is immeasurably

(1) *Will differentiate* : (i) See note (3) on the text in vedic texts. When it is said that *Brahma* evolves as the universe, we might prepare that He is Himself subject to changes, and is therefore subject to imperfections. This text removes the impression. It is known as the purifying (*śodhaka*) text.

The author of the *sūtras* has not given this text as the definition of *Brahma* ; for it defines Him in Himself and apart from the universe. He has to be meditated on as clothed in the universe, and it is in this form that He is reached. He should therefore be known in this form, and the other definition has therefore been considered. But He should be known to be free from imperfections; and it was therefore the author's intention that reference should be made here to the purifying text also. The original in closing the discussion uses the epithet *niravadya* in the reference to *Brahma*. There is no *sūtra*, in which the purifying text is considered; and the references made to it in *sūtras* (II-3-29) and III-2-15 and 24 serve only as illustrations.

(2) *The view of others*. This is that *Brahma* alone exists; nothing else; and that He has no attribute whatever. As there is nothing from which He can differ, He is said to

great, and who makes others great; and this Being is stated here to be the cause of the world's evolution, etc. The *sūtras* also, which follow, and the *vedic* texts examined therein do not lend any support to that view; for they refer to attributes like willing. Nor can it be proved by inference; for to show that there is fire on a hill, it must be shown that smoke, which co-exists with fire, is seen on it. Similarly, to show that *Brahma* is *nir-viśeṣha* it is necessary to admit that there is an attribute in *Brahma*; and this will make Him *sa-viśeṣha*. Even the interpretation of the *sūtra*, based on their authority, will prove the same thing. This interpretation is—He, who has the misconception that the world evolves, is sustained and dissolves, is *Brahma*. Misconception comes from *avidyā* (ignorance); and *avidyā* is, as they admit, seen by Him. This is possible, as He is mere *chit* (light) and *chit* is differentiated from dark things (*jaḍa*), as it shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about. *Brahma* therefore has this attribute, and this will make Him *sa-viśeṣha*. If He has not this attribute, He is non-existent; for being *chit* is stated to be the proof of His existence.

SUB-SECTION 3

The enquiry regarding *Brahma* having been shown to be possible, after considering first the *Vedānta* as a whole, and next a particular text, which serves as a definition, it is next examined whether the enquiry is necessary. With this point the third *sūtra* deals :

3. शास्त्रयोनित्वात् ।

Because *Brahma* can be known only from the *veda*.

Meaning—The *sūtra* has the term *śāstra yoni tva*. The first member of the compound is the *Veda*; and the second member means cause, not a cause that becomes a product, but a cause by which something is known; and *Brahma* is known from the *Veda*. The term "only" is also implied, as in the statement "He lives on water"; the meaning evidently is that he lives on water only. So here also.

Subject—The text for consideration is the same as in the preceding subsection. The doubt is the same as in the other case, but in a different form. If *Brahma* can be known by other means, then the *Veda* is no authority; for it is authority only, when a thing cannot be known by any other means.

First View. I dispute the statement that *Brahma* can be known only from the *Veda*; for He can be known from other sources. The *Veda* serves a purpose, only when it shows what cannot be so known. Here an objector comes forward and asks—What is the source? It cannot be sense perception (*pratyaksha*); for

be *nir-viśeṣha* (without differences). If any other thing exists, or if He has any attribute, he will differ from them; and then He is said to be *sa viśeṣha* (with differences).

the senses make known those objects only, that are present and are capable of being contacted by them. They are powerless to show a maker of the world, who sees everything and who is capable of making it. It cannot be perception by the mind; for it shows only pleasure and pain and the like, and is powerless to act in regard to objects in the outer world independently of the outer senses. It cannot be perception in *yoga* (meditation); for however vivid it may be, it is merely thought on something previously experienced, which by much practice has become vivid like sense perception. It possesses no authority; how can it be considered to be sense perception? It cannot show anything else; if it does, it is misconception. Nor can the source be inference; for the *hetu* (1), on which you rely, cannot be one that is seen in the Being under consideration; for being beyond the senses, its existence in Him cannot be perceived. The *hetu* cannot be one common to Him and others; for its co-existence with the power to see all things and to make them has nowhere been seen. Here one, who holds the same view as the *vaiṣeṣhika*, comes forward and urges the following inferences:

(i) The universe is a product; for it is made up of parts;

(ii) The universe has for its maker one, who knew of what material it should be made, what were the instruments needed, who were to profit by it and how the product was to be utilised; for it is a product like an earthen jar.

(iii) The universe depends upon a single intelligent being; for it has been made out of non-intelligent material, like the healthy body of a person.

2. A *mīmāṃsaka*, who holds the same view as the *vedāntin* in regard to the helplessness of inference on this point, criticises the inference thus: First,¹ the second inference is faulty in three respects. (i) In the example given the work is within the normal knowledge and capacity of the maker, and only such works are known to be made by intelligent persons; but it is not so in the case under consideration; for the earth, the hills and the great oceans are beyond normal knowledge and capacity. The condition that the work should be of this character is present in the example, but is absent from the subject under consideration. The inference is faulty (2). (ii) Next, it is a simpler hypothesis to

(1) *Hetu*. The following is the type of a valid inference: "There is smoke on the hill; therefore there is fire on it; for smoke and fire co-exist." Here smoke is known as the *hetu*; and fire as the *sādhya*.

(2) It is not sufficient to state that a thing is a product; it should be shown also that normal knowledge and capacity will suffice for making it. In the case under consideration this cannot be shown. *Example*: There is fire on the hill; therefore there is also smoke on it. Here the *hetu* alone is not sufficient; it must be shown also that undried fuel has been placed on the fire. If a condition, that must co-operate with the *hetu* in producing the effect, is present in the example, but is absent from the subject under consideration, it is known as *upādhi*, and an inference tainted by *upādhi* is invalid.

¹ The original considers the second inference first; here the order of the inferences is followed.

accept *jeevas* as the makers; for their existence is admitted by both the parties. They perceive the material of which the universe is made, viz., the earth and the other elements, and they also perceive the *yāgas* which produce the *adrishṭams* and serve as the instruments. As they perceive them now, it may be presumed that they perceived them at the time of creation. It is not necessary that they should also perceive the *adrishṭams*—i.e., capacity generated in themselves by the *yāgas*; it is sufficient to know that the *yāgas* generate this capacity, and this knowledge is obtainable from the *veda*. In the case of the jar the potter knows that the rod and wheel possess the capacity to make the jar; but he does not see the capacity. The conclusion on this point is that the opponent attempts to prove what is accepted by the other party. (iii) Next, the jar is made by one subject to karma, of limited knowledge and capacity, operating in a body, and with instruments, and not in possession of every object of desire. The *hetu*—being a product—being found to co-exist with these particulars, it will follow that the maker of the universe is also subject to *karma*, that he is of limited knowledge and capacity, that he lives in a body, that he works with instruments and that he is not in possession of all objects of desire. In other words the inference proves the reverse of what is intended. If the subject of the inference proves the reverse of what is intended. If the subject of the inference can be known from some other source, it may be possible to eliminate these particulars; but the maker of the universe is not known by any other means. The inference is faulty.

3. The third inference—the universe depends upon a single intelligent being, like one's healthy body, is also untenable. What is meant by this dependence? It cannot be dependence for coming into existence or for its continuance; for this is absent from the example, the person's body having been born, and continuing to exist for the sake of his wife (1) and others, who profit by him. Existence in the sense of the parts of the body remaining together as a whole does not need an intelligent person. Nor can it be existence in the sense of breathing; for this is absent from the earth, hills and oceans, which are included in the universe. What is needed is the same form of dependence, which is found in both the example and the subject under consideration; and this does not exist here. Lastly, it cannot be dependence for action; for the *hetu*—being made—is found in cases like the meaning of cars, where many persons co-operate to produce a work. Hence the inference is faulty; for the *hetu*

(1) *For the sake of his wife*. Every deed produces a capacity in the person, who does it, to yield its fruit. This is known as *adrishṭa* or *apūrva*. The *adrishṭas* of the wife, children and others bring the person's body into existence, and keep it going, so that they may all obtain the fruits due to them. Hence the body depends upon the *adrishṭas* of many, and not upon a single intelligent being. For a valid inference both the *hetu* and *sādhya* should co-exist; they do not do so in the example.

and *sādhya* do not co-exist. Unless they do, the inference cannot be valid. If you omit the word "single" from the *sādhya*, you will then try to prove what needs no proof.

4. The *Vaiśeshika* himself comes forward to reply to the criticism and deals with the objections stated in para 2, first putting forward three inferences to prove that the universe is a product : (i) The earth and hills are products; for they consist of parts, like a jar; (ii) The earth, oceans, and hills are products; for they are of such size as can be perceived and have motion, like a jar; and (iii) The human body and earth are products; for they are such size as can be perceived but of limited dimensions, like a jar. Among objects consisting of parts, there is nothing, other than this character, which determines their becoming products. The condition that a work should be within normal knowledge and capacity (1) as unnecessary. In a thing known to be made, an opinion of the knowledge and capacity of the maker is formed from the workmanship. When a large palace of a king is seen, considering its parts and the way in which they have been put together, it is concluded that it was made, and at the same time the knowledge and capacity of the maker is noted to be of a high order. Similarly, as the universe consists of parts, it is presumed that it was made, and that its maker was omniscient and omnipotent, and that the work was not beyond his knowledge and capacity. The first criticism therefore fails.

5. Further, all men experience pleasure or pain as the result of good or bad deeds; but the deeds themselves, not being intelligent, cannot yield their fruits without guidance from an intelligent Being. It is therefore necessary to assume that a Being exists, who can give every fruit in accordance with the past *karma* of all persons. A carpenter's tools, though the set is complete, and though all the conditions exist, except guidance by an intelligent person, cannot make a box, unless they are handled by him. That a tree grows from a seed, and that pleasure which one feels makes his hair stand on end do not disprove the point; for both these cases are included in the subject under consideration.

6. The next criticism also fails. The *jeevas* are unable to see things which are minute, which are at a distance, or which are separated from them by intervening objects. This is known as a fact; and in constructing a theory one should be guided by what one actually sees. In the case of the maker of the universe it is known that he labours under the same incapacity, and it is not illegitimate to infer his existence as omniscient and omnipotent.

7. The last criticism that the inference proves the reverse of what is intended merely reveals ignorance. In the making of a product what is needed

(1) *Within normal knowledge and capacity.* The meaning is – What is normal should be determined each case from the work itself, It is different for different works; so that the Maker of the universe has such knowledge and capacity as is needed for His work, and that is normal knowledge and capacity for the work. There is therefore no *upādhi*, and the interference is not invalid.

is knowledge of the material and the capacity to make it into the product, but not ignorance or incapacity in regard to other objects. To find out whether a thing is connected with the effect as cause, it should be examined whether the effect will follow, if that thing be absent. Tested by this method ignorance and incapacity in regard to other matters will be found unconnected with the effect (1); and the assumption that the attributes found in the potter will be found in the maker of the universe is not therefore legitimate. As to the possession of a body, let me point out that by the mere exercise of will one is seen able to dislodge the poison, which has entered the body of another; that for the exercise of the will, a body is not needed; that what is required is the mind; that it exists in the maker of the universe; that it is eternal and survives death; and that in the inference of the existence of a maker the possession of the mind is included along with knowledge and capacity. Hence, the text in question is no authority, and the proposed enquiry is unnecessary.

Final decision. That the universe has been made is conceded; but what is the authority for holding that it was made by one person and at one and the same time ? A jar, for instance, is made of one material, and is of limited size, so that it may be made by one person at the same time. The whole of the universe is not one product, like the jar, capable of being made of one material by one person at the same time. If it were so, one maker might be presumed to have made it without effort. But it consists of different products; and those which differ from one another are seen to be made by different persons and at different times; but not always made by one person and at the same time.

2. You urged (*first view*, para 6) that the *jeevas* have not the capacity (2) to make the universe; but we see that particular individuals by accumulating merit by numberless good deeds acquire peculiar capacities; and it is possible that some *jeeva*, by making the *jyotishtoma* offering numberless times, acquires the capacity to create the earth, and other objects. It is not therefore legitimate to ignore the *jeeva*, who is already known, and assume the existence as a maker

(1) *Will be found unconnected with the effect.* The opponent asks : You say that the potter is a man of limited knowledge and capacity, that is, he is ignorant and incapable in regard to many matters. Do the ignorance and incapacity relate to all matters, other than the making of earthen vessels, or only to some matters ? The former alternative is not correct; for the potter does possess them in some matters. Nor will the second alternative do ? What is this matter ? Is it the making of gold ornaments ? If so, ignorance and incapacity in regard to gold ornaments are not found in the goldsmith; and yet he makes them. Hence ignorance and incapacity in any matter other than the making of a particular product is not necessary for making it.

(2) *Have not capacity.* The opponent's contention was this. The products are some of them of very large size, and some are very minute; and these being beyond the capacity of *jeevas*, one other than a *jeeva* should be assumed, and in doing so, it is simpler to assume one such being than many. In the reply it is pointed out that it is needless to assume one other than a *jeeva* ; and this being so, there is no room for the simplicity rule.

of a person wholly unknown. The rule to be followed in adopting a new theory is that it is more legitimate to assume a new attribute as existing in a known individual, than to assume the existence of a new individual. *Question* : At the dissolution of the universe *jeevas* are devoid of bodies; and they can do nothing without them. How can a *jeeva* create the universe ? A maker, who can work without a body, and who is therefore other than a *jeeva* is needed. *Reply* : Why do you assume that all things come into existence or go out of existence at the same time. For such a thing has not been seen; on the other hand, they appear and disappear only one after another. *Question again* : This is so; but should not simultaneous creation at the end of cosmic rest be assumed ? *Reply* : The assumptions must be based on what is seen; and from doing so no undesirable result will follow.

3. The criticism stated in the two preceding paras may be put in logical form thus : You say—the universe has been made by one intelligent person; for it is a product. If reference be made to an intelligent person in general terms, the *hetu* is found among things which are made by many persons. The inference is faulty. If reference be made to an omniscient and omnipotent person, such a person is unknown, and the *sādhya* will be absent from the example (1). When it is wished to infer that there is fire on a hill, fire is already known, and it is concluded that it exists on the hill. Here the thing predicated is unknown. If the word "one" be omitted from the *sādhya*, it will prove what requires no proof. Again is the *hetu* —being a product—found in all objects coming into existence at the same time or in all objects appearing successively ? In the former alternative such a *hetu* does not exist. In the latter alternative, the inference will prove that the objects are made by many persons; a conclusion the reverse of what is intended. If you assert that they are made by a single individual, it will be opposed to sense perception, inference and the *veda*. We hear the statements—"The maker of the jar is born"; "The maker of the car is born". Thus, the jar and car are made by different persons.

4. In para 7 of the *first view* you rejected the argument that like the potter, the maker of the universe should be of limited knowledge and capacity and the like; you urged that these points were not connected with the effect. This view is not correct; when something is done, the doer not only possesses the knowledge and capacity that is needed for the work, but is also under bondage to *karma*. For, he is invested with a body, which as shown by the effects produced—pleasure, pain, or delusion—is influenced by the three *guṇas* ; and his knowledge and capacity are limited by them. Even the desire, which

(1) *Will be absent from the example.* For a valid inference the *hetu* and *sādhya* must co-exist; and an example is given to show that this condition exists. If therefore the *sādhya* be absent from it, there is nothing to show the co-existence.

prompts the action, springs from the action of the *guṇas*. And the bondage to the *guṇas* depends upon his past *karma*. Hence, the maker of the universe should be bound by *karma*, like the potter; and the inference will prove the reverse of what you intended.

5. From what has been stated in the preceding paras, it will be evident that the scope of inference as a source of knowledge is limited. It can only prove that the universe was made by an intelligent person; and it will overstep its bounds, if it states that the maker is omniscient also on the strength of the magnitude of the product. For, omniscience is not found in the potter, though he is the maker of the jar. The attempt to prove omniscience by inference will be like the attempt to perceive smell by the ear. (*Adhi.*, verse 42.)

6. Do you rely in the last resort on a negative example and put forward the following inference : The universe has been made by an omniscient maker for it is a product. What is not made by an omniscient maker is not a product, like the *jeeva*. We reply. We accept the *hetu*, but reject the conclusion. If the argument were valid, you should be able to point to an unwelcome result as flowing from the rejection, but you cannot; for there are lots of things that are not made by an omniscient maker, and yet they are products like the potter's jar. If on the other hand, you say "The universe has been made by a maker; for it is a product", we cannot accept the *hetu* and reject the conclusion; for we should then assert that a thing is a product, though not made by any one, which is absurd. Your argument must be such that no conclusion other than the one stated by you should be possible; here it is not so. Your epithet "omniscient" therefore serves no purpose. We reject arguments based on a negative example only; for there is no evidence of the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*." (*Adhi.*, verse 43.)

7. In passing, let us add that inference is powerless to prove that *Brahma* is both the material and operative causes of the universe; for in the example of the potter, the causes are found to be distinct. You may say—accept my inference to prove the existence of *Brahma* as an operative cause; and then your *vedānta* may show that He is also the material cause. This view is untenable; for, if *vedānta* should rely on your inference, it must accept its testimony as it determines the fact; and it will determine *Brahma* as the operative cause only, and as distinct from the material cause.

8. Here are some counter-arguments : (i) The body and the earth were made by a bound *jeeva* ; for they have been made, like an earthen jar. (ii) *Brahma* was not the maker of the universe; for He had no object to gain, like the freed *jeeva*. (iii) *Brahma* was not the maker of the universe; for He had no body, like the freed *jeeva* again; and (iv) At the time under consideration (1)—

(1) *Time under consideration*. The time stated to be the beginning of evolution. The intention is to show that the universe as it exists now, existed then; and that therefore there is no need to prove that it had a maker.

the universe was not non-existent; for that time had the characteristic of time, like the present time. The result will be that if *Brahma* be accepted as the maker on the authority of inference, He would be bound by *karma*. He would have some object to gain; and He would be embodied. Here the opponent speaks. The *jeeva* does not need a body, when his first connection with a body begins, or when he moves his own body to action. Reply. In the first case, he does remain in a subtle body, when he enters a gross body. His subtle and gross bodies follow one another like the seed and tree. *Illustration*. The entry of a *jeeva* in a child body into a young man's body. In the second case the very body that he moves to action helps him in this effort. *Illustration*. A jar by its very existence causes perception of itself, and then becomes the object of the perception.

9. Let us put some questions to the opponent : In making the universe did *Īśvara* work in a body or without a body ?

Opponent : Without a body.

Questioner : He could not have done so; for we have not seen any one without a body doing anything. Can you give an instance ?

Opponent : An operation of the mind takes place without the help of a body. It only requires the possession of the mind. Mind being eternal, *Īśvara* can therefore make the universe by mere willing.

Questioner. Even mental operations are observed only in those invested with bodies. Though the mind is a permanent entity (which by the way we do not accept), the freed *jeeva*, being devoid of a body, does not give any indication of its operation.

Opponent : *Īśvara* worked in a body.

Questioner : Was that body permanent or perishable ?

Opponent : It was permanent.

Questioner : If so, a body, though made up of parts, need be a product. The universe, though made up of parts, might likewise be permanent, and the need for inferring the existence of a maker would not arise.

Opponent : The body was a perishable one.

Questioner : It must have been made; but the body by the exertion of which this body should be made was not then available.

Opponent : *Īśvara* was himself the cause.

Questioner : This cannot be in one without a body.

Opponent : He had a body other than that made on the completion of evolution.

Questioner : We will ask—how was that body made? This would lead to the assumption of a third body; then of a fourth body and so on *ad infinitum*.

10. Another question. In making the world, did *Īsvara* operate or not?

Opponent : He operated.

Questioner : Having no body, this could not be.

Opponent : He did not operate.

Questioner : Like the freed *jeeva* he could make nothing.

Opponent : The universe might be made by mere willing without manual operation.

Questioner : Making a thing by mere willing without the use of the hand is unknown, and an example would be wanting; for the potter does not make a jar by mere willing.

11. The conclusion is that *Brahma* can be known only from the *veda*. The *opponent* puts some questions :

(i) You reject my inference on the ground that it assumes many things which are unknown and improbable; does not the *veda* do the same ?

Reply. The *veda*, not having been made, and being therefore perfect, its testimony is implicitly accepted, like the statements of a friend returning from a distance. Where any of these statements conflicts with what is known from other sources, they are rejected. Similarly, if the *veda* makes a statement conflicting with sense perception, it is understood in a secondary sense as mere praise. (*Adhi*, verse 44.)

(ii) Do not those who rely on the *veda* say "From products which are beyond our capacity, we should infer a superior maker ?" Does not the text under consideration in this sub-section refer to what is already known from another source, and is not that source inference."

Reply. These are not the cases of proof of *Brahma* by inference. The testimony of the *veda* on this point is unhesitatingly accepted; and the truth is brought home to students by pointing out its appropriateness. In the text under consideration the reference is not to the *vaiśeṣika*'s inference, but to other texts. (*Adhi*, verse 45.)

SUB-SECTION 4

Introduction. The enquiry regarding *Brahma* has thus been shown to be both possible and necessary. The next *sūtra* points out that (1) it is highly desirable.

(1) A person will desire to know a thing, (i) when he does not know it already; and (ii) when it will lead to a desirable end. In the preceding sub-section it was shown

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It—viz.—that *Brahma* should be known from the *veda*—surely results from the fact that *vedic* texts describe Him as the highest among the ends desired by man.

Subject. The word "surely" gives the meaning of the particle *tu*, which occurs in the original. This is the description given (2). The world-cause, referred to in general terms as *Sat*, *Brahma* and *Ātmā*, is *Nārāyaṇa*. He is free from every imperfection; He is the seat of every good quality; and He is limitless bliss (3).

The *vedic* texts, which give this description, as a whole, is the subject for consideration; and the doubt is whether they are authority for the statements made by them.

2. *An objector* states— The texts do not mean what they state; for they do not enjoin action or abstention from action.

Reply. Explain your meaning.

3. *Objector.* When a sentence means what it states, action or abstention from action is invariably enjoined. When therefore it does not do so, it does not mean what it states.

Reply. The invariable co-existence that you allege is not a fact. Every source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) gives information in matters to which it relates. When this has been done, its business ends; it does not go further, and enjoin action or abstention from action.

4. *Objector.* When sentences mean what they state, a purpose (*prayojana*) exists; and when a purpose exists, action or abstention from action is enjoined. When therefore neither is enjoined, no purpose exists; and in its absence, sentences do not mean what they state.

that *Brahma* cannot be known from any source other than the *veda*. In the present subsection it will be shown that He is the highest among desirable ends.

(2) The texts which give the description are; (1) From whom these beings are born (*bhṛigu.*, *anu* 1); (2) Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only; one only; without a second; It willed "I will become many; I will evolve; He became fire" (*Chāndo.*, VI-2-2 and 3); (3) Before creation, this was *Brahma* ; one only (*bṛihad.*, III-4-11); (4) Before creation this was *Ātmā* ; one only (*aita.*, 1-1-1); (5) "From this *Ātmā* ether came forth" (*āna.*, *anu* 1); (6) *Nārāyaṇa* alone was (*maho.*, 1-1); (7) Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* (*āna.*, *anu* 1); (8) *Brahma* is bliss (*bhṛigu.*, *anu* 6).

(3) Limitless bliss. As He is bliss, He is an end that man may seek; as the bliss is limitless, it is the highest end. One may be disagreeable in himself; but being the means to some pleasure, he may be sought by others. *Brahma* is not of this character; He is extremely agreeable in Himself, and is also the means to limitless bliss.

Reply. Neither statement is correct. The real intention of a speaker does not depend upon a purpose; on the other hand, the purpose depends upon the meaning which it is intended to convey. Also it is not true that a purpose does not exist, when action or abstention from action is not enjoined; for a desirable end appears. In the world also sentences, which merely state facts like "A son has been born to you," or "This is not a snake," do show a desirable end; for they give pleasure or remove fear.

The first view is put forward by the *Prābhākara*, the *mīmāṃsaka*. The *veda* is authority in so far as it refers to a pleasure to be attained or to a pain to be removed; and it serves a useful purpose of this kind, in so far as it enjoins the doing of a thing or abstention from another. The earlier portion is full authority, as it refers to *svarga* and enjoins the performance of *yāgas* as the means for attaining it. But the later portion contains no such injunctions, and merely states that *Brahma* is such and such. It is not therefore any authority in the sense of stimulating one's effort to procure a good (1).

2. *Objection.* The business of a source of knowledge is, as already stated, to convey information in matters with which it deals;

Reply. This is true of sense perception only. The *veda*, however, should point to a good; for no statement is made in the world or in the *veda*, which does not do so; nor will one make or hear a statement, without aiming at something desirable (2). This something is seen to be either the attainment of pleasure, or the avoidance of pain by abstention from action. Here are some instances—"One, who desires to get a valuable object, should go to the palace; one, who has a weak stomach, should not drink too much water; one, who desires *svarga*, should do *yāga*; one should not eat an intoxicating article of food."

3. Here the question is put to him. Has it not been stated that sentences, which merely state facts, give pleasure or remove fear?

Reply. We must consider what it is that gives pleasure or removes fear—Is it the fact stated or the impression created on the hearer's mind by the sentence? It cannot be the fact; for though it exists, if it be not known, it will not produce the effect stated. Hence, it must be the impression created on the

(1) The opponent contended that the sentences in the *upanishads* convey no meaning. This was refuted in the first sub-section. He now contends that their meaning is not what appears on the surface, but something different.

(2) *Something desirable.* For himself or for others; whether little or great. When a person speaks, some effort is needed; and it will not be made, unless there is something good to be attained. As statements are of this character, repetition of a statement is considered to be a fault.

hearer's mind by the sentence. This being so, even though the fact stated does not exist, from the mere impression created the desirable end will result. The sentences are therefore no authority for the facts, which they state. It follows from this that every sentence aims at some action to be done or to be abstained from, or at creating an impression on the hearer's mind; and in either way it serves a purpose. But in regard to a settled matter no sentence can convey any information.

4. Here an *illusionist* (1) comes forward and observes—Even the texts of the *Upanishads* aim at a *kārya* (something to be done); and from the very fact that they do so, they are authority for the existence of *Brahma*.

Opponent. How can it be ?

Illusionist. This is what they state—*Brahma*, who is without a universe, who has no second, and who is merely *jnānam* (perception) (2), under the influence of beginningless *avidyā* perceives Himself as connected with the universe; make Him disconnected with the universe. Though *Brahma* already exists, He may become the subject of an injunction through the destruction of the universe.

Opponent. What is the injunction, which directs that by destroying the universe, consisting of knowers and the known, *Brahma* should be made mere *jnānam*.

Illusionist. Here is one.

Do not perceive a knower other than knowing; do not think that a thinker exists other than thinking. (*Bṛihad.*, V-4-2.)

And there are others. This text means—"Make *Brahma* devoid of differences in the form of knowers and the known, and make Him mere *jnānam*" (3). *Brahma*'s existence of Himself is not incompatible with his being a *kārya* in the aspect of being disconnected with the universe.

5. The opponent criticises the illusionist. The view put forward is untenable. You state that the text aims at the creation of a *kārya*, *apūrva* or *niyoga* (for,

(1) An illusionist is one, who maintains that *Brahma* alone exists; but that under the influence of *avidyā* (ignorance) He imagines that there is a universe other than Himself, and that this is illusion.

(2) Mere *jnānam*. In every perception there is a person who perceives, and a thing that is perceived, in addition to the perception. The universe is made up of numberless persons who perceive, and numberless things that are perceived. In the opinion of the illusionist this universe does not really exist.

(3) Make Him mere *jnānam*. The meaning is that even the *avidyā*, that is the cause of the misperception, should go.

they are all synonymous). You should then point out the following things—*niyoga*, the qualification of the person to whom the injunction is given, the action that creates it (1), what helps this action and the person who does the action. Of them the qualification of the person is either a contingency, on the occurrence of which an action should be done (*nimitta*), or a fruit to be attained by the action. In either case, it cannot be enjoined. What is it here ?

Illusionist. It is the perception by *Brahma* of Himself as He really is.

Opponent. Then it cannot be *nimitta* ; for the perception of the true nature does not now exist; but has to be brought about. In the case of *agnihotra* offerings (2) the *nimitta* is to be alive at sunrise or sunset; and this already exists, when the offerings are made. Assuming it to be *nimitta*, it will ever exist, when once it is attained; and like the *agnihotra* offerings the action enjoined will have to be done ever afterwards, even though *avidyā* has been destroyed.

Illusionist. The undesirable result which you state will not happen; for though the *nimitta* may exist, a body and senses, which are needed for action, will not be available.

Opponent. *Brahma* now perceives Himself to be connected with the universe; and this is not perception of His true nature. It must come only after release from the influence of *avidyā*. As this is the *nimitta*, the action enjoined should be done after release. Seeing that He will have then no body and no senses, will He be able to do the action enjoined ? If He be able, he can do the action ever afterwards. If he be unable, the injunction should not have been issued. The qualification of the person cannot thus be *nimitta*. Nor can it be the fruit; for the fruit will be yielded by *niyoga*, and will therefore be perishable. *Svarga* is yielded by *niyoga*, and is known to be perishable.

6. *Opponent*. Next, what is the *vishaya* of *niyoga*, i.e., what is it that distinguishes the *niyoga* under consideration from other *niyogas* ?

Illusionist. *Brahma* Himself.

Opponent. The *vishaya*, like *yāga*, must be such as is made. A fruit is also created; but *vishaya* must also be an action like *yāga* again. Here *Brahma*,

(1) *The action that creates it*. This is denoted by two words in the original—*vishaya*, and *karana*. The same *yāga* is *vishaya* (subject), when it particularises an *apūrva*, and is *karana* (instrument), when it creates it. *Apūrvas* are all similar, being mere capacities generated in the persons who do *yāgas*. To distinguish one *apūrva* from another, it must be connected with the *kṛiti*, which generates it through a *yāga*. In this aspect of distinguishing an *apūrva*, *yāga* is *vishaya*.

(2) *Agnihotra offerings*. These are made under the injunction "One should make the *agnihotra* offerings, so long as he lives". Here being alive at the time for making the offerings is the *nimitta* ; and it occurs at sunrise and sunset every day.

being eternal, can neither be made, nor is He action. Hence, He cannot be *vishaya*.

Illusionist. *Brahma* devoid of the universe may be made.

Opponent. Even if He is to be made, He will be only a fruit, and cannot be *vishaya*; for *vishaya* is different from the fruit; as *yāga* is different from *svarga*. As He is not action, He cannot be subject to an injunction. *Brahma*, devoid of the universe is thus not *vishaya*; nor can *Brahma* or the withdrawal of the universe by itself be the *vishaya*. It cannot be the former; for He already exists; and if He is to be made, He will be liable to destruction, as whatever is made is seen to perish. It cannot be the latter; for the withdrawal of the universe will be the thing to be made, not *Brahma*.

Illusionist. The withdrawal of the universe is the subject of the injunction.

Opponent. It is a fruit and cannot be the subject of the injunction; for the withdrawal of the universe is itself release, (*moksha*); and release is a fruit. Further, if withdrawal of the universe be the *vishaya*, it creates *niyoga*, as *yāga* creates it; and *niyoga* will bring about withdrawal of the universe, as it brings about *svarga*. This is arguing in a circle.

7. Is the universe to be removed real or unreal?

Illusionist. It is unreal.

Opponent. It must be removed by right understanding and not by *niyoga*; which will serve no purpose.

Illusionist. *Niyoga* yields the right understanding, and through it removes the universe.

Opponent. The right understanding comes from the *vedic* text itself; why should *niyoga* intervene? From the mere understanding of the text, every thing other than *Brahma*, being unreal, is destroyed; hence *niyoga* and its adjuncts no longer exist.

8. If the universe is to be removed, what is the *niyoga*, which removes it? Is it *Brahma* Himself or something else?

Illusionist. It is *Brahma* himself.

Opponent. Then *niyoga* will be eternal; and the universe to be removed by it can have no existence whatever. And being eternal, it cannot be created by doing the action enjoined, as *niyoga* should be.

Illusionist. Something other than *Brahma* is the *niyoga*.

Opponent. This *niyoga* should be created by doing the *vishaya*, and this *vishaya* is the withdrawal of the universe (para 6 *supra*). Hence, the person, who should do it, ceased to exist, as he is included in the universe. *Niyoga*, being a capacity subsisting in a person, and finding no one, will not be available. As

by mere doing of the *vishaya* everything other than *Brahma* will disappear, there will be no fruit in the shape of release (*moksha*) to be brought about by *niyoga*.

9. You say that the withdrawal of the universe is *vishaya* of *niyoga*; it is also the instrument (*karana*) that creates the *niyoga*. What is it that helps it (*itikartavyatā*). In the absence of the helper, it cannot be a *karana*. You cannot point to anything in reply. The help is of two kinds. (i) To bring the *karana* into existence, and (ii) to enable it, when it has come into existence, to create the *kārya*. We see nothing, which will destroy the whole of the universe, as a hammer destroys a jar by falling upon it. Thus, help of the first kind is not available. Help of the second kind too fails; for if it exists, then the whole of the universe will not disappear, and the complete disappearance being the *karana*, it will not come into existence.

Illusionist. The knowledge that *Brahma* is without a second brings the *karana* into existence.

Opponent. This alone will lead to the disappearance of the universe (which disappearance is *moksha*); and there is nothing for the *karana* to do. If the helper is a negation, by the very fact that it is a negation, it cannot render help of either kind. This conclusion is that there is no injunction, which contemplates *Brahma* disconnected with the universe.

10. Another *illusionist* now comes forward and speaks. Though the texts of the *upanishads* possess no authority, on the ground that they refer to *Brahma*, as already existing, yet *Brahma* is surely shown to exist.

Opponent. How ?

Second Illusionist. From the strength of the injunctions to meditate. (1) So do they teach—

Meditation is the *vishaya* of *niyoga*. (See note under para 5.) And as meditation can be described only by referring to the object meditated on, *niyoga* implies that object. That is *Ātmā* referred to by the texts. The question arises—What is His nature ? The reply is given by texts like these—

(1) (i) *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen; should be meditated on (*Bṛihad.*, IV-4-5); (ii) The *Ātmā*, who is unpolluted by evil, should be sought; He should be meditated on (*Chāndo.*, VIII-7-1); (iii) Meditate on Him only as *Ātmā* (*Bṛihad.*, III-4-7); (iv) Meditate on the *Ātmā* alone, who is the world (*Bṛihad.*, III-4-15).

The first text enjoins meditation, and indicates that it should be as vivid as sense perception. The third text indicates meditation on oneness; and the fourth text directs meditation that the *Ātmā* and the world are one. The term used in the original is *loka*. The illusionist understands it to mean the world; but the correct meaning is fruit.

Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* (*āna.*, I-1); and, "Before creation, dear, the world was *sat* alone" (*Chāndo.*, VI-2-1).

They show the nature of *Ātmā*, and thus serve the injunction texts and obtain authority. As *Brahma* enters into the meditation, the texts do mean what they state about Him.

11. They also mean what they state, when they say that the universe is illusion. The following texts show that *Brahma* alone exists; and that everything else is unreal.

"One only; without a second" (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1); "That is real; He is *ātmā*; That thou art, *śvetaketu*" (*Ibid.*, VI-8-7); "Here no difference of any kind exists" (*kāṭha.*, 4-11).

On the other hand, differences are shown by sense perception and by the portion of the *veda* dealing with *karmas*, which are based on differences. There is thus conflict between the two sets of authorities; but the perception of differences is capable of explanation as having been caused by beginningless *avidyā*. We therefore conclude that non-difference alone is the truth. Now, meditation on *Brahma* creates a *niyoga*, which in its turn leads to the realisation of *Brahma*. Then release (*moksha*) is reached; and this is the attainment of the *Brahma*-condition, in which all *avidyā*-made differences of many kinds are removed, and *Brahma* appears without a second, and as mere *jnānam* (perception). This condition cannot be reached by the mere understanding of *vedic* texts; for, it is not so perceived; and the perception of differences of many kinds continues. If the *Brahma*-condition could be reached as stated, the injunctions to hear, to think and to meditate would become purposeless (1).

12. *The opponent* replies. This view of the second illusionist also is unsound. The texts may serve injunction texts as pointed out; but the texts of the *upanishads* are no authority for the existence of the facts stated. If the texts under consideration be connected with the texts enjoining meditation, so as to form a whole, then they serve the latter texts and do not mean what they state about *Brahma*. If they be not so connected, as they do not enjoin action or abstention from action, they possess no authority.

13. *Second illusionist*. Have I not shown that meditation on *Brahma* implies a knowledge of His nature, and that this knowledge is furnished by the texts under consideration ?

(1) This view of the second illusionist is not open to the objections urged in regard to the view of the first illusionist. Meditation on *Brahma* is the *vishaya* of *niyoga*; and it is also *karāṇa* (instrument) in the creation of the *niyoga*. The control of the mind and the rest are the helpers. The removal of *avidyā* is the fruit; and to attain this *niyoga* is created and the meditator is the person, who creates it.

Opponent. This is so; but meditation is possible, even with imaginary facts, and the correctness of the facts meditated is not needed. In the injunction "Meditate on name as *Brahma*" it is not true that name is *Brahma*; and what applies to this text may apply to all texts. The conclusion is that the texts of the *upanishads* do not enjoin action or abstention from action and do not serve any purpose. Even if they be considered as rendering service to meditation texts, they only point to the object to be meditated on, and their business ends there. Considering them by themselves, they create an impression on the hearers' minds, and by this alone, as by statements made to children and invalids to induce them to take medicines, they conduce to the attainment of desirable ends. Hence in mere statements of facts there is no guarantee as to the truth of the facts, and the *upanishads* are therefore no authority regarding *Brahma*.¹

Final decision. The argument is not valid. What pleases is not the impression created on the mind, but the belief that the statement of the facts is correct. If it be known to be false, no pleasure will follow. In the case of children and invalids the pleasure is based on the belief in the reality of what is told them. With the disappearance of the belief, the pleasure also will disappear, even though the impression remains. Similarly, if one be certain that the *upanishad* texts, though asserting the existence of *Brahma*, do not mean what they state, his knowledge of the texts will not in his opinion count for anything. And there is no reason to hold that the texts do not mean what they state. For the *veda* is not a thing made by any one; and it is perfect.

2. Let us ask the opponent—Why should not your argument be turned against yourself? The statements made in the earlier portion of the *veda* do not mean what they state; and yet like children elders are duped into doing what is enjoined.

Opponent. The *veda*, not being made, cannot delude like the statements of worldly men. If it did, knowing men would not teach it to their children and disciples.

Reply. This applies to the *vedānta* also.

Opponent. The *vedānta* shows that the *jeeva* has an existence, independently of the body; and this knowledge being needed by the earlier portion, the later one is subsidiary to it, and will continue to be learnt on this ground.

Reply. How do you know that the *jeeva* is other than his body? When one has reason to believe that the difference between them is delusion, will he be induced to learn the *vedānta*, as subsidiary to your injunctions.

¹ Here the original brings in *Śankara* and *Bhāskara*, and makes them state their views, which are criticised by the second illusionist. This portion of the *Śrī Bhāshya* is omitted, as not quite relevant. It is, however, embodied in the "Three *Tatvas*".

Opponent. The difference between the *jeeva* and his body is real; it is known from the perfect *vedānta*, helped by good arguments.

Reply. *Brahma* is the highest among desirable objects. This is known from the perfect *vedānta*, helped by good arguments.

Opponent. The difference between the *jeeva* and his body stated by the *vedānta* is confirmed by some other source; hence no one is deluded.

Reply. Then you do not need the *vedānta* ; and it will not be learnt as subsidiary to injunctions.

Hence, as the earlier portion of the *veda* is accepted as authority, by its teaching being found to be true in regard to present needs, and by its injunctions in regard to *svarga* being acted on by knowing persons, so the later portion also must be accepted as authority. Being free from imperfections, and not conflicting with any other source of knowledge in matters which are within its province, the *vedānta* is authority from its very nature.

3. These questions now arise : (i) How is *Brahma* the highest among desirable objects; (ii) How are the fruits attained by following the injunctions of the earlier portion of the *veda* defective; (iii) Where has it been seen that statements of existing facts give pleasure; and if this be so, how are injunctions to meditate useful. The following are the replies. *Brahma* gives limitless bliss by His substance, by His figure, by His attributes, by the persons and objects whom He controls and by His doings; all freed *jeevas* share this fully with Him; and the bound *jeevas* have their full share in it (1) when they render themselves fit for it. In the fruits dealt with in the earlier portion, on the other hand, the pleasure is limited, and the efforts to attain them are great and painful. Hence, the texts of the *upanishads*, which show *Brahma* to be in every way enjoyable, directly aim at a desirable end; while the texts, which enjoin action or abstention from action, do not do so. They merely indicate the means to petty pleasure, which are in themselves by no means agreeable. Hence one who states that the former set of texts do not aim at a desirable end, on the ground that they do not enjoin action or abstention from action, states that a person

(1) *Bound jīvas have their full share* : At present bound *jeevas* do not enjoy this limitless bliss; for they are under the influence of *avidyā* in the shape of beginningless *karma*. They do not therefore know the real nature of *Brahma* and of the universe, which He controls; nor are they aware of their own nature. Owing to differences in their *karmas* there are endless differences in what supports them, in what nourishes them and in their enjoyments. Above men, there are *devas*, *asuras*, *gandharvas*, *siddhas*, *vidyādhara*s, *kinna*ras, *kimpurushas*, *yakshas*, *rākshasas* and *piṣāchas*. Below men, there are beasts, birds, snakes, trees, bushes, creepers, grasses and the like. In each class, there are males, females and neuters. In spite of such diversity, all of them are entitled to the enjoyment of the same degree of bliss as *Brahma* Himself.

born in a royal family has no desirable end on the ground that he is not one among a group of low men living on dogs.

4. Reply to the third question is contained in the following two examples : A person is told "There is treasure buried in your house". He is pleased with this (1), and at his leisure makes efforts to take it out (2). A young prince (3), intent on his play (4), gets out of the palace (5), loses his way and is given up as lost by the king. Being of too tender an age to know his parentage, he is brought up by a good *brāhmaṇa*, and is taught the *veda*. He is sixteen years old, is a fine-looking boy and is full of all estimable qualities. If some good man tells him "Your father is the lord of all the country, and is full of all estimable qualities (6), and lives in a great city, anxious to see you (7), his long-lost son",

(1) *Is pleased with this*. Even a statement of this kind is pleasing. Hence statements that *Brahma* is such and such give pleasure; and to one, that wishes to realise Him, the injunctions to meditate indicate the means thereto, and are therefore not purposeless.

(2) The first example shows the pleasure that may be derived from a non-intelligent material possession, and the second the pleasure which the company of an intelligent person may give. Both kinds of pleasure are found in *Brahma*.

(3) *A young prince*. This indicates that *Brahma* is the ruler of all, and that *jeevas* are His sons.

(4) *Intent on his play* indicates that they are engrossed in sensual enjoyment.

(5) *Gets out of the palace*—This shows that they are outside His presence, and have not attained the highest heaven; *loses his way* that they do not know *karma yoga* and other means of reaching Him. By "good *brāhmaṇa*", reference is made to a teacher (*āchārya*), who teaches the *jeeva* the *veda*, and makes him qualified to receive instruction about *Brahma*. Sixteen years of age indicates that the *jeeva* becomes fit to enjoy *Brahma*, and that he is also an object of enjoyment to *Brahma*. By *Is full of estimable qualities* reference is made to the qualities in the *jeevas*, which are pleasing to *Brahma*.

(6) *Full of all estimable qualities*. Here the original enumerates seven qualities as being found in the king. They are therefore found in *Brahma* also. They are (i) *gāmbhīrya*—the quality of not minding the unfitness of the person, who receives a gift, and the greatness of the gift itself; (ii) *audārya*—the quality which makes Him feel that He is a debtor, even after He gives Himself and His possessions; (iii) *vātsalya*—love, which makes Him regard even a fault as a good quality, like the love of a mother towards her child; (iv) *saṁsilya*—the quality which makes a great man closely mingle with low persons. These four qualities of *Brahma* should encourage a *jeeva* to approach Him without fear, and ask to be taken to Himself. The next three qualities show His greatness. (v) *Saurya*—the quality of going in the midst of enemies, like going into one's own house; (vi) *vīrya*—absence of fatigue, however much He may have to fight; (vii) *parākrama*—the power to overcome enemies. To these should be added *dhairya*, though not stated. It is the quality of treating any trouble given by enemies as mere straw.

(7) *Anxious to see you*. This shows the longing of *Brahma* as expressed by the text—"That great man is very difficult to find" (*gita*, VII-19) "Great city" refers to man's

he is extremely pleased and cries out "my father lives; he is full of every kind of wealth". The king also is equally pleased, and makes efforts to get his son back; and in due course they become re-united. Similarly, the *vedānta* teaches. How is *Brahma* to be reached ? The injunctions to meditate point out the way (1).

5. It will be seen that *arthavādas* (portions of the *veda* other than injunctions and *mantrams*) are treated by the *mīmāṃsaka* as mere praise, without authority for what they state, unless they supply some information needed by the injunctions. Here the same kind of *arthavādas* are stated to mean what they state, and to possess authority independently of injunctions. How are these to be reconciled, if the two *mīmāṃsas* form one work ? Thus—in the earlier one a general rule was stated, and here an exception is pointed out. (*Adhi.*, verse 50.)

SUB-SECTION 5

Introduction. The bar to enquiry having been thus removed, the enquiry is begun in this sub-section (2) with the help of the definition considered in sub-section 2. It will be shown, first, that neither matter nor *jeevas* are fit to be contemplated by the texts which describe the maker of the universe. The first text is taken from the *Chāndogya*, Chapter VI.

The text is "Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; without a second. It willed "I will become many; and to that end I will evolve : it created fire". *Vide* "Vedic Texts". Here the doubt is whether what is indicated by the term *Sat* is *prakriti* (matter).

5. ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् ।

What may be known from inference, i.e., *prakriti*, is not referred to in creation-texts; for the term "willed" occurs in the text.

heart, where *Brahma* is present in a form of the size of one's thumb. It may refer also to the place known as *śrivaikunṭham*. *Good man* refers to a *guru* who imparts instruction about *Brahma*.

(1) The opponent may urge that in the example of the buried treasure, the sentence should be taken to include a direction to dig and take out the treasure. This contention is untenable. The digging will be done by the hearer of his own motion without an injunction, and the mode of digging is known to all. The *veda* will serve a purpose only, when it enjoins a thing, which will not be done otherwise.

(2) The correctness of the conclusion reached in the preceding sub-section may be impugned on the plea that creation texts refer to matter or *jeevas* as the world-cause. It has therefore to be shown that the world-case is neither the one nor the other, and that He is a unique Being.

The *sūtra* has the term *aṣabda*, which means that in regard to which the *veda* alone is not authority. *Prakṛiti* or matter may be known by inference.

The first view is that reference is made to *prakṛiti* or matter. The term "this" in the vedic text refers to the diverse material products of the universe as distinguished from *jeevas* (1) with whom they are blended. It properly applies to what are capable only of sense perception, which the *jeevas* are not. The *jeevas* do not change in substance, and go from one condition to another; they are present in bodies only as enjoyers. The material products on the other hand continually change and are characterised by the attributes—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, the effects of which in the form of pleasure, pain and delusion are everywhere perceptible. The text under consideration states the causal condition of these products; for an object, by abandoning one condition and assuming another, becomes a product. Hence, whatever object possesses a particular nature in the changed condition, that same object possessing the same nature was in the causal condition. The universe in the condition as products exhibits the three attributes mentioned in an unbalanced state; the same in the condition in which they were balanced was the cause (2); and what is known as *pradhāna* or *prakṛiti* is that cause and the only cause. Because it was then devoid of any name or form, it is denoted by the term "sat" (3). Hence the cause and product do not differ; it is only then that the announcement made—viz., that by knowing one thing everything is known—will be appropriate. If an intelligent being were the cause, then the illustration of the lump of earth and its products would not fit in. The conclusion is that *prakṛiti* is stated by the text as the world-cause, as taught by the great sage *Kapila*. This is evident also from the form of the texts, which like a syllogism state the point to be proved and the example.

Final decision. The term "willing" states a particular mental operation of *Sat*, which is followed by the creation of fire. A mental operation of this kind cannot take place even in a *jeeva*, though from the possession of the attribute

(1) *As distinguished from jeevas.* To show that *prakṛiti* is the world-cause it is necessary to exclude the *jeevas*, who are blended with material products. Three reasons are assigned for their exclusion. (i) the term this (*idam*) cannot be applied to them; (ii) they do not change in their substance; and (iii) they are without the three *gunas*—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.

(2) *Prakṛiti is that cause.* The opponent's meaning is that *Brahma* cannot be the cause; for He must have the three *gunas* or the universe must be without them. In the first alternative *prakṛiti* would be accepted as the cause under another name; the second would be opposed to the experience of all.

(3) *It is denoted by the term sat.* The term "one only" in the vedic text shows that names and forms did not then exist; and the term "without a second" that the three *gunas* were not unbalanced. This is the interpretation of the opponent.

jnānam he is capable of willing; much less can it be found in the unintelligent *prakṛiti*. Hence, one who is capable of this, and who must therefore be omniscient and omnipotent, viz., the highest *purusha*, is denoted by the term *Sat*. In all other creation texts also creation preceded by willing is seen (*vide Aitareya*, I-1-2; and *Praṣṇa*, VI-3-4). Hence, the attempt to understand the term "willing" in a secondary sense, which will be referred to immediately, will overlook the natural meaning of these texts.

2. The *first view* relied on similarity of the cause to its products; and this point is accepted; but not the conclusion arrived at (1). For, the highest *Purusha* clothed in His inseparable elements (2)—*jeevas* and matter in a subtle condition—is the cause, and He is also the universe in the gross condition; the cause and products are therefore similar. These elements are His bodies; but their possession does not pollute Him with any imperfection as in the case of *jeevas*. This will be explained later on in chapter II, section I, *sūtras* 6 to 9.

3. The second reason is untenable. For, though the point to be proved and an example are stated, the *hetu* (reason), the principal element, is absent from the text. It cannot be contended that the *hetu* should be added, as implied in the other two elements of the syllogism. This may be accepted only, when the other two elements do not serve any other purpose; but they are common to inference and all other sources of knowledge. In the present case the example serves to show that the statement made by the father was not impossible, as imagined by the son. The reasons assigned in this *sūtra* and those which are to follow show that even as an alternative the second reason is untenable.

6. गौणश्चेन्नात्मशब्दात् ।

If it be contended "the term 'willed' is used in a secondary sense," the reply is "no; for the term *ātmā* is applied to *Sat*".

The opponent contends—Willing in its primary sense, which is consistent with intelligence, is not stated here; but only such an operation as is found in

(1) *But not the conclusion.* If *prakṛiti* were the world-cause, the cause and the products would not be similar; for it cannot be the cause of the *jeeva*-element, which is a part of the products.

(2) *Inseparable elements.* Because *Brahma* is clothed in these elements, He is fit to be the world-cause. He is besides all-knowing and omnipotent. As the latter quality is in no way limited, He is *satya-samkalpa*, i.e., His will never fails. The following texts describe Him as being of this character :

His capacity (*śakti*) is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds and to pertain to His nature; also His capacity to know, to support and to create and destroy (*Sveta*, 6-8); Who knows everything and every attribute of everything, whose *tapas* is thought (*Munda*., 1-10); "whose body matter *avyakta* is; whose body *akshara* is; whose body subtle matter (*mrityu*) is; He is the inner Ruler of all beings."

an unintelligent thing is referred to. For further on in the same section it is said "The fire willed", "The water willed", and the terms in these cases should be understood in a secondary sense. By the side of these sentences (1), the willing by *Sat* must be understood in the same way to mean coming into a state immediately preceding creation. It is usual to speak of unintelligent things as possessing the attributes of intelligent beings—"The rice-crops look forward to rain". "The seed was pleased with the rain."

2. The author of the *sūtras* states the contention and replies. It is said of *Sat* further on "All this is pervaded by that (*Sat*); this is true. *Sat* is *ātmā*". (*Chānd.*, VI-8-7). By the term "all this" the universe consisting of the intelligent *jeevas* and the non-intelligent *prakriti* is referred to; and this *prakriti* cannot be the *ātmā* (inner Ruler) of them all. Accepting the view that the term "willing" was used in a secondary sense in the case of fire and water, a reply has been given; but even there the term has the ordinary meaning. For the words "fire" and "water" indicate the highest *Purusha*, who is within them and controls them. This point will be explained later on in *sūtra* II-3-14. It will be sufficient here to refer to the text. "I will enter these three *devatās* as the ruler of this *jeeva* and make diverse names and forms" (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2). It is by the entry of the highest *Purusha* into them, that they become objects and receive names (2).

7. तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशात् ।

Because the attainment of *moksha* by one who meditates on *Sat* is taught.

One reason for the final decision was stated in the preceding two *sūtras*. Another reason is stated in this *sūtra*—viz., the giving of *moksha*, which

(1) *By the side of these sentences.* Here reference is made to the following rule deduced in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. In connection with milking for making the *agnihotra* offerings, it is enjoined "one should touch the calf". The original of the text has the term *ālabheta*, which may mean either to touch or to kill for offering to a *devatā*. It is decided that the term means to touch only, as this is mentioned along with several other operations intended to give a fitness (chapter II, section 3, sub-section 6).

This rule is to be followed in cases of doubt. Here the question may be put—"How can you follow the rule, when there is no doubt in the matter? The term "willed" is *śruti*; its use along with the other words is the *pramāṇa* known, as *sthāna*, and this is weaker than *śruti*. Hence the term is used in its primary sense." *Reply.* Here the opponent contends on the strength of an inference that *prakriti* is the world-cause; the primary meaning of the term "willed" will then be inappropriate. Hence a doubt exists, and there is room for relying on the rule.

(2) These two rules may be deduced from the two *sūtras*—(i) By the statement of the point to be proved and of the example, the *hetu* (reason) should not be assumed as implied by them. (ii) When there are grounds justifying the understanding of a term either in its primary sense or in a secondary sense, the ground justifying the adoption of the primary sense should be followed.

pertains only to the world-cause, as shown in the text "The world-cause should be meditated on". In a text which occurs in the same *upanishad* it is stated "That thou art". The word "that " refers to *Sat* described in the preceding sections, and the word "thou" to *Śvetaketu*, who was being taught by his father. As *Sat* is stated to be the *ātmā* of the world, He is also the *ātmā*, of *Śvetaketu* ; and the sentence therefore directs him to meditate on *Sat* as his own *ātmā*. In section 14 of the same *upanishad* it is said in regard to one, who follows the instruction of a teacher and meditates on the supreme Being,

There is delay only so long as he is not released from his body. He will then be united to *Brahma*.

Now if *Sat* were *prakṛiti*, meditation thereon would lead to union with it. For the law of growth is

Whatever one meditates on in this world, that will he become when he departs from hence. (*Chāndo.*, III-14-1.)

And union with *prakṛiti* will only strengthen one's bondage to material things, from which he is already suffering. The *veda*, which loves us more than a thousand parents, cannot give this instruction. Even those, who assert *prakṛiti* to be the world-cause, do not admit that meditation on *prakṛiti* will lead to release. Hence, the teaching as to the attainment of *moksha* will not fit in with the view that *Sat* is *prakṛiti*. It may be stated here that the term *moksha* does not mean merely release from the body, but includes also union with *Brahma* ; for both the items are mentioned in the text.

8. हेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

And because meditation on *Sat* has not been stated to be a thing to be avoided.

In the view that *Sat* is *prakṛiti* meditation thereon would have the undesirable result pointed out; and the teacher would have warned his disciple against it; but he did not do so. These two *sūtras* point out the same reason, one in a positive form and the other in a negative form. This is indicated by the particle "and" (*cha.*) in the second *sūtra*.

9. प्रतिज्ञाविरोधात् ।

Because the view that *Sat* is *prakṛiti* would conflict with the announcement made (at the outset in the *upanishad*).

The announcement was made in the first section, viz., that by knowing one thing—*Sat*—everything would be known. Because the cause and the product are one—i.e., the cause by a change of condition becomes the product—by knowing *Sat*, the cause, the universe, the product, will be known. If *Sat* were

prakriti, by knowing it, one would know all its modifications, but not the *jeevas*; for they are not products of *prakriti*. This *sūtra* became necessary to remove the erroneous impression that the commencement of the *upanishad* (1), chapter VI, referred to *prakriti* as the world-cause, and that the reasons contained in later texts were therefore weak as compared with the commencement.

10. स्वाप्ययात् ।

Because *jeevas* are said to be dissolved in *Sat* in deep sleep.

The preceding *sūtra* referred to the relationship of cause and effect; and this brought up the *jeeva*'s condition in deep sleep based on the same relationship; and this furnishes a further reason. In explanation of the statement that the universe evolved from *Sat*, the teacher confined his attention first to the evolution of matter (sections 2 to 7), and in sections 8 to 11 he dealt with the evolution of *jeevas*. In the case of matter evolution is growing from unity and uniformity to multiplicity and diversity; but in the case of the *jeevas*, who do not undergo change of substance, evolution is expansion of consciousness, while dissolution is its contraction, till in the state of cosmic rest consciousness ceases to work. As the expansion and contraction of consciousness could not be explained with reference to the cosmic processes of evolution and dissolution, the teacher selected the processes of going to sleep and returning to wakefulness. The *upanishad* says:

When this statement—a person sleeps—is made, he is then, my dear, united to *Sat*; he is dissolved in himself (section 8, verse 1).

Section 9 states that the sleeping man does not remember what he was before, and does not know where he is then. He is then without name and form. This is his daily *pralaya* or rest. Section 10 states that when he rises from sleep, he does not know whence he goes forth, and he resumes the impressions that he had before going to sleep. He is now with name and form. This is his daily evolution or going forth. The seat, on which a person daily rests, and from which he daily goes forth, is his cause i.e., *Brahma*. section 8 states that cause is *Sat*, which cannot be the non-intelligent *prakriti*; because it is not fit to be the cause of the changes in the consciousness of the intelligent *jeeva*.

2. The word "himself" (*svam*) in the second sentence of the text takes the place of the word *Sat* in the first sentence; and as both the sentences convey the same idea, the word "himself" refers to *Sat*. As every word denotes *Brahma*, the inner Ruler of what it ordinarily denotes in the world, the word "himself" means *Sat*, his inner Ruler. *Brahma*, denoted by the word himself (*svam*), is

(1) *The commencement of the upanishad*. The opponent would refer to the example of the lump of earth mentioned in section 1, verse 4. The *sūtra* refers to verse 3, which possesses greater validity than verse 4 (Intro., para 24).

described merely as *Sat* during deep sleep as in the state of cosmic rest; for He is then without name and form. Hence, the text states that the sleeping *jeeva* is united to *Sat*; and that he is dissolved in himself.¹ The same thing is stated in a parallel passage (1).

This *jeeva*, embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside; does not know what is inside (*brihad.*, VI-3-21).

The *jeeva*, till he is finally released from bondage to matter, can know anything other than Himself only by the possession of a name and a form. In deep sleep he abandons them, and is united to *Sat*. On waking he takes up his name and form again. This is clearly stated in another place.

When he sleeps, and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with *Prāṇa* alone. When he awakes, from that *Ātmā* the *jeevas* go forth, each to his place; from the *jeevas* the senses; from the senses their activities (*kaushī.*, chap. III). See also *chando.*, VI-9-3.

Hence, the term *Sat* denotes *Brahma*. The author of the *vritti* also observes "By the union and separation stated in the text "He is then, my dear, united to *Sat*." this is known for certain. It is also stated "embraced by all-knowing *Ātmā*."

11. गतिसामान्यात् ।

The text under consideration states what other creation-texts state.

Other creation-texts describe an all-controlling Being as the world-cause, and the text of the *Chāndogya* must therefore do the same. The texts cited are from *Aitareya* (I-1-2); *Ānandavalli* (I-1-2); and *Brihad āraṇyaka* (IV-4-10).

(1) *Parallel passage*. This is quoted in order to remove the doubt, which may arise, that the *jeeva* abandons his gross condition and comes into a subtle condition; that this is his cause; and that his coming into this condition is his dissolution. The word *sat* would then denote a *jeeva*.

¹ The expressions "united to *Sat*" and "dissolved in himself" require explanation. The term "himself" does not denote only a *jeeva*; for as already stated it is identical with *Sat* and in this context *Sat* is *Brahma*. Nor does it denote *Brahma* as distinguished from His inseparable elements; for in this form He cannot be the material cause, and cannot therefore be the *jeeva*'s seat in deep sleep. A product is dissolved in its cause. Hence, the term means *Brahma* in the form of the *jeeva*. The dissolution in question is not like the dissolution of silver in shell-silver, in cases in which the latter is first mistaken for the former, and then the mistake is discovered. The silver disappears; but the *jeeva* remains. It cannot be like the dissolution in the atmosphere outside, of the air in a jar, when the jar is removed; for the *jeeva*'s body remains. Nor can it be like the dissolution of a jar on the ground, when it is broken and reduced to dust; for the *jeeva*-condition remains, as he is eternal, and his body also remains. If the *jeeva*-condition could disappear by one's merely going to sleep, the means of release indicated in the *veda* would be purposeless. Hence "being united" and "being dissolved" mean that the *jeeva*'s attribute *jñānam* then ceases to flow outwards. The term "himself" means *Sat* as the inner Ruler of the *jeeva* in this condition.

12. श्रुतत्वाच्च ।

And because the attributes of an all-controlling Being are explicitly stated in the same *upanishad* regarding *Sat*.

These are (i) the entering into everything as its *ātmā* and making its name and form, and (ii) being all-knowing, omnipotent and the support of everything; being free from *karma* and other defects, and the possessor of unchanging objects of desire, and of a will that never fails. (VI-3-2; VI-8-6 and 7; VIII-1-3 and 5.) (1).

Criticism of Śankara's view. The view that *Brahma* is *nirviśeṣa*¹ and mere *chit* should be known as having been rejected by the author of the *sūtras*. For, he has proved that *Brahma*, who should be known, possesses the power to will, taking the word in its primary sense, and this power is real.

Opponent. The *vedic* text does not refer to the possession of an attribute. It states *Brahma* to be a witness merely. Being a witness, He is other than *prakṛiti*.

Reply. In your view even to be a witness is unreal. If he is not a knower, He cannot be a witness. The announcement was made at the outset that *Brahma* taught by the *upanishads* was to be known; and it has been shown that He is an intelligent Being by *sūtras* 5 to 12. An intelligent person is one, who has the attribute *jñānam*; what is without the attribute of willing is merely like *prakṛiti*.

(ii) The opponent holds the view that *Brahma* is mere light. Now light is a substance that makes itself or other things fit to be spoken about. A

(1) The same thing is stated in other *upanishads* :

Svetāśvatara. "No one in the world is His lord; there is none who controls Him; He has no body; He, the world-cause, is the lord of the lords of the senses (i.e., *jeevas*); no one is His maker or his lord" (sec. VI).

Taittirīya-āranyaka. The all-knowing Being made all forms and names, and remains being denoted by the names (III-3-12). He has entered into man and rules them; He is the *ātmā* of all (*Ibid.*, 11).

Ibid., *nārāyaṇa.* The *ātmā* of all, and the highest goal; the lord of all and the controller of Himself; whatever is seen or heard about in this world, *Nārāyaṇa* prevading all that within and without, remains (*anu.*, 11).

Subāla-upanishad. He, the inner Ruler of all beings, is free from *karma* ; is the dweller in the highest heaven; has a shining figure; is one (i.e., without an equal or superior); and is *Nārāyaṇa*. Hence the texts, that deal with the world-cause, are not fit to refer to *pradhāna*.

¹ For the meaning of the terms *nir-viśeṣa*, *viśeṣa* and *saviśeṣa* see note (iii) on page 106.

nirviṣeṣha thing does not possess either character, and is therefore a thing like a jar and is not light.

Opponent. Even though it does not possess either character, it has the capacity therefor.

Reply. Capacity is an attribute; if you admit its possession, you abandon your view of a *nirviṣeṣha* substance.

Opponent. On the authority of the *veda* this one *viṣeṣha* is accepted.

Reply. Then on the very same authority accept all other attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, being the controller of all those that rule over others, being the seat of all estimable qualities, and being an enemy to imperfections of every kind. For the moment we accepted your statement that your *Brahma* has the capacity; we now repudiate that statement; for having a capacity should conduce to the doing of an action; and it can be explained only with reference to a particular action. If there be no authority for that action, i.e., if it does not show itself or other things, and make them fit to be spoken about, there is no authority for holding that it has the capacity.

(iii) There is no authority for holding what is *nirviṣeṣha* to be a thing at all; sense perception, inference, testimony, and one's own experience—all refer to *saviṣeṣha* things.

The conclusion is that the Being to be known is one, who is competent to will "I will become many in the form of the universe consisting of endless varieties of *jeevas* and material products", and that He is *Purushotama*, the highest *Purusha*.

SUB-SECTION 6

In beginning the enquiry the mind first turned to matter, which is seen everywhere; it was turned away from it in the preceding sub-section by the reasons adduced. It next turns to the *jeevas*, who though not so well-known as matter, are yet better known than *Brahma*, and are perceived by the cognition "I am"; and in this sub-section the mind is turned away from them also.

13. आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात् ।

Ānandamaya is the highest *Ātmā*, because He is the seat of infinite bliss.

The text for consideration is

There is a being known as *Ānandamaya*, who is other than this *viñānamaya*, and who is within it. He is the *ātmā* (*āna.*, V-2).

The doubt here is whether *ānandamaya* is a *jeeva* in the condition of bondage or a *jeeva*, who has become free, or whether he is the highest *Ātmā*. It arises from the statements that He is full of bliss, and that He has a body.

First view. Ānandamaya is a jeeva ; for the text

Who is the *ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *ātmā* (in the body) of this also (section VI-2) states that He has a body, and one who has a body is a *jeeva*.

2. *This objection is raised : The upanishad described creation in these terms.*

From that *Ātmā* came forth ether; air from ether; fire from air; water from fire; earth from water; plants from earth ; food from plants; *purusha* (body) from food (I-2).

By the term "that *Ātmā*" reference was made to *Brahma*; and to show who He is in a manner, which the student might understand easily, the *upanishad* stated that the *purusha* was *annarasamaya*, i.e., a modification of food and water (1-3); next, that within it was *prāṇamaya*; that it was *ātmā* (II-2); and that whatever was the *ātmā* of *annarasamaya* was the *ātmā* of this also (III-1). The impression first created that *prāṇamaya* was the *ātmā* of *annarasamaya* was thus removed; and it was stated that another was the *ātmā* of both. In this manner the *upanishad* passed over *manomaya* and *vijnānamaya*, and reached *ānandamaya*. It therefore teaches that the same world-cause is *ānandamaya*; and the world-cause, as shown in sub-section 5, is the all-knowing Ruler of all. To this objection the *sāṅkhya*, who put forward the first view, replies. True; but the world-cause is no other than a *jeeva*; for it is stated in the *chāndogya* itself, to which reference is made, "Entering with this *jeeva* with myself" and "That thou art *Śvetaketu*". Here the expression "with myself" and the word "That" refer to *Sat* mentioned as the world-cause; and this *Sat* is put in apposition with the *jeeva* and with *Śvetaketu*, who also was a *jeeva*. Words in apposition—i.e., words in the same case, placed side by side and intended to denote the same object—always refer to oneness. And the *jeeva* is competent to will and then create; for he is an intelligent person.

3. A further *objection* is raised : The *upanishad* begins with this injunction—"One who meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest", and then gives this definition "Unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma*." This shows *Brahma* to be the object of meditation and of attainment; for one attains what he meditates on. If the *jeeva* were *Brahma*, there is nothing to be attained by him; for he is a *jeeva* already. Being known, the definition would be purposeless. Lastly, he is not unchanging; for his attribute *jñānam* contracts and expands; and he is not without limitations. Hence *Brahma* is not a *jeeva*. The opponent replies : By the term *Brahma* is meant the aspect of the *jeeva* divorced from the body; and it is this that is to be attained; and the definition states what this aspect is. The attainment of this aspect is indeed *moksha* ; for it is stated.

From one, who is in a body, welcome and unwelcome things do not depart; and one who is without a body, welcome and unwelcome things do not touch (*chando.*, VIII-12-1).

Hence, this aspect of the *jeeva* is stated to be *ānandamaya*.

4. The opponent explains his conclusion further : The *upanishad* goes on to indicate what the *Ātmā* is, following the method adopted in the world to indicate a star to a person. His attention is first drawn to the branch of a tree; and when his eye is turned to it, he is asked to look in the same direction; and it is stated that the star which he sees is what has to be known. Following this method, the student's attention is first drawn to his body with the words "This *purusha* is *annarasamaya* ; then it is directed to *prāṇa* with its five-fold activity, which is within the body, and supports it; next to the mind, which is within the last one; next to *buddhi*, which is within the last; and it is finally fixed on the *jeeva*, as the *ātmā* of them all. The natural aspect of the *jeeva* is *Brahma*; and the same is stated to be *ānandamaya*.

5. *Brahma*—the tail. Here an *illusionist* raises an objection. The *upanishad* states :

He has the form of man; imitating the human form of *vijnānamaya* he has a human form. Pleasure (*priya*) is his head; *moda* is his right wing; *pramoda* is his left wing; *ānanda* is his trunk; *Brahma* is his tail, that supports. (V-2 and 3).

Brahma is therefore other than *ānandamaya* (1).

Opponent. It is not so. *Brahma* is described as having the form of man by His attribute, and is stated Himself to be head, wings and tail. This is clear from the description in similar terms in section 1, verse 3 of the body nourished by food. The parts of the body—head, wings and tail—do not differ from the body. In the same way *Brahma*, who is *ānandamaya*, is described by *priya*, *moda* and the rest, which are not other than Himself (2). As *Brahma*, who is wholly *ānanda* (bliss), is the seat of *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda* and *ānanda*, described as parts of Himself, He is stated to be the tail that supports them. If *Brahma* were other than *ānandamaya*, the *upanishad* would have stated (3) "other than *ānandamaya* and within it is *Brahma*; He is *ātmā* ; but this is not stated. The *upanishad* began by enjoining meditation on *Brahma*. It next gave a definition, by which He is differentiated from everything else. Reference was then made to

(1) *Brahma is therefore other than*. In the words "His tail" the termination of the sixth case shows relationship; and this implies two things, the tail being one, and he who has it being the other. Hence *Brahma*, the tail, is other than *ānandamaya*, who owns the tail.

(2) *Which are not other than Himself*. The reply to the objection raised on the strength of the sixth case is that it denotes here the relationship of the whole and a part of it.

(3) *The upanishad would have stated*. In this context each thing is shown to be other than the preceding one, as being its *ātmā* ; hence *Brahma* would have been stated to be the *ātmā* of *ānandamaya*, and therefore as different from it.

Him as *Ātmā* in the text "From that *Ātmā*". In order to show that He is the inner *ātmā* of all, the *upanishad* mentioned *prāṇamaya* as the inner *ātmā* of *annarasamaya*, and then passing over it, stated *manomaya* as the inner *ātmā* of both. In this manner it passed over *manomaya* and *vijnānamaya*, and ended with the statement that *ānandamaya* is the *ātmā* of all. Hence the word *ātmā* shows *Brahma* Himself, with whom the *upanishad* began, to be *ānandamaya*.

6. *Illusionist*. After stating 'Brahma is his tail' the *upanishad* gives a verse (*āna.*, VI-1) which means that one, who has knowledge of *Brahma*, exists, and that one, who has not the knowledge, does not exist. This does not refer to the knowledge of *ānandamaya*, and its absence (1). *Ānandamaya* is known to all the world in the form of *priya*, *moda* and the rest; and reference to its knowledge and its absence would not be fitting. Hence, this verse has not been stated with reference to *ānandamaya*; and *Brahma* is other than *ānandamaya*.

Opponent. You say that the verse under consideration refers to what is stated to be the tail; but in the four verses preceding it reference is made not to the tail, but to *annarasamaya* and the rest. Similarly, here also reference is made by the verse to *ānandamaya*, and not to the tail or anything else.

Illusionist. Then *ānandamaya* Himself is *Brahma*. The objection that I stated holds, as *Brahma* would be known to all.

Opponent. True; but it is not known that *ānanda* is unlimited. Your *Brahma*—the tail—is known already; you must therefore say—not as unlimited *ānanda*. This answer applies to us too.

7. *Illusionist*. *Brahma* is not a whole made up of head and the rest. Hence *ānandamaya* is not *Brahma*.

Opponent. *Brahma* is neither the tail, nor the support; He cannot therefore be said to be the tail.

Illusionist. *Brahma* is said to be the tail and support, as He is the seat, on which the illusion created by *avidyā* rests.

Opponent. *Brahma* may be described as *priya*, *moda* and the rest to show that He is *ānanda*, and other than pain. Thus, as by the definition "unchanging, etc." He is differentiated from things, that undergo changes, from things that do not shine, and from things that are subject to limitations, so He is differentiated from what is not bliss by the statement "He is *ānandamaya*". Hence, in the term *ānandamaya*, the termination *maya* (*mayat*) as in the word *prāṇamaya* has

(1) Does not refer to the knowledge of *ānandamaya*. Verses similar to this verse are found in the *upanishad* in regard to *annarasāmaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vijnānamaya*; and in all of them the terms *anna*, *prāṇa*, *manas* and *vijnānam* are found. If *ānandamaya* were the principal thing, the word *ānanda* would be found in the verse; but it is not.

not separate meaning. The conclusion is that the natural condition of the *jeeva*, who now appears under the influence of *avidyā* to be divided in endless ways as *devas*, men, etc., is described as *ānandamaya*. It is every part of it bliss and only bliss. *Ānandamaya* is therefore a *jeeva*.

Final decision. *Ānandamaya* is the highest *Ātmā*. This expression is what is implied by the words *na* and *aṣabdam* (1) drawn down from the first *sūtra* in the preceding sub-section. What is the reason ? He is the seat of infinite bliss. Section 8 of the *upanishad* gives a description of bliss, taking as the unit the happiness of one who is young, healthy and strong and who commands every influence on earth, and showing that the happiness of various classes of beings and of various personages is one hundred times the happiness of the next lower class or personage. The bliss of *Ānandamaya* is one hundred times the happiness of the last, i.e., the four-faced being; and to show that this description is intended merely to indicate that this bliss exceeds the happiness of every one and that it has no limit, it is stated that speech and mind set out to find out its higher limit, and that they return baffled. Bliss of this kind can never be found in a *jeeva* ; for he enjoys a drop of limited happiness mixed with endless misery. The freed *jeeva* enjoys the same kind of infinite bliss no doubt; but it is bestowed on him by *Brahma*, after releasing him from his bondage. The bliss of *Brahma*, on the other hand, pertains to Him by nature; and there is nothing to show that it has had a commencement. It is not left to settle this point by argument only. There is express statement :

There is a Being known as *Ānandamaya*, who is other than this *vijnānamaya*, and who is within it (V-2).

And *vijnānamaya* is a *jeeva* ; for the term means one having *vijnānam* or *buddhi* in abundance; and he who has it is a *jeeva*.

2. *Vijnānamaya* is *jeeva*. In para 4 of the first view reference was made to *buddhi* as immediately preceding *Ānandamaya* ; and this is the translation of *vijnānam*, the opponent regarding the termination *maya* in *vijnānamaya* as having no meaning. But this is not legitimate. In the case of the word *prāṇamaya*, the termination has no meaning, and this has to be accepted; but here as one who has *vijnānam* is available, the termination should not be so dealt with. *Vijnānam* is a natural attribute of a *jeeva*, whatever be his condition.

3. Here an objection is raised. The verse, which follows the texts regarding *vijnānamaya*, states "*vijnānam* does *yajna* (offering), and does (worldly) actions" (V-1). How is the use of the word *vijnānam* without the termination explained ?

(1) By the words *na* and *aṣabda*. The latter term means that in regard to the existence of which testimony (*śabda*) alone is not authority; as the *jeeva* shows himself, and as he is also known from inference, he may be denoted by the term *aṣabda*.

(N.B. : The meaning is that both the words are synonymous, and that therefore the termination has no meaning.)

Reply : The term *vijnānam* in the verse refers to a *jeeva* ; for like his attribute, he is also self-revealed, and the term has this meaning. Next, *vijnānam* is his chief attribute; and he is defined only as possessing it; and it is usual to use a word connoting such an attribute to denote an individual as possessing the attribute. The word "go" connotes the characteristic attribute of cows; and by itself it denotes also an individual possessing this attribute. Lastly, the term denotes a knower (*jnātā*), the termination being that known as *lyut* or *lyu* to the grammarian. In the former case on the authority of *Pāṇini's sūtra*, III-3-13, the termination is assumed to denote the doer; and in the latter the root is included in the group of words referred to in *Ibid.*, III-1-134. This being so, the term *vijnānam* is used in the following cases to denote a *jeeva* :

(i) In the verse quoted he is stated to do *yajna* (offering) and (worldly) actions; an unintelligent thing like *buddhi* or *vijnānam* cannot do these things. The word "does" should not be understood in a secondary sense, following the precedent in regard to the body—the *jeeva's* instrument—where it is stated "It eats beings" (II-2). In regard to *prāṇa* and mind—also instruments of the *jeeva*—the preceding sections contain no such mention of the doing of action peculiar to a knower. And as both *prāṇa* and the mind intervene between the body and *vijnānam* under consideration, the precedent is broken. It should not be forgotten that resource to a secondary meaning is itself a flaw, unless with the primary sense the meaning cannot be made out.

(ii) In section 6 of the same *upanishad* *jivas* and material products are considered separately with reference to the attributes peculiar to each class; and it is stated "He (*Ānandamaya*) became *vijnānam* and what is other than *vijnānam*" (verse 3).

(iii) In *Bṛihad Āranyaka* (v-7) many things are enumerated within which *Brahma* is present, and one of these is *vijnānam*. The reading of the *māndhyandinas* is exactly similar, except that the term *ātmā* is used in the place of *vijnānam* ; and this shows on the place authority (*sthānam*) that *vijnānam* is *ātmā* —i.e., a *jeeva*. The neuter gender of the word may conflict with its denoting a *jeeva* ; but he is regarded in the light merely of something that exists. Assuming that the term *vijnānam* in the verse denotes *buddhi* merely, the term *vijnānamaya* is certainly a *jeeva*. There is a precedent in the same context. In the verse, which follows the text regarding *annarasamaya*, though reference is made to *anna* (food), *annarasamaya* is not *anna*, but is a modification of *anna*. Hence, the conclusion that *Ānandamaya* is other than a *jeeva* stands.

4. *Words in apposition.* Interpretation of the *illusionist*. In para 2 of the *first view* it was stated that two words, which denoted *Brahma* and a *jeeva*,

being in apposition, *Brahma* was *jeeva*, and that the latter was competent to create the universe. This latter point is untenable. In the state of cosmic rest, the bound *jeeva* is without a body and instruments; and his attribute *jnānam* is in a state of extreme contraction. How can he create by mere will? The freed *jeeva* is equally powerless as will be shown in chapter IV, section 4. The former point is equally untenable. The term denoting *Brahma* connotes that He is without any imperfection; that He is the seat of numberless, immeasurably high, auspicious attributes; and that He is all-knowing, omnipotent, with an unfrustrated will; and the term denoting the *jeeva* connotes that he is the seat of endless sufferings of various kinds, and that every thought and every motion of his down to the opening and closing of the eye-lids depend upon his *karma*. How can the two sets of attributes co-exist in the same?

The opponent replies. Either set should be regarded as non-existing. This is the second set (1); *Brahma* under the influence of *avidyā* imagines that He suffers; but this thought is a misconception.

Reply. On this theory to be under the influence of *avidyā* (2) and the misconception engendered thereby—these alone (3) constitute imperfections; and the seat of them cannot at the same time be also free from all imperfections.

Opponent. These imperfections being unreal, there is no harm.

Reply. Even the unreal imperfections are undesirable; and to remove them all *upanishads* do their work, as you say.

Opponent. This theory is needed to explain the words in apposition.

Reply. A theory, that is built up, should be unopposed to vedic texts and be capable of standing examination.

Opponent. The first set of attributes does not exist.

Reply. Then the *veda* would cease to be a guide, by pointing out that the condition of suffering is natural, and that the condition of unalloyed bliss is a myth.

(1) *This is the second set.* Of the three alternatives stated here, the third alone is put forward by the opponent; but as the other two are possible, they are considered here.

(2) *Under the influence of avidyā.* A cloth, which is pure in itself, become dirty by contact with a polluting substance. A crystal, which in itself is pure, appears red by the side of a rose. Similarly, *Brahma* is free from imperfection and the seat of every good thing, and is yet connected with *avidyā*. If both were natural and real, there would be conflict, but *avidyā* is unreal. This is the opponent's meaning.

(3) *These alone.* It is not suffering alone that is undesirable; but its cause, *avidyā*, and the thought that there is suffering also are undesirable.

Opponent. Both the sets are non-existent; *Brahma* alone exists without a difference.

Reply. This is an exploded theory. See "Three tatvas". It is sufficient to note here that this explanation does not consider the commencement of chapter VI of the *chāndogya*, in which by the knowledge of one thing the knowledge of every thing is predicated.

5. *Opponent.* The commencement has been duly considered. Nothing other than *Brahma* exists; hence by knowing Him, other things are known as not existing.

Reply. If all things were unreal, there would be nothing to be known. The fact stated would not happen. If as the knowledge of one thing relates to a real thing, the knowledge of all things also relate in the very same way to real things, and if all these things are contained in that one thing, then it is possible to state that by knowing that thing all these things are known. By knowing real shell-silver, unreal silver, for which it is mistaken, is not known.

Opponent. The meaning of the text is—The *nir-viśeṣa* thing alone is real; the rest is unreal.

Reply. Then the text should not be worded, as it is; for it means—by knowing one thing what is not known also is known. Your interpretation is open to the following objections : (i) You must say "all things are known as unreal; the words "as unreal" should then be brought in; and it will not be legitimate to do so, when the sentence can be understood without them. (ii) As we understand the sentence, all things being included in the one thing, the knowledge of them is of the same kind; and this is what naturally appears. In your interpretation as the real thing differs from the unreal universe, the two pieces of knowledge would be dissimilar. (iii) The term "know" needs a knower, a thing known, and knowing; as they do not exist, it must be taken to mean "to withdraw" thus—"by knowing one thing, all things withdraw". This will be resort to a secondary meaning. Further, the example given would not fit in with your view; for it states that by knowing a lump of earth, the cause, its products are known.

Opponent. Even here what is intended is that the change from the lump of earth to the products is unreal.

Reply. To show that what was stated was possible, a well-known fact should be stated; but the hearer did not know that the products were unreal, as the snake, for which the rope is mistaken, is unreal; hence in your view the example will not fit in.

Opponent. That the products are unreal may have been known from inference or some other authority.

Reply. This can be known only from the text "That thou art," which occurs much later in the *upanishad*. We are not aware of any other source, whether supported or unsupported by arguments.

6. Thus, our statement that the commencement of the *upanishad* was not duly considered is borne out. Similarly you have not considered the verses that follow. They state the following : The universe was *Sat*; before the time of creation it was without name and form; in the creation *Brahma* referred to as *Sat*, did not need an operative cause other than Himself. At the time of creation He willed "I will myself become many in the form of endless moveable and immoveable things—a willing not found elsewhere; He created as He willed endless things of many kinds in an order that was unique. He caused *jeevas* controlled by Himself to enter all unintelligent objects and made for Himself endless names and forms. He is the root from which everything else proceeded; He alone supports them, moves them to action and gives them existence; and they will be dissolved in Him alone in the end. These points can be known only from the *veda*. Other *upanishads* point out regarding Him attributes by thousands, such as freedom from *karma* ; freedom from every imperfection; omniscience; being the ruler of all; the possession of unchanging objects of desire and of an unfailing will; giving bliss to all, and being Himself infinite bliss. To say that the term "that," which refers to *Brahma* described in the *upanishads* as clothed in endless *viśeṣas* to be known from no other source, denotes only a *nir-viśeṣa* thing merely is inappropriate and resembles the ravings of a mad man. The term "thou" too denotes a *jeeva* in *samsāra* (cycle of births and deaths); and to state that it denotes only a *nirviśeṣa* thing is to abandon its own meaning. To state that a *nirviśeṣa* shining thing is prevented by *avidyā* from appearing is to assert its destruction. Thus by abandoning the primary meanings of both words—that and thou—you resort to secondary meanings.

7. *Mīmāṃsaka's interpretation.* The *mīmāṃsaka* now comes forward with his explanation. When two words in the same case are in apposition, as red rose, is their meaning considered at the same time, or is the meaning of one word first considered, and it is then connected with the meaning of the other word ? In the former case, as the two words in apposition should denote one thing only, the object possessing the red colour should be identical with the object belonging to the species rose. This would mean that as the objects are one, so red colour and the peculiar feature of the species rose (which we shall denote by the term *jāti* for convenience), are also one, which is absurd. In the latter case, the object possessing the red colour should first be taken, and then connected with the object belonging to the species rose as qualifying it. This would mean that the red colour qualifies the *jāti* rose, which is equally absurd. Hence the objects possessing the red colour and the *jāti* rose are taken; the attributes are ignored; and the objects stripped of their attributes are treated as one. The absurdity pointed out will appear in a stronger light in the

sentence "This *devadatta* is he"—meaning a person seen at another place and on another occasion. Here the former place and time are not identical with the present place and time. But there is no resort to a secondary sense. This would happen if something outside the ordinary sense were taken; but what is done here is to ignore a portion of the ordinary sense, and retain the more important portion. A person does not cease to be the same person, if he loses a finger.

8. The *mīmāṃsaka*'s explanation is equally untenable. When a word is used by itself, jar (singular number) for instance, the word without the case-ending shows three elements—an attribute, an object, and the connection between them, while the case-ending indicates oneness—not oneness of all the three elements, but oneness of the object merely. That this is so is known from recognised usage (1) based on sense perception. Similarly, when two words in the same case are used together, the case-endings show oneness of the objects, but not oneness of their attributes also. Hence, when both the words are considered at the same time, all the attributes connect themselves with the single object. As the two words should be considered at the same time, it is unnecessary to notice the difficulty pointed out in the second alternative. In using two words in apposition the intention is to show that an object denoted by one word as possessing one attribute may be denoted by another word as possessing another attribute, or briefly to refer to one object as possessing both the attributes. The interpretation has the support of the grammarian. Thus, in the expression "*devadatta* is a black-coloured, young, red-eyed, not-weak-minded, not-poor and without faults", the first three epithets show the possession of three attributes in a positive form, and the other three words the possession of three others in a negative form. As words in apposition should be understood

(1) *known from recognised usage*. We ask the opponent. In words in apposition you ignore the attributes ? What is the reason ?

Opponent. Oneness indicated by the same case-endings is the reason.

Reply. Words without the case-endings connect the attributes with the object; and the meaning of words without the case-endings is of greater importance than their meaning. See Introduction, paras 22 and 34. Hence, the case-endings should not be understood as overriding the connection of the object with its attributes. They only show that the object is one.

Opponent. Usage shows that the case-endings indicate oneness.

Reply. Usage also connects the attributes with the object.

Opponent. Words denote only the object; its connection with attributes is seen by sense perception. In cases, in which this is not available, words do not indicate the connection with attributes.

Reply. Why should it not be the other way ? That is, words denote the connection of an object with its attributes, and oneness is seen by sense perception. Hence words denote an object as possessing attributes.

in this manner, their sense as settled by recognised usage should be adhered to; and words are so understood in the world. When the order is given—"bring a red rose"—an object answering to this description is brought and no other. It may be thought that the person receiving the order sees the red colour in a rose and brings it. Here is another example to remove this doubt. When a person going to the *Vindhya* mountains is told "In the jungles of those mountains mad elephants abound, he will not ignore the epithet mad, and go unarmed."

9. Where words in apposition connote two attributes, that cannot co-exist in the same object, even there one word (1) is taken in a secondary sense, eg., *bāhlīka* is a cow. The term cow is understood as meaning like a cow. In the expression "red rose" there is no conflict in the co-existence of the two attributes—the red colour and the *jāti* rose; hence the same object is perceived as possessing both the attributes. Here the opponent interposes. Have I not urged that an object possessing one attribute must be different from an object possessing another attribute? The words jar and cloth (*ghaṭa*, *paṭa*) have the same case endings, and yet they cannot denote the same object. Words in apposition do not therefore denote objects clothed with attributes. They only point out an object by their attributes; and the object so indicated is treated as one.

Reply. This may be as you say, if the connection with two attributes alone make oneness of the object impossible; but it is not so. What makes oneness of the object impossible is incompatibility in the co-existence of the two attributes in the same object. The incompatibility in the case of the jar and the piece of cloth is known from a source of knowledge other than the words themselves. In the expression "red rose" no such incompatibility is perceived. The attributes are as compatible, as in a person having a stick and an ear-ring; and as in an object possessing color, taste and smell. It is not merely this; by the difference in their connotations the words in apposition are intended to show that one object has both the attributes. When two words are used to denote the same object, each must refer to some attribute in it; otherwise the use of both the

(1) *Even there one word.* Words should be taken in the sense that is settled by usage; this is the natural course. But if such sense be found to be unsuitable on proper authority, a secondary meaning should be resorted to. If this be not possible, another primary meaning should be assumed. The term "go" means a cow, and also light; here the primary meaning "cow" cannot be extended to light; hence another primary meaning is accepted. When recourse is had to a secondary meaning, it should be done for one word only; for, by this alone the incompatibility is removed. All words should not be so understood; for then the intention of the speaker cannot be found out. When a secondary meaning is adopted, the word does not denote an object stripped of the connotation. The attribute connoted by the word in the secondary meaning is connected with the object.

words would be purposeless. Hence both the attributes are intended, and should not be ignored. Here the opponent (*Śankara*) explains. The words merely point out objects without reference to their connection (1) with the attributes, which they connote, and therefore do serve a purpose.

Reply. The purpose of pointing out the object will be served by one word only, and the other word will be superfluous. If the aspect of the object to be pointed out by each word be different, it will be an admission that the object is *saviśeṣha* (with difference) (2). The opponent referred in support of his view to the statement "This *devadatta* is he." Here too there is no need to resort to secondary meanings; for there is no incompatibility (3). The person was in one place in the past, and he is near in the present time. Because there is no difference, a thing that was seen at two different times is recognised as one object only by those who maintain that objects have not a momentary existence only. If the opponent contends that there is difference i.e., that the *devadatta* seen at a past moment is different from the *devadatta* seen at the present moment, he will maintain that every object exists only for a moment.

10. *Aruṇā-adhikaraṇam.* As words in apposition are to be interpreted as denoting one object clothed in more than one attribute, it is enjoined in the text (4).

With a red, one-year old, reddish-brown eyed (cow) the *soma* creeper should be purchased.

(1) *Without reference to their connotations.* When the moon is pointed out to a person by asking him first to look at the branch of a tree, and then to look in the same direction, the branch serves only the purpose of showing the moon. It is not intended to connect it with the moon. Similarly, the attribute connoted by a word serves merely to show the object; but it is not the intention to connect it with the object.

(2) *The object is saviśeṣha.* The opponent would ignore the attribute in order to support his own theory that *Brahma* is *nirviśeṣha*; but in the end he is driven to admit *viśeṣhas*; for if the two aspects are different from one another, they cannot be identical with the object, and they must differ from it. It then becomes *saviśeṣha*. It is better therefore to admit that the attributes of an object are intended by the person, who places two words in apposition.

(3) *For there is no incompatibility.* If *devadatta* were connected with both the places at the same time, there would be conflict; but he is not. This example was referred to by the opponent to justify the adoption of secondary meanings for both the words "he" and "this"; but as pointed out in the text there is no need for it. A word denotes an object as possessing a certain attribute; this is the principal element; and if it be ignored, the object cannot be denoted at all. This is the reply to the opponent's contention that in ignoring the attribute there is no resort to a secondary meaning.

(4) *It is enjoined in the text.* This implies that to strip words of their connotations, and take only objects as denoted by the words will be opposed to the rule deduced by the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (III-1-6). See Introduction, para 21.

that the purchase should be made with the one-year old animal possessing the red colour. This is stated in a *sūtra* of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. Here the *first view* (1) is thus stated. The word *aruṇayā* no doubt denotes an animal (2) possessing the red colour; for like the common form of a species (*ākṛiti*), qualities also naturally appear only as aspects of objects. Yet the red colour cannot be connected only with the *ekahāyanī* (one-year old animal); for the sentence would then mean "purchase with the one-year old animal, and it should be of the red colour; but the same sentence cannot give two directions. Hence the sentence should be split up into two; the word *aruṇayā* will then show that every article without exception enjoined in the context should be of the red colour. That the word is in the feminine gender is no objection; for it is used merely as indicating all objects, whatever be the gender of the words that denote them. The final decision on the subject is as follows : The two words *aruṇayā* and *ekahāyanyā* are placed in apposition. The first word shows an object possessing the red colour; and the second word an object, that is one-year old. Being in apposition they indicate that the object is one. The one-year old object and the red colour are connected with the one action—viz., purchase, as the first word by its very form connects itself with the second as its epithet (*viśeṣhaṇa*). In this there is no incompatibility. Hence the red colour should be connected only with the means of purchase—the one-year old animal. If the connection of the red colour with the purchase should be known from the sentence like the connection of the one-year old animal, then two directions would be given by the sentence; but it is not so. By the word *aruṇayā* itself (1) an object possessing the red colour is denoted; as it is put in apposition with the other word, it is indicated that the object should be one-year old. This alone is indicated; but not the connection of the red colour with the age; for words in apposition indicate that the object as clothed in the attributes is one. This is in accordance with the definition of words in apposition given by the grammarian.

(1) *Here the first view.* As the *sūtra* is explained differently by the *mīmāṃsaka*, the *Srī Bhāṣya* states what the correct *first view* and *final decision* should be. This is stated in para 10.

(2) *No doubt denotes an animal.* This is based on the rule deduced in *pūrva mīmāṃsa* (I-3-10). See Introduction, para 12. The rule refers only to *ākṛiti*; but qualities are exactly alike. Both *ākṛiti* and qualities appear only as aspects (*prakāra*) of objects; and they have no independent existence. Hence what applies to *ākṛiti* applies to qualities also.

(1) *By the word aruṇayā itself.* This shows what work is done by the two rules. The rule deduced in I-3-10 shows that a word not only connotes an attribute, but that it also denotes an object possessing the attribute. The rule now being considered shows that the same case-ending in many words indicates that the object denoted by them as possessing the attributes connoted by them is one.

11. This being so (1), in sentences like "the red cloth is" the object being one, the sentence is one. The business of the sentence is to connect the cloth with the action "to be"; the connection of the object with the red colour is denoted by the word "red" itself; and that the object connected with the red colour is the cloth—this alone is known from the words being placed in apposition. Thus, the attributes may be one, two or many (2); each word, whether it is a compound or whether it is used by itself, denotes an object clothed with the attribute that it connotes. By the words being placed in apposition, it is shown that the objects clothed in all the attributes is one; and this object is then connected with the verb in the sentence. Here are some examples :

(i) *Devadatta* black-coloured (3), young, red-eyed, with a stick and ear-ring stands; (ii) make a screen with a white cloth (4); (iii) bring a blue *utpala*

(1) *This being so.* The *mīmāṃsaka's* view is that the word *ekahāyanī* satisfies the need of the sentence, and that the other word *aruṇayā* is not required. (See para, 12, *infra*.) This is unsound. In an example, which he considers (I-2-1), viz., "red cloth is", the words "cloth is" will make a complete sentence; but as the word "red" occurs in the sentence, it is assumed that one desires to know what kind of cloth it is; and this desire is satisfied by the word "red". Similarly, here also, as the word *aruṇayā* occurs in the sentence, we assume that a desire springs up as to the colour of the one-year old animal; and this the word satisfies. Hence it is required.

(2) *The attributes may be one, two or many.* Here three doubts may arise.—(i) In sentences like the "red cloth is" there is only one epithet, and it may be taken to satisfy a desire as explained. But if there be many epithets, will the explanation apply ? (ii) Should they not form one compound word ? (iii) Here the words are in the first or nominative case. May the termination be of any other case ? To remove these doubts examples are given.

(3) *Devadatta, black-coloured.* This is the author's intention. The words "red cloth" denote an unintelligent object; the words "red, one-year old" denote an animal; this difference does not affect the meaning of words in apposition. Similarly, the termination indicating the case does not affect it. It may relate to any case. Similarly also, the epithets may indicate an inseparable attribute, as colour and age, or objects that may be separated like the stick and the ear-ring. This makes no difference. The second example shows that the words in apposition may have the ending of the third or instrumental case. The third example shows that they may be in the objective case; and the fourth example is an example of a compound word. The sixth is from the *veda*, and shows that the words may be in the fourth or dative case.

(4) The second example raises a doubt. In "with a white cloth" (*śuklena vāsasā*) the termination of the words indicates the connection of the whiteness and cloth with the verb, and its force is exhausted when this work is done; it does not therefore indicate their connection with each other. We ask the opponent—In the sentence "Do

(flower); (iv) bring blue-*utpala* ; (v) bring the cow, white and good-eyed; (vi) take out paddy for offering an eight-*kapāla* made *puroḍāṣa* to the *devatā agni* with the epithet *pathikrit*.

Similarly, in the *vedic* text under consideration. In the sentence "cook rice in a *sthāli* with fuel" one action—to cook—as connected with many *kāra*kas is perceived at the same time. Similarly, each *kāra*ka, denoted by the group of words in apposition, at the very time that it is perceived, appears as clothed in

yāga with a *paṣu*" (four-footed animal) (*paṣunā yajeta*), the *paṣu* and the singular number are connected with the verb. Why should we not hold that they are not connected with each other, as the termination showing the case has exhausted its force, when it showed the connection ?

Opponent. The termination has two aspects—as indicating the case, it shows connection with the verb; as indicating the number, it connects the number with the *paṣu*. The aspects being different, there is no objection.

Reply. The termination of the words connects whiteness and cloth with the verb; while the placing of the words in apposition connects them with each other.

Opponent. The termination, being in the same word, shows both the connections at the same time. The two aspects being of equal strength, neither aspect is incompatible with the other. In your case the connection with each other needs reference to another word, and as this takes time, it is nullified.

Reply. Is it your view that quickness in perception by itself gives strength, while delay in perception by itself is the cause of weakness ? If so, sense perception alone would be authority; and the others—inference and testimony—would lose their force. This view would give victory to the *chārvāka*. The *veda* alone would be authority; but not *smritis*. Of the authorities *śruti*, *lingam* and the rest, the first alone would be authority; but not the others. When words in the first case are placed in apposition, the singular number denoted by the termination in one word would be first perceived, and the effect of placing words in apposition would be nullified, as it needs reference to the similar case-ending of another word. Even in the case, which has your approval, the words connect the *paṣu*, and the singular number with the verb; and after this their connection with each other takes place; but this would be impossible in your view.

Opponent. It is only when there is conflict, what is quickly perceived nullifies what is perceived with some delay.

Reply. In your case also there is no conflict. This is admitted by you in your final decision in the case.

Opponent. Absence of conflict alone will not suffice; you should have the support of usage also.

Reply. We also have the support of usage.

various attributes, and is connected at the same time with the verb in the sentence. In their doing so there is no incompatibility whatever. Here is an example.

Let a capable cook, prepare milk-boiled rice in a vessel of proper dimensions with dry *khādira* fuel.

12. The *first view* and *final decision* regard to the *vedic* text under consideration given by the *mīmāṃsaka* are unsound. He considers that when a word (1) connoting an attribute, occurs in a sentence, in which an object is mentioned, it connotes merely the attribute, and that therefore the word *arunayā* only connotes the red colour. This conclusion is untenable; for both in the world and in the *veda* no word connoting an attribute, when placed in apposition with a word denoting an object, has been seen to connote only the attribute. And the argument on which the conclusion is based is also unsound. In the expression *paṭaḥ suklaḥ* (cloth white) the first word denotes an object; and yet the second word denotes an object possessing the white colour and not merely the colour. In the expression *paṭasya suklaḥ* (white of the cloth) the second word no doubt does not denote a cloth possessing the white colour; but this is due to the use of different case-endings; not because the word "white" occurs in the same sentence with the word "cloth". In the same expression, if the word *bhāgaḥ* be added, it and the word "white" (*suklaḥ*) having the same case-endings, the word will denote a part possessing the white colour. Next, the statement in the *first view* is also unsound, that because the purchase is connected with the one-year old animal, the red colour is unconnected with it. The word connoting the red colour-*arunayā*—is in apposition with the other

Reference has been made to the final decision in regard to the text *paṣunā yajeta*. It is as follows :

In the word *paṣunā* the first member denotes a *paṣu* ; and the termination the *kāraka* (object of the action) and number. The number is connected first with the *kāraka*, which is nearest to it; as the *kāraka* is connected with the action denoted by the verb, the number through the *kāraka* is connected with the action. The action here is *yāga* shown by the word near at hand, *viz., yajeta*. Thus, oneness becomes an *anga* of the *yāga* ; but as it has no form and cannot therefore help in bringing the *yāga* into existence, it looks out for an object to which it may attach itself. It finds this object afterwards in the *paṣu*. Thus oneness and *paṣu* being connected, the *yāga* should be done with one *paṣu* only (IV-1-5).

(1) *He considers that when a word, etc.* In the expression "black goes" (*krishṇogacchati*) he admits that the word "black" denotes a black object. In the expression "white of a cloth" (*paṭasya suklaḥ*) the term white denotes only the quality; and he concludes from this that in all cases, when in the same sentence another word denoting an object occurs, the word connoting the quality does not denote the object also. This conclusion is refuted here.

word, the object denoted by which does not possess an attribute incompatible with the red colour. Hence the attribute connoted by it may be found in the animal, and the word may be connected with the verb in the sentence. In this there is no incompatibility. Lastly, as the red colour may for the reason stated be connected with the animal by the words themselves, the animal and the attribute may not inappropriately be the means of purchase. The final decision need not, as it does, connect both the words with the verb, and by this means connect them with each other. Hence the explanation of the *sūtra* given in para 10 is the right one.¹

13. *Application to the present case.* The interpretation of words in apposition having been thus settled, it may be applied to the present case. In the text "That thou art" and similar texts, in which words are placed in apposition, the oneness intended should be explained without ignoring the attributes connoted by the two words. This will not be possible to one, who does not admit that there is a highest *Ātmā*, who is an enemy to all imperfections, and the one seat of limitless good qualities, and who is other than the *ātmās* that are or were under the influence of beginningless *avidyā*, and suffer or suffered (1) endless misery. Here the opponent asks—if I admit what you say, will not *Brahma*, by the words "that" and "thou" being in apposition, become the seat of all imperfections connoted by the word "thou".

Reply. No; for the word "thou" also denotes only *Brahma*, the inner Ruler of a *jeeva*. This will be clear from the following explanation. *Brahma*, denoted by the word *sat* (2), free from the touch of every imperfection, possessing an unfailing will, the seat of groups of endless infinite good qualities, and the cause of all, willed "I will become many," and created the whole world, beginning with fire, water and earth. In this world, which consisted of various forms of *devas*, men and the like, He made the *jeevas* enter bodies suited to their *karmas*, as their *ātmās*, and He himself of His own choice only entered after them as their inner ruler. For the aggregates thus produced in the forms of *devas* and the like and ending with Himself, He made names and forms. That is, aggregates of this nature alone are objects and are denoted by words. The

(1) *Or suffered.* A person, that is seen to be other than the king, when he is punished by him, does not become identical with the king, when he is rewarded by him. Similarly, the *jeeva*, that was other than *Brahma*, when he was bound, does not become *Brahma*, when he is released and shares in his bliss.

(2) *Brahma* may be other than the *jeevas* ; so is a bit of straw. How is He an object, which all will seek ? The two epithets—freedom from imperfections and the possession of good qualities—are therefore stated.

¹ For the *first view* and *final decision* of the *mīmāṃsaka* see Introduction, para 21.

text "with this *jeeva*—*ātmā*," meaning "with this *jeeva*—myself" indicates that the *jeeva* has *Brahma* for his *ātmā*, i.e., ruler. This happens as *Brahma* has entered into the *jeeva* as his inner ruler. This is clear from the text.

He created all this, whatever exists, having created it, He entered into the very same; having entered into them, He became *sat* and *tyad* (*āna.*, VI-2 and 3).

Here the term "all this" refers to the two classes—*jeevas*, who possess intelligence and material products, which are unintelligent. The text divides them into two groups by the words *sat* and *tyad* and by the words *vijnānam* and *avijnānam*, and shows that *Brahma* entered *jeevas* also. Names and forms being made in this manner, all words denote the highest *Ātmā* united to material products and *jeevas*. Further, the text "All this has that (*Sat*) for its *ātmā* (*chando.*, VI-8-7), indicates by the term "all this" the world blended with *jeevas*, and affirms that He is their *ātmā*. Thus, *Brahma* being the *ātmā* of all *jeevas* and material products, the whole world including the *jeevas* becomes His body. This is stated in other places. "He has entered into men, and rules them; and is the *ātmā* of all". See also *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*Brihad.*, V-7), and *Subāla upanishad*.

14. Hence, even words denoting *jeevas* denote *Brahma* alone; for He is the *ātmā* of *jeevas* also, and they form His bodies. Words, denoting unintelligent bodies in the form of *devas*, men and the like, denote only the *jeeva*, to whom they pertain. The text "four persons by doing the *yāga* known as *panchadaśarātra* (done in fifteen days) attain *devatvam*' means they become *devas* (1). As the body is the aspect (*prakāra*) of one who owns it, and as words denoting aspects do not stop with denoting the aspects, but go on to denote the persons or objects, whose aspects they are, it is proper that words denoting bodies should aim at denoting those who own them. By the term aspect (*prakāra*) reference is made to the element "such" in objects, that are perceived as being such and such. This element needs the object, and the object needs the aspect in order that it may be known; it is but right therefore that the aspect should end in denoting the object. Words, which denote the aspects, should also end in denoting the objects. For this reason words like cow, horse and man, that connote the common feature of the species (*ākriti*), (which feature is the aspect in which they appear), end in denoting the bodies that exhibit this aspect. The bodies too appear as the aspects of *jeevas*, from the fact that they serve as their bodies; and the *jeevas* too, who own the bodies, appear as the aspects of *Brahma*. The words, that denote the bodies, therefore end in denoting *Brahma* alone. Hence as all words denote *Brahma* alone, when they are put in apposition with words denoting *Brahma*, they are used only in their primary meanings.

(1) *They become devas*. The text is quoted to show that the word *deva* denotes a *jeeva* in a *deva* body; and not merely that body; for then the word would be *devam gacchanti*.

15. The opponent comes forward with an objection. In the expression "The cow is broken-horned," and "the broken—horned is white" only words denoting *ākṛiti* (common feature of the species) and quality are put in apposition with words denoting objects. If one object appears as the aspect (*prakāra*) of another object, we see that the termination denoting possession is added; e.g., *dandī* (one having a stick); *kundalī* (one having an ear-ring).

Reply. What determines the placing of words in apposition is not invariably any one of these—*ākṛiti*, quality or object; for if it were one of these, words denoting others should not be put in apposition; but they are. If a thing has existence only as an aspect (*prakāra*) of another thing, it cannot remain without the other thing, and cannot be perceived without it. Words denoting such a thing denote the other thing as appearing in the aspect, which they denote. They may therefore be properly put in apposition with words, that denote the same object, as clothed in other aspects. But where a thing has an existence by itself, and can stand independently, and is made to appear sometimes as the aspect of another object, there the termination showing possession is added. The objection therefore fails.

16. As even the *jeeva* in the material vehicle is the body of *Brahma*, and is the aspect in which He appears, words "I" and "thou" and the like, though intended to denote *jeevas*, denote *Brahma* alone. This being so, the *upanishad* after stating "All this has that (*Sat*) for its *ātmā*" closes with the words "That thou art". It does not, however, follow that the attributes of the *jeeva* touch *Brahma*; for the *jeeva* is connected with *Brahma* as His body. The properties of his body like childhood and youth do not touch the *jeeva*; similarly here. The word "that" denotes *Brahma*, the world-cause, the possessor of an unfrustrated will, the seat of all good qualities, and the enemy of all imperfections. The word "thou" (1) shows the same Being as the *ātmā* of the *jeeva* and of his body. Thus both the words are used in their primary meanings. By understanding the words in this manner, we avoid conflict with the context, and with all the *upanishads*. We are saved from the need to attribute *avidyā* to *Brahma*, free from imperfections and the seat of all good qualities. The very statement that *Brahma* and the *jeeva* are one, as thus understood, shows Him to be different from the *jeeva*, who is His aspect. The conclusion is that *Brahma*, *ānandamaya*, is other than the *jeeva*, *vijnānamaya*.

(1) That thou art. This means that *Sat* denoted by the word "that", and *Brahma*, the *ātmā* of *śvetaketu*, denoted by the word "thou" are one. Here no affirmation is made; for this was made already in the preceding sentence "all" this, etc., and the result is stated here by the words in apposition, the object being that the student should meditate on *Brahma* as possessing the attributes stated in the context and as being his *ātmā*.

17. *Brahma* is *śārīra*. In para 1 of the first view *Ānandamaya* was stated to be a *jeeva*, as He is referred to as *śārīra*, i.e., one having a body. This view is unsound. The text "From that *Ātmā* came forth ether, etc." (I-2), shows that the creation of *annarasamaya*—i.e., the *jeeva*'s body—came after the creation of ether and the other elements, and that the *jeeva* being therefore incapable of creation at the time, the creator of ether and the other elements must be another—i.e., *Brahma* ; and He is referred to as *ātmā*. The term *ātmā* being correlated to body, ether and the other elements down to *annarasamaya* inclusive are His bodies. Regarding *prāṇamaya* it is stated—

Who is the *ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *ātmā* (in the body) of this also (III-1).

The previous one is *annarasamaya*, and its *ātmā* is *Brahma*, and He is therefore the *ātmā* of *prāṇamaya*, and that becomes His body. These remarks apply to *manomaya* and *vijnānamaya* also; and they also are His bodies. Regarding *Ānandamaya* it is stated—

Who is the *ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *ātmā* (in the body) of this also (VI-2).

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The previous one is *vijnānamaya*, and its *ātmā* is *Ānandamaya*. He is therefore His own *ātmā*—i.e., no other is His *ātmā*, and this is as it should be, as He is the seat of infinite bliss, and as no other is fit to be His *ātmā* and control Him. The conclusion is that *Brahma* has everything as His body, and that a being, who has the whole world as His body cannot be a *jeeva*. Because *Brahma* is *śārīra*, this work, which deals with Him, is stated by great men to be *śārīraka*.

14. विकारशब्दान्नेति चेन्न प्राचुर्यात् ।

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If it be said "No; for the ending indicative of modification is used," the reply is—
"No; for it indicates abundance."

The opponent's argument stated more fully is as follows :

(i) The ending *maya* occurs in the following words : *annarasamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijnānamaya* and *ānandamaya*. In the first word it admittedly means modification (1), *annarasamaya* i.e., the body being a modification of food and drink. As the beginning is more important, and governs all the rest, the ending should have the same meaning in the term

(1) It admittedly means modifications. *Pāṇini*, the grammarian, states in a *sūtra* (IV-3-143) that the termination *maya* (*mayat*) may be added optionally in two meanings—modification, and part of one's body. The next *sūtra* directs that it should invariably be added after words, that have a long vowel at the beginning. The word *ānanda* is such a word.

ānandamaya also. (ii) The ending is largely used in the sense (1) both ordinarily and in the *veda*, and this sense is thought of first. (iii) Further, to understand the ending to mean abundance (2) will not serve the purpose. Much of bliss implies a little of misery, and the existence of misery even in a small degree will make its seat a *jeeva*. (iv) Lastly, a *jeeva* is certainly a modification of bliss. Though blissful in his real nature, he has only a modicum of bliss in the state of bondage. The *sūtra* repeats the opponent's objection, and replies.

Reply, taking the four points in order :

(i) In para 1 of the *final decision* under the first *sūtra* (*sūtra* 13) it was stated that *Ānandamaya*'s bliss exceeds the happiness of various grades of beings and various personages, and that it has no higher limit. This being impossible in a *jeeva*, the seat of this bliss must be *Brahma*; this being so, as *Brahma* is not subject to modification, and as the termination *maya* indicates also abundance, it cannot be taken in the sense of modification (3). The opponent relies on what is known as the majority rule (*vide* note under *sūtra* 6, page 147); but it has no place here, as the word *ānandamaya* has the capacity to single out its seat from all *jeevas*; and capacity, known as *lingam*, is stronger than the context, on which that the rule is based. The rule is not applicable for another reason. In the word *prāṇamaya*, which immediately follows *annarasamaya*, the meaning modification is dropped as unsuitable. Here also the termination indicates abundance; of its five-fold activities the *prāṇa* or breathing activity is mostly in evidence.

(ii) Secondly, the termination *maya* is also largely used to denote abundance. Even if the other meaning were the common, it must be rejected, when it is unsuitable, as the well-known meaning of the term *gangā* (Ganges) is given up in this sentence, "Shepherd huts on the Ganges."

(1) *Largely used in this sense*. Here are some examples—*mriṇmaya*, *hiraṇmaya*, *dārumaya* (modification of earth, of gold and of wood); *parṇamayī juhūḥ* (*juhū* a modification of *parṇa* wood); *ṣamīmayāḥ sruchaḥ* (*sruks*, modifications of *ṣami* wood); *darbhamayī raṣanū* (cord, a modification of *darbha* grass). The first three examples are from worldly usage, and the next three from the *veda*.

(2) *To mean abundance*. It was suggested to the opponent, that the termination is used in the sense of abundance also; and reference was made to *Pāṇini's sūtra*, V-4-21, and to the following examples—"annamayo yajnaḥ" (offering in which food was abundantly given).

(3) *It cannot be taken in the sense of modification*. The opponent's view that the termination in *ānandamaya* is added under *Pāṇini's sūtra*, V-3-144, is not sound; for it refers to words in worldly usage, as the term *bhāshāyām* occurring in the preceding *sūtra* is drawn down to this *sūtra*. As regards *vedic* words, the *sūtra* is 150; and this contemplates words of two syllables only. The word *ānanda* has three syllables.

(iii) Thirdly, the argument that much of bliss implies a little of suffering is not sound. The expression "one has bliss in abundance" does not imply the existence of any suffering at all. It only means that its degree is not low. The existence or otherwise of suffering has to be ascertained by other means. Here the absence of suffering is known from other *Vēdic* texts. A comparison is certainly intended; a high degree implies a low degree; and the question is—is reference made to the same attribute as found in the subject under consideration and in other individuals, or to an attribute, which is the reverse of that under consideration, as found in the same individual? The opponent adopts the latter alternative; but as already stated, it is negated by express denial of imperfection of every kind in *Brahma*. And in favour of the former alternative there is also express affirmation in the description of *ānanda* in *anu* 8 of the *upanishad* and it is the more natural of the two. When it is said "A.B. is stronger", comparison is made with the strength of other individuals, and not with another attribute of the same individual, such as intelligence.

(iv) Lastly, the remark that the *jeeva* is a modification of bliss is untenable; he is not subject to a modification of substance, as a lump of earth is modified as a jar; and the termination indicative of modification implies a change of this kind. He is naturally *jñānam* (a knower) and bliss; during the condition of bondage, the capacity to know and bliss are limited by his *karma*. This is all (1).

15. तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च ।

And because *Ānandamāya* is stated to be the cause of bliss in others.

This statement is made in the following text :

Who will attain worldly pleasure, who will attain the bliss of release, if this limitless (*ākāṣa*) bliss does not exist? He alone makes one blissful (VII-1).

He who gives bliss must be different from him who receives it. *Ānandamaya* Himself is referred to here as *ānanda*.

16. मान्त्रवर्णिकमेव च गीयते ।

And the same Being that is defined in the *mantra* is referred to as *Ānandamaya*.

The *mantra* is "Unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma* (I-1)". And He is other than a *jeeva*. For He is to be reached by the *jīva* by meditation, and what is reached must be other than he who reaches Him. Hence, *Ānandamaya* is not a *jeeva*. It is hardly necessary to add that the *mantra*

(1) From this discussion the following rule may be deduced : When two primary meanings of a word are available, one well-known, and the other not so well-known, if the former is unsuitable, and the latter is suitable, the reason which supports the former should be rejected, and the reason which supports the latter should be followed.

merely explains (1) the *brāhmaṇa* "one who meditates on *Brahma* reaches the highest (2)".

Here the argument already stated in para 4 of the *first view* is refuted:

17. नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

The other is not referred to in the *mantra* ; because of inappropriateness.

The other is—other than the highest *Ātmā*—he who is called *jeeva*. even though he has become free. For to *Brahma* referred to in the *mantra* the epithet *vipaśchit* (3) is applied, and this is unconditioned (4). It means one who possesses *jñānam* capable of seeing diverse things. This is referred to further on thus, "He wished, I will become many, and to that end I will evolve." This is therefore the perception preliminary to the evolution of the universe. Similar omniscience is inappropriate to a *jeeva*. It appertains to the freed *ātmā* no doubt; but it has had a beginning; for during the state of bondage it was absent, Unconditioned *vipaśchithvam* cannot pertain to him.

To one, who regards the freed *ātmā* as being mere intelligence without any attribute, the unfitness to see the many becomes still more evident. It has been already explained that there is no authority to show that a substance exists that is *nir-viśeṣha* - i.e., devoid of difference. The opponent refers to the text 'From which speech returns with the mind without reaching' (*āna, anu-9*) and observes that *Brahma* cannot be spoken about or thought of. Assume that this is the meaning; yet we cannot see from this that a thing is *nir-viśeṣha*. It only shows that speech and mind are no authority in regard to *Brahma*. He would then become only a non-entity. The *upanishad* begins with the direction that *Brahma* should be meditated on, and states that He is *vipaśchit*, i.e., all-

(1) This is clear from the verse, which is between the *brāhmaṇa* and the *mantra*. It means "Referring to that, i.e., *Brahma*, this verse has been stated, and the verse is the *mantra*. The same meaning of the *brāhmaṇa* is explained by the *brāhmaṇas* and *mantras* that follow.

(2) The word "and" in this and in the preceding *sūtra* indicates that the reasons stated in them are in addition to that stated in the first *sūtra*. It is absent from the second *sūtra*; because it is not independent; it merely confirms the reason adduced in the first *sūtra*.

(3) The epithet *vipaśchit*—*vipaśchit* = *vi* + *paśyat* + *chit*—This means one who sees various things. In the second member the letters *yat* have been dropped. This is included in a group of words, beginning with *prishodara*, which are similarly formed. (*Pāṇini*, VI-3-109).

(4) This is unconditioned. This means that it does not depend on any particular action, on the senses and the like. If it did, it would have been stated; as it does not exist, it has not been stated.

knowing; that He is the world-cause; that He is the one seat for *jnānam* and bliss; that He gives bliss to others; that by mere willing He created the whole world consisting of *jeevas* and material products; that He entered the created objects and has become their *ātmā*; that He causes fear and removes it; that He controls the wind, the sun and the rest; that He is the seat of infinite bliss; and many other things. If after all this, it be stated that there is no authority for *Brahma*, on the plea that speech and mind do not reach Him, it would be speaking like an insane person (1). The term "which" in the text refers to *ānanda*; for it is correlated to the term *ānanda* in the remainder of the text "One who knows the *ānanda* of *Brahma*". It is connected with *Brahma* by the words *ānanda* of *Brahma*, and reference is made to one who knows it. If the meaning be that *Brahma* is beyond speech and mind, the sentence would make conflicting statements. Hence the correct meaning of the text is as follows : Speech began to explore the higher limit of the bliss of *Brahma*; and as it has no limit, and for this reason alone, withdrew from the attempt along with the mind. It is added that one, who knows that the bliss of *Brahma* is limitless, does not fear anything (2).

18. भेदव्यपदेशाच्च ।

Because His difference (from the other) is expressly stated.

The texts, which beginning with the words "From that *Ātmā* came forth ether," go on to indicate who is referred to in the *mantra*, distinguish Him from *jeevas*, as they distinguish Him from body, *prāṇa* and mind, thus :

There is a being known as *Ānandamaya*, who is other than this *viñānamaya*, and who is within it; He is the *ātmā*.

Here attention is called to the *jeeva* in the state of bondage, and *Ānandamaya* is stated to be other than he, and to be his *ātmā*. This statement would not be correct, if the same *jeeva*, when freed, became *Brahma*. Hence the *Ānandamaya* referred to in the *mantra* is other than the *jeeva*.

(1) *Speaking like an insane person*. If *Brahma* were beyond speech, nothing should be said about Him; but as the *upanishad* states many things about Him, He cannot be said to be beyond speech; to say that He is would be conflicting. As the *upanishad* refers to the knowledge of the bliss of *Brahma*, He cannot be said to be beyond thought; to say that He is would be conflicting.

(2) In this and the preceding *sūtra* the reason found at the commencement of the *upanishad* was stated. The next *sūtra* states another reason found in the middle, which is clearer, and the *sūtra* next to it a reason found towards the close. *Sūtra* 17 is subsidiary to *sūtra* 16, as it confirms the reason assigned in that *sūtra*. Hence, the conjunction "and" is absent from it.

19. कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा ।

And because He brings about the evolution of the world by a mere wish, and has no need of matter.

An *ātmā* in bondage can create only, when he is embodied; he will therefore need matter in the form of a body and senses and motor organs. This is seen in the four-faced *Brāhmā*. But the Being under consideration brought about the evolution by a mere wish, even though He was without this matter.

He desired, "I will become many, and to that end I will evolve." "He considered; considering, He created all this, whatever exists."

A freed *ātmā* is also omnipotent; but his power does not extend to the evolution of the world.

20. अस्मिन्नस्य च तद्योगं शास्ति ।

And because it is taught that the *jeeva* attains bliss in Him.

This means that the bliss consists in the enjoyment of *Ānandamaya*. The text is—

He is bliss; for on reaching this bliss one becomes blissful (VII-1).

That, by the enjoyment of whom one becomes blissful, cannot be that one. Hence *Ānandamaya* is other than a *jeeva*. This last *sūtra* removes the doubt that may arise that the freed *jeeva* might create, without a body, as he has merely to will; and it is stated in *vedic* texts that he attains this power on reaching *Brahma* in the highest heaven.

Ānandamaya (1) being thus decided to be *Brahma*, the reference to *ānanda* in the texts

"If this limitless *ānanda* did not exist" (VII-1); "*Vijnānam ānandam Brahma* (*Brihad.*, V-9-28); is to *ānandamaya* alone, as by the term *vijnāna* reference is made to *vijnānamaya*. For the same reason the following statements are made:

"One who knows the *ānanda* of *Brahma*' (*āna.*, IX-1); and "He reaches the *ātmā*, who is *ānandamaya*' (VIII-6).

(1) The objection may be raised that one becomes blissful on reaching *ānanda* (bliss); but not by reaching *ānandamaya*. To refute this objection, the text states that the words are synonymous. The reasons for this statement are the same for *vijnāna* and *vijnānamaya*. (See final decision, para 3.) As *Brahma* is extremely agreeable, He is *ānanda*; and even though the word denotes the attribute bliss, it cannot stop there, but must denote also one who possesses it, i.e., *Brahma*. Where it is intended to refer to the attribute alone, the word *ānanda* and *Brahma* will not be in apposition; the word *Brahma* will have the termination of the possessive case, as in the expression quoted in the text.

In the *Bhriguvalli*, which follows, reference is made to the things enumerated in the *Ānandavalli*, thus—

‘He learnt that *anna* was *Brahma*.’ ‘He learnt that *prāṇa* was *Brahma*.’ ‘He learnt that the mind was *Brahma*’; and “He learnt that *vijnāna* was *Brahma*’.

Hence in the expression ‘He learnt that *ānanda* was *Brahma*, reference is made to *ānandamaya* alone’. For the same reason the conclusion in that place is thus stated—‘Reaching the *ātmā* who is *ānandamaya*’.

SUB-SECTION 7

In the preceding sub-section *Ānandamaya* was shown to be other than a *jeeva*. In the *upanishad*, which dealt with it, the following text occurs :

He who is within man, and he who is within the sun, He is one. (*āna.*, VIII 5.)

The former being *Ānandamaya*, it follows that *Ānandamaya* is he who is seen within the sun. In the *Chāndogya* reference is made to the *purusha*, who is seen within the sun, and He is described as having a body with eyes, hair and nails. The opponent attempts to show that this *purusha* is a *jeeva*, and thinks that if he succeeds, he can contend that *Ānandamaya* also is a *jeeva* ; and the conclusion reached in that sub-section will then be nullified. Hence this sub-section is subsidiary to the other.

It may be asked—Has it not been proved that the possession of a body does not make its owner a *jeeva* ?

Reply. True; but the bodies therein referred to were not shown to be bodies with hands and feet. The relationship of *Ānandamaya* to those bodies was that of controller and controlled, or of owner and owned. Here reference is made to a body with eyes, hair and nails; a body of this kind is well-known to be made by *karma* ; and the relationship in regard to it is that of a person to an instrument. Though *annarasamaya* is a body with hands and feet, yet *prāṇa*, mind and *jeeva* are not of this description. Hence a doubt may properly arise.

The text for consideration is (1) :

“Now that golden *Purusha*, who is seen within the sun, with golden beard, with golden hair, and golden in every part of the body up to the tip of His nails. His eyes are like the lotus flower newly opened to the sun’s rays.” And “Now, that *Purusha* who is seen within the eye”. See *Vedic Texts*.

(1) *The text for consideration.* The text begins with the word *ya eshaḥ* ; and though they indicate *anuvāda* (repetition), they should not be so treated; for what is stated here has not been stated anywhere else.

Here the doubt is—Who is this *Purusha*—is he a *jeeva*, known by the words sun and the like (1), who has attained this greatness as the result of numberless good deeds, or is the the highest *Ātmā*. It arises from the mention of the possession of a body and further on of freedom from every imperfection.

First view. The *Purusha* is a *jeeva* with accumulated merit. For mention is made of the possession of a body; and connection with a body is found only in a *jeeva* ; and its purpose is to enable him to experience the fruits of *karma*—pleasure and pain. Hence the attainment of release, in which connection with a body ceases, is described as being without a body—

One who is in a body is caught by welcome and unwelcome things; from one in a body welcome and unwelcome fruits do not depart; and one who is without a body they do not touch (*Chāndo.*, VIII-12-1).

2. The possession of extraordinary knowledge and capacity is possible with exceedingly great merit. Hence the attributes mentioned in the *upanishad* may be found in the *jeeva* also—viz., control of worlds and of enjoyments; being the subject of meditation; and bestowal of fruits; and by the removal of sin, he may be the means of others' attaining release. Examples of such persons are seen among men; then there are *siddhas*, *gandharvas*, *devas*, *Indra* and others in order of merit (See *Vedic Texts—āna.*, section 8). Though the four-faced *Brahmā*'s life is limited, there may be a succession of *Brahmās*, each exercising authority and creating the universe in a world-age. Hence, there is no highest *Ātmā* other than a *jeeva*. This being so, the texts, that describe *Brahma* as being neither gross nor subtle, should be taken to refer to the *jeeva*'s nature; and the texts relating to release should be understood as teaching its nature, and the means to its attainment.

Final decision. It is thus stated in the *sūtra* :

21. अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात् ।

The *Purusha* who is seen within (the sun and in the eye) is other than a *jeeva* ; He is the highest *Ātmā* ; because His attributes are stated.

The words 'other than a *jeeva*' have been added to convey the meaning of the word *anya* inserted from the succeeding *sūtra*. The sentence 'He is the highest *Ātmā*' is what the first sentence implies. One attribute is mentioned thus : "He has risen from all evil." Now what is meant by the term "evil" ? When one thing out of many connected things is mentioned and denied, the existence of the other things may be inferred. Good *karma* and evil *karma* are

(2) *The sun and the like.* The intention in using the word *ādi* in the original is that for the reasons stated in this sub-section every text, which refers to a body and senses, and in regard to which the doubt may arise whether they indicate a *jeeva*, refers only to *Brahma*.

spoken of together; and when evil *karma* is denied of the *Purusha* in the sun and in the eye, the existence of good *karma* follows; and it may be thought that one, that has good *karma* to his credit, is a *jeeva*. But this is a point to be settled by texts; which include good deeds also in the term evil (*pāpa*).

Him night and day do not touch; no old age; no death; no grief; no good deeds; no evil deeds. All evil depart from Him. (*Chāndo.*, VIII-4-1.)

That this is so, wherever the highest *Ātmā* is mentioned, is well-known. Next, the expression "risen from all evil" cannot be understood in its primary sense. Being omnipresent, to think of His rising from a place connected with evil is absurd. It must therefore be understood to mean "untouched by all evil" as stated in the text quoted. This means that though He does actions, which in others may be regarded as good or evil, their fruits do not touch Him. As no mention is made of any means by which He reached this condition, and as there is no authority that His attributes were ever obscured, it may be concluded that this attribute pertains to His nature, and that it has never suffered change. Now, the fact that the highest *Ātmā* has no evil distinguishes Him from *jeevas*, who are bound; and His being untouched by them singles Him out from the freed *jeevas* also. This attribute cannot therefore be found in *jeevas* and pertains only to Him.

2. Along with this attribute—complete exemption from all evil—other attributes are mentioned in the *upanishad*—(a) He is the inner ruler of all; for it is stated that *rik* and *sāman* are His songs. As these praise *agni*, *vāyu* and other *devatās*, He is the inner ruler of all these *devatās*, and similarly of all others also. Next (b) He controls the worlds above the sun, and the worlds below earth—in other words He rules all the worlds. (c) He controls the enjoyments of the *devas* and the enjoyments of men. (d) whoever meditates on Him, as having risen from all evil, himself becomes free. These attributes are enumerated in the *upanishad* along with exemption from evil; and as that has been shown to pertain to His nature, these also pertain to His nature (1).

3. The statement that the *Purusha* in the sun is exempt from all evil brings up the Being described in the *ānandavalli*, *Chāndogya* (Chapter VIII) and *Subāla upanishads* as having the same attribute. Hence all other this attributes of *Brahma* mentioned in them along with attribute pertain to the *Purusha* under consideration. These, being His natural attributes, can never be found in a *jeeva*.

4. The argument urged in para 1 of the *first view* is not sound— viz., that connection with a body implies bondage to *karma*. The former point does not

(1) From this the following rule may be deduced. When it is possible to regard things as arising from the same source, of which one is well-known, and the others not so well-known, the mention of the well-known thing as springing from that source indicates that the others also have had the same origin.

prove the latter (1); for it is found in those who are not subject to bondage, and who possess the attribute of carrying out their will unfrustrated; for they assume bodies of their own will. The opponent observes—The possession of a body is first stated in the *upanishad*, and this makes out its owner a *jeeva*; while exemption from all evil, which is referred to as the mark of *Brahma*, comes further on. The statement at the beginning prevails. *Reply*. Here the statement at the beginning is capable of another explanation, and has therefore become weak.

5. *The opponent asks*—Why does the *Purusha* in the sun assume a body even of his own motion? It is an aggregate of the elements, which are the products of matter, and exhibits the three qualities—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; and in itself it is an undesirable object.

Reply. The body of the *Purusha* in the sun is not one of this kind. It is made of a shining substance (2) other than ordinary matter, with *satva* alone as its quality; it is eternal, and shines in the place known as the highest heaven; and the dwellers in that world ever see it. For the benefit of those that meditate on Him, He out of His infinite mercy takes up a portion of this body and puts it into the form in which they wish to see Him. It is a form of this kind that is seen in the sun. Here is the authority for these statements :

(i) "He is not born; yet He is born in many forms" (*Purusha sūktha*); (ii) "I know this, viz., meditating here on that great *Purusha*, who shines like the sun, and who is far removed from *tamas*" (*Ibid.*); (iii) "All moments came forth from the *Purusha* with the brilliance of lightning." (*Nārāyanam*, I-8).

The following explanation is needed. The first clause in the first text denies connection with a body made for the experiencing of the fruits of *karma*. The second sentence states that bodies made of the shining substance are assumed for the protection of the universe. In the second text the term *tamas* means matter in the subtlest condition. The text clearly shows the possession of a body, other than a body made of *tamas*; if this were not the meaning, and

(1) *The former point does not prove*. The meaning is that in a matter, that can be known only from the *veda*, an argument based on co-existence observed in the world will not prove the point. The possession of a body is capable of another explanation, viz., that a body is taken up of one's own choice.

(2) *Brahma* is an unique being. As He has groups of good qualities, that are numberless, that belong to Him by nature, and to the excellence of which there is no limit, He has a body that belongs to Him by nature. It is to His liking and suitable to Him; it is ever the same and cannot be regarded as being like other bodies; it is a wonderful one, and is ever free from imperfections. Its brilliance, its beauty, its smell and its softness are par excellence. It is ever young, i.e., it never becomes old. It is the seat of these and endless groups of similar qualities.

the intention was merely to state that *Brahma* was other than *tamas*, the expression would be—*tamasah paraḥ* ; whereas the expression used is *tamasah parastāt* ; and the termination *astāt* would be purposeless. The third text confirms this interpretation.

6. The following *smṛiti* texts state the same thing : *Bhagavad-gītā* — Remaining unborn, incapable of change, and ruler of all beings, and being in My own *prakṛiti* (1), I come down of My own will (IV-6); To protect the good, to destroy the wicked, and establish *dharma*, I appear from age to age (*Ibid.*, 8).

Vishṇupurāṇa. That, in which all these *śaktis* firmly abide, that figure of *Hari* is other than the body formed of the world; it is made of a different substance and is of large size. (VI-7-70.)

That figure, the seat of all *śaktis*, He makes for his own amusement into bodies bearing the names of *deva*, man and beast, and acting like them. This is done for helping the worlds; it is not brought about by *karma*. (*Ibid.*, 71 and 72.)

Mahābhārata. The body of the highest *Ātmā* is not an aggregate of the elements (*Udyoga parva*).

7. The following texts confirm the conclusion stated, and show that the highest *Ātmā* is free from bondage to *karma*, free from connection with a body made of matter with the three *guṇas* and free from connection with undesirable qualities pertaining to it :

Taittirīya ānandavalli. Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* (I—1);

Bṛihad āraṇyaka. *Jñānam* and bliss is *Brahma* (V-9-28);

Ātmopanishad. He is without *guṇas* (i.e., *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*);

Chāndogya. He is free from *karma*, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst; He has unchanging objects of desire and an unfailing will (VIII-1-5);

Svetāśvatara. (VI) He is without attachment (19); He has no body, no senses; no one is seen to be his equal or superior; His capacity is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds, and to pertain to His nature; so also His power to know, to support and to create and destroy (8); Him the greatest ruler among rulers, and the highest *devatā*, among *devatās* (7); He, the world-cause, is the lord of the lords of the senses (*jeevas*); and no maker or lord of Him exists (9).

Taittirīya, nārāyaṇam. The all-knower made all forms and names, and remains being denoted by the names.

22. भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्यः ।

The *Purusha* in the sun's orb is other than a *jeeva* ; because his difference from the *jeeva* energising the *orb* is expressly stated.

This statement is made in the *Bṛihad āraṇyaka* text:

Who stands in the sun, who is within the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun from within, this inner ruler is your immortal *ātmā*. (V-7-13.)

The *upanishad* separates the *inner ruler* similarly from all others. There are similar verses relating to all *devas*, and *ātmās*. The former distinguishes Him not only from the *devatā*—sun, but also from all other *devatās*, and the latter from the *ātmās*, divorced from their bodies. Hence, even in the condition of release, the *jeevas* are controlled by *Brahma*.

By these three sub-sections, which form one group, this point has been settled, viz., that the cause, which brings about the evolution of this universe, is other than matter and other than *jeevas*, whether they are bound or have been freed. The *upanishads*, that were examined, use general terms, as *Sat*, *Brahma* and *Ātmā* ; and with reference to the indications, which they contain, the decision was arrived at. It will be open to an opponent to contend that there are other *upanishads*, which refer to the world-cause in terms which unmistakably denote particular individuals, and that express mention, known as *śruti*, should prevail over arguments based on indications, known as *lingam*. The next four sub-sections (1), which form another group, proceed to examine these *upanishads*, and to confirm the conclusion already reached.

SUB-SECTION 8

The text for consideration is :

What is it that this world should attain ? *Ākāśa* replied he; all these beings come forth from *ākāśa* alone; they disappear in *ākāśa* ; for *ākāśa* alone is greater than all these; *ākāśa*, is the highest goal. (*chando*; I-9-1)

First view. *Ākāśa* is the element ether. In a matter to be known (2) only from testimony, whatever is denoted by a word by well-recognised usage, that

(1) In the first verse the term *prakṛiti* means what belongs to one alone; and denotes here the figure which appears in the highest heaven, as opposed to the figures of bound *jeevas*. The term "will" is the rendering of the term *māyā* in the original. The term is stated to be synonymous with *jñānam* by vedic lexicographers. The "good" are those who meditate on Him; to protect them alone is the purpose of *avatāra* ; the destruction of the wicked is incidental; for it may be brought about by mere willing. The term *śakti* in the third verse means what is an inseparable element of a thing, and denotes here matter, *jeevas* and time. They appear in the body of the highest *Ātmā* in the forms of ornaments and weapons.

(2) In the first sub-section the *first view* is based on a term, which is known to denote a particular element; and the *final decision* relies on the unsuitability of the attributes mentioned to that element. In the second the absence of similar unsuitability

alone should be adopted. The element ether is denoted by the term *ākāṣa*; and it is the cause from which all objects—moveable and immoveable—come forth.

2. Here an objection is raised—Has it not been shown that *Brahma* is other than unintelligent matter and other than *jeevas* on the ground among others that they cannot create by mere will ?

Reply. Yes; but the conclusion is not sound. *Brahma* was defined as the world-cause; this led to the question from whom the universe came forth; and the text under consideration furnishes a reply. It is then decided that the world-cause is *ākāṣa*, and that the general terms *Sat* and *Brahma* used in other creation-texts refer to this particular object—on the rule stated in note (1) on page 51.

3. *Second objection.* Is not *ātmā* also mentioned in another creation-text ?

Reply. True; but the term is not confined to the unintelligent objects only. Example : "The jar is *mridātmaka*, i.e., has *mrit*—earth—for its *ātmā* or substance." As the term has more than one meaning, and it is uncertain which should be adopted, they should all be rejected, and the meaning by its etymology should be taken. The term *ātmā* will then mean what pervades something, and will apply to *ākāṣa*, which pervades all space.

4. *Third objection.* Does not *ākāṣa* appear to be a product from the text, "From that *Ātmā* came forth ether?" (*āna.*, I-1-2.)

Reply. Ether and the other elements exist in two conditions, one subtle, known as *tanmātra*, and the other gross, known as element. The subtle condition of ether is the cause, and the gross condition is the product. The text therefore means that ether in the gross condition came forth of itself from its subtle condition. The conclusion therefore is that the element ether is the world-cause. Hence *Brahma* being no other than *ākāṣa*, the following statements are made in the *upanishads* ;

"If this *ākāṣa*, bliss—did not exist" (*āna.*, vii-1); "*Ākāṣa* is indeed the maker of names and forms" (*Chāndo.*, VIII-14).

is urged; the *final decision* points out its existence. In the third the *first view* refers to the absence of any difficulty of the same kind, and points to an indication in its support; and this is over-ruled by drawing attention to the commencement of the context. In the last sub-section the *first view* relies on this argument, and it is set aside by showing that the *upanishad* as a whole supports the final view.

(1) *In a matter to be known.* In the expression "The sun is *yūpa*" (the post to which the goat to be offered in a *yāga* is tied) the *yūpa* being actually seen, it is not identified with the sun; and the word "sun". (*āditya*) is taken to mean "shining like the sun". In a matter, that cannot be known in this manner, the established meaning of words should not be similarly abandoned. (*mīmā.*, I-4-15.)

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

23. आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात् ।

Ākāṣa is *Brahma*, other than the well-known element ether; He is the highest *Ātmā* ; because certain marks appear in the text, which belong only to Him.

Of these the first mark is being the world-cause. The expression "All these beings" in the text denotes the whole of the universe made up of matter and *jeevas* blended together. The term "being" (*bhūta*) does not refer to the elements, unless the word great or five is placed before it, thus- great beings of five beings, or unless one of them is mentioned, thus—earth and other *bhūtas*. When it stands by itself, its meaning is what has been stated. The word "alone" in the text shows that *Ākāṣa* is not merely the material cause, but is also the operative cause. Now, ether being a product of unintelligent matter, cannot be the world-cause; for it cannot be the cause of the intelligent element in the universe. The next mark is being the highest goal—the goal of *jeevas* ; but ether in the form of material products obstructs the attainment of every desirable object, and is held up as a thing to be rejected. The last mark is being greater than everything; and this means excelling every one by being the seat of all auspicious qualities as a part of one's nature and in the highest degree. Such a mark cannot be found in the element ether. The term *ākāṣa* therefore refers to the highest *Ātmā*.

2. The argument in para 2 of the *first view* is untenable. The text under consideration has the expression *havā*, which indicates that what is stated is well-known; and a statement of this kind, being a mere repetition of what is found elsewhere, has no independent authority. It should not therefore conflict with other texts, which by themselves are authority for what they state. Two such texts were examined in sub-sections 5 and 6; and the world-cause was determined to be the highest *Ātmā*. The text under consideration refers to Him, and affirms certain attributes to prove that He is *ananta*—imperishable, which was the question to be established, as will be seen from the context.

3. The *first view* relied on the meaning of the term *ākāṣa* established by usage; but when it is found to be unsuitable, it must be rejected, and the etymological meaning should be adopted. The term *ākāṣa* means what shows all objects to others, and is suitable to the highest *Ātmā*. He also shines to Himself, and causes others to shine similarly for His own benefit.

4. It is true that the term *ākāṣa* mentions a particular object, unlike *Sat* and *Brahma*, which only describe objects in general terms; but the text under consideration labours under the defect pointed out in para 2, which is confirmed by the unsuitability of the term in the present case. The other texts on the other hand are capable, by the sentences which follow them, of indicating a Being as omnipresent and as possessing an unfrustrated will—which are points

not previously known; and these texts are many and speak with one mind. To plead that they should be set aside in preference to a single text, which has the defect pointed out, is not acceptable.

• 5. It may be objected that *śruti*, express mention, should not be superseded by *lingam*—i.e., mere indications, and that the *mīmāṃsā* does not contain a precedent on the point. Here are some precedents : (i) In connection with taking a portion of a prepared substance for offering it is stated,

He takes with the hand; He takes with *sruvam* ; He takes with a knife.

Here three instruments are mentioned without specifying the substance to which each instrument should apply; but each can apply to one kind of substance only—the hand for solids as rice, or cakes; the *sruvam* for liquids like ghee; the knife for the flesh of animals. Hence by the capacity of the instruments—which is *lingam*—the signification of the word *avadyati* (takes)—which is *śruti*—is narrowed, though it is repeated thrice. (ii) "Cook *krishṇala*." Here the term denotes grains made of gold to resemble grains of rice; it is obviously impossible to cook them in the ordinary sense. The meaning of the word "cook"—which is *śruti*—is narrowed to mean "heat", by the capacity of the grains to be merely heated. Precedents are available also in ordinary writings—Thus (iii) "Fire learns". The reference is to a student as pure as fire. Here the primary meaning of the *śruti agni* (fire) is superseded by the capacity indicated by the word "learns" (*bhāva*, p. 218); (iv) "Shepherd huts on the Ganges." Here, the primary meaning of the *śruti-Gangā* (Ganges) is superseded by the capacity of the word "huts". Hence, *śruti* prevails over *lingam*, only when the primary sense of the *śruti* is not found to be unsuitable. See also the precedent stated in Introduction, para 20.

6. The last point to be noticed in the *first view* is that the term *ātmā* has several meanings, and that therefore its etymological meaning should be adopted. It is true that the term is occasionally used with reference to objects possessing no intelligence; but what is well-recognised is its correlation to a body; and in the texts "Before creation this was only *Ātmā* ; there was only one," and "From that *Ātmā* ether came forth," it denotes an intelligent Being. The term "go" has many meanings; but by established usage it calls up the animal cow, as soon as the word is mentioned; and its use in other occasional meanings should be determined by the context. Similarly here. The meaning which first suggests itself is confirmed by the sentences which follow.

7. The conclusion is that the term *ākāśa* denotes the highest *Ātmā*.

SUB-SECTION 9

24. अत एव प्राणः ।

For the very same reason *Prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*.

The text for consideration is :

Prāṇa, said he. All these beings are dissolved in *Prāṇa* ; they come forth from *Prāṇa*. (*Chāndo.*, I-11-5.)

Here the term *prāṇa*, like the term *ākāśa*, denotes something other than the well-known *prāṇa*—i.e., the highest *Ātmā* ; for the entry of all beings into, and their going forth from, a certain being is mentioned; and this is His mark. As the expression *havā* occurs here also, the same conclusion follows. Why is a new sub-section necessary ? *Reply*. As all beings are seen to depend upon *prāṇa* for continued existence and for their movements, a doubt arises whether it may not be the world-cause. This is removed by drawing attention to the fact that dependence upon *prāṇa* is not seen in stones, timber, and the like, or in the *jeevas* considered apart from their bodies. As in the previous sub-section the etymological meaning of the word *prāṇa* is taken—viz., what makes beings exist; and this is applicable to the highest *Ātmā* only.

SUB-SECTION 10

In the following sub-sections it will be shown that the terms *jyotis*, *indra* and the like denote *Brahma* alone, though by established usage they denote other things; and this will be done, because the texts state some very superior quality, that co-exists with the capacity to evolve the world.

The text for consideration in this sub-section is

Now, that fire (*jyotis*) which shines beyond this heaven, above this universe, in worlds without a superior world. He is the fire within man (*Chāndo.*, III-13-7.)

See *Vedic Texts*. Here the doubt is whether this indescribably brilliant fire is one of the well-known shining objects, as the sun, or whether it is the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. The fire here is surely one of the well-known shining objects. For, though the text refers to a well-known fact, as is evident from the use of the pronoun "that" (*yad* in the original), there is no indication here, as in the texts relating to *ākāśa* and *prāṇa*, that reference is made to the highest *Ātmā*. He is not therefore recognised here. On the other hand, the fire is stated to be the fire within the stomach. Both are of the same kind, being products of the element fire, and they are therefore said to be one. Also, the term "shines" refers to the light which belongs to an object possessing colour. The term "fire" therefore denotes a well-known shining object; and as this indescribable brilliance

(1) is found in the same object along with the capacity to evolve the universe, this shining object is the world-cause.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

25. ज्योतिश्चरणाभिधानात् ।

The fire (appearing in heaven) is the highest *Ātmā*; because (all beings) are described as His foot.

The fire referred to as connected with heaven, and as indescribably brilliant, is the highest *Ātmā*, and no other. It is true that in the text itself under consideration there is no mark which belongs exclusively to Him. Yet in a previous sentence in the same context reference is made to Him as connected with heaven; and the fire similarly connected here is recognised as that Being. The pronoun "that" (*yad* in the original) shows that the sentence repeats what has been stated previously. In examining what this previous statement is, we come to the verse, which speaks of a Being connected with heaven, whose one foot are all beings. From this connection with heaven, we recognise that the fire under consideration is that Being. And as all beings are one of His feet, we see that he is *Brahma*. This verse is quoted from the *Purusha sūkta*, which beyond all doubt refers to the highest *Ātmā*, known as *Nārāyaṇa*. The brilliant fire is therefore the highest *Ātmā*. (*bhāva*, page 221.)

2. The *opponent* contends— The term *jyotis* (fire) is a *śruti*; the connection with heaven in this text, which recalls the preceding text to one's mind, is a *lingam*; the two texts occur in the same portion of the *upanishad*, which is a *prakaraṇa* ; but both *lingam* and *prakaraṇa* are weaker than *śruti*. Hence, the word "fire" does indicate a well-known shining object.

Reply. The pronoun *that* indicates that the text repeats a fact stated previously; and by its connection with it, the term "fire" (*jyotis*) has become weak. The occurrence of the term *yad* in the beginning of the sentence (and it is also a *śruti*), and the connection with heaven, which is a *lingam*, both prevail.

3. The *opponent* contends again— Of the two *śrutis*—*yad* and *jyotis*—the former should be taken as referring not to what has been previously stated, but to the well-known fire brought up before one's mind by the term *jyotis* ; by this means the primary meaning of that term will not be interfered with.

(1) *This indescribable brilliance.* In the *Mundaka upanishad* it is said "The sun does not shine there (i.e., by the side of the *Akshara*); the moon and the stars; not yet the lightning; how can this fire shine ? When He shines, everything shines after him. With His light all these shine" (chap. 2, section 2, verse 11). In the same place it is stated that the world comes from the *Akshara*. Thus the object that has this brilliance is said to be the world-cause.

Reply. It is the peculiar feature of pronouns (1) to refer to what has gone before, even at the expense of the primary sense of a word, with which it is placed in apposition. Hence, the term *jyotis* should be understood in accordance with this feature of *yad* .

4. In the preceding paragraphs it was assumed that the term *jyotis* applied exclusively to the shining objects well-known in the world; but it is not so. For the term means what lights up other things; and the highest *Ātmā* possesses this attribute in the highest degree—"Nārāyaṇa is the highest fire." (*Taittnārāyaṇam, anu., 11.*)

5. It only remains to explain why this fire is said to be the fire in the stomach. The object is that the latter should be meditated on as being controlled by this fire beyond heaven, in order that certain fruits may be attained. That *Brahma* is the *ātmā* of the fire in the stomach is stated in *Bhagavad-gītā, chap. 15, verse 14.*

6. The text under consideration does contain an indication that reference is made to the highest *Ātmā—viz.,* the shining of the fire in "in worlds without a superior world"; for this expression applies to the highest heaven beyond the world of matter; and the fire which dwells therein cannot be any other. As this does not appeal to the opponent, who thinks of a mark similar to what was found in the texts relating to *ākāṣa* and *prāṇa* , the author answers him on his own ground. (*adhi., 73.*)

26. छन्दोभिधानान्नेति चेन्न तथाचेतोर्पणनिगमात् तथाहि दर्शनम् ।

If it be contended— "This is not so, because the preceding text mentions a metre." The reply is "No; because meditation as *gāyātri* is taught. Similar teachings are observed".

Here an objection is raised. The preceding section of the *upanishad* begins with this statement—"Gāyātrī is all these"; and after mentioning the metre in illustration of this, a verse from the *Puruṣa sūkta* is quoted.

All beings from one of His feet; His remaining three feet, which are immortal, are in heaven.

This verse also should refer to the metre, and does not apply to the highest *Ātmā* as presumed. This objection is stated in the first part of the *sūtra.*

(1) See the text discussed in Introduction, para 15 (v). It has been decided that the pronoun *it* (*sa* in the original) refers to milk, previously mentioned, and that both milk and *āmikshū* are the same substance. The dropping in of the curd was merely to make it hard and give it a particular taste. As *āmikshā* is not a new substance, it determines the dropping in of curd, but *vājīnam* does not. It is merely a bye-product. (*mīmā., IV-1-9.*)

The second part contains a reply. By the word *gāyātrī* reference is not made to mere metre; for as will be shown in the next *sūtra*, it cannot have the four feet described in the text. What is taught is that in *Brahma* similarity to the metre should be meditated on. The similarity consists in each having four feet. The verse of the *Purusha sūkta* describes Him as having four feet, and *gāyātrī* metre of four feet is occasionally found. The word *gāyātrī* therefore stands here for *Brahma*. The last part of the *sūtra* refers to a precedent for denoting a thing by a word, which ordinarily denotes a metre on the ground of similarity. In the *samvarga vidyā* it is stated "Those five forming one group, and these five forming another group—make up ten," and it is then added "This is *virāt*". And *virāt* is the name of a metre. (*chāndo.*, IV-3-8.)

27. भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्तेश्चैवम् ।

And it must be so, because only then will the statement be appropriate that all beings and the other things are feet.

"All beings" are the *jeevas* in the embodied condition; and the other things are earth, which serves them as the place of enjoyment, their bodies, which are instruments of enjoyment, and the hearts, wherein they abide. After mentioning these the *upanishad* adds "This is the four-footed being." This statement will be appropriate, only if the term *gāyātrī* denotes *Brahma*.

28. उपदेशभेदान्नेतिचेन्नोभयस्मिन्नप्यविरोधात् ।

If it be contended again "No, because the statements (of connection with heaven) are different", the reply is "No, In both the statements there is no conflict".

The first part of the *sūtra* states an objection. In one of the two texts referred to under the first *sūtra* the statement is "In heaven"; and in the other it is "Beyond heaven". The statements being thus different, one cannot recall the being stated in the former text, when he considers the latter. The conclusion based on this recognition therefore fails. The second part of the *sūtra* replies : Both the statements convey the same meaning. The expression "In heaven" is a general statement, the preposition "in" meaning either inside or outside and below or above. The preposition in "Beyond heaven" means only above. While the latter text repeats the former text, it limits the meaning of the preposition; and both the expressions therefore mean above heaven. There is therefore no difficulty in recognition. Compare the statements—"The hawk is on the top of the tree; the hawk is beyond the top of the tree."

The conclusion is that the fire beyond heaven with surpassing brilliance is the highest *Ātmā* ; and from the *Purusha sūkta*, from which a verse is quoted here, it is clear that reference is made to His shining body.

I meditate on this great *Purusha*, who shines like the sun, and who is far removed from *tamas* (matter).

This view refutes certain minor objections that have been urged :

(i) The reference to brilliance implies the existence of a material object possessing colour; but *Brahma* has no colour; (ii) The expression "beyond heaven" implies limitation in place, and cannot apply to one who is omnipresent; and (iii) The expression "In worlds" implies that He needs many worlds as support; but He needs no support.

SUB-SECTION 11

In this sub-section it is determined that the being, who is denoted by the words *indra* and *prāṇa*, is the highest *Ātmā*, on the ground that He is stated to be the object of meditation as the means to immortality; and this feature is found only in Him, who is the world-cause.

The text for consideration occurs in the *Kaushītaki brāhmaṇa*, and is as follows : Being requested by one *Pratardana* to teach him what was most beneficial to man, *Indra* said.

I, a knower-*ātmā*, am *prāṇa*; meditate on me thus described as life, as immortality. (verse 14.)

See *Vedic Texts*. The doubt is—who is this, denoted by the words "*indra*, and *prāṇa*" and described as the object of meditation most beneficial to man ? Is he a particular *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā* ? (1).

First view. The text refers to a *jeeva* only; for the term *indra* denotes a particular *jeeva* by well-established usage; and the term *prāṇa* also, being in apposition with it, refers to the same individual. And he enjoined a meditation on himself as the most beneficial to man; and what is most beneficial to man is the means to immortality. Meditation on the world-cause being such means, *Indra*, well-known as a *jeeva*, is alone the world-cause.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

(1) The alternatives are only two—a particular *jeeva*, and the highest *Ātmā*, and not four as thought by some—viz., *prāṇa*, *jeeva*, the *devatā Indra* and the highest *Ātmā*. In the expression "I am *prāṇa*," the term "I" and *prāṇa* being in apposition, *prāṇa* is a property of the "I"; and as it occupies a subordinate place, it cannot be one of the alternatives. The author of the *sūtras* does mention *prāṇa* in the *sūtra* for consideration; but his intention is to indicate that the final decision will be based on the mention of the term *prāṇa* in the closing text, which mentions certain marks of the highest *Ātmā*. The marks of a *jīva* are certainly mentioned; but as they are found from the context to refer to an individual *jīva*, he is made one of the alternatives on the general and particular rule. See note (1) on page 51. Even *Indra* as a *devatā* is not a subject for consideration; for the question was considered and settled in sub-section 7. He comes in indirectly as the seat of the *jeeva*'s marks mentioned in the context.

29. प्राणस्तथाऽनुगमात् ।

Prāṇa is the highest *Ātmā* ; for only thus will the closing verse of the *upanishad* be connected with what is mentioned in the text.

What is denoted by the terms *indra* and *prāṇa* is not merely a *jeeva* ; but some other Being—i.e., the highest *Ātmā*. For, towards the close the following verse occurs :

This *Prāṇa* is all-knowing; He is bliss, untouched by old age or death.

This refers to the *prāṇa* mentioned at the commencement, and states certain attributes, which are found only in the highest *Ātmā*. Hence this text will be connected with the *prāṇa* mentioned at the beginning, only if the term denotes the highest *Ātmā*.

30. न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसम्बन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ।

If it be contended "No, because the speaker enjoined (meditation) on himself"; the reply is "there is here an abundance of connection with the *ātmā*".

The first part of the *sūtra* raises an objection : The speaker is *Indra* ; and he enumerates his previous deeds—the slaying of the three-headed *Tvaṣṭā* ; the handing over to dogs of men, who had renounced the world, but who were not reciting the *veda*, the slaying of certain *asuras* in spite of his undertaking many times not to do so. It is clear therefore that the speaker was a *jeeva*, and he enjoined a meditation on himself. Knowing that the commencement of the *upanishad* refers to a *jeeva*, one should understand the ending so as to agree with it; but not the other way; for it is an admitted rule of interpretation that when there is a conflict between the beginning and the ending, the former should prevail. (*Intro.*, para 24.)

The second part of the *sūtra* gives a reply. Immediately preceding the verse quoted—viz :

This *Prāṇa* is all-knowing; He is bliss, untouched by old age or death,
There is another verse which states

As on the spokes of a wheel the felly rests, and the spokes on the nave, so the organs (*bhūtas*) rest on the *jeevas*, and the *jeevas* on *Prāṇa*.

The term *bhūtas* refers to all material objects; they are supported by *jeevas*, who are again supported by *Prāṇa* under consideration; and this *Prāṇa* is described as all-knowing, etc. This support of all material objects and of all *jeevas* is possible only by a Being other than a *jeeva*, viz., the highest *Ātmā*.

The second part of the *sūtra* may be constructed in another way, which brings out the meaning more clearly. Many are the attributes, which can be

connected only with *Brahma*, that are enumerated in this context. First, *Pratardana* requested *Indra* to choose for him a boon that was most beneficial to man; and he enjoined meditation on himself, saying that he was *prāṇa*. Now to be the object of meditation leading to release is the peculiar feature of the highest *Ātmā*. This occurs at the very commencement. Towards the close, it is said of *Prāṇa*.

It is He alone that makes one do a good deed, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds. It is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom He wishes to lead downwards.

To be the prompter of all actions is an attribute of the highest *Ātmā*. Reference has already been made to His being the support of all; and to his being all-knowing, full of bliss and untouched by old age or death. Lastly,

He is the protector of all the worlds; He is the lord of all the worlds; He is the controller of all.

These attributes are found only in the highest *Ātmā*. Hence owing to the abundance of His attributes, that are found here, *Prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*.

The opponent relied on the greater validity of the commencement of a context. We give him the following reply. The commencement and end are parts of sentences; and when they conflict with each other, the commencement prevails. But it cannot have this strength, when the conflict is between it and the whole. Here many sentences, when carefully examined, are found to form a connected whole; and the commencement, which is only a part, becomes weak. In the sentence "On the Ganges shepherd habitations are situated," the expressions "shepherd habitations" and "are situated" convey a certain impression, which is not nullified by the expression "on the Ganges, which occurs at the commencement". On the other hand, it gives up its primary meaning, and adopts a suitable secondary meaning.

31. शास्त्रदृष्ट्यातूपदेशोवामदेववत् ।

The injunction was given from a knowledge of himself from the *veda*; like *Vāmadeva* and others.

The opponent has been silenced; but two doubts remain to be cleared up. The first is—why did *Indra* refer to himself as the object of meditation? The term *indra* no doubt from its etymology means one who is the highest ruler; but to understand it in this sense will not do here, as it will not fit in with the killing of *Tvashtā* and the rest. The particle *tu* in the original indicates this doubt.

Reply. *Indra* spoke from a knowledge of himself as gathered from the *veda*. The *veda* teaches that all *jeevas* are the bodies of *Brahma*; and that every word including "I and you," though ordinarily understood as referring to a *jeeva*, ends

in denoting Him. When he said with this knowledge "meditate on me," he meant "meditate on the highest *Ātmā* as ruling me from within". The second part of the *sūtra* points to a precedent for this mode of expression. The seer *Vāmadeva*, knowing these facts, said:

I was *manu*, and the sun, I am now the seer *Kakshīvān*.

By the term "I" he meant *Brahma* within himself. (Sub-section 6, final decision, paras 13 to 15, pages 186 to 190.) Compare also with what *Prahlāda* said :

As *Ananta* (*Brahma*) is everywhere, I am He alone; all things proceed from me; I am all things; all things are in me, the eternal.

The second doubt is stated in the next *sūtra* and then replied to :

32. जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेतिचेन्नोपासात्रैविध्यादाश्रितत्वादिहतयोगात् ।

If it be said "No; because of the mention of the marks of a *jeeva* and of *prāṇa*." The reply is—No; the intention is to enjoin meditation of three kinds; they are taught in other places; they are suitable here.

The existence of the *jeeva*'s marks has already been stated; and the marks of *prāṇa* are :

How long *prāṇa* is within this body, so long is life. *Prāṇa* takes hold of the body directed by the knower, and raises it.

Reply. There was an object in referring to *Brahma* by these words; meditation is of three kinds : (i) meditation on *Brahma* in His own nature; (ii) meditation on Him as the inner ruler of *jeevas* ; and (iii) meditation on Him appearing as material objects. Examples of the three kinds are found in other places. In the *ānandavalli*, which formed the subject of sub-section 6, meditation of the first kind is taught in these words, "Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*"; "*Brahma* is bliss"; and the other two kinds in the words "Entering into it, He became *sat* and *tyad*". Here also the three kinds are suitable. By the words "Full of bliss, untouched by old age or death" meditation in His own nature is taught; by the words "I am *prāṇa*" meditation on Him appearing as *prāṇa* ; and by the words "Meditate on me," meditation on Him as the inner ruler of *Indra*.

The ruler deduced here are not confined to the particular portion of the *upanishad* considered, but are of universal application. They are :

(i) Wherever an attribute found only in *Brahma* is applied to a *jeeva*, or to a material product, *Brahma* is to be meditated on appearing as that *jeeva* or as that product; (ii) Wherever words ordinarily denoting a *jeeva* or a material product are placed in apposition with a word admittedly denoting *Brahma*, then also the meditation should be as stated above.

The first section has now been completed. In answering the opponent's objections, and establishing the highest *Ātmā* as the world-cause, sub-sections 5 to 11 have brought out the following facts about *Brahma*. He evolves as the universe by mere willing; He is bliss beyond thought; He has a form, which is pure, not made by *karma*, and which is eternal. His nature is ever to shine and make others shine; It is by Him that everything has a continued existence, whether it has *prāṇa* or is without it. He is a surpassingly brilliant fire, and He controls *prāṇa*, *Indra* and everything else from within. (*adhi.* verse 78.)

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

॥ श्रीः ॥

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः

CHAPTER I

SECTION 2

INTRODUCTION

THE second section is now taken up. In doing so, what has been achieved so far may be briefly reviewed (1). The contention that the evolution of the universe is unconnected with *Brahma* as its cause was refuted. In sub-sections, 5, 8, 9 and 10 it was sought to prove that the world-cause was matter in the

(1) In the first section the following points were dealt with: (i) one, who had learnt the *veda*, and who by reading the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* knew the true nature of *karmas*, will perceive that *karmas* not performed as the worship of *Brahma* will yield only petty and short-lived fruits. By learning the *upanishads* he would have seen, though superficially, that *Brahma* is limitless and enduring bliss; and he will desire to attain release by mediation, which is the means thereto. He will decide that words can convey their meanings even in matters, that are settled; and that the *upanishads* are therefore authority in regard to *Brahma*. He will then begin an enquiry into *Brahma*. This was stated in order to remove the bar to the commencement of the work; (ii) The definition 'From whom these beings are Born', etc., will enable us to know *Brahma*, who is the only cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of all the worlds and the only means to limitless bliss. By the term 'worlds' we should understand that which consists of endless, diverse objects, moveable and immoveable, and which consists of those that enjoy, and of objects, means and places of enjoyment; (iii) *Brahma*, the only world-cause cannot be known by any means other than the *veda*, and that therefore He should be known only from it; (iv) This becomes desirable, as *Brahma* is the highest goal of man by His very nature; and though there be no injunctions to do or not to do, the texts of the *upanishads* may be accepted as meaning what they state; (v) *Brahma* to be known from the *upanishads* as being the only cause of all the worlds, is other than *pradhāna*, that is known from inference, and, He is an intelligent Being, as reference is made to His willing; (vi) He is also other than the *jeeva* as He possesses the following attributes - limitless bliss pertaining to Him by nature; omniscience; being the cause of fear to all *jeevas* and the means to its removal; unfailing will; being the inner ruler of all *jeevas* and material products and the like; (vii) He has a superior body not made of matter, not brought about by *karma*, and belonging to Himself; (viii) The world-cause, referred to as a well-known fact by words denoting particular material products as *ākāśa* and *prāṇa* is that unique Being other than everything else; (ix) The fire that is recognized as connected with heaven is He alone, as its brilliance is unlimited and is found only in the highest Being. The highest *purusha* alone, the means

subtle condition, or was one of its modifications-ether, air (for *prāṇa* is only a product of air) or fire. In sub-sections 6 and II *jeevas* in general, and an individual in particular in the form of *Indra* were an individual in particular in the form of *Indra* were put forward. All these attempts have failed. In the remaining sections of this chapter it will be shown that nothing else is connected with the evolution of the universe; and this will establish *Brahma* as the only cause. In the first section the opponent objected altogether to the enquiry into *Brahma*; in the next three sections he assumes a new role, and merely contends that this or that text of the *upanishad* does not refer to *Brahma*. If he should succeed, he would plead that all other texts should be construed so as to agree with his conclusion. In the first section the marks on which he relied were indistinct, that is, they did not exist, and flowed from his own imagination. In the second section the marks will be found to exist; but they are general; and the opponent will endeavour to limit them to something other than *Brahma*.

SUB - SECTION I

In this sub-section the following text is for consideration.

All this indeed is *Brahma* ; for it has come forth from Him; it will be dissolved in Him; it lives by Him. With a serene mind meditate (on *Brahma*). Now, this *purusha* is full of meditations. What he meditates on in this world, that he becomes, when he departs from hence. Let a person do meditation (*chāndo.*, III-14-1). *Manomaya, prāṇa, śarīra, bhārūpa.* (*Ibid.*, verse 2.)

This text is considered in two ways. In the first the fifth sentence only is taken up; viz., 'Let a person do meditation'. Two meditations are enjoined-one meditation in the second sentence for the purpose of attaining serenity of mind, and another in the fifth sentence for attaining release. The third sentence will then show that there is no impropriety in one's undertaking many mediation; while the fourth sentence will indicate that the second meditation aims at a fruit of its own, and that it does not serve the first meditation; for, unless a fruit is mentioned or is implied, an operation will be regarded as serving another operation, in regard to which a fruit is stated. Here the object of meditation is not stated in the sentence conveying the injunction; it is therefore supplied from the sentence which follows, and which describes one connected

to the attainment of immortality which pertains to the world-cause is denoted by the terms *Indra* and the like. Reference to Him by these terms was made from a knowledge of vedic teaching.

Thus, *Brahma*, known also as *Purushottama* and *Nārāyaṇa*, is to be known from the *upanishads*. He cannot be known from any source other than the *veda* and stands apart from everything else, as being the seat of excellent qualities like omniscience and the possession an unfailing will.'

with mind and *prāṇa*. The doubt is whether this person so connected is a *jeeva*; or the highest *Ātmā*.

First View. He is *jeeva*; for mind and *prāṇa* are the *jeevas* instruments; while their connection with the highest *Ātmā* is denied in the text-‘He is indeed without *prāṇa* and without mind.’ (*munda.*, II-1-2)

The following objections are raised:

(i) The term *Brahma* in the first sentence of the text may be added here as the object of meditation.

Reply. The term serves another purpose; for the first sentence shows how serenity, of mind, which is needed as a condition of meditation, may be attained; and it points out for this purpose that everything is *Brahma*.

(ii) But an object of meditation being needed, though the term is found in another sentence, it may nevertheless be added.

Reply. By supplying the terms *manomaya* and the rest found in the same sentence, the need is satisfied.

(N.B.-By the expression the same sentence is meant a sentence connected with it so as to form a whole. The first sentence is not so connected, as three sentences intervene.)

(iii) But the sentence which contains these terms is *arthavāda*, i.e. its object is merely to praise; and the terms, are in the first case, while what is needed is words in the second or objective case.

Reply. When an injunction-text has a need, it may be supplied from *arthavāda*. (*mīmāṃsā.*, IV-3-8) And the case ending may be changed, and by this means both the needs will be satisfied.

Hence, it may be decided that one connected with mind and *Prāṇa* is a *jeeva*; and then the term *Brahma*, which occurs towards the close of the context in the sentence “He is *Brahma*,” should denote a *jeeva*, speaking of him in respectful terms.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात् ।

Because what is well-known in all (the *upanishads*) is stated here.

The person connected with mind and *prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*; for in all the *upanishads* the connection of the terms mind and *prāṇa* with Him alone is well known. Here is the authority:

(i) *Manomaya*, the leader of *Prana* and body. (*munda.*, II-2-8), (ii) This either within the heart; in it is this *Purusha*, *manomaya*; He is immortal, and has a

shining body. (*taitti-sikshāvallī*, VI-1); (iii) With love and perseverance He may be perceived with the mind; those who meditate on Him become immortal (*nārāyaṇam*, I-10); (iv) He is not perceived with the eye; nor with speech; but with a pure mind (*munda*, III-1-8); (v) He is the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*! i.e., He is the support of *prāṇas*; (vi) Next, *Prāṇa* alone directed by the knower takes hold of this body and raises it (*kaushitaki*, II-26); (vii) All these beings are dissolved in *prāṇa*; they come forth from *prāṇa* (*chando* 1-11-5).

The first term in the first text means 'one who can be perceived with (a pure) mind only'. The third sentence in the second text is added to show that reference is made to the highest *Ātmā*. These two texts merely mention connection with mind in general; the third text shows the nature of the connection. The fourth text shows the condition of the mind needed for perception. The last three texts show connection with *prāṇa*. The sixth text refers to *Brahma* as the inner ruler of *prāṇa*. The term *prāṇa* in the last text was previously explained from its etymology as denoting *Brahma*; it may denote Him also as the ruler of *prāṇa* on the rule of interpretation to be explained in sub section 6 of this section.

N.B.-It may be noted here that both the *jeeva* and *Brahma* are connected with mind and *prāṇa*, the former using them as his instruments and the latter as being perceived by one and as supporting and controlling the other. Hence from mere connection in general no inference can be drawn in favour of the *jeeva*.

2. Taking this view the following statements, which occur in the context; "This *Ātmā* is present within my heart"; and 'He is *Brahma*' may be explained without resort to a secondary meaning. The text quoted in favour of the *first view* denies of *Brahma* the following, that His knowing depends on the mind; and that His existence depends upon *prāṇa*.

Second Explanation. The foregoing is one mode of understanding the next; but it is open to the following objections: First, the whole of the *sūtra* stated the reason; and there was no word to indicate the subject under consideration, and it was supplied. Secondly, the word *Brahma* occurs at the beginning and end of the context. The first view took it to denote *Brahma* at the beginning, and a *jeeva* at the end. But, as it is natural to presume that it denotes the same being in both places, the sub-section would be unnecessary. Thirdly, serenity of mind being attained by learning the meaning of the *veda* and dwelling on it constantly. It is unnecessary to enjoin a meditation for this purpose. Lastly, the term *santa* in the original had to be understood as meaning desiring serenity of mind, while its natural meaning is having a serene mind. The text under consideration will therefore be explained differently.

Only one meditation is enjoined, and that in the second sentence; and the injunction is repeated (1) in the fifth sentence in order to enjoin certain particulars to be included in the meditation. The particulars are 'He can be perceived with a pure mind' and the rest stated in verse 2. Hence, the meaning is 'Meditate on *Brahma*' the *Ātmā* of all, as possessing these particulars. The doubt is whether the term *Brahma* denotes a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. It denotes a *jeeva*; for the term *Brahma* is put in opposition with the term 'all'; and it will be appropriate only in the view that reference is made to a *jeeva*. The term 'all' denotes all the *jeevas* in the universe, beginning with the four-faced *Brahma* and ending with the minutest germ; and they have attained their present conditions as the result of *karma*, of which the root is beginningless *avidyā* (2). In the case of the highest *Ātmā*, on the other hand, this cannot be the case. For being all knowing, He knows that these conditions are very undesirable; being omnipotent, He is capable of avoiding them; His knowledge and power have never been limited; for He has no *karma*. Hence He cannot be all this.

2. The question is asked - Why is the term *Brahma* used if the *jeeva* be intended?

Reply. The term is occasionally applied to the *jeeva* also; for like the term *Ātmā* it is common to both the *jeeva* and *Brahma*. Hence, it is that the highest *Ātmā* is referred to with the epithet highest as in the expressions 'The highest *Ātmā*', the highest *Brahma*.

3. A further question is put. The term *Ātmā* has the same connotation and is thereof common to both. Is this so in regard to the term *Brahma*.

Reply. The *jeeva* also is great in regard to his attribute *jnānam*; and this emerges, when his *karma* goes. Here is the authority. "He becomes unlimited". (*śvetā.*, V-9).

4. Still another question. Being the cause of the evolution and dissolution of the universe is adduced as a reason; and what is previously well-known is so stated here; and its *Brahma*, that is well-known as the cause; not the *jeeva*.

Reply. Evolution and dissolution take place, as the *jeevas* have to be rewarded or punished according to their deserts. In their own nature they are

(1) *The injunction is repeated.* The text 'Do the *agnihotra homa*' gives the injunction, but does not state the material for offering. This is stated in another text 'make the *homa* with curd'. This merely indicates the material and the words 'make the *homa*' is a repetition of the first text. Similarly here.

(2) *Of which the root is beginningless avidya.* The meaning intended to be conveyed is that *avidya* and *karma* follow one another like the seed and tree; and that this succession has had no beginning.

without limitation in regard to their attribute *jnānam*, and are *Brahma*,' but owing to karma they appear in various forms-*devas*, men, beasts or vegetables.

Final decison. This is stated in the *sutra*:

1. He who is identified with all this i.e., the universe- is the highest *Ātmā*; because a well known fact is adduced (as the reason).

Here the first word *sarvatra* in the original, meaning 'in' all this' refers not to the *upanishads* as in the first explanation, but to the universe. The term *asabdam, na itara* (not the other), or *anya* (another) is brought down from the first section, and its meaning is stated. The reason assigned is that *Brahma* is the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe, and it is only what is previously known, that is stated to be the cause. If the texts be examined it will be seen that the cause is the highest *Ātmā*, not the *jeeva*. The *taittiriya bhriguvalli* begins with the sentence.

"From whom these beings are born, by whom (a supporter from within) they live, when born, and returning to whom, they enter, becoming one, know Him; He is *Brahma*,' and ends with these words "He learned that *Ananda* was *Brahma*; for all these beings are born from *Ananda* alone".

They recall the all-knowing, *ānandamaya* described in the *ānandavalli* (*vide* sub section 6). Here is another text.

He, the world-cause, is the Lord of the *jeevas*; none is His maker; no one is His lord (*Veta.*, VI-9)

The original has the word *karaṇādhipa*, which means the lord of instruments-i.e, *prāṇa*, mind, the five senses and the five motor organs and such an one is clearly a *jeeva*. The lord of the *jeevas* is the world cause. This may be seen in other places also. Hence the *Brahma* is the highest *Ātmā*.

2. How is the identification of *Brahma* with 'all this' to be explained?

*Reply.*As fully described in paras 13 to 15 of the *final decision* under *sūtra* 13 of chapter I section, 1, (pages 186 to 190), *Brahma* is the *Ātmā* of 'all this' as the *jeeva* is the *Ātmā* of his body. Hence the objections urged in para 1 of the *first view* fail. Nor can the explanation offered in the same para be accepted. The *jeeva* in each body is different from the *jeeva* in another; how can they be identical with one another? In regard to the freed *jeevas* too, their identity with the universe, and being the cause of the evolution of the world are impossible, as will be shown in chapter IV, section 4, Lastly, the *jeevas karma* merely accounts for the diversity observed in the world; but it cannot be either the material or operative cause. In the term *tad-ja-la-an*; which occurs in the original, and which means 'what has come forth from, what is dissolved in and

what lives by it', the term it (*tad*) refers to the term '*Brahma*', and not to *karma*. Hence, the last explanation also fails.

This second explanation alone meets with the approval of great men. The author of the *vritti* observes *Brahma*, the *Ātmā* of all, stated in the text 'All this indeed is *Brahma*' is the all-controller.

2. विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च ।

And because the attributes mentioned in the next verse will be appropriate only in the highest *Ātmā*.

See verse 2 in *Vedic Texts*, and the notes thereunder.

The first attribute-being capable of perception with a pure mind only-shows that He is free from all imperfections; for only a pure being (1) can be perceived with a pure mind. Impure beings only can be perceived with impure minds. The purity of the mind should be attained by meditation on the highest *Ātmā* helped by the seven *angas*, beginning with discrimination in regard to food (the capacity to separate pure food from what is impure). The next term *prāṇa*; *śarīra* should not be limited to one *prāṇa* it indicates one who supports and controls the *prāṇa* of all. Similarly all the other epithets will be found applicable to Him only. See explanation of the other terms in *Vedic Texts*.

3. अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शरीरः ।

The seat of the attributes cannot be an embodied being; because they are not appropriate in him.

The *jeeva* is like a glow worm; and he is fit to experience untold suffering from the possession of a body made by past *karma*, Whether he is bound (2) or has become free, not a grain of these attributes will ever be found in him.

The first *sūtra* assigned a reason found in the text under consideration; the second *sūtra* assigned another reason found in the second verse; and this was put into a negative form in the third *sūtra*. A third reason, which occurs in the last verse, is brought forward in the next *sūtra*.

4. कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च ।

(1) A freed *jeeva* may also be perceived by a pure mind; but he will be perceived as controlled by, and as existing only 'for, *Brahma*. If he be perceived otherwise, the mind will not be pure.

(2) *Whether he is bound*. The bound *jeeva* is mentioned in illustration. As the *jeeva*, that is bound as 'punishment, cannot be identical with the Being that punishes him, so also the *jeeva*, that is rewarded, cannot be identical with Him, who rewards.

And because *Brahma* and *jeeva* are described as object and subject respectively.

The description is as follows:

Departing from here I shall reach Him (verse 4).

Here *Brahma* is the object; and the meditator is the subject; and the object reached is what is meditated on (1); hence, *brahma* is different from the *jeeva* who reaches.

5. शब्दविशेषात्

Because there is difference in the words used to indicate them.

In the text “This *Ātmā* is present within my heart” (verse 3) the word ‘my’ (me) which indicates the *jeeva* is in the possessive case, and the word *Ātmā*, which denotes *Brahma* is in the nominative case. The same differences is seen in a parallel passage from the *bṛihadāraṇyaka*.

As is a grain of rice, a grain of *yava*, a *ṣyāmāka* seed (a kind of grain) or the same without the husk, so within the *Ātmā* is this *Purusha* having a golden form, and resembling a fire without smoke.

Here the *jeeva* is denoted by the word *Ātmā* in the seventh case, and *Brahma* by the word *Purusha* in the nominative case.

The preceding *sūtra* and the text which it considered raise a doubt. The difference pointed out between object and subject may be explained with reference to two different conditions. To remove this doubt, this *sūtra* cites a text which refers to one and the same condition, and indicates difference between *Brahma* and the *jeeva*.

6. स्मृतेश्च ।

And because *smṛiti* lends its support.

The *bhagavad-gītā* in several places similarly indicates *Brahma* and the *jeeva* by words which have different case-endings, See chapter XV, verses 15 and 19 and chapter XVIII, verse 61.

Here the mention of the highest *Ātmā*’s presence within the heart of man leads to two objections, which are replied to in the next two *sūtras*.

7. अर्भकौकस्त्वात्तद्व्यपदेशाच्च नेति चेन्न निचाय्यत्वादेवं व्योमवच्च ।

(1) *The object meditated on.* One may ask - The commencement referred to the meditator and that meditated on; and the difference between them should be stated. Of what use is the distinction drawn between the person who reaches and Him who is reached. These clauses reply.

"If it be said - No, because *Brahma* is stated to dwell in a very small place and to be of very small size' - The reply is 'No' - because He has to be so meditated on, in Himself is like the ether".

The statement is made in verse 3 ; this *Ātmā* is present within my heart in a form smaller than a grain of rice, etc'. The heart is a very small place; and His form is smaller than a grain of rice. This description applies to a *jeeva*, who is stated to be of the size of a ten-thousandth part of the tip of a hair; but not to the highest *Ātmā*, who has no limitation in place. To this objection the second part of the *sūtra* replies. He has to be mediated on as being within the heart and as appearing in this form. His natural form is further on in the same verse stated to be larger than the earth etc. That meditation is enjoined will be evident from a consideration of the *upanishad*. It begins with the injunction to meditate on *Brahma*, who is the *Ātmā* of all objects, and who is the cause of the evolution and dissolution of all objects, and of their continued existence by entry into them as their *Ātmā*. It next states that the fruit to be reached will be in accordance with the mode of meditation. It then repeats the injunction in order to enjoin certain particulars, and describes Him as the ruler of the worlds, and enumerates His attributes (verse 2). The next verse states that He is present in a small form in the meditator's heart, in order that he may meditate on Him as his *Ātmā*; and then describes the form of *Brahma* to be reached by him. The last verse directs that the meditator should meditate *Brahma* who is all this, out of His infinite mercy is present in my heart, in order that I may have immortal life'; and also. 'I will surely reach my goal in accordance with my meditation'. The *upanishad* closes with the assurance that there need be no doubt as to the result in the case of one who has this belief.

Hence being in small place and being of small size is for the purpose of meditation (1).

8. संभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् ।

It is be said "(By dwelling within the heart) the experiencing of pleasure and pain must result", the reply is "'no- Because there is a difference".

The *Jeeva*, who dwells within the heart, suffers pleasure and pain. If it be admitted that *Brahma*, also abides within it, He must suffer like the *jeeva*. The second part of the *sūtra* replies. Mere dwelling within a body does not bring about this result; the true cause is bondage to *karma*; and this does not exist in *Brahma*. Here is the authority; "Of them the other does not eat (the fruit) but shines. (*munda.*, III-1-1)

(1) From this the following rule may be deduced: When an object or being is known to be of large size, and a limiting object is stated, and a size is mentioned, the limitation is accidental; and the size without the limiting object is the natural one.

SUB SECTION 2

9. अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् ।

The eater (of *brāhmaṇa* and *kshattriya*) is the highest *Ātmā*; because these words denote (the universe consisting of) the moveable and the immovable.

The text for consideration is;

To whom *brāhmaṇa* and *kshattriya* both become food, and to whom Death is a condiment, who can know how He is.

The words 'to whom' in the text indicate a connection. between the Being referred to and food; and the words 'food' and 'condiment' show that this connection is the relationship of the eater and the eaten. Hence the term 'eater' in the *sūtra*. The term used in the original is *upasechanam* and this means what is eaten along with food, facilitating the eating by imparting a relish to the food; and it is translated here by the word 'condiment'.

The doubt here is - Who is the eater - a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view - He is a *jeeva*. Because the mention of food and condiment calls up an eater; and as the word 'food' cannot be taken in its primary sense here, it must mean an object of enjoyment; one to whom an object of enjoyment appeals (1) should be a *jeeva*; and his; enjoyment is the effect of past *karma*. He is subject to the bondage of *karma* and experiences its fruits, while the highest *Ātmā* is untouched by it.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*. The eater is the highest *Ātmā*; for by the words *brāhmaṇa* and *kshattriya* reference is made to the whole of the universe; and by the word 'food' an object of destruction is meant; and He who destroys the universe cannot be other than the highest *Ātmā*.

2. Here an objection is raised. The word 'food' cannot be an article of consumption in its ordinary sense; but in adopting a secondary meaning an attribute of food should be taken which is peculiar to it (2). Being an object of destruction is common to it and to other objects.

(1) *Object of enjoyment appeals.* The words *brahmāṇa* and *kshattriya* denote *jeevas* in the embodied condition. As persons of one sex are objects of enjoyment to the other sex, they are objects of enjoyment to the Being under consideration. If the word 'food' (*odāna*) be taken to mean objects of enjoyment, death must be taken to be a helper in the enjoyment.

(2) *Which is peculiar to it.* Here reference is made to the rule deduced in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (iii-5.8). When the juices in *chamasas* have been offered in a *soma yāga* the *adhvaryu* directs that four of them should be taken to the *sadas*, where the juice that remains is drunk. To one of the *chamasas* he refers as follows - *prodgātrīnām* (of the *udgātās*). Here the term *udgātā* denotes only one person he who sings the second part of a *sāma mantra*; but it has a plural ending. Hence, the meaning of the term established by usage is given up, and a secondary meaning is adopted. This may be

Reply. Here reference is made not to enjoyment yielded by *karma*, but to destruction by *Vishṇu*, i.e. *Brahma*, the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe. This is evident from the mention of death as *upasechana*. As the condiment is utilized to facilitate the eating, and is itself ultimately eaten up, so death is used as an instrument in the destruction of the world of diversity, and is himself ultimately destroyed. Hence destruction of the whole world is intended. The Being who destroys is referred to as *Vishṇu* in the same *upanishad* (*valli* 3, verse 9), and He is the highest *Ātmā*.

3. It is objected again. The second clause, being heard later than the first, is weaker, and should not alter the meaning which is adopted for the term 'food' independently. *Reply.* Here the words 'food' and 'condiment', being connected, one cannot be understood independently of the other. (*bhāva*, page 240.)

4. The opponent accepts these replies, but asks why the terms *brāhmaṇa* and *kshatriya* also should be understood in a secondary sense. The following is the reply. It is true that with the primary sense the meaning of the sentence can be made out; but there is no reason to presume that destruction is confined to these classes only. In cases where meditation is enjoined, the highest *Ātmā* may be regarded as connected with only a portion of the universe as in the texts considered in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 7; but here no mediation is enjoined, and the text merely states an existing fact. Further, the word 'whom' in the text refers to something stated elsewhere; and this will be found to be the *chandogya* text "All these beings, my dear, have their root in Sat ; they rest in Sat; they dissolve in Sat".(VI-8-7)

10. प्रकरणाच्च ।

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And because the context refers to *Brahma*.

The verse under consideration points out the difficulty in knowing, how the highest *Ātmā*, is unless one secures His grace; and recalls the following verses where the same difficulty was mentioned.

"The Deva, who is difficult to see, concealed from man by his *avidyā*; who has entered into all beings; who is present in the cavity of the heart and stands in the *jeeva*; and who has had no beginning: (verse 12) "This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation by mere hearing many times" (verse 23).

Here the opponent comes forward and seeks to turn this argument in his own favour. Immediately after the text under consideration comes the following verse;

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done in two way - (i) it may be taken to denote all the helpers in the *yāga* (*ritvik*), or (ii) only the three who sing *sāma mantras*. In the former reference will be made to a feature common to the singers and other; and in the latter only to the singers; it has therefore been decided that the term should be restricted to the three singers only.

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By those who meditate on *Brahma* and serve the five fires or recite a particular portion of the *veda*, two persons are said to be drinking *ritam* (the fruit of *karma*), remaining in this world reached by good deeds, entering the cavity of the heart, and dwelling in the excellent ether within it. They are also said to be shade and light.

This verse clearly refers to a *jeeva*, as will be explained presently, As it is nearest to the text under consideration, and as the verses quoted under the preceding *sūtra* are removed from it, the continuity of the context may be taken to have been broken; and this verse and the text form one context. Now the verse refers to the drinking of *ritam*, the fruit to *karma*, and a *jeeva* is clearly indicated. But who is the other that drinks with him? The following statements are made. The two - the *jeeva* and the other- are in the heart; they are in this world reached by good deeds. They cannot naturally apply to the highest *Ātmā*, who is omnipresent and who is not touched by *karma*. The terms *shade* and *light* will appropriately indicate the un intelligent mind and a *jeeva*. Hence the second must be either the mind or *prāṇa*. It is true that they do not drink *ritam*; but as they are *jeevas* instruments, they may somehow be connected with the drinking. There is an additional reason for this conclusion. The verse gives prominence to the *jeeva*, which will be preserved, if the other be one of the two mentioned. This will not happen, if the other be the highest *Ātmā*. Hence, the *jeeva* being the subject of this verse, along with either the mind or *prāṇa*, and the context being one, the text under consideration refers to a *jeeva*; and the conclusion reached in the two preceding *sūtras* is not sound.

This view is refuted in the *sūtra*:

11. गुहांप्रविष्टा बात्मानौहितद्वर्शनात् ।

Those, that have entered the cavity of the heart, are surely *Ātmās*; for this is so stated.

The *Ātmās* are *jeeva* and the highest *Ātmā*. The term 'surely' (hi) draws attention to a well-known fact. Here are some texts:

"The *Ātmā* is located in the cavity of the heart"; "Who meditates on Him as located in the heart"; "all *jeevas* are cities to Him who lies in the cavity of the heart".

Presence in the heart cannot therefore pertain either to the mind or to *prāṇa*. On the other hand the context itself shows that only the *jeeva* and the highest *Ātmā* are in the heart. First, as regards the *jeeva*:

Who has been born with the five element, has entered the cavity of the heart and remains therein and who lives with *prāṇa*, depends upon the senses for enjoyment and eats the fruits of *karma* ; of him He is the inner ruler (*katha*, IV-7).

As regards the highest *Ātmā* see verse 12 quoted under the second *sūtra*. The arguments of the opponent may be answered thus : The expression drinking *ritam* may be explained as in the statement. 'Those that carry umbrellas go'. This does not mean that every one carries an umbrella; it means that a group of persons goes, and that the group is marked by the carrying of umbrellas. This is, however, resorting to a secondary sense. Another explanation is to regard the highest *Ātmā* as prompting than the *jeeva* to drink; and both will then be connected with the drinking - the *jeeva* directly as drinker, and the other indirectly as prompter. It must be admitted that though the latter explanation is better than the former, as avoiding resort to a secondary meaning, there is still a departure from the natural meaning of the expression. In the case of the mind or *prāṇa* however, the departure is much greater for they are connected with the drinking only as instruments. When it is said. 'Two have entered the house', one thinks of two persons, and not of one person and of his walking stick. Again, mention is made of two as drinking *ritam*, and it is known that one of them is a *jeeva*. In the search for the second the mind naturally turns to another of the same class; and the highest *Ātmā* belonging to the class of intelligent beings, it thinks of Him only. Here the class being known, an individual has to be found belonging to that class, while in turning to the mind or *prāṇa* another class and another individual have to be brought up; and this requires a greater effort (1). Hence, the other is the highest *Ātmā*; the verse refers to Him; and the continuity of the context is preserved.

12. विशेषणाच्च ।

Because also (the two) are distinguished.

The *jeeva* and *Brahma* alone are mentioned through out the context thus distinguished. The one meditates and reaches the goal; the other is meditated on and is the goal reached. Three verses are quoted below;

"He, who knows, *Deva*, worthy of all praise, as the inner ruler of the *jeeva* and meditates on Him will reach the final end of *samsāra*: (1-17) "We are able to meditate on Him who gives the fruits of *yagas*, who is the unchanging highest *Brahma*, who is the firm shore to those that wish to cross the ocean of *samsāra*, and who is reached by the worship of the *nachiketa* fire" (III-2) "Know the *Atma* as the owner and ruler of the chariot; the body as the chariot". This is as to the *jeeva*. 'But the man who has control over *buddhi* (conviction),

1. From this discussion two rules may be deduced:

(i) When resort to a secondary sense cannot be avoided, and two ways of doing so present themselves, that should be adopted, which is suitable to the context. (ii) When two things are mentioned by the dual number of a word, they must be of the same class.

the charioteer, who firmly holds the mind the reins, reaches that well-known end of the road-viz., *Vishṇu*, the highest goal" (III-3 and 9).

This is as to the highest *Ātmā*. In the very verse quoted by the opponent the *jeeva* and *Brahma* are distinguished as shade and light. The former is shade being ignorant; and the latter is light, being all knowing¹ (1), (2).

SUB SECTION 3

The text for consideration is from the *Chandogya*, and is as follows:

"This *Purusha*, who is seen in the eye, He is *Ātmā*; said he, "he is *amritam*' 'He is freedom from grief; He is *Brahma*".

(See notes on this text in Vedic Texts) The doubt is whether this *Purusha* is a reflection, the being controlling the organ of sight, a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. The *Purusha* is a reflection; for the statement is like the statement of a well-known fact; and by the words 'is seen' reference is made to what is actually perceived. Or he may be a *jeeva*; for his presence in the body is ascertained by looking at his eye; and this also is well-known. Lastly, the *purusha* may be the *devatā* controlling the sense of sight; for this is known from the text - "He is established in this through his rays". (*brihad.*, VII 5-1) The *purusha* in the eye must be one of these, as the mention as of a well - known

(1) Here the original raises an objection and answers it. In *valli* 1, verse 20 of the *upanishad* (see *Vedic Texts*, Introduction and the note under this verse), *Nachiketas* requested Death Devata (YAMA) to teach him in regard to the destiny of a *jeeva*, when he quits his body. This verse relates to the *jeeva*; and hence the whole of the *upanishad* relates to him, and not to *Brahma*. The reply is that the questioner referred to the ultimate destiny of the *jeeva*, as there were several opinions in the matter. The reply had therefore to describe the nature of release (*moksha*) and its means; and this necessarily included the nature of *Brahma*, and of the *jeeva*, meditation or *Brahma*, and the reaching of the highest heaven. The objection therefore fails.

(2) The four *sūtras* of this sub-section are thus connected. The first mentions a reason that is found in the text under consideration. The second gives a reason available in a previous verse in the same context. The third removes a doubt raised by the verse immediately following the text. The particle 'and' is therefore not added. The last *sūtra* confirms the conclusion of the third *sūtra*.

(1) The original here describes how death Devoata came to teach *Nachiketas*; it explains the meaning of verse 20 and states the various opinions held regarding the destiny of the *jeeva*. As all this is embodied in the 'Vedic Texts', it is omitted here.

fact applies to them appropriately. What follows - being *amirtham* and the rest - must be understood in accordance with the beginning, and to be mere praise. The particle *iti* (Which serves the purpose of inverted commas) recalls injunctions like the following "meditate on mind as *Brahma*", the original being *mano brahma iti upasīta* (1).

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

13. अन्तर उपपत्तेः ।

The *Purusha* within (the eye) is the highest *Ātmā*; because the attributes enumerated are appropriate only in Him.

Three attributes are stated in the text. Three others are described in the verses which follow: viz., all good qualities come together in Him; He leads all good qualities to those that come to Him; He shines in all the worlds (verses 2 to 4). A single indication at the commencement, when opposed to many attributes stated further on, becomes weak. Hence, they cannot be treated as mere praise.

14. स्थानादिव्यपदेशाच्च ।

And because standing and the rest are stated.

The word *sthāna* in the original means standing, and not place, as will appear from a comparison with the wording of the last *sūtra* in this sub-section. By the word 'rest' control is meant. The statement is made in *bṛihad āraṇyaka*:

Who stands in the eye, who is within the eye, whom, the eye does not know, whose body the eye is, and who ruler the eye from within, this inner ruler is your immortal *Ātmā* (V-7-13)

This standing and control are the attributes of the highest *Ātmā*: and by the text under consideration He is thought of. The reference as of a well-known fact applies to Him, and He is seen by *Yogis* (those who meditate on Him). Hence the statements in the text are appropriate.

15. सुखाविशिष्टाभिधानादेवच ।

And for this reason alone, viz., that a Being who is bliss is stated.

See the narrative in Vedic Texts.

At the outset in this context it was taught "Bliss is *Brahma*; ether (*KHAM*) is *Brahma*". Reference is made in the text under consideration to this

(1) *The first view* is based on the statement made in the preceding sub-section, that it is difficult to know the highest *Ātmā*. If this be so, the opponent argues, the *purusha* referred to here, as well-known and as being actually seen, cannot be He.

Brahma, who is infinite bliss; and further instruction is imparted regarding the place, wherein He should be located, and the qualities, with which He should be located, and the qualities with which He should be meditated on. The word 'alone' (*eva*) shows that this reason is sufficient of itself to establish the conclusion.

Here the following objection is raised : The text under consideration is not connected with the beginning, as the teaching of *agni-vidyā* (i.e., meditation on the three fires) intervenes. This *agni-vidyā* cannot be regarded as subsidiary to *brahma-vidyā*, (meditation on *Brahma*); for certain fruits are mentioned as following from the *agni-vidyā*, which cannot be included in the fruits of *brahma-vidyā*, and which, on the other hand, conflict with them.

Reply. Before and after the teaching of the *agni-vidyā* mention is made of *Brahma* thus: (i) "*Prāṇa* is *Brahma*"; (ii) "He is *amirtam*; He is freedom from grief; He is *Brahma*", Next the fires said "Thus have been taught you our *vidyā* and *Ātmā-vidyā*; your teacher will teach you the path' (Section 14-1). It is clear that until the very end, where the *deva-path* is taught, the teaching is incomplete (1). The intervening *agni-vidyā* is therefore subsidiary to *brahma-vidyā*. The *upanishad* has the word (*enam*) in the sentence. Then the *garhapatya* fire taught him (*enam*); and it is used when reference is made to one already mentioned. Here *brahma-vidyā* was first taught; and then the *agni-vidyā* and to the same student, the intention clearly being that the latter *vidyā* should help the former. And it is taught only to one who has become fit for the latter. If any confirmation were needed, there is the express statement of the fires, "Thus have been taught you our *vidyā* and *Ātmā-vidyā*," i.e., *Brahma-vidyā*. The student was very unhappy and yearned to know the means to release; the teaching of *brahma-vidyā* to him was appropriate; but why was *agni-vidyā* also taught him, unless it was to help the other ? Thus it is evident that *agni-vidyā* was subsidiary to *Brahma-vidyā* ; oneness of teaching on a subject is not destroyed by the intervention of something subsidiary to it. Then as to the fruits that were said to flow from the *agni-vidyā*. They must be regarded as

(1) *The teaching is incomplete.* This needs some explanation. The fires said 'your teacher will speak to you about the path'. It should not be thought that this referred only to the path, and that the teaching by them was otherwise complete. Their intention was this. The teacher having gone abroad without giving instruction, the student was inconsolate; and to comfort him, the fires, pleased with the service that he rendered to them, taught him only the nature of *Brahma*, and the *agni vidya* that was to serve *brahma vidya*. They were of opinion that only instruction by a teacher would be most serviceable, and expected that he would teach the student the attributes of *Brahma*, the place where He should be located and the path. Hence, the mention of the path by the fires should be taken to include the rest. The teacher understood them in this sense.

mere praise (*arthavāda*) (1). And they do not conflict the goal sought. See sections 11, 12, and 13 of the *upanishad* in *Vedic Texts* and the notes thereunder. Hence the beginning of this portion of the *upanishad* is connected with the text, and the reason assigned in the *sūtra* holds.

At this stage the opponet asks "How is it known that in the sentence 'Bliss is *Brahma*; ether is *Brahma* the highest *Ātmā* is meant? "The form of expression suggests the well-known element ether, and worldly happiness; and these, one may presume, were to be meditated on as *Brahma*. For, the form of the sentence is similar to the sentences-name is *Brahma*; mind is *Brahma*. In both, the principal object to be meditated on is first stated and then the attribute with which it should be invested. This is confirmed by the words with which the fires close their teaching" "They told him about *prāṇa* and that ether". There is no reference here to *Brahma*. To this objection the next *sūtra* furnishes a reply:

16. अत एव च स ब्रह्म ।

And for that very reason (2) He is *Brahma*

The meaning of the *sūtra* is - Because in the text 'What is bliss, that is ether' the term 'bliss' qualifies the term 'ether' He who is denoted by the term 'ether' is the highest *Ātmā*.

Now, how is this a reply to the objection raised?

Reply. The student was disgusted with the round of births and deaths, known as *samsāra* (see the narrative in *Vedic Texts*), and was burning for release from it; and as his teacher went abroad without teaching him, the fires,

(1) *Mere praise (arthavāda)*. This is based on the following rule deduced in the *pūrva mīmāṃsa* (IV-(3)1). In the text "Whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood, he does not hear disagreeable statement", the fruit stated is decided to be mere praise; what has to serve a *yāga*, does not need any fruit other than helping the making of the *yāga*; and a *Juhū* serves *yāga*, being the instrument with which offerings are made.

(2) The expression 'for that very reason (*atah*)' refers to the words 'because a Being who is bliss is stated' occurring in the preceding *sūtra*; and the meaning is that the same words give the reason in this *sūtra* also. In the preceding *sūtra* the text was 'Bliss is *Brahma*', and it was urged as the reason; and in this *sūtra* the text is 'What is bliss, that is ether', and this is the reason adduced here. In both cases the reason is the same, though it is expressed differently. For an analogous case see chapter II, section 3, *sūtras* 18 and 19. In the former the words 'from the *veda*' express the reason; and in the latter reference is made to the same words, by the word *atah*, and they give the reason; but the texts are different. The term he (*sah*) in the *sūtra* refers to ether (*ākāṣa*); and its gender is determined by the gender of the term *ākāṣa* (ether) in the closing text "They taught him about *prāṇa* and that ether (verse 5 of section 10).

full of mercy, taught him. It is clear that they did not mean that he should meditate upon *prāṇa*, worldly happiness or ether as *Brahma*. The student understood it in this way; for he replied to the fires in these words - "I know the meaning of the statement that PRANA is *Brahma*; but I do not understand (What you mean by) bliss and ether". If the view of the opponent were correct, as all the three sentences *prāṇa* is *Brahma*; bliss is *Brahma*; ether is *Brahma* are exactly alike, he would not have said that he understood one sentence and not the others. What passed in his mind must be something like the following: The fires teach me that *Brahma* alone is to be meditated on; for I have heard that one who desires release should do so. I know also that the words man and *deva* denote a *jeeva* dwelling in bodies connoted by them, and that similarly the term *prāṇa* may denote one who is within *prāṇa* and controls it, as the *jeeva* is within a human or *deva* body and controls it. The first sentence therefore means—the controller of *prāṇa* is *Brahma*. If the other sentences were construed similarly, that is, that the controller of worldly happiness and of the element ether is *Brahma*, then no information as to what *Brahma* is would have been conveyed. On the other hand, if the terms bliss and ether should qualify one another, then the meaning would be that *Brahma*, who is bliss, is ether-i.e., as unlimited as ether; and this epithet would apply to both *Brahma* and the attribute bliss. Thus the nature of *Brahma* would be known to be indescribable bliss. His question was therefore meant to ascertain which of these alternatives was intended. The fires replied, accepting the later alternative; and in their closing words they said that He who is *prāṇa*, as controlling it, is also indescribable bliss: Hence, the text "Bliss is *Brahma*; ether is *Brahma*" refers to *Brahma*, who is indescribable bliss; and this being the subject under consideration, the same is referred to as standing in the eye. It will be observed that the nature of the reply given by the fires negatives the presumption that the text bliss is *Brahma* means meditation on bliss as *Brahma*. For the question was what was meant by the statement bliss is *Brahma*. To reply that 'bliss is ether' would not be appropriate; for this would merely be equivalent to another injunction that bliss should be meditated on as ether. This also receives confirmation from a later statement of the fires - "Thus have been taught you our *vidyā* and *Ātmā-vidyā*; (14-1); for this refers to what is under consideration and describes it as meditation on *Ātmā*, which meditation on bliss or ether will not be.

17. श्रुतोपनिषत्कगत्यभिधानाच्च ।

And because the path is taught, that should be meditated on by one that has heard the *upanishad*.

This is done in the last two verses of section 15 of the *upanishad*. This is described in other *upanishads* as leading to *Brahma*, and is here taught to the student who has heard the *upanishad* and knows the nature of *Brahma*, so that he may meditate on this also. Hence, the *Purusha* in the eye is *Brahma*.

18. अनवन्धि तेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः ।

And (the *Purusha* within the eye) is not one of the others, because it does not ever remain within the eye; and because also the qualities enumerated cannot be found in it.

First, the reflection depends upon the presence of another person before the eye; and when he departs the reflection disappears. Next, the *jeeva* remains in the heart, from which he can control all the senses and all the organs of action; and he does not therefore remain in the eye. Lastly, he being controlling the sense of sight may remain elsewhere and control the sense; and he is said to do so with his rays. In none of these will the attributes mentioned, which are unconditioned, be appropriate (1).

SUB - SECTION 4

In the second *sūtra* of the preceding sub-section reference was made to another *upanishad* in support of the view that the *Purusha* within the eye is the highest *Ātmā*. That *upanishad* is now taken up for examination.

The text for consideration is section 7 of *bṛihadāraṇyaka*, chapter V Sec Vedic Texts. One of the verses is as follows:

Who stands in earth, who is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who rules the earth from within, this inner ruler is your immortal *Ātmā* (verse 7).

There are many similar verses. Here the doubt is who is this inner ruler - is he a *jeeva* or is he the highest *Ātmā*?¹

First View, He is a *jeeva*; for in the closing verses, this inner ruler is stated to see and to hear; seeing and hearing mean perception through the senses; and one who has to use the senses to see and hear must be a *jeeva*. Even control of others depends upon the possession of the mind ; for it is so observed in the world.

2. Here an objection is raised. Reference is made to a Being who is the inner ruler of all *jeevas* and of all material objects. How can he be a *jeeva*?

(1) The six *sūtras* in this sub-section are thus connected: The first *sūtra* mentions a reason available in the text under consideration. The second *sūtra* removes a doubt that arises in regard to it by citing another *upanishad*. The third *sūtra* adduces another reasons found in a previous text in the same context. The fourth *sūtra* decides that this text refers only to *Brahma*. The fifth *sūtra* brings up a third reason, which a later text furnishes; and the last *sūtra* confirms the first two *sūtras* in a negative form.

(1) Here the original compares the *kanva* and *madhyandina* readings. This being embodied in the 'Vedic Texts' is omitted here.

Reply. For the reason stated, the inner ruler being a *jeeva* and not the highest *Ātmā*, the reference to immortality, the standing in *jeevas*, and control of them should not be taken literally. It is not true that there is but one inner ruler. When it is said. 'He who stands is your son; he who cooks is your son' one understands that there are two sons. Similarly when the pronoun 'who (*yah*) is repeated in each verse, and the being described is said to be the inner ruler, one should conclude that there are many such (*bhāva*, p.252).

3. Another objection : Why should not seeing mean merely the perception of colour? Reply. The text 'There is no seer other than this' which occurs towards the close, makes a denial, which would be inappropriate, if seeing meant merely the perception of colour in general terms; for this is found in the *jeeva*. The denial should therefore be understood as referring to perception without the help of the senses. As therefore perception is through the sense only, the conclusion stated stands.

Final decision. The inner ruler is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

19. अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवाधिलोकादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् ।

The *antaryāmi* (inner ruler) in the sentences containing the words *adhidaivam* and *adhilokam* is the highest *Ātmā*; because His peculiar attributes are specified.

The text under consideration occurs in the *upanishad* of both the *kānvas* and the *mādhyandinas*. The text as read by the former contains the word *adhidaivatam*; and the text of the latter has additional verses relating to all *lokas* (worlds), all *vedas* and all *yajnas*. By the words *adhidaivam* and *adhilokam* the *sūtra* refers to the texts as read by both (1), and affirms that the inner ruler in both the texts is one - viz., the highest *Ātmā*.

That the inner rule is 'one' is evident from the narrative with which the text commences. See *Vedic Texts*. In the question put to *Yājñavalkya* only one inner ruler is referred to: "Do you know that inner ruler, who rules from within this world, the other world and all beings", and *Yājñavalkya*'s reply is the text under consideration.

(1) How can this be - when the texts differ in some respects? Reply. the term *adhidaivatam* occurs in the eighteenth verse preceded by the particle *iti* (equivalent to inverted commas), and covers all the verses beginning with the seventh. All these occurring in the *madhyandina* reading also, it is concluded that both the sets of texts treat of the same Being; and the additional verses in one are supplied in the other on the rule that what is not stated in one place may be taken from another place, where it is stated.

2. The *sūtra* refers to the peculiar attributes of the highest *Ātmā*. One of these is the entry by one only into all worlds, all beings, all *devas*, all *vedas* and all *yajnas*, and controlling them in every way. Another is having every object as His body, and being its *Ātmā* (1). These are not possible in one other than *Brahma*, who is omnipresent and who has an unfailing will. A third attribute is being immortal; and this is as a part of His nature. When a doubt arises whether an attribute mentioned is natural or accidental, and there is no epithet to limit its application, it should be presumed to be natural. If it be accidental, the cause that induced it should be known first, and while this is being looked for, the view that it is natural occurs to the mind and is at once accepted. (*bhāva*, p.253)

3. The arguments in the *first view* are not sound. First, the perception of the highest *Ātmā* does not depend upon the use of sense organs. It pertains to His nature; for He is all-knowing, and has an unfailing will. Here is a text, which denies that His perception is like that of the *jeeva*.

Do not look upon Him as the doer of (ordinary) seeking (*bṛihad.*, V-4-2). And here is another 'He sees, but has no eye; He hears, but has no ear; He goes and he takes, but has no hands or feet:'. (*sveta.*, III-19)

Question. The primary meaning of the words seeing and hearing is to see or hear through one or the other organ. Is it not so? *Reply.* This will not apply to the cases of the highest *Ātmā*. In determining the meaning of words reference should be made to all the cases, in which they are used; and that meaning should be adopted, as the primary meaning, which applies to all the cases. Hence seeing means merely perception of colour and size. *Question again:* wherever there is perception, there is dependence upon the senses. Is not this what we see? *Reply.* Your argument will be like this. The perception of the

(1) This is stated in the following texts: 'He has entered into men and controls them; He is the *Ātmā* of all. 'Having created it, He entered into the very same; having entered into it, He became *sat* and *tyad*' (*āna.*, VI). *Subāla* upanishad begins with these words 'Here there was nothing whatever before. These beings are born without a root and without support. *Nārāyaṇa* is a dweller in the highest heaven, has a shining body and is one, i.e., has no equal or superior. The eye and what is to be seen are *Nārāyaṇa*; the ear and what is to be heard are *Nārāyaṇa*'. It then goes on thus - 'He remains within (man's) body in the heart; He is unborn; one, i.e. without an equal or superior; eternal. He whose body earth is, who moves about in earth, whom earth does not know; whose body water is; ... whose body *mrityu* (subtle matter) is, who moves about in *mrityu*, whom *mrityu* does not know, He, the inner ruler of all beings, is free from *Karma*; dwells in the highest heaven; has a shining body; has no equal or superior. He is *Nārāyaṇa*.

highest *Ātmā* depends upon the senses; for it is perception like the perception of the *jeeva*. This is, however, faulty. There is a third thing-viz., bondage to *karma*, which co-exists with dependence upon the senses in the example given, and limits perception to perceptions through the sense only; but it is absent from *Brahma*. Hence His perception is not so limited.

4. The other argument urged in para 3 of the *first view* is also unsound. In the denial of a seer the words used are “no other than this”; the term ‘this’ refers to the inner ruler described in the preceding verses as controlling others without being seen by them and the term ‘other’ (*anya*) to one who is in every way similar to Him; and the existence of a seer of this kind is denied. It has been decided in the case of *itara* (other) that it refers to something similar to what was previously stated (*vide* Introduction, para 31-i). The term *anya* has the same meaning, and the same rule applies to it also. The usage is similar in the world also when it is said. In this village *devadatta* alone is man no other is’ What is denied is not that there are no men; for this would be opposed to facts. The meaning is that there is no other similar to him in intelligence and the like. The statement ‘He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *Ātmā*’ refers to the *jeeva* by the term ‘your’ and to the inner ruler as his *Ātmā*. The latter is not therefore fit to be a *jeeva*.

20. न च स्मार्तमतद्धर्माभिलाषाच्छारीरश्च ।

Neither any form of matter nor the *jeeva* can be *antaryami* because attributes that can never be found in either are mentioned.

They are those stated in the first *sūtra*. The object in mentioning the material products is to show that it is as impossible for the *jeeva* to be the inner ruler, as it is for matter.

In these two *sūtra* the conclusion was established with reference to certain attributes. The next *sūtra* adduce a reason, which is by itself sufficient.

21. उभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैनमधीयते ।

Both (the *kanva* and the *mādhyaṇḍina*) describe Him (the inner ruler) as different from the *jeeva*.

For he is controlled as much as his instruments are - *prāṇa*, the sense and the mind. The inner ruler, who controls, is other than the *jeeva* that is controlled.

(1) The author of the *sūtras* clearly mean that both the texts should be considered together. The first word in the first sutra of this sub-section means one of whom invisibility and the rest are attributes; and this is the *akshara* mentioned in the first text. The masculine gender of the word indicates the superior in the second text.

SUB SECTION 5

Subject. The following texts from the *mundaka* are for consideration (1):

Next, the higher (*vidyā*), is that by which that *Akshara* (the endestructible) is vividly perceived (verse 5). That well known Being, who cannot be seen, nor seized; who has no name and no colour; who has no eyes and ears, nor hands, and feet and who is eternal, omnipresent, and all pervading, because of His highly subtle nature. He is without imperfections, and the wise perceive Him to be the material cause of all that exists (verse 6)

Aksharat paratah parah (superior) (1) (II -1-2)

The doubt is who is the *akshara*, described as invisible in the first text, and who is the superior mentioned in the second text. Are they matter and *jeeva* respectively or are they the highest *Ātmā* in both the texts?

First view. The *akshara* in the first text is matter in the subtle condition; and the superior in the second texts is *jeeva*. In the preceding sub-section it was decided that he who sees without being seen was the highest *Ātmā*. Here no reference is found to seeing, the peculiar attribute of an intelligent being; and the expression "Who cannot be seen" may therefore refer to matter in the stable condition. Again to be the object of seeing and seizing is denied of this *akshara*; and these are attributes of matter in the gross condition which we see. By these matter in the subtle condition is brought up; for it is of the same nature as the other - matter in the gross condition. The expression 'he is not *brāhmaṇa*' refers to one in a caste similar to the *brāhmaṇa*, viz., to a *kshatriya*, *vaiśya* or *sudra*, but not to an outcast or to a beast. The expressions 'he is not a boy', and he is not lean', bring up the same individual in conditions similar to the conditions denied, but not another individual. Similarly, here certain attributes are denied of *akshara*, and we wish to know what it is; we see the attributes in matter; and this is present before the mind. The denial may therefore appropriately refer to the same matter in the subtle condition; and we conclude that *akshara* is *sub the* matter. To go in search of another object will need greater effort on the part of the mind, and is therefore out of the question.

Here an objection is raised. The denial of visibility carried with it the denial of the absence of intelligence; for what is without intelligence is visible. *Reply.* What is not visible is not necessarily intelligent; for the mind is invisible,

(1) *Aksharat paratah parah*. This is interpreted in two ways - (i) superior to that, which is superior to *akshara*. In this the *akshara* is matter; that which is superior to it is the *jeeva*; and he who is superior to him is *Brahma*. This interpretation is adopted in the final decision. (ii) Superior to *akshara*, which is superior. 'In this also, *akshara* is matter, but in the subtle condition; and it is superior to its products. The superior to *akshara* is the *jeeva*. This interpretation is that adopted in the first view.

and is without intelligence. Hence *akshara* is matter in the subtle condition known as *pradhānam*.

2. In the second text reference is made to the *jeeva*. For the verse, of which the text is part (III-1-2), has the term without a body; and as a body is found in a bound *jeeva*, the denial of body brings up the same individual in his freed condition. And he is superior to *akshara*. The terms *aksharat* and *paratah* are in the same case and are in apposition; and the meaning is that *akshara* is superior to its products. Hence the meaning of the text is superior to *akshara*, which is superior to all its products; and such a one is a *jeeva*.

3. *Akshara* controlled by the *jeeva* evolves as *mahat*, *ahamkara* and the five elements; and this is shown by the following examples.

As the spider sends forth and draw in its thread; as plants appears on earth; as from man, who remains a man, hair comes forth, so from *Akshara* the universe comes forth here. (I-1-8)

The spider illustrates evolution of matter as controlled by a *jeeva*; the appearance of plants shows that it is possible for matter to evolve even without control; and the last example proves that the mere presence of the *jeeva* will suffice.

4. Hence the texts under consideration refer to subtle matter and the *jeeva*.

Final decision. Both the texts refer to the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sitra*:

22. अदृश्यत्वादिगुणकोधर्मोक्तेः ।

He, of whom invisibility and the rest are attributes and the Superior is the highest *Ātmā*; because His peculiar attributes are stated.

One of the attributes mentioned is omniscience, and this is predicated of *Akshara* (See *Vedic Texts*) After mentioning *akshara* in verse 6, reference is made in verse 8 to the evolution of the universe from *akshara*. This necells the *Akshara* first mentioned. This *akshara* is therefore the same. Verse 10 repeats the fact of evolution and predicates omniscience of its cause. It must be the same *akshara*. *Akshara*, being all-knowing, cannot be *pradhānam*. No reference was made to it here; and it is not present before the mind.

2. Here an objection is raised. In connecting *akshara* in the first text with omniscience, reliance is placed on the mention that it is the cause of evolution and on this being recalled by verse 10 predicating omniscience. This is the authority known as *lingam*; and by it the first text is connected with verse 10; and the *akhara* in the first text is concluded to be the highest *Ātmā*;

and to differ from the *akshara* in the second text, which is *pradhānam*. Instead of doing this, both the texts should be regarded as referring to the same object on the strength of the word *akshara* occurring in both. This is the authority known as *śruti*; and *śruti* is stronger than *lingam*. In the second text *ashara* in the first text also is *pradhanam*, and to predicate omniscience of it is not appropriate. *Reply*. You rely on *śruti* alone; but on my side there is *śruti* also in addition to *lingam*. For in verse 13 of section 2 the term *ashara* and *purusha* are placed in apposition; and this verse and the first text are connected as relating to the same object; and the *lingam* lends its support to the SRUTI.

3. *Further objection*—While the first text refers to the material cause, the verse predicating omniscience relates to the operative cause; the two causes being different, the statement that *lingam* lends support is not correct. Leaving this aside, there is *śruti* on each side; but my view is supported by the illustration of the spider. *Reply*. The illustration is as appropriate to the highest *Ātmā* invested with matter, as it is to *pradhānam*, and this must be ignored. Then each side has to rely on *śruti* but the *śruti* for me occurs before your *śruti*; for it is found in the last verse of the second section. while your *śruti* occurs in the second verse of the third section. It therefore prevails on the beginning rule (Intro., para 24). *Akshara* in the first text and *akshara*, which is put in apposition with *purusha*, being identical, and *purusha* being an intelligent person, it is appropriate that *akshara* in both places should be all knowing. He is therefore the highest *Ātmā*.

4. The view of the opponent that the material and operative causes of evolution are different is not correct. Because they are one, it is stated at the very commencement of the context that by knowing one thing everything will be known. In the view taken here in verses 8 and 10 will refer to the same cause of evolution.

5. In the second text also reference is made to the all-knowing *Akshara* by the term superior (*paraḥ*). This will be evident on a comparison of the verse in which this text occurs with the first text and the verse which immediately follows it. The term 'without body' recalls the cause 'who has no hands and feet', the words 'inner ruler of everything without and within' recall the word 'all-pervading', and the word *purusha* occurs in both the places. Hence the verse and the first text are connected and refer to the same object. But the all-knowing *Akshara* in the first text cannot be the *akshara* in the second; for there is another greater than this *akshara*, which description cannot apply to the all-knowing *Akshara*. For in the verse following the first text referring to Him it is stated "There is no other superior to Him".

6. The remark in para 2 of the *first view* that in the second text the words *akshara* and *para* are in apposition is not correct. For, a comparison being made,

we should know the thing with which it is made, and a word is needed to denote that thing; and this is supplied by the term *akshara*. The para or greater than *akshara* is the *jeeva* and greater than he is the all knowing *Akshara*. Hence in both the places reference is made to the highest *Ātmā* (1).

23. विशेषणभेदव्यपदेशाभ्यां च नेतरौ ।

And the *akshara* cannot be the other two (matter and *jeeva*); because He is distinguished from them, and His difference from them is stated.

This distinction is made by the *prakarana* or context (i) At the very commencement reference is made to *brahma-vidyā*, knowledge of *Brahma*, as the basis of all knowledge; for by knowing *Brahma* everything is known. This is stated. *Saunaka* applied to *Angiras* for instruction on *Brahma-vidyā* and asked "By knowing what is all this known". This question means that he desired information regarding *Brahma* (ii) The Teacher replied "Two *vidhyas* should be obtained — the lower and the higher". The *upanishad* goes on to state that the lower is knowing *Brahma*, from the *veda* and its adjuncts, and that the higher is loving meditation on Him (1). (iii) In the first text under consideration the nature of *Brahma*, who is the subject of both the *vidyās*, is described, referring to Him by the term *akshara*. (iv) In the verse giving the illustrations the evolution from Him of the whole universe, including the *jeevas*, is mentioned; for the terms *visvam* does not refer to matter only. (V) In the next two verses the mode of evolution is described ; and omniscience and the possession of an

(1) The term *akshara* means etymologically that which pervades; and applies fully to the highest *Ātmā*. It is used with reference to *pradhānam* also on the ground that it surrounds its products on all sides. It comes from another root and means what does not change. This description is fully true of the highest *Ātmā*; and as *pradhānam* has not changed and assumed new names like its products *mahat* and *ahamkara*, the term is loosely used with reference to it also. For the use of the same term to denote two different things, there is a precedent in the same context. The term *brahma* denotes *pradhānam*, the *veda* and the highest *Ātmā*. Though the word *akshara* applies to *pradhānam*, and the highest *Ātmā*, its application is determined with reference to the attributes mentioned. In the first text the attributes of the highest *Ātmā* being found, *akshara* there is the highest *Ātmā*. It is not so in the second text, and *akshara* is therefore *pradhānam*.

(2) The latter is the means of reaching *Brahma*; That it is loving meditation is stated in the text 'He can be reached only by him, whom He chooses' (*munda.*, III-2-3). The means to this again is the knowledge obtained from the *veda*, helped by discrimination and six others. This is stated in a text 'Him *brāhmaṇas* wish to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yāgas*, by making gifts, by *tapa* in the form of fasting (*brihad.*, VI-4-22). This is also stated in a *smṛiti*. 'The means of reaching Him is said to be *jñānam* and *karma*; of them *jñānam* is said to be of two kinds - that coming from

unfrustrated will, needed for the evolution, are predicated of Him.¹ (vi) The second section of the *upanishad* begins with the statement 'That *akshara* is *satyam*' This means that it is His nature to remain unchanged; and this statement is made to show that He does not suffer in any way by the evolution. (vii) The direction is then given that one should do the *karma* prescribed in the *veda* without an eye on their fruits, and from a desire to reach the all knowing omnipotent, unchanging *purusha*; the futility of *karmas* done from a desire for fruits is fully pointed out; and those who regard such *karma* as the only thing to be striven for are condemned. (viii) In the closing verses of this section the student, who on enquiry is dissatisfied with fruit-yielding *karma*, is directed to go to a teacher, who has learned the *Veda* and does meditation on *Brahma* (ix) In the third section the evolution of the universe is explained in detail; and certain attributes of *Brahma* not previously stated are enumerated, including His being the inner ruler of all beings, and His appearing in every form (x) In the remaining three sections of the *upanishad* He is stated to have come down from the highest heaven to dwell in the hearts of men; the mode of meditation of Him is explained; and the fruit of such meditation is shown to be release from *karma* and the enjoyment of *Brahma* in full.

By this description *Akshara* is distinguished from both matter and the *jeeva*. He is also expressly stated to be different from them by the second text under consideration.

24. रूपोपन्यासाच्च ।

And because a form is described of the *Akshara*

This description is as follows:

His head is heaven; His eyes are the sun and the moon; His ears are the quarters; His speech is the *vedas*; His *prāṇa* is the air; His heart is the universe; His feet are the earth; He is the inner ruler of all beings (II-1-4).

A form of this kind can belong only to the highest *Ātmā*, who is the inner ruler of all.

the *veda*, and that coming from discrimination and the rest (i.e. *yoga*)' (*vishnu*, VI-5-60). In the *mundaka* reference is made to the lower *vidya* in verse beginning with the words 'of them the lower is *rik veda* and ending with the word *dharma sastra*. For the *veda* helped by its *angas*, by *itihasas* and *puranas*, by *dharma sastras* and by *mīmāṃsās* creates knowledge of *Brahma*. The higher *vidya* is referred to in the remainder of the verse and in verse 6.

(1) Here the original explains the meaning of verse 9. This being embodied in 'Vedic Texts' is omitted here.

SUB-SECTION 6

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chandogya-*

Though *Ātmā vaisvanara* surrounds every thing and is really without limitation, yet one, who meditates on Him as thus limited by places, etc.

The doubt is whether it is possible to decide that this *Ātmā vaiṣvānara* is the highest *Ātmā*, or not (1).

First view. It is not possible to decide that the term *vaiṣvānara* means the highest *Ātmā*; for the term is used in four senses. First, it denotes the fire in man's stomach.

"This is fire *vaiṣvānara*, by which this food is cooked—the food which is eaten. This is its sound, which one closing his ear hears. When one departs from the body, this sound is not heard" (*bṛihad.*, VII-9-1). Next, it denotes the element fire—"For the benefit of the whole world, the *devas* made the fire *vaiṣvānara* the sun so that the day may be indicated." Next it denotes a *devatā*—"May we be in the good graces of *vaiṣvānara*; he is the king of the worlds, and is surrounded with wealth" (*yajur*, 1-5-11). Lastly, it denotes the highest *Ātmā*. "He made the offering to *agni vaiṣvānara*, who is within the body itself in the heart" (*ashtaka* III, *pra.* 11, *anu.* 8). "The *vaiṣvānara*, who appears in all forms, who is *prāṇa*, who is *agni*, rises" (*praṣna*, 1-7). The marks which are found in the context may to any one of them.

Final decision. *Vaiṣvānara* is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

25. वैश्वानरस्साधारणशब्दविशेषात् ।

Vaiṣvānara is the highest *Ātmā*; because the common term is particularised by attributes belonging only to Him.

(1) *Question.* How can there be any doubt ? At the commencement the sentence "Who is our *Ātmā*; what is *Brahma*" occurs. (See Vedic Texts). Every term in the closing portion of the *upanishad* should be understood in accordance with the beginning. *Reply.* In the *agnirahasya*, which deals with the same subject, the term *vaiṣvānara* is put in apposition with the term *agni*, which means fire, the element fire and a deva. Hence the doubt.

The form of the question for consideration is unusual. In the preceding sub-sections the form was - which out of two or more things mentioned a term denoted. *Reply.* The variation is because the first *sūtra* in this sub-section uses a word which is a common term, that is a term used to denote several things.

Question. In the preceding sub-section the term *akshara* was a common word in this sense; and yet the question considered there was whether the term denoted matter

See *Vedic Texts* for the narrative. Six seers discussed the question "Who is our *Ātmā*? What is *Brahma*?" and being unable to arrive at a decision they went to one *Asvapati*, who knew *Ātmā Vaisvanara* and applied for instruction. They wished to know *Brahma*, who is the inner ruler of *jeevas*: they searched for one who knew Him; and finding one who knew *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, they asked for instruction. *Vaisvanara* is therefore the highest *Ātmā*. The context begins with the words *Ātmā* and *Brahma*; but after this the words used are *Ātmā vaiṣvānara* throughout. The term *vaiṣvānara* being used in the place of *Brahma*, it may be concluded that *vaiṣvānara* is *Brahma*. Further, the fruits on meditation on *vaiṣvānara* are thus stated.

He who meditates on Him as thus limited by heaven and earth, eats the food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *Ātmās* (section 18-1); and all His (meditators') sins will be burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up (section 24-3).

These two fruits can be reaped only, if *vaiṣvānara* is *Brahma*.

26. स्मर्यमाणमनुमानं स्यादिति ।

This description of *VAṢVĀNARA* recalls similar descriptions in other places; and serves as a mark (to identify Him as *Brahma*).

or the highest *Ātmā*. Why should the alternatives for examination be stated differently here? *Reply*. In that sub-section *apart* from the common usage there were marks which led the opponent to think that *pradhānam* was indicated; and he put forward the first view accordingly. Here, however, the first view will be based only upon the common usage of the term *vaiṣvānara*; for in the opinion of the opponent there are no marks by which elimination may be made. *Question* again - This will mean that the word is *ambiguous*. Will not the first view thus *impugn* the authority of the *veda*? for it was stated in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* that it does not use *ambiguous* words? And this conclusion has been accepted in this enquiry into *Brahma*. *Reply*. Though it is not possible to decide which of four things is intended, it is certain that the *veda* means some one of them, and this general assurance remains. The *pūrva mīmāṃsā* itself permits an opponent who puts forward the first view to express it in this form.

(1) The *mundaka* text is 'Heaven is His head; the sun and the moon are His eyes; the quarters are His ears; the *vedas* are the activities of His speech; *vayu* is His *prāṇa*; all the world is His heart; the earth is His feet; He is indeed the inner *Ātmā* of all beings' The *smritis* also state this - *Brahmānas* state heaven to be His head; intermediate world to be His navel; the sun and the moon to be His eyes; the quarters to be His ears; and the earth to be His feet; know this beings and of *prāṇa* 'Prostration before the Being who appears in the form of the world thus - Fire is His mouth; heaven is His head; Intermediate world is His navel; the earth is His feet; the sun is His eye; and the quarters are His ears (*bhārata*).

This description referred to is this; Heaven is His head; the sun is His eye; air is His *prāṇa*; ether is His waist; water is His bladder; and earth is His feet; (see Vedic Texts, section 12 to 17). In *muṇḍaka* (II-1-4) a similar description is given (1), and it is well-known that it applies only to the highest *Ātmā*. It may be concluded that *vaiṣvānara* is the highest *Ātmā*.

These reasons should set the matter at rest; but certain passages in the *agnirahasya*, and certain remarks in the latter portion of the *chandogya* itself, raise a doubt, which the opponent takes hold of. He states as follows:

In the *agnirahasya* these words occur "This fire *vaiṣvānara*" (IV-25); and they are in apposition. Again, in the *chandogya* itself *vaiṣvānara* is stated to be in the heart, mind and mouth of the meditator and to be the three fires of one who does *yūgas* (section 18-2). In the next verse he is described to be the place, on which five offerings are made with the words *prāṇa vyana*, and the like. Lastly, in the *agnirahasya* reference is made to the location of *vaiṣvānara* within man "Whoever thus meditates on this fire *vaiṣvānara* with a human form and placed within man" (IV-26). From these it appears that *vaiṣvānara* may also be the fire in the stomach, and it cannot be concluded that he is the highest *Ātmā* alone. The first part of the next *sūtra* states this objection:

27. शब्दादिभ्योऽन्तःप्रतिष्ठानाच्च नेति चेन्न तथा दृष्ट्युपदेशाद् संभवात् पुरुषमपि चैनमधीयते ।

If it be contended 'No, because there are texts against this conclusion, and because *vaiṣvānara* is placed within (man)'. *Reply*. 'No. Because meditation in that form is taught; because the attributes mentioned cannot be found (in the fire in the stomach); and because some texts describe *vaiṣvānara* as a *Purusha*'.

Vaiṣvānara, previously described as connected with the three worlds as His body, is to be meditated on as controlling the fire in the stomach; The term *agni* (fire) does not denote only the fire in the stomach; it denotes the highest *Ātmā* as controlling it from within. How is this known? *Reply*. Thus, the terms *agni* and *vaiṣvānara* are in apposition; and should indicate the same object. The latter denotes the highest *Ātmā* described as having the three worlds as His body; and the former is known to be the fire in the stomach. The term *agni* cannot therefore fit with the other word. It must therefore denote the highest *Ātmā* as controlling the fire in the stomach (1). This is confirmed by the *agnirahasya*. "This fire *vaiṣvānara*, who is a *Purusha*" (IV-25). The fire in the stomach is not a *Purusha* in itself. The term without limitation applies to the highest *Ātmā*, as shown in the *purusha sūkta* (2).

(1) See also *Bhagavadgītā*. Becoming *vaiṣvānara* I am in the bodies of living beings, and with *prāṇa* and *apāna* (outward and inward breaths) digest their food of four kinds (XV-14).

(2) See the following texts - *Purusha* is a being with a thousand heads; *Purusha* alone is all this.

28. अतएव न देवता भूतं च ।

And for the very same reasons *vaisvanara* cannot be either the *devatā* or the element fire.

The reasons are the use of the words *Ātmā*, *Brahma* and *Purusha*, and the mention of fruit in no way limited, and of the burning up of all sins. The reason for adding a new *sūtra* is that like the fire in the stomach the *devatā* and the element are not limited, and that to possess the three worlds as a body may be regarded as not impossible in their case. The former controls the three worlds, and the latter, being compounded with the other elements, has evolved into those worlds.

In the preceding *sūtra* but one, the expression *agni vaiṣvānara* was explained, taking the word *agni*(fire) to denote the inner ruler of fire. This mode of denotation is indirect; but Jaimini considers that another explanation is available by taking the word *agni* (fire) to denote the highest *Ātmā* directly. This is stated in the next *sūtra*

29. साक्षादप्यविरोधं जैमिनिः ।

Jaimini considers that the conflict may be obviated also by understanding the term *agni* (fire) directly.

The term *vaiṣvānara* means etymologically one who leads all men; and in this sense it denotes only the highest *Ātmā*. Though it is used to denote other things also, it is restricted to Him by the attributes mentioned in the context. Similarly in regard to the term *agni* also the term *agni* (1) (fire) means from its etymology that which leads upwards; and it denotes fire, because it possesses this quality. The same quality occurs fully in the highest *Ātmā*. The term being thus common, the attributes mentioned in this context will limit it to the highest *Ātmā* only.

The question arises why the highest *Ātmā*, who is unlimited, is to be meditated upon in a limited form. The next *sūtra* furnishes a reply:

30. अभिव्यक्तेरित्याश्मरथ्यः ।

(1) If the term *agni* be understood in both the ways, as denoting the inner ruler of fire, and as leading the *jeevas* upwards, how is meditation to be done? *Reply*. Meditation should be on *Vaiṣvānara* as the inner ruler of the fire in the stomach; for this was so stated in *sūtra* 27. *Jaimini's* meaning is - where the attributes mentioned unmistakably point to the highest *Ātmā* and when words denoting other objects by established usage have to be understood as denoting Him, their etymological meaning should be adopted. This rule is of general application and having to be stated somewhere, this opportunity was availed of.

For the purpose of (the meditator's) forming a vivid image. This is the view of *Āṣmarathya*

It must be difficult for one to meditate on an unlimited Being. At the outset a mental image should be formed for meditation; and it is for this purpose that the *upanishad* mentions the limitations.

Next, a human form made of matter with head, eyes and the rest is stated here; but he has no such body. Why is it stated?

31. अनुस्मृतेवदिरिः ।

For the purpose of meditation in this manner. So does *Bādari* think.

The text is "who meditates on this unlimited *Ātmā vaiṣvānara* thus". The term thus' means in the manner described and the description is of a human form. The text adds.

He (the meditator) eats the food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *Ātmās*.

The term 'food' (*annam*) means object of enjoyment; and that which exists in all places, and which of itself is infinite bliss is *Brahma*. The object enjoyed by each bound *jeeva* to the exclusion of others has to be rejected by those that desire release. Reference is not therefore made to it here.

Why again is the breast of the meditator described as the *vedi* (the place between two of the fires whereon the materials for offerings are placed), and the like?

32. सम्पत्तेरिति जैमिनिः तथाहि दर्शयति ।

For the purpose of converting the offerings to *prāṇa* into worship of VAISVANARA. So does *Jaimini* think, and this is shown by the *upanishad*.

Every *brāhmaṇa*, when he takes his meal, puts into his mouth five handfuls of cooked rice with ghee, and offers them to *prāṇa* in its five-fold activity, mentioning the names connoting each such activity. The *upanishad* directs that he should regard them as offered to *Vaiṣvānara* in the same way, as offerings are made in what is known as *agnihotram*. In this there are three fires; the space between two of them is somewhat lower than the surrounding floor, and is known as the *vedi*. It is covered with *darbha* grass, known as *barhis*, and on this the offerings are placed as a preliminary to the offering. To make the conversion stated the meditator should regard his own breast as the *vedi*, the hair on it as the *barhis*, and his heart, mind and mouth as the three fires.

The texts referred to are as follows:

If, without knowing this, one makes offerings to prana, it would be as if one should remove the live coal from the fire and make the offering on ashes (section 24-1). Next, if, he thus knows it, and make offerings, his offering will be made to all worlds, all beings, all *Ātmās*. (Ibid., 2). When one thus knows it and make offerings, all his sins are burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up. (Ibid., 3.)

This is the fruit appropriate to meditation on the highest *Ātmā*; and this converts the offerings to *prāṇa* into *agni-hotram*.

33. आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् ।

And the *upanishad* mentions *Vaisvanara* as described as being in the meditator's body.

This is the description: The head of this *Ātmā* (the meditator) is the head of *Vaiṣvānara* named *sutejas* (heaven); his eyes are *visvarupa* (sun); his *prāṇa* is *prithakvartma* (air) his waist is *bahula* (ether); his bladder is *rayi* (water); and his feet are the earth. (section 18-2). The meditator has to regard himself as *Vaisvanara*, the parts of his own body being the parts of *Vaiṣvānara*. The offerings will then be made to *Vaiṣvānara*. This additional meditation is subsidiary to the principal meditation (1).

The second section has thus been completed. In the first three sub-sections the highest *Ātmā* is to be meditated on as being in a very small place - the cavity of the heart and the eye. In the next three sub-sections the meditation should be on *Brahma* as possessing very large dimensions. In all the six sub-sections the words *brahma*, *Ātmā* and *purusha* are limited by the context to the world-cause as distinguished from matter and *jeevas*. In thus establishing the highest *Ātmā* as the world-cause, the following attributes are brought out: The coming of everything into existence, its continuance and its movements depend upon Him. He is therefore said to be everything. He is the cause of the dissolution of the universe. He is ever in the eye; and appears in every form. The world as a whole forms His body, and He is therefore called *Vaisvanara*. (adhi., 96 and 98.)

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) At first meditation on *Vaiṣvānara* as having the three worlds as His body was prescribed; then the fruit in the form of reaching *Brahma* was stated; and then this meditation as *agnihotram* is enjoined. It is therefore its *anga* (subsidiary part).

॥ श्रीः ॥

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER I

SECTION 3

THE third section, consisting of ten sub-sections is now taken up; and it will be shown that the texts, which contain distinct marks of the *jeeva* or matter, refer only to the highest *Ātmā*. This will be done in seven sub-sections. The remaining three, interposed between the sixth and tenth sub-sections, incidentally discuss the fitness of the *devas* and of the *sūdra* among men for meditation on *Brahma*. Such discussion is not without its use. The contention of the atheistical *mīmāmsākas*, that *devas* do not exist, will be refuted, and the greatness of the highest *Ātmā* will be established. In the seven sub-sections the main teaching is that the highest *Ātmā*, who supports all, requires no support for Himself; and to confirm this reference will be made to His ruling the world and to other attributes. The last sub-section is connected with the sixth, and supports the instruction conveyed therein that the highest *Ātmā* is the ruler of all.

SUB SECTION 1

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *Muṇḍaka* :

In whom (*Akshara*) heaven, earth and the inter-mediate world are woven, also the mind with all the senses (*prāṇas*), know Him alone as *Ātmā* (inner ruler of all). Leave off words relating to other things. He is the bridge to immortality (11-2-5).

Here the doubt is whether that on which heaven, earth and other things rest is a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is a *jeeva*. For in the next verse reference is made by the term *yatra* (in which) to him, who was mentioned in the text under consideration ; and he is stated to be the support of blood vessels, and to be born in many ways. Connection with blood-vesels and being born in many ways-i.e., as *devas*, men, etc., are the attributes of the *jeeva* alone. Even in the text under consideration he is said to be the support of the mind and of the five senses, and this is certainly an attribute of the *jeeva*. When it is decided with reference to these marks that he is a *jeeva*, being the support of heaven and earth and other marks should be somehow explained.

2. Here the following question is put. Was it not shown in Chapter I, section 1, Sub-section 7 that the highest *Ātmā* takes up bodies made of a superior substance, of His own choice, and without the compulsion of *karma*,

and in section 2, sub-section 1 that He is connected with *prāṇa* and mind? **Reply.** It was not shown in the former sub-section that the expression 'beng born in many ways' does not mean to be born as devas, men and like. As regards the connection with the mind and the senses, the first impression is that they are connected as instruments ; and there is nothing here to negative it.

3. Another question. The text under consideration contains three marks of the highest *Ātmā* ; Why are they not taken into account? Reply. The text contains marks of the *jeeva* and of the highest *Ātmā* ; and owing to this conflict, one or the other set should be explained away. This being so, reference is made for help to the verse immediately following the text ; and it mentions two other marks of the *jeeva* ; the question should therefore be decided with reference to them.

Final decision. The support of heaven and earth is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. द्युभवाद्यायतनं स्वशब्दात् ।

The support of heaven, earth and other things is the highest *Ātmā*; because words which apply only to Him are used.

The expressions referred to are the following :

(i) *Ātmā*. This term means one who pervades; and by well-established usage it denotes one who pervades and controls. The term is not applied to ether, which pervades all space ; And, there are no words to limit its application. It therefore indicates *Brahma*, who pervades everything and controls it. (ii) Bridge to immortality. The word used in the original is *setu*, which means a bund placed across a stream. This is not applicable here. A secondary meaning is adopted viz., like the bund, which serves as a bridge to reach the other bank, the highest *Ātmā* carries one across the ocean of *samsāra* to immortality, which is the farther shore ; or the etymological meaning may be taken, which is one who helps another to attain a thing. In all the *vedānta* the highest *Ātmā* is stated to be the means by which immortality is reached. (*Puru*). (iii). "Knowing everything and every attribute of everything". This is stated in verse 7. All these expressions relate only to the highest *ĀTMĀ*.

2. What are stated to be the marks of the *jeeva* may be thus explained. First, to be the support of blood vessels applies to the highest *Ātmā* also through the heart. The eleventh section of *Nārāyaṇam* begins with this statement "like a lotus bud slightly opened the heart hangs connected with blood-vessels," and ends with the words "In the middle of the flame the highest *Ātmā* abides". Next, the *Purusha sūkta* states "He is not born ; yet, He is born

in many forms. (See also Bhagavad-gita, quoted on page 209). In order that *jeevas* may come to Him, He takes up bodies similar to those in which they appear, and acts as they do. Lastly, it is appropriate that one, that supports everything, should also support the mind and other instruments of the *jeeva*.

The next *sūtra* adduces another reason :

2. मुक्तोपसृप्यव्यपदेशाच्च ।

And because it is stated that He is to be reached by the freed *Ātmā*.

The statement is made in the following verses :

When the meditator sees the brilliant maker and ruler, who is *Purusha* pre-eminently, and the world-cause, he shakes off good and evil deeds, and free from all touch of matter, attains the highest likeness to Him (III-1-3). As rivers flowing into the sea, abandon name and form and lose their individual existence, so the meditator, released from name and form, reaches the *Purusha*, greater than the great and the dweller in the highest heaven (III-2-8).

Here three things are mentioned - shaking off good and evil deeds, dissociation with matter and the abandonment of name and form. As the last item occurs during cosmic rest also, reference is made to other two items also; and both the verses have been quoted. As *samsāra* is association with matter and the assumption of name and form, dissociation with matter and becoming devoid of name and form constitute release. *Purusha*, the support of heaven and earth, and the goal of the freed *jeeva* is the highest *Ātmā*.

Having thus proved with reference to expressions, which apply only to the highest *Ātmā*, that the text under consideration pertains to Him, the next *sūtra* establishes the same conclusion from the absence of expressions relating to the *jeeva* alone :

3. नानुमानमतच्छब्दात् प्राणभृच्च ।

It is not matter, because of the absence of expressions relating to it, nor he is who supports *prāṇa*.

There is here no question whether matter is the support of heaven and earth. The intention in making reference to it should therefore be that it should serve as an illustration. As owing to the absence of expressions relative to it, matter is not dealt with in this *upanishad*, so the *jeeva* is not considered here and for the same reason.

The next *sūtra* also shows that the support of heaven and earth is not the *jeeva* :

4. भेदव्यपदेशात् ।

Because He is described as different from the *jeeva*.

The description occurs in this verse :

On the same tree man, immersed, grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly things. When he sees the other, the ruler of all, pleased with his actions and sees His greatness to be such and such, his grief passes away (III-1-2).

The text under consideration referred to the support of heaven and earth in these words "Know Him alone, the inner ruler of all". By the expression "Ruler of all" this verse recalls that Being, and referring to Him by the word 'other', it differentiates Him from the *jeeva*.

5. प्रकरणात् ।

Because the context relates only to the highest *Ātmā*.

This conclusion was reached in section 2, sub-section 5 ; but from the marks of the *jeeva* stated in the *first view*, a doubt has been raised that the continuity was broken, and that a different subject is dealt with in the latter half of the *upanishad*. The object of this sub-section is merely to remove this doubt. This might have been done in the former sub-section ; but the marks of *jeeva* examined here being distinct, this is the proper place (1).

This *sūtra* does not state what it proposes to prove ; it may therefore be taken to deal with both the points that the text contemplates the highest *Ātmā*, and not the *jeeva*. This is also the purpose served by the next and last *sūtra*.

6. स्थित्यदनाभ्यां च ।

And because of dwelling and eating.

The reference is to the following verse :

"Two birds inseparable, and possessing similar qualities, cling to the same tree. Of them one eats the ripe fruit ; the other does not eat, but shines on all sides."(III-1-1).

(1) The conclusion previously reached established the *prakarāna* (context) as relating to the highest *Ātmā*. The first view pointed out certain marks, which being lingam, should prevail over *prakarānam*. This sub - section explains the marks as applicable to the highest *Ātmā* and removes the conflict. The previous conclusion therefore stands.

The one that eats the ripe fruit is the *Jeeva*; the other that does not eat, that shines on all sides, and merely dwells in the heart of the *jeeva*, is the highest *Ātmā* (1)

SUB-SECTION 2

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chandogya*:

That is *bhūmā* (large), which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear about anything else, does not meditate on anything else. That is a small thing (*alpa*), which being experienced, one sees another thing, hears about another thing, meditates on another thing. (VII-24-1).

Here the term *bhūmā* is made up of the root *bahu* and the termination *iman* ; and by a rule of grammar the word becomes *bhūman*, which in the nominative singular appears as *bhūmā*. It should mean high number or largeness of size ; but as it is here opposed to the word *alpam*, which connotes only size, and denotes an object, not a quality, it means a large thing. This large thing is *Ātmā*; for the context begins with a request for instruction regarding *Ātmā*, and closes with the words "*Ātmā* alone is all this". Thus, *bhūmā* is a large *Ātmā*. The doubt is who is he a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā* ?

First view. He is *jeeva*. See Vedic Texts. *Nārada* went to *Sanat Kumāra* and requested him to teach him about *Ātmā*, so that he might end his grief arising

(1) Here a doubt may be felt. Reference being made to a *jeeva* in this *verse*, why should he not be regarded as the subject also of the text under consideration? This *verse* mentions eating the ripe fruit, and that text the instruments needed therefore, viz., mind and the senses Reply. Though this *verse* mentions both the *jeeva* and the highest *Ātmā*, that text refers only to the latter. For, he is Himself fit to be the support of heaven and earth; He is said to be all-knowing, the bridge to immortality and the inner ruler of all; and His connection with the mind and senses is not inappropriate. On the other hand, the *jeeva* is unfit, as he eats the fruit of *karma* and grieves bewildered with the attraction of worldly objects. This *verse*, though mentioning the *jeeva*, deals only with the highest *Ātmā*; its purpose being to bring out His attribute of shining on all sides and His freedom from *Karma* and its effects. The mention of the *jeeva's* eating the ripe fruit serves this purpose by contrast. It is shown that the experiencing of the fruit of *karma* is the lot of the *jeeva* alone, but not of the highest *Ātmā*, though He dwelling within the *jeeva's* body. Question. why should it not be the other way-viz., the remark that the highest *Ātmā* does not eat is made to show that the *jeeva* eats? Reply. It is only by what is well-known that one is helped to grasp what is not known. the highest *Ātmā* is not better known than the *jeeva*; if He were, He might serve as an illustration. Nor is the knowledge of the *jeeva* more useful than the knowledge of the other. Hence the *verse* deals with the highest *Ātmā* only.

from *samsara*. The teacher told him that name i.e., words was *Ātmā* and asked him to meditate on it. Narada was not satisfied, and enquired whether there was anything greater than name. The teacher replied that speech was greater than name, and asked him to meditate on speech. Again the question was put, and again another thing was indicated ; and his colloquy went on till *prāṇa* was reached. After that there was no further question. Hence it may be concluded that the teaching came to an end here, and that *prāṇa* is the large *Ātmā*.

2. Now, the term *prāṇa* denotes the *jeeva* ; for he and *prāṇa*, the instrument which sustains his body, dwell in the body together and together they depart. This view is confirmed by the context. *Prāṇa* is said to be father, mother, brother, etc. ; and this shows that the word refers to an intelligent person. Next, when *prāṇa* abides in the body, even a harsh word used by a son towards his father brings on him censure as a parricide ; but when *prāṇa* leaves the body. i.e., when the same person is dead, if the son throws the body into a fire and fries it well, no one blames him. Now as pain cannot be caused to the body dissociated from its *jeeva*, and as the *jeeva* in his own nature cannot be reached, the term *prāṇa* as used in the *upanishad* should denote a *jeeva* abiding in a body, and capable of feeling pain. It does not refer here to *prāṇa*, the *jeeva*'s instrument, as pain is caused to things without *prāṇa*, i.e., to vegetables, when they are injured ; and those that acknowledge the authority of the *vedanta*, must admit that they too are *jeevas* in those forms.

3. This *prāṇa*, denoting the *jeeva*, is the large *Ātmā* ; for the question whether there was anything greater than *prāṇa*, was not put, and reply that there was not given. Hence, the context remains without interruption till *bhūmā* - the large *Ātmā* is reached. Hence the large *Ātmā* is a *jeeva*.

4. Here the following question is put to the opponent. After referring to *prāṇa* the *upnaishad* states :

As the spokes of a wheel rest on the nave, so does everything rest on this *prāṇa* (VII-15-1).

Does not this refer to the highest *Ātmā* as in other *upanishads*, and is not *prāṇa* therefore that Being? Reply. The highest *Ātmā* is not capable of being injured ; and this incapacity to be injured negatives the presumption that the highest *Ātmā* is intended by the use of the word. The illustration of the spokes and wheel applies to the *jeevas* also, as they support non-intelligent material products, which serve as objects and instruments of their enjoyment.

5. Another question : The *upanishad* states that one who meditates on *prāṇa* will praise it as excelling everything ; it then refers to one who meditates on *satyam*, and adds "But he praises beyond limit, who praises in regard to *satyam*." Does not this show that *satyam* is greater than *prāṇa* - i.e., the *jeeva*

and is therefore the highest *Ātmā* ; and that the large *Ātmā* is therefore that Being? Reply. No. The term he (*esha*) refers to the praiser of *prāṇa* and enjoins *satyam*, truth-speaking as subsidiary to his meditation on *prāṇa*. The expression is similar to "But he is the doer of *agnihotra*, who speaks truth" ; and this has been decided to mean that truth-speaking is a necessary condition of *agnihotra*.

6. One more question. The *jeeva*, i.e., *Ātmā* was said to be miserable by *Nārada* at the commencement. How can he be the large *Ātmā*, who is described by the *upanishad* (section 23) to be bliss? Reply. *Nārada* referred to the bound *jeeva* ; but the freed *jeeva* is infinite bliss. There is therefore no inconsistency with the commencement.

The *upanishad* enjoins meditation on the true nature of *prāṇa* (i.e., the *jeeva*), previously mentioned as receiving service from truth-speaking ; and as a means of its being attained, it refers to thinking, eagerness, the conviction that it alone should be sought and the turning away of the mind from other things. In order that it may be commenced, it points out that *prāṇa* (*jeeva*), the true nature of whom should be attained, is bliss and closes with statement that this bliss is large (i.e., unlimited). As the large *Ātmā* is thus a *jeeva*, the 'I' also mentioned towards the close is a *jeeva* ; and he is praised in these words.

I alone am below ; I am above ; I am behind ; I am before ; I am on the right ; I am on the left ; I alone am all this (section 25-1).

Final decision. The large *Ātmā* is not a *jeeva*, but he is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

7. भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात् ।

The large (*Ātmā*) is the highest *Ātmā* ; for He is stated to be greater than the *jeeva*.

Satyam is said to be greater than *prāṇa* ; and *satyam* is the highest *Ātmā*. The large *Ātmā*, being *satyam*, is greater than *prāṇa*, i.e., the *jeeva*, and is therefore the highest *Ātmā*. Examining the context, one will see that of name, speech and the rest up to *prāṇa* each is said to be greater than the preceding one, and is therefore different from it. Similarly *prāṇa* is mentioned before *satyam*, and the latter is therefore greater than the former (1).

2. Question. How can it be decided that *Satyam* is greater than *prāṇa*, when in para 5 of the first view it was replied that the praiser of *prāṇa* was referred to, and truth-speaking was enjoined on him as a special condition of his meditation.

(1) This is stated by the author of the *vritti*: "In the expression *bhuma* alone *bhuma* is *Brahma*; for beginning with name, and going through the others, *Ātmā* was reached; and after that it was taught."

Reply. In the sentence 'But he praises beyond limit, who praises, in regard to Satyam', the particle 'but' (tu) separates the *ativādi* (praiser beyond limit) previously mentioned from the *ativādi* of *satyam*. This is its natural import. Hence, the word 'he' does not refer to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*. It may refer to what has been mentioned before, or to what may be stated further on ; and it does not invariably point only to the former. Here it refers to the person stated in the latter half of the sentence, and is connected with the pronoun 'who'. There is a break in the context as indicated by the particle 'but' ; and therefore no reference is made to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*. There being a second *ativādi* from the context, he is greater than the first one ; and as his greatness is due to the object that he meditates on, it follows that *satyam* is greater than *prāṇa*.

3. This case differs from the case of *agnihotri* referred to in the first view. The *agnihotri* is like the *Ativadi* the *agnihotra* (making an offering to the *devatā agni* is like meditation; the material offered and the *devatā* are like the object of meditation. The sentence relied on in the first view 'But he is *agnihotri*, who speaks truth' does not mention either the material to be offered or the *devatā* ; and the word 'speaks' has not the capacity to bring them up, as the word 'offers' (*juhoti*) would do. There is therefore no second *agnihotra*, and no second *agnihotri* ; and the word *agnihotra* not finding another *agnihotra*, has to refer back to the *agnihotra* already mentioned ; and truth speaking has to be regarded as an item of discipline subsidiary to it. For this reason the natural import of the particle but (tu) has to be ignored. It is entirely different in the case under consideration. There are two objects to be meditated on *prāṇa* and *satyam* ; two meditations, and two persons to meditate and to praise the object of meditation as excelling everything else.

4. Further objections - (i) When it is decided that the particle 'but' (tu) separates the meditators, the word *satyam* presents a second object for meditation; when the word *satyam* present a second object for meditation, the particle will separate the meditators. This is dependence upon each other. *Reply.* The word *satyam* does not depend upon the particle. It is well-known to indicate the highest *Ātmā*. "Satyam (unchanging), shining, and without limitations is *Brahma*" (*ana.*, I-1).

5. (ii) To be *ativādi* is peculiar to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*, and will not suffer another *ativādi* by its side. This is its natural import, and it may therefore neutralise the natural import of the particle 'but' (tu). *Reply.* Usage has not established the praise of *prāṇa* only as the meaning of the term *ativādi*; and it is not legitimate to assume a new meaning, when the etymological

meaning determined by the rules of grammar is available. See Intro, para 11 (1). The term *ativādi* connotes to praise beyond limit - i.e., to praise an object as excelling every other object. This was found in the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*, as the *jeeva* denoted by the term *prāṇa* excels all those objects mentioned by the teacher to *Nārada* as objects of meditation. It is found in the fullest degree in the highest *Ātmā*, who is the highest object to be attained by man. Hence the particle 'but' (*tu*) and the term *ativādi* have their natural meanings as thus interpreted.

6. If *satyam* were to be meditated on, the term would be in the objective case, and not in the instrumental case. (*satyam* is in the objective case; *satyena* is here in the instrumental case). Compare the sentence in regard to the *ativādi* of *prāṇa*, 'He who so thinks on *prāṇa*, so meditates on it and so realises it, becomes *ativādī*? (The term *prāṇa* is in the objective case). *Reply*. The term *satyena* (instrumental case) indicates how a thing is; and the meaning is 'Who is *ativādi*, being marked with *satyam* as an object of his meditation'. The case would be inappropriate only in the *first view*, and the prefix *ati* would be without meaning.

7. The refutation of the *first view* in the foregoing paragraphs is confirmed in two ways; First, when the student heard that the *ativādi* of *satyam* was *ativādi* in truth, he said "Let me, revered sir, praise beyond limit in regard to *satyam*" The teacher replied 'you must then meditate on *satyam* (Section 16). (1) Neither of them referred to *prāṇa*, which they would have done, if *prāṇa* were the *Ātmā* in quest. Secondly, at the close of the *upanishad* the sentence '*prāṇa* comes from the *Ātmā*' occurs (section 26-1), and *prāṇa* comes from *Ātmā* as all others do-name, speech and the rest. Hence, the *Ātmā*, regarding whom instruction was commenced in the first section of the *upanishad*, is other than what is denoted by the term *prāṇa*.

8. One more objection—Was not the teaching as to *Ātmā* completed. When *prāṇa* was reached ? For, no question was put by the student as to the existence of anything else, and no reply was given by the teacher *Reply*. Question and answer is not the only mode of going from one subject to another. It will be what is called *lingam*; but here is the particle *tu*, which is *śruti*; and the

(1) Intro., para 11. In the first view, it was contended that the word *prokshani* denoted the species water. In reply it was stated that usage had not established this as the meaning of the word, and that it was not legitimate to fix a new meaning for the word, when the meaning by *yoga* was available.

(2) It may be attempted to explain away the teacher's reply, and to state that what he meant was - "To speak truth, *satyam* should be known". This will be open to two objections. The words 'to speak truth' should be added in the sentence; and 'should be known' is not the natural meaning of the word used.

origination of *prāṇa* from *Ātmā*, which is *lingam*. But why did not the student ask? Because when *prāṇa* was referred to, and one who meditates on him was praised as *ativādi*, while the same praise was not bestowed on those that were to meditate on name, speech and the rest, the student thought that here the teaching came to an end. The teacher saw his mistake and himself introduced *satyam*.

9. *Satyam* having been shown to be the highest *Ātmā*, it has to be connected with *bhūmā*, the large *Ātmā*. The teacher thought that one who realised *satyam* would praise it above everything else; that realisation depended upon meditation; that the latter should be preceded by hearing and thinking; that this implied eagerness to know; that eagerness came from the conviction that *satyam* alone should be known; that this conviction should be coupled with the turning away of the mind from all other things; and that both would happen, if *satyam* was known to be bliss (sections 17 to 22). He accordingly led the student through each of these stages, and at the end stated, 'What is *bhūmā*, that is bliss'. Hence *satyam* and *bhūmā* are identical.

10. The text under consideration gives a definition of *bhūmā*, the large *Ātmā*.

That is *bhūmā*, which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear about anything else, does not meditate on anything else.

This does not mean, as the school of *Sankara* thinks, that all other things do not exist, and that *Brahma* alone is real. The correct meaning is that all other things form a part of *Brahma*, including His attributes and the perishable and imperishable worlds which He controls. And he, who experience *Brahma* as thus described, will find Him to be infinite bliss (1). This is stated in a verse at the end. "One who sees (*Brahma*) does not see death; nor disease; nor anything (in the world) to be disagreeable" (section 26-2).

11. How can this be? Is it not known that many things give pain, or that the pleasure derived from them is limited? *Reply*. This is so (i) to those that are

(1) Two other interpretations of the text are possible. In that given above *bhūmā* is the highest *Ātmā* considered by Himself; for he is stated to be the *Ātmā* of all; and the highest *Ātmā* together with the matter and *jeeva* elements cannot be the *Ātmā* of those elements. In this case, as these elements exist, it is not correct to say that one does not see anything else. The difficulty is got over by remembering that these elements are inseparable from Him, and that one who experiences Him necessarily experiences them also. Two other interpretations are therefore given. One does not see anything, i.e., anything similar to Him; for the term *anya* (other) in the original refers to some one similar to what has been described. The other interpretation is that one who experiences Him finds him so full of bliss, that he does not see anything equal to it in this respect.

under the influence of *karma*; and (ii) to those that see things as distinct from *Brahma*. The following analogies will make this clear. One suffering from bile finds milk to be bitter; when he regains health, it becomes sweet again. The son of a ruling prince may look upon his father's subjects in themselves with indifference or with positive distaste; but when he looks upon them as relating to his father, the feeling changes. This point is explained by what follows:

One thus seeing, thus thinking, thus meditating finds every variety of pleasure in the *Ātmā*; and becomes his own master; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds come to Him. Next those that meditate differently from this are subject to another; their worlds are perishable; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds does not come to them (25-2).

His own master-no longer subject to *karma*; subject to another-subject to *karma*. There is another verse to the same effect;

One that sees (*Brahma*) does not see death; nor disease; nor anything to be disagreeable. He sees everything; he attains everything in every way.

That *Brahma* is infinite bliss is fully dealt with in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 6. The conclusion is that *bhūmā* is *Brahma*; for *satyam* is stated to be other than *prāṇa*; and *satyam*; is *Brahma*; and *prāṇa* is a *jeeva*.

8. धर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

Because also the attributes mentioned further on are appropriate only in the highest *Ātmā*.

The attributes are : (i) Immortality, which pertains to His nature and is not the gift of another (section 24); (ii) non-dependence upon anything else for support (*Ibid*); (iii) Being the *Ātmā* of everything (section 25); and lastly the source from which everything beginning with the *jeeva* evolves (sections 25 and 26).

What then is the meaning of the teaching "I alone am below . . . I alone am all this" (section 25) It means that in the meditation the meditator should identify himself with *Brahma*, in order that the fact that He is his inner-ruler may be firmly impressed on his mind. For the term I' like the other terms means the inner ruler of the I'.

As everything is the body of the highest *Ātmā*, He is the *Ātmā* of all; and He is therefore the *Ātmā* of the *jeeva* too. This is taught in the text beginning with the words 'next the teaching regarding meditation on (*Brahma*) as *Ātmā*, and ending with the words 'the *Ātmā* alone is all this' In order to explain this point, the coming forth of everything from the highest *Ātmā*, the *Ātmā* of the *jeeva* too, is taught -'From the *Ātmā* of him. Who thus sees, who thus thinks, who thus meditates, *prāṇa* comes; from the *Ātmā* ether comes' and so on. This

means that everything comes forth from the highest *Ātmā*, who abides in the meditator as his inner ruler.

SUB SECTION 3

The text for consideration in this sub section is from the *bṛihad- āraṇyaka*, and runs as follows:

It is that well-known *akshara*, *gārgi*, whom those knowing *Brahma* describe as neither gross nor subtle as neither short nor long, as neither red (like fire) nor cohesive (like water), as being without shadow, .etc. (V-8-7).

The doubt is whether this *akshara* is subtle matter, the *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. It is subtle matter; for in the *mundaka* text (II-1-2) the term *akshara* denotes subtle matter; and the attributes stated in the text apply to it. Further, *Gārgi* (see *Vedic Texts*) referred to things existing at all times, and asked on what they rested. Receiving the reply that it was *ākāśa* (ether), she enquired again on what the *ākāśa* rested; and the reply was that it was *akshara*. The element ether is the cause of all that exists at all times, and its support must be subtle matter, known as *pradhānam* or *prakṛiti*.

2. Here a question is put. In the same *mundaka* the term *akshara* occurs, and it was decided that it refers to the highest *Ātmā*. *Reply.* Subtle matter has been known from inference, while the highest *Ātmā* is known from the *veda*. Of the two authorities the former depends only on sense perception; while the latter depends upon sense perception and upon the connection of a word with its meaning. Hence, inference brings up an object more quickly than the *veda*; and that should be accepted. In doing so there is no conflict with anything.

Final decision. *Akshara* is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

9. अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः ।

Akshara is the highest *ātmā*; because He is said to be the support of what is the end of ether.

In the reply given to *Gārgi* the term *ākāśa* does not mean the element ether; for *Gārgi*'s question referred to what is above heaven, below the earth, and between them, and to what was past, what is present and what may come in the future, i.e., to all products existing at all times; and the element ether, being itself a product, could not have been meant. It must therefore refer to subtle matter, which is the end or farther limit in which evolved products will be dissolved. *Akshara* said to be the support of *ākāśa* cannot therefore be subtle matter.

2. The view put forward in para 2 of the *first view* is not sound. The term *akshara*, being used to denote more than one object, its etymological meaning has to be taken. In understanding a word from the elements, that make it up, where is the need for sense perception? Does it occur when the meaning of each element is ascertained, or when the meanings of all the elements being already known, their meaning as a whole is known? In the former case, the need does exist; but not in the latter. The word *dandi* is made up of the word *danda*, a stick, and of the termination, which means one who possesses. To know what object the word denotes, and who is its possessor sense perception may be necessary; but when these elements of the word are known, the word conveys its meaning without any other help. An eye suffering from cataract needs a doctor to remove it; but when this has been done, it can perceive a jar without the doctor's help. Hence testimony in general and the *veda* in particular conveys its meaning as quickly as any other authority. If it be considered that even when the elements of a word together convey their meaning, the authority, by which the meanings of the elements were ascertained, is needed, commands, like 'call the *dandi*' can never be carried out. For the person not being present, and the word *dandin* depending upon his perception to be understood, no impression will be made on the mind of the person, that receives the order. As the *veda* deals with matters not of this world, it will serve no purpose. Hence, the conclusion stated stands.

3. Again, when the etymological meaning of a word is taken, is the need for another authority felt, when the object indicated is to be known in general terms, or when a particular individual answering to the general description is to be found? In the former case the meanings of the elements suffice without extraneous help. In the latter case the marks known as *lingam*, the position by the side of other words and the context will decide who the particular individual is, and sense perception is not required.

4. Further, in cases like this, that object in which the etymological meaning is found in the highest degree is quickly brought up by a word. The term *isvara* means one who controls; and the exercise of control in the highest degree possible being found in the highest *Ātmā*, the word brings Him up naturally, though a number of persons exercising control in this world are found. Similarly, the word *Akshara*, meaning one who does not change, brings up the highest *Ātmā*, who does not in any way change. Subtle matter is not brought up as quickly by the word. It cannot be perceived by the senses; it cannot be established by inference in opposition to the *veda*; and the only authority for it is the *veda*. Hence, the statement that it is more quickly known from inference than the highest *Ātmā* from the *veda* is not made out.

Question. If *akshara* cannot be subtle matter, why should it not be the *jeeva*? The term is used to denote him also; he can appropriately support all forms of matter, including *procreate*; and the attributes mentioned in the text apply to him. The next *sūtra* gives a reply:

10. साचप्रशासनात् ।

Because this support is by command.

The *Upanishad* states (verse 8) that by the command of *Akshara* the sun and the moon stand supported; and heaven and earth; by His command rivers flow, and time is measured as days, half-months, months, season and years. The term used in the original is *praśāsana*—superior command - *i.e.*, command never frustrated and exercised over all. The power to support all things by mere command in this manner can never be found in a *jeeva*.

Akshara was differentiated from subtle matter and the *jeeva* in the two preceding *sūtras*. The same result is attained in the next *sūtra* with reference to the texts at the end of the *upanishad*.

11. अन्यभावव्यावृत्तेश्च ।

Because attributes showing that *akshara* cannot be any other thing are stated.

In the penultimate verse it is said:

Unseen He sees; unheard He hears; unthought of, He thinks; unmeditated on, He meditates.

Here by the terms sees, hears and the rest *Akshara* is differentiated from unintelligent matter. The attribute of seeing everything, while He remains unseen by all others, differentiates Him from *Jeevas*. Hence *Akshara* is the highest *Ātmā*.

The last *sūtra* may be explained in another way also:

Because the existence of a similar being is denied.

Following text quoted above these words occur :

There is no seer other than He; no hearer other than He; no thinker other than He; no meditator other than He.

The term "other" refers to one similar to the Being described here, is one who is unseen by others, who sees others and who supports all others; and this similar being is denied. In other words, as *Akshara* is unseen by others, sees others and supports all others, so there is no one, who unseen by *Akshara* sees Him and supports Him. In effect *Akshara* is differentiated from subtle matter and the *jeeva*.

The *sūtra* has the particle *cha* (and), which connects the reason mentioned with other reasons stated at the same place in the *upanishad*. These reasons are (i) that all acts whether pertaining to this world or enjoined by the *veda* take place under His command; (ii) By not knowing Him one remains in

samsāra, and by knowing Him, he attains immortality. These are the attributes of the highest *Atma*, and He is therefore *Akshara*.

SUB-SECTION 4

The text for consideration in this sub-section occurs in the *prasna*:

If again he meditates on the higher *Purusha* with that same syllable (known as *pranava*), with the vowel elongated, he reaches the orb of the sun full of light. As the snake is released from its (worn-out) skin, so is he released from sins, and is carried to *Brahma-loka* with *Sama* verses. He sees the *Purusha* who dwells in man's hearts, and who is superior to the freed *jeeva*, who is again superior to the bound *jeeva*.

Here the words 'meditates' and 'sees' have for their object one and the same thing; for the seeing is the fruit of meditation; and by the law of evolution what is meditated on is reached. In both the places the term higher *purusha* occurs and denotes the object to be one. Here the doubt is who is this *purusha* that is seen? Is he the four-faced creative agent (1) or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is the four-faced one. For, three meditations with the syllable known as *prāṇava* are described here : if with one *matra* i.e., with the vowel short, the world of men is reached; if with two *matras* i.e., with the vowel long, the intermeditate world is attained; and if with three *matras*, i.e., with the vowel elongated, *brahma-loka* is reached as the fruit. This *loka* or world, coming after the intermeditate world, must be the world of *Brahma*, the four-faced one. The *purusha*, seen by one who goes thither, must be the lord of that world.

2. Here a question is put. The *purusha* is said to be superior to one who is superior to this *jeeva ghana* i.e., the *jeeva*, who has a *karma-made* body. How can be the four-faced one? Reply. The terms *jeeva ghanāt* and *parat* are in apposition and refer to the same person, i.e., the *jeeva*; and he is superior to his body and instruments. The four-faced one is superior to this *jeeva*.

3. Hence, the marks of the highest *Ātmā* mentioned in the *upnishad* should be somehow explained away.

Final decision. The *purusha* is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

(1) The original adds the epithet *jeeva samashti-rupa* to the word denoting the four-faced creative agent. It means in the form of *samashti jeeva*. At the time of creation all the *jeevas*, that were to be embodied in the evolving universe, were made to enter his body. The *jeevas* were then *samashti* - without name and form, as opposed to *vyashti jeevas*, which they subsequently became by assuming names and forms (*nyaya siddhanjānam*).

12. ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात्सः ।

The object of seeing is He (1); for it is so stated.

In the second verse recited by the *upnishad* in illustration of what precedes, he who is to be reached by the meditator is described as free from the six evils, free from old age, free from death, and free from fear and as superior (verse 7). This description applies only to the highest *Ātmā*, as will be seen from a comparison with other *upanishads*.

2. The explanation in para 2 of the *first view* is not correct. Even the four-faced one is included under the term *jeeva-ghana* (bound *jeeva*); for he lives in a body; he was made, and the *veda* was taught to him. This implies that his attribute *jnānam* was not fully expanded. Here is the authority:

Who created *Brahma* (in the lotus of His navel) and gave him the *veda* (with the capacity to create the world) (*Sveta.*, VI-18).

Hence, the words *jeeva ghanat* and *parat* are not in apposition; and the meaning is as in the translation of the text.

3. Nor is the argument in para 1 of the *first view* tenable. When it is decided, for the reason stated in para 1 above, that the meditator sees the highest *Ātmā brahma-loka* cannot be the perishable world of the four-faced one. This is confirmed by two facts : (i) the meditator is released from all sins, and travels to *brahma-loka* on the way leading through the sun. (ii) In the verse recited the place reached by him is said to be seen by the seers; they are dwellers in the highest heaven; and what is seen by them is the world of *Vishṇu* as taught in other *upnishads* "The dwellers in the highest heaven ever see that highest place of *Vishṇu*".

4. It is not true that the world of the four-faced one is next to the intermeditate world; for between them there is the world of *Indra* and many others. Hence, even on the *first view*, the natural order of the worlds was departed from; and this flaw is not peculiar to the final decision.

5. Why then is reference made to the intermediate world? Reply. The fruits to be earned by the three meditators were divided into two groups; the lower group consisted of *aihikam*-fruits to be enjoyed on earth; and of *amushmikam*-fruits to be enjoined in the intermediate and other worlds, includ-

(1) The term 'he' in the sutra indicates that in all the sutras of this section this term should be added to show what is predicated. This purpose was served in the first section by the word *anya* (other) in sutra 22; and in the second section by the word *brahma* in sutra 16. In the fourth section the word *prajna* in sutra 5 will do the same work.

ing the world of the four-faced one. The higher group is to be enjoyed in the world of the highest *Ātmā*. Thus the term *antariksha* includes all perishable worlds other than earth.

SUB-SECTION 5

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chandogya*.

There is in this city of *Brahma* a dwelling place in the form of a small lotus; The small ether within it and what is within it-both should be sought and be meditated on (section 1. verse 1).

The doubt is whether this small ether is the element ether, a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. It is the element ether; for the term *ākāśa* (ether) denotes it by well-recognised usage; and it appears as the support of what has to be sought.

Final decision. The small ether is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

13. दहर उत्तरेभ्यः ।

The small ether is the highest *Ātmā*; for the reasons stated in the succeeding verses.

These reasons are : (i) "He is *Ātmā*; He is free from *karma*, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst. He has unchanging objects of desire; His will is never frustrated." These attributes refer to the small ether (verse 5); and show it to be the highest *Ātmā*; (ii) one who meditates on the small ether is said to attain an unfrustrated will (verse 6). (iii) In verse 3 the small ether is compared with the element ether, and is said to be as large as that element is. This comparison would be inappropriate, if they were identical :

2. Here the following objections are raised : (i) The ether within the heart is compared with the same outside. Reply. The ether within the heart cannot then be the support of heaven and earth and of all other things as stated in that verse (See Vedic Texts). (ii) If the small ether were the highest *Ātmā*, how can an unlimited Being be compared with ether which is limited? Reply. The intention is merely to remove the erroneous impression, that may be left on one's mind by the statement that the highest *Ātmā* is within the heart, viz., He is a minute Being. Similarly, to show that the sun does not move slowly, it is usual to say that he goes like an arrow. Nor can it be thought that the sentence means that there can be no comparison with anything else, and that the small ether is unique, as in the sentence 'the fight between *Rama* and *Ravana* was like the fight between *Rama* and *Ravana*.' The term 'as large as' would then be inappropriate.

3. Another objection-The first of the three reasons adduced does not hold. For the text quoted from verse 5 refers not to the small ether, but to what is within it. The small ether is the element ether, and what is within it is *Ātmā*. At the commencement prominence is given to this *Ātmā* by its being placed before the students as an object to be sought. In other *upanishads* it is the *Ātmā*, that one is enjoined to seek; hence what is within the small ether is *Ātmā*, and it is so stated here. Another objector observes-The expression 'what is within the small ether' refers to certain attributes of the small ether; this small ether should be meditated on, in which case the attributes also will be included in the meditation; but the reverse will not happen, if the attributes be meditated on omitting the seat of the attributes. Hence the injunction is to seek the small ether only. Reply. Neither view is correct. Both the small ether, and what is within it should be sought and be meditated on. The meditator's body is the city of the highest *Ātmā*, his heart is His palace; He is the small ether; for, the all-knowing, and omnipotent highest *Ātmā* out of love towards those that come to Him and for the purpose of helping them is present in this palace; and he should be meditated on as being of small size; and what is within the small ether is His noble qualities. Both He and His noble qualities are to be meditated on. To bring out this meaning clearly, the pronoun *yaḥ* (which) and the conjunctin *cha* (and) should be added in the sentence, which will then be like this "which (*yaḥ*)small ether is within it (the lotus-like dwelling place), and which (*yad*) is within it (i.e., the small ether) that (*tad*) should be sought and be meditated on". The masculine *yaḥ* and the neuter *yad* will then correspond to the term *tad*; this being made up of the masculine *sah* and the neuter *tad*. By a rule of grammar one of them will be dropped and what remains will assume the form of the neuter singular. Or, the whole is treated as one sentence, and the term *yad* stands for both the things mentioned, the small ether and what is within it.

4. How is this known-that the small ether is the highest *Ātmā*, that what is within it is His noble qualities, and that reference is made to both and meditation is enjoined? Reply. This will be evident from a careful examination of the first section of the *upnishad* (See Vedic Texts). In the third verse the small ether is said to be exceedingly large; it is referred to by the words 'within it', and is said to be the support of everything. Again, referring to it by the words 'within it', it is stated that the meditator will find in it every kind of enjoyment. Verse 5 states that though the small ether is within a part of the body, viz., the heart, it is not affected by the old age or death of the body, being as the ultimate cause of the universe extremely subtle, and that it is *satyam*-i.e., unchanging. It is said to be an unchanging city, *Brahma* being the dwelling place of all the worlds. Again referring to it by the words 'in Him' all noble

qualities are said to be contained in it. The original has the term *kāmān* (plural) but it means noble qualities; for the meditator will no longer hanker after any worldly object. The sentence under consideration then states that the small ether is *Ātmā*, and enumerates His noble qualities. The closing verse, stating the fruit of meditation, expressly mentions both the small ether and the eight qualities enumerated as included in the meditation. Hence the small ether is the highest *Ātmā*.

5. Objection again. From what has been stated it appears that the commencement of the context is changed to suit the close; but this is not correct; it should be the other way. Reply. The commencement refers to seeking what is within the small ether; and this is left untouched. The close refers to the small ether also; and this is taken to have been intended at the commencement; and this is all that is done.

6. The question is again asked-Why is so much trouble taken to explain the opening verse? The beginning enjoins search for only what is within the small ether' and the close enjoins search for the small ether. Why should they not be understood in this way? Reply. The close mentions the fruit, repeating what has been stated already; and as it mentions search for both, the beginning should refer to both. If the search for the small ether be not mentioned at the beginning, its repetition at the close will not be appropriate. The close cannot give an injunction as to the search for both; for one of them has been enjoined already by the opening verse. Nor can it be regarded as repeating this injunction and as giving a new injunction for the other; for it repeats both searches and mentions the fruit. Hence the explanation already given stands.

7. This has the support of the author of the *vākyam*.

14. गतिशब्दाभ्यां तथाहि दृष्टं लिङ्गं च ।

For this reason also-the mention of going and of the word *brahma*; for so is it seen (in other places); and they are (by themselves) a sufficient reason.

The mention is made thus :

As people, not knowing the gold treasure buried below, constantly go over the place and do not get at it, in the same way all these people every day go to that *brahma-loka* and do not reach Him (section 3, verse 2).

The word 'that' refers to the 'small ether' and the daily going is in deep sleep as stated in *chandogya* (VI-8-1) which clearly refers to the highest *Ātmā*. Similarly, it is said, "He is *Brahma-loka*, oh king" (*brihad.*, VI-4-23). It is not necessary to seek support from parallel passages. Here the reference to treasure in the illustration, and the daily going of all people to it in deep sleep as during cosmic rest to enjoy temporary respite from misery, show that the small ether must be the highest *Ātmā*. Similarly the term *brahma-loka* means

Brahma, who is a *loka* or world; because He supports everything. See Intro., para 29 (ii).

The daily going may also be taken to mean the daily going of the *jeevas* over the highest *Ātmā*. who is ever present as the inner ruler. They go over Him, but do not know Him and do not reach Him. This is stated in the texts quoted in chapter I, section 2, sub-section 4. Taking this daily going with the illustration of the treasure, this reason will suffice to show the small ether to be the highest *Ātmā*. (1).

15. धृतेश्च महिम्नोऽस्यास्मिन्नुपलब्धेः ।

Because the greatness of the highest *Ātmā* consisting in the support of the worlds is seen in the "small ether."

The text, which shows this is :

This *Ātmā* is a protective bund, to prevent these worlds from being confounded (section 4, verse 1).

The reference is to the small ether; and this is stated to be the work of the highest *Ātmā* in *bṛihadāraṇyaka* thus :

'He is the ruler of all; He is the lord of all beings. He is the protector of beings; He is the protective bund, to keep these worlds from being confounded' VI-4-22). Again, 'By the unobstructed command of *Akshara*, *Gārgi*, the sun and the moon stand supported (Ibid., V-8-8).

The small ether is therefore other than the element ether.

16. प्रसिद्धेश्च ।

And because of its being well-known to (indicate the highest *Ātmā*)

The use of the term *ākāśa* (ether) to indicate the highest *Ātmā* is well-known; and by the side of the attributes referred to under *sūtra* 13, it must prevail over the ordinarily accepted signification to denote the element ether.

Having thus shown that the small ether cannot be the element ether, the second point is taken up, viz., that the small ether is not a *jeeva*.

(1) In this second explanation going over applies to both the illustration and to the case under consideration, which was not the case in the first; but it referred to the smaller ether directly; here it has to be taken that the small ether and the inner ruler are one. See also note on this text in Vedic texts.

17. इतरपरामर्शात्सइति चेन्नासम्भवात् ।

If it be contended "It is a *jeeva*; because reference is made to one other than the highest *Ātmā*", the reply is "no; because (the attributes mentioned) are impossible in Him".

The reference is made in the following verse :

"This *jeeva* rises from this body (1) reaches the highest Light, and appears in his natural form". (section 3, verse 4).

It is argued that the verse relates to the *jeeva* alone. Though the small ether was decided not to be the element ether, owing to the inapplicability of the comprison with it, and for other reasons, yet on the authority of this text, it may be taken to be the *jeeva*. The term *ākāṣa* (ether) may denote him, taking the etymological meaning. The first part of the *sūtra* thus states the objection, and the second part gives a reply. The reply is no. Because freedom from *karma* and the other attributes mentioned as existing in the 'small ether' cannot be found in the *jeeva*.

18. उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु ।

If it be urged again "(They are found), because it is so taught in the later portions of the same chapter." the reply is "Reference is made to one in whom they have recently emerged".

In sections 7 to 12 of the same chapter of the *upanishad* the attributes referred to are taught as belonging to the *jeeva* also. The conclusion in the preceding *sūtra* is therefore unsound.

These sections of the *upanishad* deal with the *jeeva* alone. *Indra* had heard the following statement as having been made by *Prajapati* (the four-faced being) :

The *Ātmā* who is free from *karma* free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst who was unchanging objects of desire, and whose will is never frustrated should be sought and should be meditated on. He who knows him and meditates on him, attains all the worlds and all objects of desire (section 7, verse 1).

(1) This *jeeva* rises. The word 'this' refers to what has gone before; hence in previous sentences also the *jeeva* was referred to. In this text he is referred to by a word that denotes him, but not by a mark relating to him. The reference is therefore, unmistakable.

He approached *Prajapati* in order to know the nature of the *Ātmā* who has to be sought. *Prajapati* wished to examine whether the applicant was fit to receive instruction, and successively described an embodied *jeeva* in the condition of waking, of dream, and of deep sleep. *Indra* saw nothing to give him enjoyment in these conditions, and approached *Prajapati* again and again. Having thus tested him and found him qualified to be taught the nature of a pure *jeeva*, *Prajapati* taught him as follows :

The body alone is perishable; it is surrounded by death. It is supported by this *Ātmā*, who does not die, and who has no body. One, who is in a body is caught by welcome and unwelcome things; from one in a body welcome and unwelcome things do not depart; and one who is without a body they do not touch (section 12, verse 1).

The teacher thus showed that the body is supported, and the *Ātmā* supports; that when the *Ātmā* is divorced from the body and remains in his own nature, he is immortal; that when he is connected with a *karma* made body, his lot is to experience pleasure and pain in accordance with his *karma*; and that when he is released from it, he is without this undesirable result. He then taught him the nature of the *jeeva*, as separated from the body in these words :

In the very same way this *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light, and appear in his natural form (Ibid., verse 2).

He next observed that the highest Light to be reached is the best of *purushas*; that the *jeeva*, the obscuration of whose nature has come to an end, and who has reached the highest Light, has such enjoyment as he desires in the world of *Brahma* : and that he no longer thinks of the *karma*-made body, that was inseparable from pleasure, and pain and such undesirable things : that as a horse is yoked to a carriage, the *jeeva* of this very nature is yoked in the state of bondage to a *karma*-made body (verse 3) ; that the eye and other senses are his instruments for perception : forms and the like are the objects perceived : and the *jeeva* is a perceiver : that he is therefore other than the body and the senses : and that when he shakes off the body and senses brought about by *karma* he has every enjoyment with the help of *jnānam*, his natural attribute (verses 4 and 5). He closed with the remark that wise men know the *jeeva* to be of this nature : and that one, who meditates on the *Ātmā*, of this nature, attains all worlds and all enjoyments - i.e, enjoyment of *Brahma* (verse 6). Hence he, who was stated to be known as possessing the eight qualities beginning with freedom from *karma*, is a *jeeva* alone. This being so,

these qualities may be found in him; and as he is referred to in the remainder of the *upanishad*, the small ether is he alone.

The second portion of the *sūtra* replies to this objection. These attributes in the condition of bondage are prevented by *karma* from appearing; when this bondage of *karma* is broken, and the body is cast aside and the highest Light is reached, they emerge. Such a person is referred to in the teaching of *Prajapat*. Here, however, reference is made to a Being, in whom they never at any time ceased to appear. Further, there are other attributes of the 'small ether.' which a *jeeva* can never possess, even when his nature emerges. These are (i) protecting the worlds like a bund, and (ii) the controlling of *jeevas* and matter. This latter point follows from the etymological explanation of the term *satya* (VIII-3-5)

Why then is the *jeeva* referred to in this context?

19. अन्यार्थश्च परामर्शः ।

And the mention is for another purpose.

This purpose is to add to the attributes of the 'small ether' already taught here one more, viz., to enable the freed *jeeva* to attain his true nature on reaching Him. The true nature of the *jeeva* is explained further on in sections 7 to 12 of the chapter. He has to meditate that he will enjoy the highest *Ātmā*, the seat of endless noble qualities, being himself the seat of noble qualities. He should therefore know his true nature, and the latter half of the chapter gives this information. Hence it is subsidiary to the former half, and the fruits stated in it are a repetition of the fruits of the former half.

In these three *sūtras* a reason found towards the close of the context was urged by the opponent. In the next *sūtra* he puts forward a reason found at the commencement.

20. अल्पश्रुतेरिति चेत्तदुक्तम् ।

If it be contended " a place of small dimension is mentioned." the reply is " this (objection) was met already".

The 'ether' under consideration is expressly stated to be of small dimension; and residence in it is appropriate to the *jeeva* alone, who is of minute size

(1), but not to the infinite highest *Ātmā*. The latter half of the *sūtra* states that this objection was raised in the first sub-section of section 2 of this chapter, and that the reply was given that 'the highest *Ātmā* has to be so meditated on. (2)

In these four *sūtras* it has been proved that the small ether is not a *jeeva*. The main reason urged was that the highest *Ātmā* possess as a part of His nature freedom from *karma* and the other seven attributes, while in the *jeeva*, they did not appear in the state of bondage, and they emerge only on his release. The next *sūtra* proves that this distinction is real.

21. अनुकृतेस्तस्य च ।

The *jeeva* *Ātmā* attains freedom from *karma* and other attributes by becoming like it (the ether).

This is stated in the *mundaka* text (III-1-3).

When the meditator sees the brilliant maker and ruler,..... he shakes off good and evil deeds and free from all touch of matter, he attains the highest likeness (to Him).

22. अपि स्मयते ।

The same teaching is conveyed in the *smṛiti* (1).

(1) Who is of minute size. This is what is meant by the term in the original *aragropamitasya* - which means 'who is compared to the pointed end of an ara or goad.

(2) The reason, for raising this question again is that there is a further doubt. In the other place the mention of a place of small dimension was not at the beginning of the context; while being the inner ruler of all was stated in the opening verse and being of large size at the close. In accordance with these the mention of small size was over ruled. Here, however, the small size is stated at the very outset, and the references to the *jeeva* towards the close strengthens it. Hence, the opponent contends that the small ether is the *jeeva*. The reply is that the context as a whole contains numerous evidences of the small ether; being the highest *Ātmā* as pointed out in detail in the first four *sūtras*, and as the close refers to the highest *Ātmā*, as well as to the *jeeva*, and is therefore not *unimpeachable* evidence, the beginning is over-ruled. A similar decision based on this rule was arrived at in the last sub-section of chapter I, section 1; but there the close contained no reference to the *jeeva*.

(1) In the *vedic* text quoted under the preceding *sūtra* it is not expressly stated that the likeness is to the highest *Ātmā* and the words 'to him' were added to convey the intention. The *smṛiti* is cited to make this clear. The verse is 'Resting on this wisdom, they have reached My likeness. They do not become the objects of either creation or destruction. (*Bhagavad-gītā*, XIV-2).

Sūtras 21 and 22 are treated by some as forming a separate sub-section, and as proving that the shining object described in the *mundaka* text (II-2-11) is the highest *Ātmā*. This is unsound. It has been shown in section 2, sub-section 5 and section 3, sub-section 1, that the whole of that *upanishad* deals with Him. The *first view* put forward by them does not arise, as *Brahma* has been shown to be limitless fire in section 1, sub-section 10. Further, the interpretation of the *sūtras* is opposed to their wording.

SUB-SECTION 6

The texts for consideration in this sub-section are from the *kathavalli* :

Purusha, the controller of the past and the future dwells in the middle of the meditator's body, in a form of the size of the thumb. Hence He doest not shrink (from the faults of the body) (IV-12). The *Purusha* the controller of the past and the future, and of the size of the thumb, is like a fire without smoke. He alone is what exists to-day; He alone is what will exist to-morrow (IV-13). The *Purusha*, the inner ruler of men, is ever seated in the heart in a form of the size of the thumb. Separate Him in thought from His body (the *jeeva*) like an *ishika* from a bush. Do this with perfected knowledge. Know him to be bright and immortal. (VI-17).

Here the doubt is who is this *purusha* of the size of the thumb? Is he a *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*? It arises from the inapplicability of the expression 'of the size of the thumb' to the highest *Ātmā*, and of the expression 'controller of the past and the future' to the *jeeva*.

First view. He is a *jeeva*; for in another place reference is made to the same size as regards him.

The lord of *prāṇa*, goes about bound by the strings of *karma*, he who is of the size of the thumb, bright as the sun, full of resolutions and of the notion that he is the body (sveta.V-8)

As regards the highest *Ātmā* there is no similar mention anywhere even for the purpose of meditation (1). Hence, it should be decided that the text refers to the *jeeva*; and the control mentioned in it should be limited to his body and its instruments, and to objects and instruments of his enjoyment.

Final decision. The text refers to the highest *Ātmā* This is stated in the *sūtra*:

(1) The statement made above is not correct. In the *taittiriya* and *svetasvatara* the highest *Ātmā* is described as of the size of the *thumb*, but the statement made is accepted and the question is discussed.

23. शब्दादेव प्रमितः ।

The *purusha* of the size of the thumb is the highest *Ātmā* from the mere mention of the word.

The word is controller. The control of what was and of what will be i.e., control of all, is not possible to a *jeeva* bound by *karma*.

2. The following objection may be raised. The reference to the size is what is known as *lingam*, and the expression 'controller of the past and the future is also *lingam*'; but it occurs later on and cannot prevail over the other *lingam*, which is first heard. *Reply*. The size is capable of being explained with reference to the place where the *jeeva* abides; but the other expression cannot be so explained. Hence, it is stronger and prevails.

Why is the highest *Ātmā* said to be of the size of the thumb?

24. हृद्यपेक्षया तु मनुष्याधिकारत्वात् ।

Because. He is present in the heart, and the mention of the size is with reference thereto. He remains in men's heart, because men are competent to meditate on Him.

He dwells in the heart of man, in order that he may meditate on Him; and man's heart is of the size of the thumb. Hence the form of the highest *Ātmā* is of the same size. The opponent must admit that for the same reason the *jeeva* also is of this size; for by nature he is *anu*, an atom. In regard to the inapplicability of the size both the *jeeva* and the highest *Ātmā* are in the same boat; but the control is full in the case of the latter, but not of the former.

SUB-SECTION 7

Here the question whether man alone is competent to meditate on the highest *Ātmā* and whether *devas* are excluded is taken up and discussed. The discussion on sub-section 6 will be continued after the ninth sub-section.

25. तदुपर्यपि बादरायणस्सम्भवात् ।

That (meditation) is possible also (to beings) above man. So does *Badarayana* think; Because they are both capable and likely to desire release.

The *first view* is put forward by the *mīmāṃsāka*. *Devas* are not competent; they have no bodies, and there is no authority for holding that they have. It cannot be contended that the *vedānta* proves this fact; for testimony possesses

authority, only as it directs the doing of what is desirable, or as it prohibits the doing of what is undesirable; and the earlier portion of the *veda* possesses authority of this kind. In sub-section 4 of chapter I, section 1, it was decided after much discussion that the *vedanta* is authority in regard to the highest *Ātmā*, as being the highest among what man desires. The possession of bodies by *devas* does not come under either description; and neither the earlier nor the later portion of the *veda* can be cited in evidence.

2. The earlier portion consists of *mantras*, *arthavadas* and injunctions; but the two former serve the last, one pointing out how the *karma* enjoined should be done, and the other praising the *karma*, so that one may take it up with zest. The efficacy of both is thus expended.

3. *Question.* Are not injunctions an authority is needed? for they state the *devatās* and the materials to be offered to them. As the *karma* disappears as it is done, one must look to the *devatās* to yield the fruits of *karma*. It must therefore be presumed that they possess bodies, that they receive the offerings, that they eat them, that they are satisfied and that they are pleased with their worshipper. *Reply.* This presumption is, however, erroneous. When a person makes gifts or undergoes severe discipline (*tapas*), there is no *devatā* to be pleased; and what is known as *apūrva* must be assumed to be originated, and to subsist till the fruits aimed at by the gifts or discipline are yielded. This being so, similar *apūrva* may be presumed in the case of other *karmas* also. The injunctions need only the name of the *devatā*, to whom offerings should be made, and they mentioned them, but state nothing other than this.

4. This view is strengthened by the fact that the *devatās* are themselves products of evolution; that it may not be possible for them to reward their worshippers within this world-age for all their *karmas* that they may not reappear at the beginning of the next world-age; and that some *karmas* may fail to yield fruits.

5. Here the *vedantin* observes-It is the highest *Ātmā* appearing in the form of the *devatās*, that is worshipped by *karma* and yields fruits, and that He endures, as also His power to reward. *Reply.* Do you know what is known as the *pratima-pratimeya* rule. When one worships an image and makes offerings to it, a *devatā* is pleased. Similarly, when *devatās* are worshipped and offerings are made to them, the highest *Ātmā* is pleased. Hence, in doing the *karma* enjoined one should know only who the *devatā* is in each case, as the image-worshipper looks only to the particular image to be worshipped; and he need not enquire whether the *devatā* is pleased or not.

6. For these reasons *devas* have no bodies, and do not possess the capacity to do meditation. Nor have they any desire for release; for having no bodies,

they have no sufferings of any kind to be ended. Suffering is an incident of the possession of a body.

Final decision. *Badarayana*, the author of the *sūtras*, dissent from this view; for *devas* may desire release, as they are also subject to unbearable suffering, and as they know that the highest *Ātmā* is untouched by any imperfection, that He has hosts of countless good qualities, the excellence of which has no limit, and that He is indescribably agreeable. And they are also capable, as they have very superior bodies and senses. In this matter the *veda* contains ample evidence. In the *chandogya* reference is made to the entering of the highest *Ātmā* along with *jeevas* into the products of evolution and to the making of names and forms. This means that He provided *jeevas* with bodies suitable to their *karma*, and gave them appropriate names. In certain texts reference is made to the division of the embodied *jeevas* into four main groups—*devas*, men, animals and the vegetables kingdom. As the *jeevas* are not distinguished in their nature as *devas* or men, the difference must be traced to their bodies, and these are of various kinds, being calculated to serve the *jeevas* for the enjoyment of the fruits of their *karma* in the fourteen worlds beginning with the world of the four-faced one. Turning to the portions of the *vedanta* dealing with meditation, one will observe in the latter half of chapter VIII of the *chandogya* that *Indra* among the *devas* and *virochana* among the *asuras* went to *Prajapati* with fuel in their hands; and lived by his side a life of discipline for thirty-two years, and that then *Prajapati* spoke to them.

2. In the earlier portion of the *veda* also there is ample evidence. The following statements are made : *Purandara* has *vajra* in his hand"; "with this *Indra* raised the *vajra*"; and they do not conflict with any authority and should be accepted as correct statements of facts. It is not possible to explain them away on the plea that the texts, being subsidiary to injunctions, have merely to praise or to show what has to be done, and that therefore it was not the intention to state what appears on the surface. For the statements are needed for praise. Without making similar statements there can be no praise; for praise is a recitation of one's qualities of body or mind; and if there be no qualities, there will be no praise. Opponent. One may be induced to act by stating a quality, which does not exist. Reply. The same argument applies also to injunctions; one may be made to do a *karma*, though it does not lead to any desirable result. Opponent. Injunction-texts, not having been made by any one, are perfect, and they are authority for what they state. Reply. We give the same answer. The *arthavada* texts were not made by anyone, and they do not describe any *deva* as what he is not.

3. *Mantra*-texts serve injunction texts by bringing the nature of *karma* to the mind of one who does it at the time it is done. Now, one *karma* is

distinguished from another by the material to be offered and by the *devatā* who is to receive it; and the *mantra* should state such and such is the *devatā* in this *karma*. Meditation on this *devatā* by the *hota* is enjoined; and it should be on the *devatā* as possessing a particular body; for to think of a being without any attribute is not possible. Further, the terms *indra*, *varuna* and the rest do not denote the *jeeva* apart from his body. Opponent. Some thing is required for the mind to rest on; but it need not exist in reality. Reply See what we stated at the end of para 2 above.

4. *Mantra* and *arthavada* texts sometimes make known qualities not previously known from any other authority and do their work. Sometimes they refer to qualities previously known. If in any case there is incongruity, resort is had to a secondary sense. In the text the *yupa* (post for tying the goat intended for offering) is the 'sun' the term 'sun' is taken to mean shining like the sun: for the *yupa* being smeared with ghee will shine, when light falls upon it.

5. In the *first view* it was stated that injunction texts require only the knowledge that a *devatā* exists and nothing more. This is not correct. It should be known that the *devatā* is pleased with the worshipper and that he will reward him. A person does a *karma* to procure a fruit; he cannot look to the *karma*, which disappears in a moment, while the fruit will come at some future time, and he should therefore think of the *devatā* to help him.

6. *Objection*-When one tills a field for raising crops, the plants intervene between the tilling and the reaping of the crops; similarly *karma* may yield its fruit through an intermediary in the form of a non-intelligent *apūrva*, which comes into existence, when the *karma* is done, and subsists till the fruit is attained. Reply. This assumption is unnecessary. For here is a text.

Vayu is indeed a quickly-acting *devatā* : he (the worshipper) approaches *vayu* alone with his own offering; *Vayu* causes wealth to come to him.

This shows that a *devatā*, worshipped with an offering, bestows a fruit: his power suitable for this purpose, which appears in the *arthavada* is required; and it fits in with the injunction text, with which the *arthavada* is connected. To abandon what is stated and to assume what is not stated, like the *apūrva* is not legitimate. By considering the whole of a text, all that is required by the injunction is known from the text itself. Hence there is no need to assume an *apūrva* as some persons do. It is not known when the meanings of words are ascertained : and it need not therefore be taken as others do to be denoted by the termination conveying the injunction.

7. Where it does not appear from a sentence following an injunction-text that a *devatā* is pleased, it may be presumed, from the word formed from the

root *yaj*, that the worship of a *devatā* is the principal part of the *karma*; for *Panini*, the grammarian, states the meaning of the root to be to worship a *devatā*. As the root supplies what is needed by the injunction, his statement may be accepted as authority, and as being based on a previously existing *mantra* or *arthavada*.

8. The possession of bodies and senses by *devas* is proved also by *smritis*, *itihasas* and *puranas* which are based on *vedic* texts scattered throughout the *veda*. They describe very clearly their natures, the places where they live, their occupations and their enjoyments.

9. The need for assuming *apūrva* even in some cases stated in para 3 of the first view is denied. In the case of gifts and of leading a life of discipline there is the highest *Ātmā* to be pleased by them; and there are also *devatās* who are pleased as stated in this text.

“He gives cloth; the *devatā* concerned with the gift of cloth is all *devatās*. for all *devatās* are satisfied.”

10. If the highest *Ātmā* is to be satisfied with all *karmas* the satisfaction of *devatās* will not become superfluous. The *mīmāṃsāka*s precedent to assume a principal *apūrva* and subrodinate *apūrvas* to serve it is followed. A principal *karma* is helped by many subordinate *karmas*, some done before, and the other after, the principal one; and as they cannot be done at the same time, it is assumed that each subordinate *karma* produces its own *apūrva* and that all these *apūrvas* bring about the *apūrva* which yields the fruit. Similarly, each *karma* satisfies a *devatā*, and all the *devatas* so satisfied satisfy the highest *Ātmā* and make him well disposed towards the worshipper.

11. Hence, as *devas* have bodies, they have the capacity to meditate.

26. विरोधः कर्मणीति चेन्नानेकप्रतिपत्तेर्दर्शनात् ।

If it be said “this view will conflict with *karma*,” the reply is - “No, because it is seen that many (bodies) may be taken up.”

If it be admitted that *devas* have bodies, it must also be conceded on the strength of the *arthavadas* that the *devatās* are invited to come and attend the performance of *karma*, and that they do come, and receive their offerings. Now, when many men perform *karma* at the same time, how can the same *devatā*, *Indra* for instance, go to them all? To this objection the reply is that they may take up as many bodies as may be needed; and that such a thing is possible has been seen in the case of *Saubhari*, who took up at one and the same time as many bodies as he had wives.

27. शब्द इति चेन्नातःप्रभवात् प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

If it be said "this will conflict with words." the reply is - "No; because from them (beings) proceed as stated in the *veda* and *smritis*

The reply given leads to a further difficulty. For if *devatās* had bodies, as they are made of parts, they must be perishable. Hence, as in the case of particular individuals like *devadatta*, there was no *Indra* before he was born and there will be no *Indra* after he dies. The word *indra* occurring in the *veda* will either have no meaning owing to the non-existence of an object connected with it, or it must cease to be pronounced. In the performance of *karma*, *Indra* will have to be invoked, and owing to his disappearance, the word will cease to have a meaning, or it will have to be dropped as being useless. In either case the *veda* being thus subject to change, its claim to be eternal and authoritative must be denied. To this objection the second part of the *sūtra* replies. The term *indra* used in the *veda* does not denote a particular individual like *devadatta*. It is a common name like the word *go*, and indicates one of a class, possessing specified attributes and performing certain definite functions. When one *indra* disappears the four-faced *Brahma* considers what the word *indra* meant, and creates another *indra* possessing the same attributes to exercise the same functions. This is analogous to what a potter does. He considers what the word 'jar' denoted, and makes another jar of the same 'form and size. That such is the ease may be seen from the *veda* and *smritis*.

With the *veda* *Prajapati* made diverse forms intelligent and non-intelligent.

Similarly. "He uttered the word *bhuh*; he created the earth; he uttered the word *bhuvah*; he created the intermediate world": and so on. This means that he uttered the word, that denoted an object, he thought of its form, and created the object in that form. The same thing is stated by *smritis* also- "At the beginning *svayambhu* (one that exists of himself) gave this noble word forming the *veda*, which has no beginning or end, and from which all creation proceeded (*manu*-21)" "In the beginning he made from the words of the *veda* alone the names of all, their actions, and their forms, each having his own name, action and form". "At the beginning he made from the words of the *veda* alone the names of all, their actions, and their forms, each having his own name, action and form." "At the beginning he made the names and forms of beings beginning with the *devas*, and determined what work each class should do; this was done with *vedic* texts alone" (*Vishṇu* I-5-63)

28. अत एव च नित्यत्वम् ।

And for the very same reason the eternity (of the *veda*).

Vasishta and other seers are said to have made this or that text of the *veda*. How can this statement be reconciled with the other statement that the *veda* was not made, and that it is eternal? The *sūtra* states that taking the same view they may be reconciled. Thus *Vasishta* is an officer in the economy of nature, his business being to go into meditation and to perceive the texts of the *veda*, as they were known before, i.e., what were the sounds that made up a text, their order and the accents with which they were pronounced. On this work the four-faced *Brahma* employed other seers also, endowing them with the necessary capacity. Because the texts were only reproduced, the *veda* is said to be eternal; and because they were seen by this or that seer, they are said to have been made by them. There is thus no real inconsistency.

Here arises a further question. The explanation given was that the four-faced *Brahma* created *indras* and *vasishtas* with the help of the *veda*. There is a period of cosmic rest in which either a product of *ahamkara* disappears along with words, and in which the four-faced one who creates also disappears. How can there be creation by *Brahma* with the help of the *veda* after the close of the cosmic rest; and how can the *veda*, which has ceased to exist, be said to be eternal? Hence one, who holds the view that the *veda* is eternal, should admit that the universe is beginningless like a stream, i.e., that there is a succession of universes, one following another without a beginning. The next *sūtra* replies:

29. समाननामरूपत्वाच्चावृत्तावप्यविरोधो दर्शनात् स्मृतेश्च ।

Because the names and forms of the preceding evolution are reproduced, there is no difficulty even when evolution is repeated. And this is known from the *veda* and *smritis*

The highest *Ātmā* recalls to His mind the universe as it existed before; He wills to become many, and causes the evolution to proceed down to the appearance of the four-faced *Brahma*. He makes him learn the *veda* exactly as it was recited in the previous evolution, and directs him to create the world as it was before. He himself remains as the inner ruler and helps him to carry out the order. The impression left on one's mind by the recitation of the *veda* in the previous world-age enables him with the help of *tapas* (life of discipline) and meditation to recall the *veda* exactly as it was known by him. This is the eternity of the *veda*. This is what men do; but the highest *Ātmā* does not depend upon the impression.

The *vedic* text is "Who formerly made *Brahma*, and who gave him the *vedas* (sveta VI-18). The *smṛiti* texts are : "This was in the condition of *tamas* (subtle matter) . . . He considered; and in order to create diverse products from His own body, He created first the materials for making the egg-shaped

universe, and gave them the capacity for its formation. They became a golden egg, with the brilliance of the sun; in this *Brahma*, the grand-father of all the worlds, came forth of himself (*manu*, I-5, 8 and 9). The following verses are from the *puranas* : In the navel of the *Deva* who slept in it, a lotus appeared; in that lotus *Brahma*, the great being, who knew the *veda* and its *angas* thoroughly, was born; To him the *Deva* said 'Create beings, Oh, wise one'; *Nārāyaṇa* is a great *deva*; from Him was born the four-faced being'; Stating 'I will describe the first creation,' a *purana* states 'I creased water, which is *nāra* (made by *nāra*, the imperishable), and remained within it; hence My name has become *Nārāyaṇa*. In every *kalpa* (word-age) I sleep in it; in the *navel* of myself, who thus sleeps, a lotus again appeared as before; Oh Devi! in the lotus, which appeared in My navel, the four-faced one was born. I told him 'create the beings, wise one.'

SUB-SECTION 8

In the preceding sub-section it was decided that *devas* in general are fit for *brahma-vidyā* in general. In this sub-section the fitness of particular *devas* for particular *vidyās* is considered. The *vidyā* known as *madhu-vidyā* is taken from the *chandogya*, chapter III, sections 1 to 11; but from the expression 'in *vidyās* beginning with *madhu* used in *sūtra* 30 it appears that the conclusion should apply to other similar *vidyās* also.

See Vedic Texts. The sun is to be meditated on as honey; it is made from the *karmas* enjoined in the four *vedas* and secret doctrines; it is carried by the sun's rays and is lodged in cells on the four sides and on the top of his orb; the honey-comb is the intermediate world hanging from the cross-beam of heaven. The group of *devas* known as *vasus* lives on the honey on the east, and four other groups live on the honey lodged on the other sides and on the top. By this meditation, a person gets into one of these groups, enjoys its honey and has supremacy in the group, and his will is never frustrated (sec. 6-3 and 4). Here, in addition to meditation on the sun and on the five-fold honey, one has to meditate also on the *vasus* as enjoying the honey : for he has to become a *vasu* himself, and the rule is what one meditates on, that he becomes. The doubt is whether it is competent to a *deva*, who is already one of the *vasus*, to take up this form of *vidyā*.

First view. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

30. मध्वादिष्वसम्भवादनधिकारं जैमिनिः ।

In *madhu* and other similar *vidyās* there is no competency; this is *Jaimini's* view, owing to non-existence (of desire and capacity).

One, that is already a *vasu*, will not desire to become a *vasu* and there is no *vasu* other than himself on whom he may meditate. Nor will he be capable of meditating on himself. Question. Why? Will it not be easy to do so? Reply. The meditation in question is not merely to dwell with the mind on an object : for, to think continuously of a jar should then be called *vidya* or meditation. *Vidyā* is to dwell continuously on an object superior to the meditator; and this is not possible to the *vasu*, as he is not superior to himself. Again, one unable to attain a fruit, that he desires, pleases a *devata* with his meditation and receives the fruit from him. It is absurd that the *vasu* should please himself with meditation on himself. The conclusion is that a *vasu* is not competent for this *vidyā*.

The next *sūtra* gives an additional reason :

31. ज्योतिषि भावाच्च ।

And because of meditation on the fire.

A *bṛihadāraṇyaka* text states "Devas meditate on that fire of fires, who is life and who is immortality" (VI-4-16)

Reference is here made to the highest *Ātmā*. The text may mean one of two things—*devas* alone meditate, or *devas* meditate on the highest *Ātmā* only. Now, *brahma-vidyā* being common to both the *devas* and men, the first alternative will not do. The text therefore means that *devas* meditate only on the highest *Ātmā*. They are therefore excluded from the rest, inclusive of *madhu-vidyā* :

Final decision. This is stated in the next *sūtra*:

32. भावंतु बादरायणोऽस्ति हि ।

In the view of *Budarayana* qualification exists. It is so.

Vasus are qualified for the meditation referred to. First, they have to meditate not on themselves, but on the highest *Ātmā* as the inner ruler of themselves and of the *devatā* sun in their present condition. This is taught in sections 6-10 of the *upanishad*. In section 11 meditation on Him as the inner ruler of the *devatā* sun in his unevolved condition is taught. Thus, in both the places the meditation is on the highest *Ātmā*; and this is indicated by the verse.

When one thus meditates on this *brahma-vidyā* i.e., practises *Brahma-vidya*, for him the sun does not rise or set; for him there is day, once and for all.

The whole of the *madhu-vidyā* is therefore concerned with the highest *Ātmā*. and its fruit is to reach Him, but after being one of the five *deva* groups. Next, the existing groups of *devas* may desire to reach the same condition in the next *kalpa* (world-age), and then to reach the highest *Ātmā*. The objection raised does not therefore hold (1).

As *Brahma* alone is to be meditated on in this *vidyā*, the text quoted in *sūtra* 31 raises no difficulty. The author of the *vritti* states the same thing, There is qualification in *madhu* and other *vidyās*, for *Brahma* alone is the object of meditation in all places.

What is the purpose served by these two sections as regards men, who practise *brahma-vidyā*? Reply. They will know that the highest *Ātmā* is the object of meditation even to the *devas* in general and of particular groups among them, and that he gives them what fruits they desire; and they will meditate on Him as possessing this high attribute.

Objections (1) Why is this sub-section necessary? It has been decided that a *vasu* should meditate not on himself or on the sun, but on the inner ruler of both; and this rule was laid down in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 1(1) *Reply*. In that place the fitness for the meditation under reference was not considered. A new sub-section is therefore necessary. Also, there the conflict was between the marks of a *jeeva* at the beginning and of the many marks of the highest *Ātmā* in the context as a whole. Here, however, there is an apparent conflict between the beginning and the *end*; and the conclusion in the former will not do.

(2) How is the first view admitted and replied to; for there is no difficulty as far as one can see. The meditation is on the *devata* sun, and a *vasu* comes in only as living on the honey in that *devata*. In meditations on the highest *Ātmā* as ruling the perishable and imperishable worlds the meditator is himself included. Similarly, the *vasu* may meditate on the *devata sun*, though he will come in as living on the honey or as being included in the five *deva* groups. *Reply*. From the text considered in the second *sūtra*, the *vasu* and all others in the five groups would be excluded from the *madhu-vidya*.

(3) How is the final decision sound, if there be conflict between the commencement and end of the context. *Reply*. The conflict is only apparent, and not real.

SUB-SECTION 9

It has now to be considered whether among men the *śūdra* is qualified for meditation on *Brahma*. In the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* it has been settled that he is not qualified for the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* (VI-1-7). These are the reasons. First, there are the following injunctions :

In *vasanta* let the *upanayana* of a *brāhmaṇa* be done; in *grishma* the *upanayana* of a *kshatriya*; in *sarad* the *upanayana* of a *vaisya*.

There is another injunction :

Let one learn the text of his own *veda* ;

and this has a need—who is to carry this out?

Those that have gone through the *upanayana* ceremony have also a need—viz., for what purpose have we been made to approach a teacher in that ceremony? The injunction to learn the *veda* therefore attaches itself to them. Hence the rule is deduced that one should first pass through the *upanayana* ceremony, and then learn the text of the *veda*. Next, there are injunctions to do *karmas* of various kinds—the term *karma* meaning making an offering to a *devatā*. They have a need—who is to perform the *karmas*, so that they may serve their purpose? And the performance presupposes the possession of the requisite knowledge and the adoption of the means for the acquisition of the knowledge, viz., leading a life of discipline as a student and learning from the teacher. On the other side, the knowledge has been acquired at great personal inconvenience; it was not intended for any other purpose; and it needs something in which it may be utilized. The injunctions in regard to *karmas* finding this knowledge available in the three higher castes, attach themselves to those castes. A second rule is laid down that only those, that have learnt the *veda*, and thus possess the requisite knowledge, should make the offerings. It follows that the *śūdra* not being directed to pass through the *upanayana* ceremony, is not qualified to learn the *veda* or to perform the *karmas* enjoined in the earlier portion thereof. The same reasoning applies also in regard to *brahma-vidyā*s enjoined in its later portion, and the *śūdra* is equally disqualified for them. But certain doubts have been felt on the subject; and it is therefore necessary to examine them and arrive at a conclusion. Hence, the need for the sub-section.

First view. The *śūdra* is qualified for *brahma-vidyā* for he has a desire to practise it and is also capable; and these two elements constitute the qualification. Two conditions are regarded as necessary for *vidyā*, viz., the doing of the duties of one's caste and stage of life, as a help to *vidyā* and a knowledge of the highest *Ātmā* and of the mode of meditation. Now, the first condition is satisfied by the *sūtras* doing his own duties—viz., the service of the three higher

castes. As to the knowledge needed, it may be acquired from hearing *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* read; and permission to hear them has been given.

Let one make the four castes hear (them), placing the *brāhmaṇa* in the front.

Hearing implies critical examination; and knowledge not tainted with doubt or misconception is available to the *sūtra* and he is therefore qualified.

2. Here the following objections are raised: (1) If the argument urged were valid, it would follow that the *śūdra* might learn the mode of doing *karmas* also from hearing *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*. Reply. Though they are described in general terms in those works, detailed information needed for performance not being available, the *śūdra*'s exclusion from them remains unaffected. (2) The permission to hear *itihāsas* and *purāṇas* does not extend to understanding their meaning. Reply. In the *mahabharata* reference is made to the hearing of the chapter on the thousand names of *Vishṇu*, and it is added 'the *śūdra* will attain happiness'. Hence he may hear and recite them himself. (3) There is a text in the *yajur veda* which states - 'Hence the *śūdra* is unfit for *yajna*. This is a repetition of the conclusion of the *mīmāṃsā* and as the reasons apply to the case of *Brahma-vidyā* also, the text must be understood as excluding the *śūdra* from *vidyā* also. Reply. The text refers only to *yajna* and similar *karmas* needing a knowledge of the *veda* and the maintenance of the sacred fire; while *vidyā* doest not need either condition. The text quoted by the objector strengthens the first view. By denying a qualification for *yajna*, qualification for *vidyā* is conceded.

3. Here are some further reasons. *Itihāsas* and *purāṇas* mention *vidura* and other *śūdras* as having meditated on *Brahma*. The *chāndogya* (IV-1 and 2) shows that instruction on *brahma-vidyā* was imparted to a *śūdra*. *Raikva* addressed *Jānaśruti* in these words :

You have brought me these things, O sudra! and with this means you will make me speak (section 2, verse 5)

And in the next section he is said to have taught him. Hence the *śūdra* is qualified.

Final decision. The *śūdra* is not qualified; for he is not capable. *Brahma-vidyā* needs a knowledge of the highest *Ātmā*, His nature and the mode of meditating on Him; and as a help to it daily recitation of the *veda* and performance of *yajna*. The *śūdra* does not possess this knowledge and is not qualified for the *yajnas*. Hence, he has not the capacity to do *brahma-vidyā*; and desire without capacity does not constitute qualification. The incapacity comes from the fact that he has not learnt the *veda*. As the injunctions in regard to

karmas seek those that possess a knowledge of the *veda*, the injunctions as to *brahma-vidyā* seek the same persons. They have found them in the three castes, and the *śūdra* is excluded. *Question*. Why should it not be assumed that he is qualified? *Reply*. An assumption is made only, when injunctions cannot otherwise serve their purpose. There is an injunction, 'Let *ratha-kāra* establish the fires'. *Ratha-kāra* is a member of a mixed caste. This direction is not carried out by looking to one among the three castes: for a *ratha-kāra* is not included among them; and it is assumed that he is qualified for establishing the fires and for learning the requisite *mantrams*. There is no similar direction in regard to the *śūdra*. *Question* again-Is not the *śūdra* mentioned in the *chāndogya* text quoted in para 3 of the first view? *Reply*. It is not an injunction, and it is what is known as *arthavada*. *Question*. Has it not been recognised that *arthavadas* also are authority for what they state? *Reply*. It is only when they are not nullified by the context. Here the sense of the word established by usage is unsuitable, as will be shown presently, and does not therefore support the first view.

2. As to obtaining the requisite knowledge from *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* it should be known that they are authority only as elucidating the *veda*, and not independantly. They are commentaries on the *veda*, and one cannot obtain the full knowledge needed for *vidyā* from them alone. Also, as persons who have learnt the *veda* are advised to read *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* in order clearly to understand it, one who is disqualified for the original should not take the commentaries as independent authority. Hence, any knowledge obtained from this source will not serve its purpose, like knowledge derived from reading books.

3. This being so, the permission given to the *śūdra* to hear *itihāsa* and *purāṇa* must be understood as limited to knowing the narratives of good men, so that by this means his sin may be diminished. As to *vidura* and other *śūdras* referred to in the first view., it must be presumed for the reason given that the commencement of *brahma-vidyā* by them was on previous births, in which they were qualified; that owing to previous *karma* they were born as *śūdras*, but that they retained the knowledge acquired undiminished.

4. The reasons adduced in the foregoing paragraphs are those that are acceptable to the author of the *sūtras*. The last point in the first view is dealt with in the *sūtra* itself.

33. शुगस्य तदनादरश्रवणात्तदाद्रवणात्सूच्यतेहि ।

(By the term *śūdra*) the grief of (*Jānaśruti*) is indicated by his over-hearing the disrespectful speech (of the swan) regarding himself and by his running at one (to Raikava)

See the narrative in Vedic Texts. *Jānaśruti* gave with a free hand and fed as many people as went to his places of shelter. One day a swan, which flew over his house at night time, spoke disrespectfully of him as compared with one *Raikva*, who was a meditator on *Brahma*. Overhearing this speech he at once took steps to find out the whereabouts of *Raikva*; and going to him with presents, he applied for instruction. The teacher knew what had taken place; and by the word *śūdra* he indicated that *Jānaśruti* was in grief at his own ignorance, and was therefore fit for receiving instruction. The term means by its etymology one who grieves (1).

In this *śūdra* a reason for adopting the etymological meaning has been stated. In the next *sūtra* a reason is assigned, which shows that the meaning by established usage will not do.

34. क्षत्रियत्वगतेश्च ।

And because *Jānaśruti*,s being a *kshatriya* is seen.

This is seen from the following facts - He gave large presents, and fed large crowds of people. He had for the guard at the door of his residence a *kshatta*, one born of a *vaisya* father and a *brāhmaṇa* mother. A person of this birth was employed as guards by kings. He gave away many villages, which shows that he was the ruler of a country. *Janasruti* was therefore a *kshatriya*, and not a *śūdra* by caste. The address as *śūdra* should therefore be explained as in *sūtra* 33.

The indications that *Jānaśruti* was a *kshatriya* found in the narrative at the beginning of the context have been stated; and the next *sūtra* shows similar indications at the close.

35. उत्तरत्र चैत्ररथेन लिङ्गात् ।

From the mark, viz., reference to *chaitratatha*, further on.

In section 3 of the same chapter of the *upanishad* reference is made to three persons as connected with *samvarga vidyā*-the same as that taught to *Jānaśruti* (see Vedic Texts). Of them two were *brāhmaṇas* and the third was *abhipratarin*. One of the *brāhmaṇas* was *kapeya*, whose family is seen from other *vedic* texts to have been connected as priests with the family of *chaitraratha*,

1. The term *śūdra* is formed from the root "SUCK" 'to grieve' by adding the termination. The vowel of the root is lengthened, and the letter *ch* is changed to *d*. It therefore means one that grieves.

a *kshattriya*. It may be presumed that *abhipratarin* belonged to the family of *chaitraratha* and was a KSHATTRIYA. It thus appears that in addition to *brāhmaṇas*, KSHATTRIYA alone among the other castes were qualified for the *saṁvarga vidyā*. *Jānaśruti* was therefore a *kshattriya* and not a member of the fourth caste.

By the three *sūtras* it has been established that there are no indications anywhere in regard to the qualification of the *śūdra* for *brahma-vidyā*. It will next be shown that his disqualification is supported by *vedic* and *smṛiti* texts.

36. संस्कारपरामर्शात्तदभावाभिलापाच्च ।

Because of the reference to *upanayana*, and because of the declaration of (the *śūdra*'s) unfitness for it.

Wherever meditation on *Brahma* is taught, reference is made to the ceremony known as *upanayana*, which gives a qualification. Thus, in the *chāndogya*, chapter IV, section 4, a teacher, applied to for instruction, stated.

One who is a *non-brāhmaṇa* is not fit to say this. Go and fetch fuel, dear, and I will do *uapnayana* for you.

And the teacher initiated him. As to the *śūdra* there is express teaching that he is not fit for the *samskāra*, i.e., the *upanayana*. "There is no sin in the *śūdra*; and he is not fit for *samskāra* (*manu*, X, 126); "The fourth caste forms one class; and it is not fit for *samskāra*" (*guatama*, X-9).

37. तदभावनिर्धारणे च प्रवृत्तेः ।

And because one sets about giving instruction on ascertaining that the student is not a *śūdra*.

This will be seen from the quotation made under the preceding *śūdra*. *Jubala* applied to a teacher for instruction, who asked him of what family he was. *Jābāla* replied that he did not know. He was born, when his mother was young, and was wholly engrossed in the service of his father's parents; and she did not know to what family his father belonged. The teacher was pleased and observed that only a *brāhmaṇa* could speak out the truth as he did. He then offered to do the *upanayana* ceremony and to teach him.

38. श्रवणाध्ययनार्थप्रतिषेधात् ।

Because to hear the *veda*, to learn it, and to act on its teaching are prohibited (for a *śūdra*).

Hence near him (the *śūdra*) one should not learn the *veda*. Hence the *śūdra* is like a beast, and is unfit for *yajna*.

Hearing the *veda* being thus prohibited, it follows that the *śūdra* cannot learn it, cannot know its meaning and cannot act on it. These also should be taken as prohibited.

39. स्मृतेश्च ।

Because the *smṛiti* does the same.

Here is a text.

Do not teach him *dharma* (the means to a desirable end), and do not direct him to follow any discipline (*manu* IV-80)

Criticism. The illusionist will be unable to maintain that the *śūdra* is disqualified for the knowledge of *Brahma*. This is his view "*Brahma* is *nir-visesha*, and mere *chit*; He alone is real; everything else is unreal. Bondage is not real; and it is to be removed by the mere knowledge of His true nature to be generated by a sentence; and its removal alone is release." This being his view, even one, who has not gone through the *upanayana* ceremony, has not learnt the *veda*, and has not been taught the *upanishads*, may know from any sentence whatever the true nature of things as taught by the illusionist; and from this knowledge alone bondage may disappear.

Illsionist. The knowledge needed should come from the text, "That thou art" and similar texts, but not from any other sentence.

Reply. You cannot limit the knowledge to these texts only; for it does not depend on one's choice, when the proper conditions exist, knowledge will be generated, even though one does not desire it.

Illusionist. Bondage will disappear on the acquisition of knowledge only from *vedic* texts.

Reply. Bondage being illusion, it will disappear, when the true nature of things is known from any source whatever. It may be a statement made by any one; not necessarily a statement of the *veda*; it will make known the true nature of things, and from this alone illusion will disappear. When one mistakes a piece of shell-silver for real silver, a friend's statement 'it is not silver' removes his illusion; and in this matter the person that is deluded may be any one - a *brāhmaṇa* or a *śūdra*. Similarly, the *śūdra* too may hear a statement made by one, that has *vedic* knowledge, and knows the true nature of things. By this means his illusion may be removed.

Illusionist. Does not *Manu* direct those that know the *veda*, 'Do not teach him *dharma*:'

Reply. This plea is untenable; for one, who knows from the *vedic* text 'That thou art'm, that in his true nature he is *Brahma*, has set his foot on the *upanishads*, has burnt all his conditions (*adhikāra*) and is no longer subject to the prohibitions contained in *smṛitis*. Even from statements made by those that disobey *vedic* and *smṛiti* prohibitions, knowledge may come to the *śūdra*.

Illusionist. The *śūdras* illusion does not disappear, as the misperception of shell-silver as silver disappears, as soon as he knows the meaning of a statement made by some one.

Reply. Let me apply the same argument to your case. Even a *brāhmaṇa*'s illusion does not disappear as soon as he hears the text 'That thou art'.

Illusionist. Only when the tendency to perceive differences is removed by meditation, the text generates such knowledge, as will remove illusion.

Reply. The same service may be rendered in the same manner to a *śūdra* even by a statement made by any one. We see no difference between the two cases. Meditation means for the mind to dwell on the meaning, which a sentence is capable of conveying. This alone removes the evil tendency. Thus you state an effect to come from meditation, which can be seen. When the *śūdra* has acquired a desire to know, he may meditate on a statement made by any one; and when by this his evil tendency is removed, knowledge will come to him from the statement. By this alone the unreal bondage will be ended.

To put the matter in another way. The *śūdra* may arrive at the true nature of things from sense perception helped by argument and from inference; by dwelling on *Brahma* in His true nature, he may get rid of his evil tendency, realise Him and be released. No help whatever can be rendered to one by statements in the *vedānta*, which are based on unreal things, such as the powers of various beings, the creation of diverse products and endless similar differences. Hence the *śūdra* alone is qualified for meditation on *Brahma*. This appears to be a very proper view. As the very same argument may be applied to the *brāhmaṇa* also, the *upanishad* will become a dead letter.

Illusionist. When one is deluded by worldly statements, that are natural to him, if some one states "worldly statements are delusive; the truth is such and such," then alone he will desire to know what sense perception and inference can teach. Hence the *vedic* text too, that gives this information, should be accepted.

Reply. No. To one who is afraid of *samsara* the *sāṅkhya* explains the true nature of things with the help sense perception and inference. He creates a

desire to know what these sources of knowledge can do. When this desire comes, their capacity having been ascertained, with their help alone he may easily know the true nature of *Brahma* as you describe Him. In a thing, which shines without any help, what is the particular to be learnt from the *veda*? In your view its purpose is merely to remove an unreal aspect, which is imposed upon Him.

Illusionist. To know that the *Ātmā* is bliss, the *upanishad* is needed.

Reply. No. He is *jnāna* and is separated from all other things, that are not *jnāna*, and He is Himself bliss. The view that the *śūdra* is disqualified for *brahma-vidyā* can be held only by one that believes that the knowledge taught by the texts of the *vedānta* as the means to release is in the form of meditation; that it pleases the highest *Brahma*, the highest *Purusha*; that it can be attained only from the *veda*; that the portion of the *veda* dealing with meditation teaches that the knowledge acquired by one that has passed through the *upanayana* ceremony, and has learnt his *veda*, as to how he should meditate, this alone is the means, and that it should receive help from the seven qualifications beginning with discrimination in the matter of food and desirelessness; that pleased with such meditation the highest *Purusha* imparts to the mediator knowledge of His true nature, destroys the ignorance engendered by *karma*, and releases him from bondage.

Continuation of sub-section 6

The questions, which arose incidentally, having been considered, sub-section 6 is taken up, where it was left, and two further reasons are stated to confirm the conclusion that the *purusha* of the size of the thumb is the highest *Ātmā*.

40. कम्पनात् ।

Because of the shaking (from fear).

Between the texts quoted under *sūtra* 23 the following two verses are found:

Whatever stands in and comes forth from *prāṇa* (*Brahma*), i.e., all this world, shakes from great fear of Him as from the raised *vajra*. Those that meditate on this become immortal. The fire heats from fear of Him; the sun heats from fear; from fear *Indra* and *Vayā* (do their duties); and Death, the fifth, runs (on his errand). (*katha*, VI, 2 and 3).

Thus the whole world, and the fire, the sun and the rest stand in fear as to what will happen, if His command be disobeyed in any particular, and attend

to their respective duties carefully. Such control can be found only in the highest *Ātmā*. Compare with *brihad.*, V-8-8, and *ane.*, 8-1.

41. ज्योतिर्दर्शनात् ।

Because the light (peculiar only to the highest *Ātmā*) is seen.

This is seen in the following verse:

“There (*i.e.*, by His side) the sun does not shine; nor the moon and the stars; nor these lightnings. How can this fire shine? When He shines, everything shines after Him; by His light all this shines” (*katyha*, V-15).

It will be seen that the light of the *Purusha* of the size of the thumb makes all other lights pale by its side; that it is the (operative) cause of all other lights; and that it helps them to do their work. This supreme light is everywhere in the *veda* described as pertaining only to the highest *Ātmā*. Compare with *chāndo.*, VIII-12-2; *brihad.*, VI-4-16; and *chāndo.*, III-13-7; and this very verse occurs in the *mundaka* as referring to the highest *Ātmā*. The *Purusha* of the size of the thumb is therefore He.

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SUB-SECTION 10

The text for consideration in this sub-section is from the *chāndogya* (VIII-14-1).

Ākāṣa known as the maker of name and form, as being between them, is *Brahma*; He is unlimited bliss; He is *Ātmā*.

The doubt is whether this *ākāṣa* is a freed *jeeva* or the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. He is freed *jeeva*; for the text occurs immediately after a verse which refers to a freed *jeeva*, and the text therefore refers to him. The verse runs as follows:

Shaking off *karma*, as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rahu*, (in an eclipse), throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma-world*, the purpose of my life having been attained. (VIII-13-1).

The expression ‘being between them.’ *i.e.*, being untouched by name and form, refers to his release from them; and the first half of the text describes his previous condition, when he had a form and bore a name, the term *nirvahita* in the original being understood in its etymological sense. The condition which he has reached is described by the terms *brahma* and unlimited bliss. The term *ākāṣa* may denote the freed *jeeva*, as his attribute *jnāna* has fully expanded.

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2. Here an objection is raised. The text under consideration is connected with the beginning of the chapter, which relates to the small *ether* (*ākāṣa*). For, by the term *ākāṣa* here the small ether (*ākāṣa*) is recalled, and the two are recognised as one. And that has been decided in sub-section 5 of this section to be the highest *Ātmā*. *Reply*. Between the portion relating to the small ether (*ākāṣa*) and this text the teaching of *Prajāpati* intervenes; and in this the nature of the *jeeva*, till he attains freedom, is described; and reference is made to this freedom by the words "shaking off sin". Hence the conclusion urged stands.

Final decision. *ākāṣa* here is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

42. आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात् ।

Akāṣa is the highest *Ātmā*; because an attribute is stated, which differentiates him from others; and for other reasons.

This attribute is stated in the first half of the text. The term *nirvahita* in the original should not be understood in its etymological sense; for the meaning by recognised usage, being suggested first, and being for that reason stronger, prevails over the other. And this meaning is a maker: and the highest *Ātmā* is known from other *vedic* texts as the maker of names and forms.

I will enter three *devotes* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva* and make diverse names and forms (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2): He knows everything and knows every attribute of everything ; His *tapas* is thought; from him came forth this *brahma*, name, form and *annam* (*munda.*, I-1-10).

See also the *purusha sūkta*. This attribute cannot be found in a *jeeva*; for in the bound condition he has a form and bears a name imposed on him by *karma*, and is powerless to make them for others; and the freed *jeeva* cannot evolve the universe, with which this is connected. The attribute under consideration therefore separates *ākāṣa* from a *jeeva* and shows him to be the highest *Ātmā*.

2. The opponent ask.-If this be so, why is the freed *jeeva* next mentioned by the words 'as being between them'. *Reply*. Reference is not made to a freed *jeeva*; but the previous remark is justified. Because this *ākāṣa* is between name and form, i.e., untouched by them, and is therefore a unique Being. He makes names and forms for others. And He is competent to do so. Being untouched by name and form implies that he is free from *karma*, and His will is therefore unfrustrated. The words 'for other reasons' in the *sūtra* refer to the terms *brahma*, *Ātmā*, and bliss mentioned at the close of the text. Used without limiting words, they apply only to the highest *Ātmā*.

3. The main argument on which the *first view* is based is untenable. Reference is made to two persons in the preceding verse—to the *jeeva*, that is freed, and to the highest *Ātmā*, that is to be reached. The former may appear to be the more important of the two, as being denoted by a word in the nominative case, and the latter coming in only as the object to be reached by him. But as it is the more important, *ākāṣa* is the highest *Ātmā* for the reason stated, and the text should be connected with the expression *brahma-loka*. This means not the world of *Brahma*, but *brahma* the world -i.e., *Brahma* who supports everything. When a compound word has to be broken up, the more appropriate way is so to do it as to give prominence to each member of the compound, and this has been recognised as correct in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. (Intro, 29-ii).

4. Further, this chapter of the *upanishad* began with the mention of the “small ether” in the heart as the subject to be meditated on; the nature of the medicator was described in *Prajāpati’s* teaching; and lastly in the text under consideration the subject is brought to a close, stating that the same small ether is reached. He is recalled by the term *ākāṣa* in the text, and is identified with what it denotes/ *Prajāpati’s* teaching, which formed the subject of sections 7 to 12, is a portion of the context subordinate to the whole, and not distinct from it. (1).

5. Lastly, the term *ākāṣa* has nowhere been used to denote a *jeeva*.

The opponent shifts his ground, denies the existence of the highest *Ātmā* and asserts that it is the freed *jeeva* that is called the supreme *Ātmā*, the supreme *Brahma* and the supremene ruler. This is his argument: The word *brahma-loka* recalls the same word used by *Yājñavalkya* at the close of his teaching to king *janaka*. “He is *brahma-loka*, great king” (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23), and it is decided that they denote the same person. In the same place, a few verses before this, the following statements are made:

1. If the verse regarding the shaking off of karma be connected with *Prajāpati’s* teaching and the freed *jeeva* is primarily dealt with in it, then following the reason assigned in *sūtra* 19 of this section (see under sub-section 5), the highest *Atma* is mentioned in order to indicate what the *jeeva* has to reach. *Prajāpati’s* teaching having been brought to a close in section 12, if the verse, which is in the 13th section, be connected with sections 1 to 6, the mention of the freed *jeeva* is to draw attention to the greatness of the highest *Ātmā* in freeing *jevas* and taking them to Himself. Viewed either way, *ākāṣa* in the text is connected with *brahma-loka* in the verse, and denotes the highest *Ātmā*.

In this (*Brahma*) there is no separateness whatever; one that suspects even a small separateness in Him attains *samsara* after *samsara* (verse 19); This unlimited, unchanging *Brahma* (the *Ātmā* of all beings) should be meditated on as one (verse 20).

There is thus express mention of oneness and express denial of separateness. There is therefore no highest *Ātmā* other than the *jeeva*. The conclusion stated in the preceding *sūtra* does not hold (1).

The next two *sūtra* give the reply to the opponent:

43. सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन ।

Because in deep sleep and in getting out of the body in death He is stated to be different from the *jeeva*.

Hence, the highest *Ātmā*, other than the *jeeva*, does exist. In the same place of the *brihadaranyaka* these texts are found:

This person, embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside, does not know what is inside (VI-3-21). This refers to deep sleep. As a cart fully laden (with the things needed for a journey) leaves (the place where it was) and goes on, in the very same manner, this embodied *jeeva*, the all-knowing *Ātmā* having mounted on him (like a driver), abandons (the body) and goes on (VI-3-35).

This refers to death. In both the cases the *jeeva* is in contact with another, who is referred to as 'all-knowing,' while he himself is without any knowledge in deep sleep, and depends upon the other to help him out of the body. This other person cannot therefore be himself. Nor can it be another *jeeva*; for he cannot be all-knowing, if bound; and if free, the epithets to be referred to in the next *sūtra* will not apply to him.

44. पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः ।

Because He is described by the terms *pati* (lord) and other terms).

This being, who embraces the sleeping or outgoing *jeeva*, is thus described further on in the same *upanishad* (VI-4-22).

He has every one in His grip ; He controls every one ; He is the lord of everyone. He does not become great by a good deed; He never becomes small by a bad deed. He is the ruler of all; He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of being; He is the protective bund, that keeps these worlds from being confounded.

1. *Question.* Should not this matter have been settled in the first section? *Reply.* True; it was shown that there is a Being other than matter or the *jeeva*; but the decision was based on *vedic* texts, that prove His existence. But until texts, that seem to point to a different conclusion, are examined and shown to bear a different interpretation, it does not rest on firm basis. Hence, the author of the *sūtras* takes this

This description cannot apply by any means even to a freed *jeeva*. Hence, the existence of a Being other than the *jeeva* is established, and the *ākāṣa*, who makes names and forms, is other than the freed *jeeva* (1).

These two *sūtras* thus confirm the conclusion reached in the first section of this chapter-that the highest *Ātmā* is other than matter, and the *jeeva*. The mention of oneness and the denial of difference should be explained so as not to conflict with this. To point this out is the work of this sub-section. This is the explanation. The mention of oneness is due to all objects, intelligent or non-intelligent, being products of evolution from the highest *Ātmā*, and to being on this account identical with Him. This was stated in explaining the first *sūtra* in chapter I-2-1. The denial of difference follows from the same. In other words, the oneness affirmed is based on the fact that a cause and this product are one ; but this is not due to the *jeeva*'s being one with *Isvara*. The denial of difference is subsidiary to the affirmation of oneness, and deals with the erroneous view, based on unsound arguments, that a product is different from its material cause. This will be refuted in chapter II-1-6. This denial includes also a refutation of the impression that any object is independent of the highest *Ātmā*, and not an inseparable element in an aggregate. This point is dealt with in chapter II-3-7 and III-2-6.

This brings this section to a close. The highest *Ātmā* has been proved to be the world-cause in all the texts considered; and the following attributes regarding Him have been learnt. He is the *Ātmā* of all. His greatness is unlimited; He supports the world by His command; He is the object of enjoyment to freed *jeevas*. Everything rests on Him, though he is the small ether in the heart of man. Though of the size of the heart, He controls all. He is fit to be meditated upon by the *devas*; *vasus* and other groups of *devas* may meditate on Him as their *Ātmā*; but he cannot be meditated on by the *śūdra*. And He alone makes names and forms *adhi*, 129).

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occasion at the end of this section to draw attention to the texts in question and to settle the matter.

1. It will be observed that the term lord (*pati*) occurs in two sentence; but not at the beginning of the text quoted. The intention of the author of the *sūtras* in using the term *pati* (lord) in the *sūtra* is that the passage between the two sentences, which affirms freedom from *karma*, should also be cited as authority here. This freedom from *karma* shows that the other attributes mentioned pertain to His nature, and that they were not acquired as in the case of the freed *jeeva* at any subsequent time. Again, the original has the term *adhipati* in both the places; but only the portion *pati* finds a place in the *sūtra*, the object being to refer also to the *Nārāyaṇa* text, which uses the word *pati* only - The Lord of all (*pati*) and the controller of Himself (section 11). And this text shows that the lord of all is the Being known as *Nārāyaṇa*.

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CHAPTER I

SECTION 4

The fourth section is now taken up, and the texts of the *upanishads*, that appear to repeat the teaching of other schools of thought, are examined, and shown to indicate only the highest *Ātmā*. The first six sub-sections remove the doubt raised by the *sāṅkhya* school, and the seventh sub-section performs the same work with regard to the *yoga* school. Taking the sub-sections individually, it will be seen that the first and second sub-sections refute the view that matter in the subtle condition is the world-cause. By the third, even accepting the counting of the *tatvas* relied on by the same school, their position is held to be untenable. In the fourth the term *avyākṛita* is shown to indicate the highest *Ātmā*, on the principle that every word indicates Him fully and directly. In the next two sub-sections the *jeeva*, both bound and freed, is shown not to be the world-cause. And the seventh sub-section establishes the incorrectness of the view that the highest *Ātmā* is only the operative cause.

SUB-SECTION 1

The following verses occur in *kathavalli* (III-10 and 11).

The objects are more powerful than the senses; the mind is more powerful than the objects; more powerful than the mind is *buddhi*; and more powerful than *buddhi* is the great *atma*. More powerful than the great (*Ātmā*) is *avyakta*; more powerful than *avyakta* is *purusha*. There is nothing more powerful than *purusha*. He is the last; He is the highest goal.

The opponent regards the last four clauses here as mentioned *mahat*, *avyakta* and *purusha* of his school; taking the term *para* in the original to mean greater than instead of more powerful as translated. And *avyakta* is greater than *mahat*, being its cause; *purusha* is greater than *avyakta*, being self-proved, while the other is not. The statement that *purusha* is the last is taken to deny the existence of the highest *Ātmā*, controlling both *avyakta* and *purusha* (matter and *jeeva*). He concludes that *avyakta* is the world-cause.

This argument is stated in the first part of the *sūtra*:

1. आनुमानिकमप्येकेषामिति चेन्न शरीररूपकविन्यस्तगृहीतेर्दर्शयति च ।

If it be said " In the portions of the veda of some schools even *pradhāna* is stated to be the world cause", the reply is "No, because reference is made to the body, likened to a chariot. And this is show."

The second part of the *sūtra* gives a reply. The context deals with the control of the mind and the senses, so that meditation on the highest *Ātmā*

may be steady. For this purpose a metaphor is employed to bring the points clearly before the student. The human body is a chariot; *buddhi* or conviction is the charioteer; the mind is the reins; the senses are the horses; and the objects to which they are drawn are the roads. The *jeeva* is the owner seated in the chariot and enjoying the pleasure which the objects yield. (Ibid., verses 3 and 4). The *upanishad* goes on to point out (see Vedic Texts) that one, that has a good resolve, and controls the mind and the senses, will reach the end of the road, viz., *Vishṇu*, the highest goal (verse 9). Then follow the two verses under consideration, which show which of the things mentioned it is easy to control and which are more difficult. In the order of difficulty they are arranged as follows: the senses, sense-objects, the mind, conviction, the *jeeva*, the body and the highest *Ātmā*. The sense-objects are more powerful than the senses; for, in their presence the senses, though well under control, become unmanageable. The mind is more powerful than sense objects; for when it dwells on them, their absence does not count for much. Conviction is more powerful still; for without it, the mind can do nothing; and it merely follows conviction. The *jeeva* is more powerful than conviction; for he is the thinker and doer; and because he controls everything - conviction, the mind, and the senses-he is said to be great (*mahan*). The body is more powerful than the *jeeva*; for all his efforts to reach his goal depend upon the co-operation of the body. The most powerful is the highest *Ātmā*, the inner ruler of all, and the end of the road; for the efforts of everything down to the *jeeva* are subject to His will (1).

Now, in the two verses under consideration all the things mentioned in the metaphor are referred to by their own names, except the body, and in its place the term *avyakta* is found. Hence, it may be concluded on the authority known as *sthāna* that that the term indicates the body. This being, so, there is

1. This point, viz., that the *jeeva's* doership depends upon the highest *Ātmā*, will be stated in chapter II, section 3, *sūtra* 40. He that is the final help by which the *jeeva* will complete his meditation, is also the highest goal. This is stated in the last part of the text under consideration. The *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* begins with the words "who stands in the *Ātmā*, and states that he highest *Ātmā* sees everything and controls everything. It then by the words 'There is no seer other than this' denies another controller. *Bhagavad-gītā* is also to the same effect: "The body, the *Ātmā*, the five organs of action, *prāṇa*, and *Daivam*, the fifth in the list of causes" (XVIII, 14). The term *DAIVAM* in this verse is the highest *Ātmā*; for it is stated in the same work - 'I am seated in the heart of every one; from Me flow remembrance, knowledge, as well as inability to see' (XIV, 15). The means of securing His grace is to fall down at His feet, and nothing else. This is also stated 'The ruler of all has mounted all beings on the wheel of the body, and being in their hearts, He makes them go round and round with the help of attractive sense - objects. Appeal to Him alone for help (XVII, 61 and 62).

no reference whatever to the *pradhāna* (matter) of the *sāṅkhya*. If the question of control is not intended, the verse must refer to the relation of cause and effect; for that is the relation between *mahat* and *avyakta*, and the same relation must be intended in the other cases also.

But sense-objects are not the causes of the senses according to the *sāṅkhya*; nor the mind the cause of sense objects. Next, *buddi* is understood by Him to mean *mahat*; and *mahat* cannot therefore be the cause of *buddhi*, i.e., of itself; and the application of the epithet *Ātmā* to it would be inappropriate. Hence the term *avyakta* must mean the body.

The last part of the *sūtra* shows that this must be the interpretation. Verse 12 states that the highest *Ātmā* cannot be seen by one whose mind and the senses are not under control; and the next verse states:

A wise man should place speech under the control of the mind; that should be placed under the control of *buddhi* in regard to the *Ātmā*; *buddhi* should be placed under the control of the great *Ātmā*; he should be placed under the control of the *Ātmā* free from the six evils.

See *Vedic Texts*, and the notes on this verse therein.¹

How can the term *avyakta* mean the body, which is *vyakta* or one that is capable of being seen? The next *sūtra* replies:

2. सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात् ।

It is the subtle (*avyakta*) that becomes the body; because only in that condition is it fit.

The meaning is that the term *sarira* (body) being first mentioned in verse 3, while term *avyakta* is mentioned afterwards in verse 11, the term, *avyakta*, should be taken to mean body. This is appropriate, as *avyakta* (matter in the finest condition) by a change of state becomes the body. It is in that condition that it can help the *jeeva* to reach his goal, as a chariot helps a traveller to reach the end of his journey.

Here the opponent turns round, and asks why if the existence of *avyakta* (matter in the finest condition) be admitted, there is so much dislike to it. In the *smṛiti* of *Kapila* also it is stated to be the material cause. The next *sūtra* replies:

3. तदधीनत्वादर्थवत् ।

1. The original explains this verse in full. This, being embodied in the *Vedic Texts*, is omitted here.

It becomes useful, when under the control of the highest *Ātmā*.

The existence of *avyakta* or of its modifications is denied, not in themselves; but as not controlled by the highest *Ātmā*, and as not forming His body. It is only under such control that they are in a position to serve their purpose; otherwise they cannot come into being, have continued existence or do anything. Because the existence of a controlling Being is not admitted. Kapilas' theory of evolution is rejected (1).

4. ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च ।

And because it has not been mentioned among the things to be known.

The *sāṅkhya* states that one attains release from *karma* by knowing *vyakta*, *avyakta* and the *Ātmā*. But *avyakta* has not been mentioned in the *upanishad* as a thing to be known; and it would have been mentioned as a thing to be known, if such were the intention.

5. वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात् ।

If it be said "The *upanishad* does mention it," the reply is — "no; for, reference is made to the all-knowing, as may be seen from the context."

The opponent draws attention to the following verse:

Who is ever without sound, ever without touch, ever without colour, and therefore ever without decay; who is similarly ever without taste, ever without smell; who is ever without beginning or end; who is greater than the great (the *jeeva*) and is unchanging, one that meditates on Him is released from the jaws of death. (III-15).

He observes that this description applies to *avyakta* and that it is said to be greater than *mahat* (the great). *Reply*. No; the Being to be meditated on according to this verse is the all-knowing *Brahma*. For, the context refers to Him alone as the subject of meditation. See verse 9 and 12 of *valli* 3 in Vedic Texts. For the same reason by the statement "There is nothing greater than *purusha* a *tatva* other than the twentyfifth, i.e., the *jeeva*, is not denied. The

1. In the *veda* and in the *smritis*, where they describe the evolution and dissolution of the universe, and the greatness of the highest *Ātmā prakriti* (subtle matter) its products and the *jeevas* are stated to be controlled by Him. Beginning with the statement "The earth dissolves in water," the *veda* states "The *tanmatra* dissolves in *ahamkāra*; *ahamkāra* dissolves in *mahat*; *mahat* dissolves in *tamas*; *tamas* becomes one with the highest *Deva*"; again "Whose body earth is; whose body water is; whose body fire is; whose body air is; whose body ether is' whose body *ahamkāra* is; whose body

attributes mentioned apply to Him (vide munda, I-1-6); and He is greater than mahat, which from the preceding verses must be the *jeeva*.

6. त्रयाणामेव चैवमुपन्यासः पञ्चश्र ।

And because the question related only to three things as fit to be known and they are thus expounded.

These three things are the means, the Being to be reached, and the person that is to reach Him. No reference is made to *avyakta* or to anything else. See the narrative in Vedic Texts under chapter I, section 2, sub-section 2. As the third boon *Nachiketas* asked for information as to the nature of *moksha* (release); and this was practically as to the three things mentioned. This was in verse 20 of section 1. See the note under it. Death tested him as to his fitness for receiving instruction, and then taught him in verse 12 of section 2. This refers to three matters: (i) by the words 'He meditates on *Deva*, to the Being to be reached; (ii) by the words 'meditates on himself' to the *jeeva*, who is to reach Him; and (iii) by the words 'meditates and abandons joy and grief' to meditation on *Brahma*. *Nachiketas* then requested fuller information on these points in verse 14. See note 2 on this verse. Death replied, first praising *prāṇava*; and referring to the three matters generally, taught him the *prāṇava* (verse 15). He again praised the *prāṇava* in verses 16 and 17; and then described the nature of the *jeeva* in verses 18 and 19; the nature of the highest *Ātmā* in verses 20 to 22 and 25; and the nature of the means, viz., meditation in verse 23. In the first verse of the third section he pointed out that the highest *Ātmā* was in man's heart, and that meditation on Him was therefore easy; and in the remaining verses down to verse 14 the mode of meditation and its fruit - the rearing of *Vishṇu* are described and the subject is brought to a

mahat is; whose body *avakta* is; whose body *akshara* is; whose body *mrityu* is He, the inner ruler of all beings, is whose body *mrityu* is, He the inner ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*, lives in the highest heaven, has a shining figure, and has no equal or superior. He is *Nārāyaṇā* (*subala*); "Earth, water, fire, air ether, mind, *mahat*, and *ahamkāra* - the *prakṛiti*, thus divided into eight forms, is Mine. This is the lower *prakṛiti*; there is another *prakṛiti*, higher than this, which consists of the *Ātmās*, and which supports this world. Know that also as Mine. All things that exist have spring from the union of these two *prakṛitis*, and are therefore Mine. I am the place from which all the worlds go forth; the place in which all the worlds dissolve. Another being does not exist, who is higher; all this world rests on Me, as *pearls* on a strung (*bhagavad-gītā*. VII, 4 to 7). *Vyakta* is *Vishṇu*; so also are *avyakta*, *jeevas* and time. (*Vishṇu*, I-2-20); *Prakṛiti* in the form of *vyakta* and *avyakta*, described by me, and the *jeevas*-both these dissolve in the highest *Ātmā*; the highest *Ātmā* is the support of all, and the highest ruler" (*Ibid.*, VI-4-38 and 39).

close in verse 15, which was quoted by the opponent under *sūtra* 5. Hence there is no reference to the *avyakta* of the *sāṅkhya*.

7. महद्ब्रह्म ।

And like *mahat*.

In the two verses first considered, the term *mahat* has not been understood to mean the *mahat* of the *sāṅkhya*; because the word *Ātmā* was placed in apposition with it. Similarly, the term *avyakta* does not indicate the *avyakta* of the *sāṅkhya*, as *avyakta* is said to be greater than *mahat*, the *Ātmā*.

In the following five sub-sections the same contention is raised by the opponent and is rejected. But the reasons therefor are different in each case. The intention is not to deny the existence of *prakṛiti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the rest forming the bodies of *Brahma* and supported and controlled by Him; for their existence is stated by the *veda* and the *smṛitis*. In support of the last statement see the texts shown at the foot of the page (1).

SUB-SECTION 2

The next text cited is from the *svetasvatara*:

One unborn (*aja*) red, dark and white, and producing numerous offspring like herself. One unborn attends on her, and following her he remains; another unborn, having enjoyed her, abandons her (verse 5 of section IV).

Here reference is evidently made to matter in the subtle condition. It is red, dark and white; because it possesses the three qualities *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. From it are formed many products, in all of which the same three qualities appear; and they are therefore said to be like itself. The one unborn

1. *Mantrika upanishad* - *Prakṛiti*, the creator of products (the five senses the five organs of action, the mind and the five great elements); non-intelligent; appearing in eight forms (*prakṛiti*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, and the five *tanmātrās*); without birth or death. (I verse 3); she enters into the willing of *Brahma*; directed by Him, she comes into the gross condition (as the great elements); again directed by the very same, she creates the universe consisting of objects of enjoyment and the means and places of enjoyment (verse 4). She is a cow, without beginning or end; the creator of the great elements and of the diverse products of evolution; white, black, and red (through the products fire, water and earth) and yielding every amusement to the all. Ruler (verse 5). She is impartial (changing in accordance with the *karmas* of the *jeevas*); persons of dull intelligence, not knowing themselves, enjoy her (verse 6). One *Brahma*, a shining Being,

(the word is in the masculine gender) is the bound *jeeva* immersed in the pleasure of sense-objects; while the other unborn is he, who is disgusted with such enjoyment and leaves it.

This verse and all other verses, which give the impression that matter by itself is the world-cause, are considered here. The doubt arises from the fact that matter is non-intelligent, and from the use of the word producing, which naturally indicates independent creation. The alternatives are whether the matter referred to in the text is the *pradhāna* of the *sāṅkhya* or whether it is what is controlled by the highest *Ātmā*. *First View*. It is the former. For, the word *aja* (unborn), shown that it is not a product of evolution; and it is said to create many objects of the same kind; but no reference is made to anything else as controlling it. On the other hand the termination in the term *srijamanam* (producing) denotes cause of the action (*karta*); and it is said by the grammarian to be independent.

The *sūtra* refutes this view:

8. चमसवदविशेषात् ।

Because (the term *aja*) is not particularised. It should be treated like the term *chamasa*.

being His own master (i.e., not subject to *karma*) derives amusement from her who is subject to Himself (verse 7). This *Bhagavān*, the all-Ruler by willing and creation derives amusement controlling her (verse 8); hre, who treats all bound *jeevas* alike and gives enjoyment, being prompted by those that do *yagas* (offering) (verse 9). *Vyakta* and *avyakta* numbering twenty-four is He alone (*Ibid.*, II-4).

Thus the nature of *prakṛiti* and the rest has been described. *Brahma*, who is their *atma*, is thus stated. Some say that He is the twenty-sixth; others that He is the twenty-seventh; He whom the *atharva siras* knows to be *purusha*, without qualities (*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), and to be *jnana* (*Ibid.*, 3).

(ii) The causes are eight, and the products are sixteen.

(iii) *Svatasvatara*. The all-Ruler supports this universe made up of *kshara* (material products) and *akshara* (*jeevas*) blended together, whether they be in the subtle or gross condition. The *jeeva*, not being his own master, is bound from a hankering after enjoyment; knowing the shining one. He is released from all bondage (I-8). Two persons are unborn; but they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant; ruler and ruled; one unborn exists for the purpose of affording enjoyment to the *jeevas* (verse 8). *Ātmā*, of whom the whose world is a body, and the excellence of whose good qualities has no limit, does not do *karma* as the *jeeva* does; for He does not desire the fruits of *karma*; when one thus perceives the three he becomes like *Brahma* (verse 9). Matter is *kshara* (*perishable*); the *jeeva* who is immortal, and who takes material products for enjoyment, is *akshara*; one the shining being controls both *kshara* and the *Ātmās*; by constantly thinking on Him, by concentrated meditation, and by the emergence of the nature one

Here the term *aja* from its etymology denotes merely what is not born; and there is nothing to indicate that reference is made to matter, which is independent of the highest *Ātmā*. In the *bṛihad aranyaka* text (see Vedic Texts)

There is a cup with its mouth below, and its bottom above (IV-2-3).

The term cup (*chamasa*) merely refers to a vessel for drinking, and does not indicate what the particular instrument is. When the etymological meaning of a word is taken, it naturally denotes an object in general terms; and the particular object has to be found from the capacity of the word, from other words in the same sentence or from connected sentences which follow it. Without considering these the particular object cannot be known. In the case of the cup (*chamasa*) the sentence, which follows, indicates that it is the human head. The same plan should be followed here; but there is nothing in the context to show that it is the *prakṛiti* of the *sāṅkhya*. The termination in the term *srijaṃanam* does not possess the necessary capacity. The independence shown by it means that it is the seat of its own action and not that it is not controlled by another. This is seen in the sentences 'The car goes'; on the other hand, there is reason to hold the view that it is matter controlled by the highest *Ātmā*.

१. ज्योतिरुपक्रमा तु तथा ह्यधीयत एके ।

abandons all bondage to matter at the close of worldly existence (verse 10). 'The *vedas*, the *karmas* enjoined (*yajnas*, *kratus*, and *vratas*), and what past and future the *vedas* describe, all this the lord of *māyā* creates from this; in it another is bound, deluded by *māyā*; know *māyā* to be *prakṛiti*; and the lord of *māyā* to be the great Ruler; all this world is pervaded by the *jeevas*, who are His parts (*Ibid.*, IV-9 and 10). The lord of matter and of embodied *jeevas*, and the ruler of *jñāna* and the other five qualities and the cause of *samsāra*, of release therefrom and of its continuance (*Ibid.*, 16). (iv) *Bhagavad gītā*. Know that the body and the *Ātmā* both have had no beginning; know also that changes take place, and *gunas* manifest themselves in the body (XIII-19). The body is said to be concerned, when the body or the senses act; the *Ātmā* is said to be concerned, when pleasure and pain are experienced (*Ibid.*, 20). For, the *Ātmā*, seated in the body, experiences the *gunas* manifested in the body, and their effects. Attachment to the *gunas* and their effects causes his birth in good or evil wombs (verse 21); *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* the *gunas* manifested in the body, bind the changeless *Ātmā* seated in the body (XIV-5); All the beings at the end of a world-age come to My *prakṛiti*. At the beginning of another world-age I send them forth again (IX-7). Energising and controlling My *prakṛiti*, I send forth again and again all these beings, who are helpless being under the control of matter. (*Ibid.*, 8); with Me to direct *prakṛiti* sends forth from itself the world with the moving and unmoving things. From this cause the world goes round from evolution to dissolution and from dissolution to evolution (*Ibid.*, 10).

It is only a product of evolution from fire, for so some read in their *veda*.

The term 'fire' here is *Brahma* from whom it evolves. The *taittiriya*-(NARAYANAM—X) begins with the sentence:

Subtler than the subtle, and greater than the great; *Ātmā* is placed in the cave of the heart of the *jeeva*.

The reference is to *Brahma*, who is present in the heart in order that He may be meditated on. The *upanishad* goes on to state that from Him all the worlds, and all beings beginning with the four-faced one came forth, and then repeats the verse under consideration with one slight change. Here the evolution of every thing else from *Brahma* is described, and the mention of *aja* in this connection shows that it also has evolved from *Brahma* like the rest, *pranas*, the seas and the hills. Hence, *AJA* is not independent of *Brahma*; but controlled by Him it becomes the various products of evolution. This follows from the rule stated in note (1) on page 147. As the particular *chamasa* is found from a connected sentence that follows, so we determine what the *aja* is from a text in another branch of the *veda*, which is of the same form, and the meaning of which is recognised as identical with the meaning of which is recognised as identical with the meaning of the text under consideration. Hence, the *aja* is what is controlled by *Brahma*.

2. *Objection*. The text does not refer to creation; the subject was broken off with the third verse; in the next verse the highest *Ātmā* is identified with the fourfaced one and others; then the text under consideration comes; and in this the freed *jeeva* whose creation is inappropriate, is mentioned. *Reply*. The verse does refer to creation of many products of the same kind; and the reference to the freed *jeeva*, like the reference to the bound one, is with the object of stating something about the *aja*. On the other hand, the *aja* is mentioned not to serve any other purpose, and as it is found in a place where creation is described, the conclusion stated holds. The identification of the highest *Ātmā* with the fourfaced one and the rest rests on the fact that they are all products of evolution; and the cause and product are one. As the four-faced one is placed on a par with the eagle and the buffalo, this must be the meaning.

3. In the *svetasvatara* itself there are indications as to what the *aja* is. The *upanishad* begins with the question "*Brahma*, the cause of the world, What is He?" and the reply is next stated as follows:

They perceived by meditation matter, the inseparable attribute of the being known as Deva and *Ātmā*, with its own qualities *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* (I-3).

Further on in section IV after the verse under consideration this verse occurs:

All this *māyi* (owner of *māyā*) creates from this; and in that one other than He is confined. Know *māyā* to be *prakriti*, and Him, who has the *māyā*, to be the great Ruler..... who being one controls the causes of the world's evolution, *prakriti*, *mahat* and the rest.

Hence there is no reference in the text to an independent matter alleged by the *sāṅkhya*.

How can *prakriti* be *aja* (unborn) and also a thing produced by evolution from fire? The next *sūtra* replies.

10. कल्पनोपदेशाच्च मध्यवादिवदविरोधः ।

Because here evolution is taught. There is no conflict, as in *madhu vidyā*.

From matter in the subtle condition, which is inseparable from Himself, *Brahma* makes the world evolve. Matter in this condition is *aja*. It is then one with *Brahma*; it has no names and forms; and it is subtle. In the condition of evolution its qualities-*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*-become perceptible; it appears in diverse forms and with diverse names; it is referred to by *vyakta* and other terms; it evolves as *Fire* water and earth and it is seen to be red, white and black. In this condition it evolves from *Fire*. Hence, there is no inconsistency. In illustration of this explanation the *sūtra* refers to the two conditions of the sun to be meditated on in the *madhu vidhya*. See Chapter I, section 3, sub-section 8. In one condition the sun is one with *Brahma*; in the other or manifested condition it rises and sets, and is then enjoyed by groups of *devas* as honey.

Criticism. Others construe the verse under consideration differently. They state that the verse refers to a single she-goat, marked by fire, water and earth. Let us ask-What do you mean by the words 'marked by fire, water and earth?' Do you refer (i) to fire, water and earth only; (ii) or to *Brahma* in the form of fire, water and earth; (iii) or to some thing else that is the cause of them all?

Reply. To fire, water and earth.

Questioner. They are many; and the statement that they are one she-goat would not be correct.

Reply: Though they are more than one, yet as they have been compounded, they have become one.

Questioner : In spite of the composition their being more than one does not disappear; for each of them is a compound of the three elements formed in different proportions.

Reply: *Brahma* in the form of fire, water and earth is a single she-goat.

Questioner : Do you mean that *Brahma* is a single she-goat, when he has evolved as fire, water and earth or when he has not evolved, but remains as He is.

Reply : I mean the first alternative.

Questioner: Then being more than one does not disappear; they cannot be a single she-goat.

Reply : Take the second alternative.

Questioner: Then, the aja cannot be red, black and white; for *Brahma* in His own nature has no colour; and if you say that He has the colours indirectly, you must admit that matter, that has the colours, forms His body; and this will be accepting our view.

Reply: What is the cause of fire, water and earth is a single she-goat.

Questioner: You must then mention the words, fire, water and earth, and then by them refer to their causal condition. It is better by the term aja itself to refer to the causal condition; for this is stated by the *veda*.

2. Again, the statement that *prakriti* (aja) is likened to a she-goat is inappropriate: for it serves no purpose. In the verse considered in the preceding sub-section, the body was likened to a chariot in order to show the means to the reaching of *Brahma*. In the *upanishad* considered in section 3, sub-section 8, the sun was likened to honey, to show that he was an object of enjoyment to the *vasus* and other deva-groups. If *prakriti* be likened to a she-goat as is done by you, where is the comparison useful? It is not merely that the comparison is useless; but it is objectionable. *Prakriti* is the cause, from which the whole world evolves; while a she-goat brings forth only a few young ones. The connection of the *jeevas* with the former has had no beginning: and all the *jeevas* have been connected with it; while the connection of he-goats with the latter is casual; and all he-goats are not connected with it. The former serves as the means to every kind of enjoyment to them, and also serves as the instrument in the attainment of release; while the latter yields very petty fruit viz., milk; while the latter yields very petty fruit. viz., milk. The former is unintelligent, and is incapable of abandoning one, that is connected with it; while the latter is intelligent and can leave those, with whom it is connected. Further, the term aja would denote a she-goat, while the term aja would mean

one unborn; thus the same word would have different meanings in the same verse.

Reply: To obviate the last objection the term *aja* will denote goats in both the places.

Questioner: The verse states that a *jeeva*, who has obtained knowledge of the true nature of things, abandons *prakriti* completely; while a he-goat may after once leaving the she-goat go to it again, or to another she-goat; and to liken one to the other is extremely objectionable.

SUB SECTION - 3

The next text cited is from the *brihad aranyaka* :

On whom the five *pancha-janas* and ether rest, another who thus meditates on that *Ātmā* as *Brahma*, as immortality, becomes immortal (VI-4-17).

The opponent contends that this verse refers to the *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya*; because the term *pancha-jana* means five *janas* and it is qualified by the word five. It therefore means twenty-five beings. Five-*jana* is a group of five *janas*, and there are five groups. Thus there are twenty-five *janas*. What are these? The context refers to one that is qualified for release; and what he has to know are the *tatvas* or substances well-known in the *smṛiti* or *Kapila*. These are *mula prakriti*, which is not a product; mahat, *ahamkāra* and the five *tanmātrās*, seven in number, which are themselves products and give rise to other products; sixteen, which are only products, viz., the five great elements, mind, the five senses and the five motor organs; and *purusha*, who is not a product, and from whom no product evolves - in all twenty-five.

The reply to the opponent is given in the *sūtra* :-

11. न संख्योपसंग्रहादपि नानाभावादतिरेकाच्च ।

No: even if the number be accepted, because the things mentioned are different, and because the number is exceeded.

Assuming that the text refers to five groups of five *tatvas*, they are not those mentioned in the *sāṅkhya smṛiti*. For they rest on something, which is referred to by the term 'whom' (*yasmin*); and this is correlated to the term that (*tam*), which denotes *Brahma*. Hence they rest on *Brahma*, while the *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya* do not. Next, in addition to the twenty-five *tatvas*, there are ether and *Brahma*, on whom they rest. Hence this verse refers to the highest *Ātmā*, the ruler of all, and the support of the all *tatvas*, who is well-known in the *veda*

“He is said to be the twenty-sixth; by others, He is said to be the twenty-seventh”.

Lastly, it is not correct to say that reference is made to five groups of five things; for there are no marks or properties common to the members of each group, such as will constitute them a group. This is indicated by the word ‘even’ (*api*) in the *sūtra*. *Opponent*. There are five organs of action, five senses, five great elements, five *tanmatras* (subtle conditions of the elements) and the remaining five. *Reply*. As ether is separately mentioned, the group of five great elements does not exist.

What then are the five-*janas*? *Reply*. The term does not denote a group; it is a special name (*Panini*, II-1-50), as is shown by the termination of the compound. There are five of them. The next *sūtra* shows what they are:

12. प्राणादयो वाक्यशेषात् ।

Prāṇa and the rest, as shown by the connected sentence, which follows (1):

The very next verse reads :

Those that know the *Ātmā* to be the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, and the mind of the mind, have known in truth the ancient, highest *Brahma*.

This is the reading of the *kanvas*. The *mandhyandinas* have in addition the expression “the *anna* of *anna*” between the ear and mind. In the *mandhyandina* reading three senses are mentioned - eye, ear and mind, and two others - *prana* and *anna*, and in accordance with the majority rule (note 11) on (page 147), the two latter also should be the senses. And all of them are dependent on the highest *Ātmā* for support in the performance of their functions.

1. The connected sentence, which follows: Reference is made to the rule deduced in *pūrva mīmāṃsā* I-4-19. In the text ‘Place near each other small lime stones dipped in an oily substance; ghee is indeed *tejas* (a shining substance)’ the injunction does not state what the oily substance is; and what it is has to be determined. The *first view* is: The first clause gives the injunction; and it occurs first in the sentence, while the second clause is an *arthavāda*, and it occurs later. Hence the latter is weaker than the former; and any oily substance may be selected. The final decision is that *ghee* alone should be used. The objection will hold, if there were any conflict between the two clauses; but there is none. The first clause refers to an oily substance in general; and *ghee* is one of the things, which may come under this description. As the direction in general terms cannot be carried out, we desire to know what the substance should be; and the second clause helps us in finding it out. Further, as *ghee* is praised, it is an indication that it is intended by the injunction; for it is the business of an *arthavāda* to praise what is enjoined.

Here the following objections are raised : (i) In the *kanva* reading no mention of *anna* is made; and the number five is therefore inappropriate. (ii) The term *prāṇa*, occurring first in the verse, prevails on the beginning rule (*Intro.*, para 24), and its meaning by recognized usage should not be interfered with. Hence, the majority rule does not apply. The next *sūtra* has been framed to meet these objections:

13. ज्योतिषैकेषामसत्यन्ने ।

With the term *jyotis* (fire), even though the term *anna* is not found in the reading of some.

Ignore the *kanva* reading for a moment. With the verse as read by the others, a decision can be arrived at with the help of the term *jyotis* in the preceding verse; which has the ending of the possessive plural. This runs as follows:

Below whom the year with its days limits life, on that Being, who is the light of lights (*jyotisham*) who is life, who is immortality, the devas meditate.

This verse has a need - how many are the lights; and the text under consideration also has a need - what are the five? By this mutual need they are connected to form a *prakāraṇa*. It follows that the five are lights - ie., what reveal objects, and that they are the senses. This being settled, the term *prāṇa*, though occurring first in that verse, should be understood to mean one of the sense by the adoption of a secondary meaning. It denotes the senses of touch, which is connected with the element air, and *prāṇa* is only a variety of that element. The term *anna* denotes both the senses of smell and taste; for they are connected with earth, which is the meaning of the term *anna*. Smell is the quality of the element earth, and the sense of smell is connected with it; and the sense of taste is connected with food, which is a variety of earth. As both these senses are denoted by the same term, there is no conflict with the mention of the number five; for they form a group, and the number of the members of the group is neglected. Here is a precedent for this form of expression. "The twelve months are five *ritus*." The term *ritu* means a group of two months; and though there should be six *ritus*, the last two of them are treated as forming one group. The first objection raised may now be answered. The expression 'annam of annam' should be added in the *kanva* reading; for the subject being the same, what is found in one place should be added in the

1. Before creation, my dear, this was sat only (*chāndo*, VI-2-1); Before creation this was asat only (*ana* VII); Before creation this was asat only; it became sat; it became the universe (*chāndo*, III-19-1).

other, where it is not found. The conclusion is that the *sāṅkhya* gets no support from this text.

SUB-SECTION 4

The *sāṅkhya* makes a last stand on behalf of his *pradhāna* as the world-cause. All creation texts, which contain doubtful words, from the denotation of which it is not possible to exclude matter, are here for consideration. This is his contention. If the *vedānta* referred to one thing only as the cause of the evolution of the universe, it may be possible to affirm that the highest *Ātmā* is that single cause. But it mentions *sat* and *asat* indifferently by as the cause (1); and these terms exclude each other. On the other hand it is possible to assert that *pradhāna* is the cause. Here is a text:

Then this was *avyakṛitam* : the same by itself was made in to the universe to possessing diverse names and forms (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7).

The first clause states the dissolution of the universe in *pradhāna*, which was then without names and forms, and which is therefore referred to by the term *avyākṛita*. The second clause shows evolution from the same. Being indestructible in its substance, it may be said to be *sat* (what exists); and being subject to change of conditions, it may be said to be *asat*; and these terms used by creation-texts will therefore not be inappropriate in *pradhāna*, as they would be in the highest *Ātmā*, who is not subject to change.

2. Here an objection is raised. In a sentence, which follows, it is stated

He breathes and receives the name *prāṇa* ; He speaks, and receives the name speech; He sees, and receives the name eye; He hears and receives the name ear; He thinks, and receives the name mind. These are His names indicative of his actions.

This shows *avyakṛita* to be an intelligent being. Reply. From the word *avyakṛita*, which is first found, the world-cause is known to be non-intelligent; and on the beginning rule (Intro., para 24), this should prevail ; and the seeing and the rest should be understood in a secondary sense(1). The terms *Brahma* and *Ātmā*, which are used in regard to the world-cause, are applicable to *pradhāna* alone, as being great, and all-pervading. And this is also well-known from the *smṛiti* of Kapila as the world-cause.

1. This is necessary even to the *vedāntin*. He admits that matter exists, and that being without a beginning, it is the final cause; for this well-known from *vedānta* texts. He states that the aggregate made up of matter, *jeevas* and the highest *Ātmā* is the cause and that evolution is preceded by willing. But all of them cannot will; and as regard the matter element, willing not being possible, resort to a secondary sense must be accepted.

This view of the sankhya is refuted in the sutra :

14. कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्तेः ।

But in the texts containing the word *ākāśa* and the rest that Being is referred to as the world-cause, who has been described as all-knowing, as possessing an unfrustrated will, etc.

It is possible to decide that the universe evolves only from the highest *Ātmā*. Take the *ānandavalli* text. This refers to *Brahma* as all-knowing by the term *vipaschit*, and then states "From that *Ātmā ākāśa* (ether) came forth". Here before stating the creation, creative Being is referred to as all-knowing; and before the word *sambhūta* (came forth) the term *Ātmā* occurs, which in itself is confined by usage to intelligent beings. In the *chāndogya* text also first willing to become many is stated, and then the evolution of fire. The same course is followed in other *upanishads* also.

Before creation this was *Ātmā* indeed; one only; He willed I will create the words; He created these worlds. (*aita.*, I-2). He knows everything, and knows every (attribute) of everything; His tapas is thought; from Him came forth this *brahma*, name, form and *anna*. (*munḍa.*, I-1-10).

In another place beginning with the statement "*Nārāyaṇa*" alone was it is stated.

He found no pleasure in being alone; He thought of another object of desire in His mind; it become a golden egg; in it the four-faced *Brahma* was born.

In all these texts as willing is mentioned first and creation after it, it must be understood in accordance with the beginning. One or two texts cited by the opponent cannot prevail over so many, which speak with one mind and state the highest *Ātmā* only as the world-cause. The texts quoted by the opponent must therefore refer to creation by the highest *Ātmā*.

Why is it then stated that *asat* was the cause in the *ānandavalli* text?

15. समाकर्षात् ।

Because reference backward or forward is made (in such cases).

This verse is quoted as witness of what was stated before, viz., that *Brahma* is all-knowing, that His will is never frustrated, that He is full of bliss, that He evolved the world, and that He entered into everything and was therefore its inner ruler. Similarly, He is referred to in the next section of the *upanishad*, and control of all and possession of infinite bliss are affirmed. Hence, that *asat* in the verse is the all-knowing *Brahma*. He is referred to as *asat* or non-existent, because having then no name and form He did not exist

as possessed of them. The same interpretation should be applied to the *aitareya* text quoted. As to the term *avyākṛita* it indicates only *Brahma*, as the inner ruler of *avyākṛita*. For, reference is made to *avyakrita* by the term 'he' in the sentence which follows, and it is stated.

He has entered into this (the universe) to the very tips of the finger-nails. (*Ibid.*)

He, who enters into the products of evolution, makes names and forms and controls them, is well-known to be *Brahma*. Hence *avyakrita* is the Being that ensouls it. The *pradhāna* of the *sāṅkhya*, being non-intelligent, cannot enter into things in this manner for the purpose of control.

The sentence "The same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms" means, that the same *Brahma*, all-knowing and having an unfrustrated will, who was without diverse names and forms, became possessed of them, and that this change was brought about by Himself. Understanding the text in this manner, it will be observed that willing and the rest may be taken in their primary sense, and that the terms *Brahma* and *Ātmā*, meaning as they do what is immeasurably great, and what pervades others for the purpose of control, can never apply to *pradhana*.

SUB-SECTION 5

The *sāṅkhya* gives up *pradhama* for good, and comes forward to plead for his *purusha*, who being intelligent, cannot be rejected in the same way. He quotes the following text from the *kaushitaki* :

He, who made these persons, and whose this *karma* is, should be meditated on (III).

See the narrative in Vedic Texts. *Bālāki* offered to speak to *Ajātaśatru* about *Brahma*, but referred to a number of *jeevas* in the sun, the moon and many other places. *Ajātaśatru* rebuked him for vainly saying that he would speak about *Brahma*, and began to teach him, beginning with the text quoted.

First view. The *sāṅkhya* argues : Here reference is made to one, who is connected with *karma* ; *karma* is good and bad deeds, and pertains only to a *jeeva*, who is bound. Hence the *purusha*, who controls *pradhāna* and derives enjoyment, is put before the student for meditation; and he must be *Brahma*; and from the context it cannot be any other ; for the *Brahma* of the *vedantin* has no connection with *karma*.

2. Here he anticipates an objection, which may be raised by the *vedantin*. The term *karma* means, taking the etymological meaning, what is made, and refers to the universe brought up before the mind by sense percep-

tion; and it is this that is indicated by the expression - 'this *karma*'. The instruction given is therefore that He, who made all this world, should be meditated on; and He must be other than a bound *jeeva*. The *sankhya* replies. Then the second half of the text would merely repeat the first half, and would have no meaning. Also, the term *karma* is well-recognised as meaning good and bad deeds in the *veda* and in the literature of the world.

3. Question. If the text refers to a bound *jeeva*, how is the statement 'Who made these persons' to be understood? Reply. The world is made, so that every one may experience the fruits of his own *karma* ; and a bound *jeeva* may appropriately be said to be the cause of creation. He needs objects of enjoyment and places of enjoyment; and the sun, the moon and the rest and the persons who control them are made for him. He becomes the cause of this through his *karma* ; and *Ajata satru* taught that his nature, as divorced from matter, should be known.

4. This view is confirmed in three places in the same context of the *upanishad*. First, both the teacher and student went to a sleeping person; and the teacher called by names which referred to *prāṇa*, the *jeeva*'s instrument; and the person not replying, he pushed him with a stick, whereupon he awoke. These are marks indicative of a *jeeva*. Secondly, the illustration of the great man of the world points to the same conclusion. This is what the *upanishad* states :

As the great man obtains enjoyment with his people as instruments, and as his people profit by the great man, so that all-knowing *Ātmā* obtains amusement with these *jeevas* ; these *jeevas* enjoy Him and become happy.

5. Lastly, *Ajatasatru*, referring to the sleeper, asked

Balaki, where did this person sleep then; where was it (the group of his instruments); and whence did it come forth.

Balaki, being unable to reply, *Ajatasatru* himself gave the answers :

There are blood-vessels of the heart, known as *hita*,.... in which the person was then, when he sleeps and sees no dream of any kind ; next it (i.e., the group of his instruments) becomes one with this *prāṇa* ; then speech becomes one with it with all its activities ; ... the mind with all its activities; when he awakes, then as from a burning fire sparks go forth in all directions, so from this *Ātmā prāṇas* go forth, each to its place, etc.¹

Here reference is made to a *jeeva*, who exists in three conditions - the dreaming, sleeping and waking conditions, to whom speech, and other instru-

¹ This text is interpreted so as to suit the *first view*. For the correct interpretation see Vedic Texts.

ments go in sleep, suspending their functions, and from whom they return. The words 'this *prāṇa*' mean 'this *jeeva*'; for the *jeeva* bears *prāṇa*, and he is therefore denoted by that word. This must be the meaning; for, by the word 'he' in 'when he awakes' reference is made to *prāṇa*; and he that awakes must be a *jeeva*. Neither the instrument *prāṇa* nor the highest *Ātmā* sleeps or awakes. This interpretation of the term *prāṇa* has resort to a secondary sense; and this may be avoided by taking the words 'this' and *prāṇa* as not being in apposition. The meaning will then be 'with *prāṇa* which is in this (*jeeva*)'. Though the term *prāṇa* is taken to mean the *jeeva*'s instrument, it is the *jeeva* that is considered in this context, *prāṇa* itself being his instrument.

6. The conclusion is that *Brahma*, whom the teacher began to speak about, is *purusha* alone; and there is no *Ishvara* other than he. The willing and other attributes of the world-cause, which are said to pertain only to intelligent beings, are appropriately found in him alone. Hence, *pradhana* only under his control is the world-cause.

This view of the *sankhya* is refuted in the sutra :

16. जगद्वाचित्वात् ।

(No), because the term *karma* indicates the world

Here reference is made not to the *jeeva* under bondage to *karma*, but to the highest *Ātmā*. The term *karma* is qualified by the term 'this' (*etad*), which refers to what is present before the mind; and, what this is must be determined from the sentence, in which it is found, or, from the context, or from other marks showing the intention. Here neither the sentence nor the context will help. The term does not refer to the persons mentioned in the same sentence; for it is in the neuter singular, while the term denoting the persons is in the masculine plural. Next, it does not refer to *karma* in the form of good and bad deeds; as it has not been mentioned in the context. Thirdly, though not mentioned, it cannot be assumed, on the plea that reference is made to the creation of the persons and a cause is implied; for this will lead to delay in understanding the term. Lastly, it cannot draw attention to the action in the form of creating the persons; for as this has been mentioned by the clause 'who made those persons,' there will be redundancy. Hence, the term *etad*, not being in any way limited, draws attention to the whole world, made up of the intelligent and non-intelligent elements. This is seen from sense perception; and the reference to the persons in the sun and the rest, who are a part of the world, brings up the whole before the mind. The term *karma*, being connected with this, cannot refer to good and evil deeds.

2. Next, let the context be examined. *Balaki* came forward with the offer to teach *Brahma* to *Ajatasatru*, and failed; for he only referred to the persons in the sun and other places, and they are not *Brahma*. *Ajatasatru* undertook the task of teaching him *Brahma*, whom he did not know. This purpose will not be served, if his attention was drawn to persons who were connected with *karma*; for *Balaki* already knew the persons in the sun, the moon, etc., and other persons would be of the same description. The Being, whom he did not know, and whom *Ajatasatru* wished to show him, must therefore be a Being without good and evil deeds. Hence also the term *karma* cannot be interpreted as proposed; and it will be as inappropriate here, as action in general will be, which is another meaning of the term by established usage.

3. Objection. The word 'he' in 'he should be meditated on' refers to the *jeeva* by the mark that he is connected with *karma*, and draws attention to his true nature as the thing to be known for meditation; and this is a thing which *Balaki* did not know ! Reply. In this case the ordinary meaning of the term 'whose' will be laid aside; for it indicates connection with *karma*, and it must be understood as bringing up before the mind absence of such connection. If reference to *karma* were needed to indicate the person, whose true nature should be known, the more direct form would have been 'whose *karma* exists'; and the word 'this' (*etad*) would be superfluous.

4. Further objection. The clause 'whose this *karma* is' would be purposeless under your interpretation. Reply. It is not so; for this is what *Ajatasatru* meant. "You have mentioned several persons as being *Brahma*. All of them were made by a superior Being. Why should I single out these? The whole world is His work-high or low, intelligent or non-intelligent, and in this respect, viz., being products of evolution from Him, they are all alike".

5. Lastly, the impression that a bound *jeeva* is the cause of evolution of other persons through his *karma* is untenable. His *karma* may have led to the evolution of the world; but he cannot himself create objects of enjoyment and instruments of enjoyment. He merely utilises them, when they are made for him by the highest *Ātmā* ; as a person for whom a cup is made, uses it for drinking, though it is made by another, the potter.

17. जीवमुख्यप्राणलिङ्गान्नेति चेत्तद्व्याख्यातम् ।

If it be contended "No ; because the marks of a *jeeva* and the further mark in the mention of his instrument *prāṇa* occur" ; the reply is "This objection has already been answered".

In section 1, sub-section 11, the rule was laid down that when on the consideration of the beginning and end of an *upanishad* it is decided that it

refers to *Brahma*, then the marks of other things should be understood in accordance therewith. Here also the *upanishad* begins with the offer to teach *Brahma*. A text in the middle has been examined in the preceding sutra and shown to refer only to Him. In the end it is stated;

One, that knows this and meditates on that *Ātmā*, abandons all evil deeds, attains pre-eminence and supremacy among all beings and becomes his own master (IV-20).

The abandoning of all evil deeds and becoming free follow only on meditation on the highest *Ātmā*. Hence, this portion of the *upanishad* refers only to Him ; and the term *prāṇa* in the clause "Then he becomes one with this *prāṇa*" means the inner ruler of *prāṇa*. The terms 'this' and *prāṇa* are in apposition; and this should be assumed, unless the context directs otherwise. This mode of expression is adopted to show that the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as the inner ruler of *prāṇa*.

18. अन्यार्थं तु जैमिनिः प्रश्नव्याख्यानाभ्यामपिचैवमेके ।

(The mention of the *jeeva*) was to show a Being other than he. So does *Jaimini* think. This is seen from the question put and the explanation offered. So some read.

The mention of the *jeeva*'s marks is explained in another way. The particle *to*, which occurs in the original, expresses dissent from the *sāṅkhya*'s view that the context refers to the *jeeva*, because of his mention. *Ajātaśatru* took *Bālāki* to a sleeping person, whose *prāṇa* was wide awake. To show that the sleeper was different from his *prāṇa*, he called *prāṇa* by its names ; but there was no response. He then pushed the sleeper with a stick, and he arose at once. *Ajātaśatru* next wished to show him that there was a being other than the *jeeva*, viz., the highest *Ātmā* ; and he put to him three questions : "Where did this person sleep then *Bālāki*; where was he; whence did he come forth" As *Bālāki* was unable to reply, he himself explained. The answers were - first question - "In these (the blood-vessels) the person was then". Second question - 'Next when he sleeps and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with this *prāṇa*'. Third question - 'From that *Ātmā* *prāṇas* go forth each to his place'. They refer

1. The above shows that the *sūtra* was needed to remove a further doubt. In sub-section 11 of section 1 there were marks of the *jeeva* at the beginning; and the context as a whole related to the highest *Ātmā*. Here, however, the marks of the *jeeva* are found in the beginning, the middle and the end; and one cannot be certain that the intention is that the terms used should be understood as denoting the inner ruler of what they ordinarily denote. This is the further doubt. It is removed by showing that though the three kinds of meditation are not possible, the rule deduced in that sub-section may be applied, as the purpose is to show that there is another, that is other than *jeeva*.

only to one that is other than the *jeeva*, viz., the highest *Ātmā*. He is well-known to be the place, to which the *jeeva* goes in deep sleep, forgets the joys and griefs experienced in the waking and dream conditions to the distraction of this mind, and enjoys peace. He it is from whom he goes forth to resume the daily turmoil. Here is the authority :

He is then, my dear, united to Sat (chando., VI-8-1) ; Embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, he does not know what is outside; he does not know what is inside (*brihad.*, Vi-3-21).

It is thus clear from the questions and answers that the mention of the *jeeva* was in order to show that there was another than he - viz., the highest *Ātmā* (1).

2. The remarks of the sankhya in para 5 of the first view are not sound. First, the place to which the *jeeva* goes in deep sleep is not the blood - vessels known as *hita*; for they are the place, being in which he dreams. See the quotation in the same para. The term *atha* (next) separates the condition of the *jeeva* indicated by the word *then* (*tada*) from the condition of deep sleep. The statement that he sees no dreams in this condition implies that he sees them in the other. Two conditions are therefore stated - in the first or dream condition the *jeeva* is in the blood-vessels known as *hita* and sees dreams; in the second or deep sleep condition he becomes one with *prāṇa* and sees no dreams. The clause 'when he sleeps and sees no dream' should be connected with the next sentence 'with this *prāṇa*, etc.' The answer 'In these the person was then' refers to the dream condition, and is the reply to the first question 'where did this person sleep'. The answer 'Next, when he sleeps and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with this *prāṇa*' refers to the deep sleep condition, and is the reply to the second question 'where was he then'. The first view overlooks this difference and makes one condition of both; but as shown at the beginning of this paragraph this is incorrect.

3. Next, the view that the second question "Where was he then" refers to the group of the *jeeva*'s instruments is incorrect. The term *he* (*etad*) refers to what has been mentioned before, and this is the person referred to in the first question; and no reference whatever was made before to the group of instruments. Objection. The neuter gender of the word *etad* makes it inapplicable to the person. Reply. This is not a serious objection. The principal part of the word-the root-makes the reference to the person, and the termination is of less importance as compared with it. Understanding the first two questions to refer to the same person, and the replies to them to deal with the dream and deep sleep conditions, the first two questions will also relate to these two conditions - otherwise, there would be incongruity, the question relating to the deep sleep condition and the answers to both the conditions.

4. Question. Why is reference made to the group of the *jeeva's* instruments? Reply. It is for the purpose of explaining what is meant by his becoming one with *prāṇa*. In this condition his instrument *jnana* does not go forth through the various senses, which cease to function then. As this cessation of functions is a part of the deep sleep condition, a separate question in regard to them was unnecessary.

5. The opponent's remark that in the sentence 'when he awakes', the word 'he' refers to *prāṇa* is also incorrect. The natural connection is between the person who sleeps and the person who awakes : and the sleeper being a person, the same must be taken to arise from sleep.

6. Hence, the conclusion stands - viz., that the *jeeva* with his instruments becomes one with *prāṇa*, and that *prāṇa* is the highest *Ātmā*.

7. The last portion of the *sutra* confirms the conclusion that *prāṇa* here is the highest *Ātmā*. In the parallel passage from the *brihadaranyaka*, which treats of the same subject, the highest *Ātmā* is distinguished from the sleeping *jeeva*: "That ether (*akasa*) in the heart on Him he lies" (*brihad.*, IV-1-17). This ether is well-known to be the highest *Ātmā*. Hence this portion of the *upanishad* does not mention as the world-cause either *pradhana* or the *jeeva* as directing it.

SUB-SECTION 6

Once more the *sankhya* quotes a portion of an *upanishad* as relating to the *purusha* mentioned in *Kapilās smṛiti*, and contends that there is no *Isvara* other than he. The portion is what is known as *Maitreyi brāhmaṇa*, in which *Yājñavalkya* teaches *Brahma-vidya* to his wife *Maitreyi*. See Vedic Texts. *Maitreyi* requested instruction in regard to the means to immortality; and *Yajnavalkya* began with the following words:

A husband does not become dear, because the husband wishes it in order to obtain what he desires; but to carry out the wish of the *Ātmā* the husband becomes dear.

Then follow similar verses for wife, sons, wealth, *brahmana*, *kshattriya*, *svarga* and similar worlds, *devas*, being and all things. Then he added :

Ātmā, dear, should be seen, be heard about, be thought about, be meditated on. *Maitreyi*, dear, by the seeing, hearing about, thinking about and meditating on of the *Ātmā* all this becomes known (IV-4-5).

Who is it that is taught in this next as being the object of seeing? Is he the *purusha* of the *sankhya* or the highest *Ātmā*?

First view. He is the *purusha*; for in the beginning, middle, and end of this *upanishad* reference is made only to him. In the beginning reference is made to husband, wife, sons and wealth being dear. In the middle the birth and death of the *Ātmā* are stated (verse 12); and in the end these words are found - "By what means, my dear, can he see the knower?" (verse 14). Hence, this *upanishad* deals with the *purusha* of *Kapila's smṛiti*.

2. Here an objection is raised. The beginning shows that the means to immortality is taught. How can it be said to relate to the *purusha*? Reply. It is for this very reason that the *purusha* is mentioned. That *smṛiti* teaches that knowledge of the true nature of the *purusha*, divorced from the condition, in which he fancies himself to be the seat of the attributes of non-intelligent *prakṛiti*, leads to immortality. Hence the text quoted states that this true nature should be known.

3. Other portion of the *upanishad* support this conclusion. (i) The true nature of all *Ātmās* divorced from matter is of one character; hence one by knowing his own true nature knows all *Ātmās*; and the statement that by knowing *Ātmā* everything is known is borne out. (ii) In all beings beginning with *devas* and ending with the vegetable kingdom, as the *Ātmās* have but one character, viz., intelligence, the teaching was that all *Ātmās* are one (verse 6). (iii) As the forms in which these beings appear are not the forms of the *Ātmās*, the notion that they are different was condemned (verse 6). (iv) The *Ātmās* being alike, and the differences among them relating to their bodies, the impression that the differences are in the *Ātmās* is stated to be illusion (verse 14); and (v) As the *purusha* directs the evolution of *prakṛiti*, and is therefore the operative cause, the description of evolution from him is appropriate (verse 10).

If this *upanishad* be decided to deal with the *purusha*, as other *upanishads* should agree with it, the whole of the *vedānta* describes the *purusha* of *Kapila's smṛiti*; *pradhana* directed by him is the world-cause ; but not *Isvara*.

Final decision. The *Ātmā* to be known is the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

19. वाक्यान्वयात् ।

Because only in this view will the mutual relation of all the sentences forming a connected whole be natural.

First, *Maitreyi* treated wealth with contempt, and desired to know the means to immortality, and *Yajnavalkya* instructed her to meditate on *Ātmā*.

1. Meditating on Him alone one overcomes death (*śveta*, III-8) One, that thus meditates on Him here, becomes immortal; no other path lies to the goal (*puru*).

This *Ātmā* must be the highest *Ātmā*. For the *upanishads* teach meditation on Him as the only means to immortality (1). Opponent. Should not the true nature of the *jeeva* be known? Reply. This knowledge is needed only as subsidiary to the meditation on the highest *Ātmā*, but not as an independent means. For the *jeeva*, who has to reach Him, being among the things controlled by Him, He is not known fully, unless the *jeeva* also is known. Hence the highest *Ātmā* alone is taught as the means to immortality by the words 'should be seen'.

2. Next, the statement that by knowing *Ātmā* everything is known will be appropriate only, if the *Ātmā* be the highest *Ātmā*, who is the inner ruler of all. The explanation on this point in para 3(1) of the first view is not satisfactory ; for it ignores matter, which will not be known (verse 5). At the end of the next verse it is said : "*Ātmā* is all this", reference being made by the term 'all this' to the universe consisting of matter and *jeevas*, which every one sees; and *Ātmā* is identified with it. This identification will be inappropriate in the case of the *jeeva*, who, when bound, is controlled by matter and is powerless, and who when freed is not competent to deal with the world. The highest *Ātmā* alone, pervading the universe, can be said to be the world. Hence, one who regards anything as existing independently of Him is condemned in the same verse. In verse 10 everything is said to come forth from *Ātmā*. This must be the highest *Ātmā*, as the evolution of the world is His function. The bound and freed *jeevas* are powerless as stated already; and the *purusha* of the *sāṅkhya* is according to his own showing incompetent to will and cannot therefore be the operative cause. Lastly, in verse 12 of the first of the two *upanishads*, which cover the same ground, the *Ātmā* under consideration is stated to be a great Being - unlimited in His nature and in His attributes. This description applies only to the highest *Ātmā*, who is therefore dealt with in this *unpanishad*.

3. The opening sentences of verse 5 may now be considered: They state that a husband is dear, not because he wishes it; but to bring about what the *Ātmā* desires, such as pleasure. These sentence are connected with the sentence containing the injunction to seek the *Ātmā*, who, as shown in paras 1 and 2, is the highest *Ātmā* ; and their purpose is to induce one to seek Him.

4. *The opponent asks.* Have I not observed that at the very outset the *jeeva* is stated to be an object to be sought, the *jeeva*, who is connected with things that are dear, as husband, wife, sons, wealth, cattle and the like? These sentences therefore relate to him. *Reply.* Yes but what you said is not sound. If the term *Ātmā* in these sentences be taken to mean a *jeeva*, they will not be connected with the injunction-text. As already observed, they have to render a service to that text; but this will not happen. By the statement that the husband and the rest become dear the *jeeva*, to whom they are dear, will not

be induced to abandon them, and seek his own nature; for he will naturally seek what is dear; but not his own nature, in which the connection with the dear things will disappear. It is not merely that the sentences will serve no purpose; but there is an absurdity. The husband and the rest become dear, not for their own purpose, but for the purpose of the *jeeva*, to whom they become dear. Hence that *jeeva* should seek them alone for his own purpose. To ask him to reject them and seek what will not be connected with the dear things is absurd. *Opponent*, Let not the sentences be connected with the injunction-text. *Reply*. This will itself be a flaw; for when it is possible to regard the sentences and the injunction-text as a connected whole dealing with one topic, to treat them as unconnected and as dealing with two different matters is not legitimate. Even if this flaw be put up with, they will serve no purpose. Hence, the sentences and the injunction-text should be so explained, that one will be induced to abandon all dear things as husband and the rest and seek the *Ātmā* alone.

5. This is the explanation. The term *Ātmā* should be taken to mean the highest *Ātmā*. The sentences will mean that the husband and the rest are not dear by nature; for this is a passing trait; while they are dear in some respects, they may be repulsive in other ; and they cannot be the dearest. This we all see. They become dear to carry out the will of the highest *Ātmā*, who rewards His worshippers by giving them a drop of bliss in accordance with their *karmas* by making certain things dear to them. He, on whose will this bliss depends, must be limitless bliss (1) ; and He should be sought, the petty dear things being rejected. That things become dear at the will of the highest *Ātmā* is stated by the *veda* 'He indeed confers bliss' (*ana.*, vii). That things are not desirable or undesirable in their own nature is stated.

Because the same thing having given pleasure, subsequently leads to pain; and because the same thing first leads to anger, and afterward leads to good will, there is nothing, that in itself is painful or pleasurable.

6. The sentences may be explained in another way also, taking the term *Ātmā* to be a *jeeva* in those sentences, and to be the highest *Ātmā* in the injunction-text. The husband becomes dear to the wife, not because he wishes it, in order that he may attain what he desires ; and the wife has to accept him as such, having no choice; but she herself of her own choice to attain what she desires regards him as dear to herself. Instead of doing so, she should seek one, that in his nature, is dear beyond measure and free from imperfections ; and such an *Ātmā* is the highest *Ātmā*. The husband and the rest are not like Him;

1. *Must be limitless beliefs*. The Being, on whose will the pleasure which the wife derives from her husband depends, must be unlimited bliss. If one gives wealth or imparts learning to another, his own wealth, or learning must be very great:

the pleasure which they given is petty; it is alloyed with pain and leads to subsequent pain. And their being dear or otherwise depends entirely on the highest *Ātmā*.

7. Of the two explanations the first is preferable, as the *upanishad* deals only with the highest *Ātmā* ; and as reference is made only to Him by words, that denote a *jeeva*. This occurs in verse 12. This great Being unlimited in His nature and in His attributes is *vijnama-ghama* only. The term *vijnama-ghama* denotes a *jeeva*, who is by nature all-knowing. The other terms in the verse denote the highest *Ātmā* ; as the term *vijnama-ghama* is in apposition with them, it must be taken to denote the highest *Ātmā* alone.

The question arises why the highest *Ātmā* is referred to by a term, that ordinarily denotes a *jeeva*. This is replied to in the next three *sūtras*:

20. प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ।

(The reference made to the highest *Ātmā* by words that ordinarily denote a *jeeva* is) a mark which proves the declaration. So *Āsmarathya* thinks.

The declaration is made in the *chāndogyn* (VI-1-1 to 3) and is that by knowing one thing all things are known. It is proved on the theory that the highest *Ātmā* appears by evolution as the *jeeva*, and that He is therefore one with him. If this were not so, the *jeeva* being different from Him, cannot be known by knowing Him. This theory is supported by these texts:

Before creation this was *Ātmā* indeed; one only (*aita.*, I-1-1); As from a blazing fire sparks similar to it go forth by thousands, so from *Akshara* come forth, dear, various beings; and they are dissolved in the very same (*munda.*, II-1-1).

Hence the highest *Ātmā* and *jeevas* are one ; and words ordinarily indicating them are used with reference to Him.

21. उत्क्रमिष्यत एवम्भावादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

Because the *jeeva*, when he rises (finally) from the body, becomes so (i.e. *Brahma*). This is the views of *Audulomi*.

The view of *Asmārathya* is unsound ; for the *jeeva* is said to be unborn in the text 'The *jeeva* who is fit to become all-knowing is not born, nor does he die' (*katha*, I-2-18). It is admitted that the universe is created in order that the *jeevas* may experience the fruits of their previous *karmas* ; if this be not admitted, the creation of differences cannot be explained. If *jeevas* were products of *Brahma*, *moksha* (release) would be their return to the *Brahma*-condition ; and this would be as inevitable as the dissolution of ether and the rest. Then

the pointing out of the means to *moksha*, and its adoption would be purposeless. *Moksha*, would mean return to the causal condition like the conversion of a jar to dust, and would be destruction. It would therefore cease to be an end that man will seek. There are certain texts no doubt, which speak of the *jeevas* creation and destruction ; they will be explained later on. Hence as the *jeeva* becomes *Brahma*, when he rises from his body (*chāndo.*, VIII-3-4, and *munda.*, III-2-8) the highest *Ātmā* is denoted by a term, that denotes a *jeeva*.

22. अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ।

Because *Brahma* dwells (in the *jeeva*); this is the view of *Kasakritsna*.

The view of *Audulomi* too is unsound; for it cannot stand examination. Before the *jeeva* rises from his body, he was not *Brahma*. Does this previous condition pertain to nature, or was it brought about by an *upādhi* (1) ? In the former alternative, the *Brahma*-condition cannot be attained ; for the previous condition being natural, the *jeeva*'s difference from *Brahma* pertain to his nature ; and it cannot disappear, so long as he remains. If it be said that he disappears along with the difference, then as he no longer exists, there is no *Brahma*-condition. There is also the objection that the result will not be what man will seek.

2. Let us next consider the second alternative. If the previous condition was brought about by an *upādhi*, was that condition real or unreal? If it were real, he that rises from the body was *Brahma* only before ; and it is not correct to say that the *Brahma*-condition is now attained, there being no difference between the two conditions. In this view there are only two things - *Brahma* and *upādhi*; nothing else; *Brahma* has no parts, which the *upādhi* can contact. It must, therefore, contact *Brahma* Himself. Now as what is contacted by the *upādhi* becomes a *jeeva*, the whole of *Brahma* will become a *jeeva*; and there will be no *Brahma* left. Hence, the *upādhi* itself must be a *jeeva*. Then *Brahma* will retain his natural condition.

3. If the previous condition brought about by the *upādhi* were unreal, it should be stated who it is that attains the *Brahma*-condition? *Śankara* replies: *Brahma* Himself whose nature suffered *tiro-dhara*, i.e., did not appear, owing to *upādhi* in the form of *avidyā*. This reply is untenable ; for *Brahma* being ever free, being light (*jnāna*), and requiring no help for being known, He could not be prevented by *avidyā* from appearing. A thing is said to experience *tiro-dhara*,

1. *Upadhi* is something, by connection with which a thing assumes a new aspect. In *Bhāskara*'s theory the *upadhi* is real, and consists of the mind or *antahkarana*, by contact with which *Brahma* assumes the *jeeva*-condition. In *Śankara*'s theory it is unreal *avidya*, under the influences of which *Brahma* perceives an unreal work as existing.

when its light is not made to appear, while the thing itself remains. As it is stated that *Brahma* is only light, its appearance cannot be prevented; if it be, it must cease to exist. Hence, as His nature ever appears, in His attaining the *Brahma*-condition on rising from the body there is no difference. Hence the words 'when he rises from the body' serve no purpose. In the text which was in *Audulomia's* mind, by the reference to one's appearing in his own nature, it is not meant that he becomes *Brahma*. It only means that his own nature, which previously existed, but was now perceived, now emerges. This will be explained in chapter IV, section 4, sub-section 1.

4. The correct explanation is that the *jeeva* forms the body of *Brahma* ; that He remains within the *jeeva* as his *Ātmā* ; and that therefore *Brahma* is referred to by terms that ordinarily denote *jeevas*. This is the view of *Kasakritsna*. It has been explained that the term *jeeva* does not end in denoting a *jeeva* only ; but that it goes on to denote *Brahma* also (*vide* paras 13 to 16 of the final decision on pages 186 to 190). When this view is taken, all *vedic* texts will convey consistent teaching—those that affirm of *Brahma* freedom from imperfections, omniscience and the like ; those that state that the *jeeva*, who is ignorant and suffered misery, attains release by meditation on *Brahma*; those that describe the evolution and dissolution of the universe; and those that identify *Brahma* with the universe. Hence the author of the *sūtras* has accepted the view of *kasakritsna* alone.

In this interpretation the *upanishad* contains this teaching. On *Maitreis* enquiring as to the means to immortality, *Yājñavalkya* stated meditation on the highest *Ātmā* to be the means (verse 5). The marks of this *Ātmā* and the control of the mind and the senses as a help to the meditation were next stated in general terms (verses 5,7,8 and 9). In verse 10 His being the single cause of all the world was explained more fully ; and in verse 11 the need for the control of the mind and of all the organs of perception and action was expatiated on. In verse 12 in order to stimulate efforts towards meditation, the all-knowing character of the highest *Ātmā* was pointed out ; and the conditions of the *jeeva* in bondage and in release were contrasted ; it was shown that though by nature his attribute *jñāna* is unlimited, in bondage he follows the movements of his body, coming into the world with it and disappearing on its dissolution; and that in release he no longer confounds himself with the body. This portion of the teaching is given by referring to the highest *Ātmā* as appearing in the form of the *jeeva*, the object being to point out that in all conditions the *jeeva* is supported by the highest *Ātmā*, and that he is never independent. Though attributes of the *jeeva* are predicated of the highest *Ātmā*, yet as in the sentence "The revered man-lion is white" they should be connected with the *jeeva*, who forms His body, and only indirectly with Him. In verse 14

it is stated that to regard anything as independent of the highest *Ātmā* is an error; that it arises from ignorance; that ones from whom all ignorance is expelled, will perceive the whole world as *Brahma*; and that there being no object other than *Brahma*, he will not see any difference. The *upanishad* closes with the following remarks : The *jeeva* knows all this, being given *jnāna* by the highest *Ātmā*, who abides in himself as his *Ātmā*. He cannot know Him by any other means. The highest *Ātmā*, the ruler of all, stands apart from all things, intelligent and non-intelligent; He has every thing as His body, and remains as its *Ātmā*; and He is therefore not touched by the imperfections of the intelligent and non-intelligent objects that form His bodies. One cannot see the highest *Ātmā*, who differs from all else, who is the sole cause of all the worlds and who sees everything, by any means other than the meditation alone is the means to immortality; and the attainment of *Brahma* alone is that immortality. Hence this *upanishad* deals only with the highest *Ātmā* ; He alone is the world-cause; but not the *purusha* of the *sāṅkhya*, nor the *pradhāna* directed by him.

SUB-SECTION 7

In the first six sub-sections of this section the view that *pradhāna* directed by *purusha* was the world-cause was refuted. In the first three the opponent referred to this as an alternative to the highest *Ātmā*, while in the next three he ventured to put it forward as the only cause. Though all the texts quoted seemed to be similar to sentences in *sāṅkhya* works, the view that the highest *Ātmā* was not the world-cause was not directly connected with the section and came in for consideration only incidentally. Thus the atheistical *sāṅkhya* has been silenced. In this sub-section the *sāṅkhya*, who accepts the existence of the highest *Ātmā*, comes forward, and pleads that He is the operative cause ; that *pradhāna* is the material cause ; that each needs the other ; and that both are connected with the same work-the evolution of the universe.

First view. The view that the highest *Ātmā* is the world-cause, on the ground that willing implies an all-knowing Being, is accepted. But the same *vedānta*, which supports this view, points out *pradhāna* only as the material cause. For, the highest *Ātmā* is all-knowing is not subject to change of substance, and directs; while *pradhāna* is non-intelligent, is subject to change, and is directed. And He cannot be the world-cause without it. This is stated:

He is without parts, without action, without the six evils, without imperfections, and without attachment (*sveta.*, VI-19). He is indeed the great *Ātmā* without birth, without old age, without death (*brithad.*, VI-4-25).

These texts show that the highest *Ātmā* does not change. On the other hand *pradhāna* is stated to change and to be directed by Him:

Prakriti, the creator of products, non-intelligent, appearing in eight forms, without birth or death. She enters into the willing of *Brahma* ; directed by Him, she comes into the gross condition (as the great elements); again directed by the very same, she creates the universe consisting of objects of enjoyment and the means and places of enjoyment. She is a cow without beginning or end; the creator of the great elements and of the diverse products of evolution (*mantrikopanishad*).

Similarly, He creates only with *pradhāna* as the material:

From this the lord of *māyā* creates this world. Know *māyā* to be *prakriti* and the lord of *māyā* to be the great Ruler (*sveta.*, IV-9-10). With Me to direct *prakriti* brings forth the world with the moving and unmoving things (*bhagavad-gita*, IX-10).

2. Even if these were not stated by *vedic* texts, the evolution of the world from Him cannot happen, unless the existence of *pradhāna* and its direction by Him be accepted. For He does not change; and a thing that is capable of becoming the universe is needed; and this being non-intelligent, some one is required to direct its evolution. This complete difference between the material and operative causes is seen in the world also. The non-intelligent lump of earth or piece gold is the material, out of which jars or bracelets are made; and the intelligent potter or goldsmith is the maker; and this is perceived to be invariably the case. Further, the making of a product is seen to require invariably a number of causes, as every one sees (1). *Upanishad* texts cannot overlook these necessary conditions, and assert that the single *Brahma* is both the material and the maker. There are thus in support of the *first view*, *vedic texts*, the need for the assumption of *pradhāna* to justify *vedic* statement and the arguments set out; and these prevail over mere texts, which like the statement 'The *yupa* (post) is the sun,' must be understood differently. Hence, the highest *Ātmā* is the operative cause only; not the material cause. It is *pradhāna* directed by Him, that is that cause.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

23. प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ।

1. This may be put into logical form thus : (i) *Isvara* is not the material cause in the making of a substance; for He is an intelligent being, like the *jeeva*; (ii) The material cause under dispute is other than the operative cause of its products; for it is a material cause, like the lump of earth; (iii) The products under dispute need more than one cause; for they are products, like the jar.

The highest *Ātmā* is the material cause also; only in this view will the declaration and the illustrations not become nullified.

Reference is made here to the *chāndogya* text VI-1-3 to 6. See *Vedic Texts* under chapter I, section 1, and sub-section 5. The declaration is that by knowing one thing every thing will be known. Three illustrations are given, which show that by knowing the cause its products are known. For, the cause itself by a change of condition becomes the products. Now, if the highest *Ātmā* were only the operative cause, then by knowing Him the whole world could not be known. By knowing only the potter the vessels made by him are not known. Hence both the declaration and its illustrations would be nullified. If the highest *Ātmā* is the material cause in addition to being the operative cause, by knowing Him the whole world will be known; being its material cause. Hence it is concluded that He is the material cause also.

2. The statement in the *first view* that *vedic* texts themselves show difference between the material and operative causes is not correct; for they show them to be one. The father asked 'Did you enquire about that *Adesa*, hearing about whom everything not heard before is heard' (*chāndo.*, VI-1-3). Here the term *adesa* means controller; the root meaning to control and the termination the instrument in the control. The controller Himself being the most efficient instrument of control, the termination denoting the instrument is used to denote the controller. It may be objected that there is a departure from the natural meaning. The only other way to understand the term is to take it to mean what is taught; but this is common to any other things, while what is needed here is some attribute that is found only in the highest *Ātmā*. There is a departure in both cases from the natural meaning; for to teach is not the natural meaning of the root. But the root being more important than the termination, and the meaning controller being required, the other interpretation is rejected. The text then means-by hearing about the controller, what is not

1. See *antaryami brāhmaṇa*, *subalopanishad* and *brihad.*, IV-4-6, and VI-5-15, and *chando.*, III-14-1 and VI-8-7.

(2) *Question*. Is it not stated that *avyakta* and *akshara* come into existence and are finally dissolved? "*Mahat* is dissolved in *Avyakta*; *Avyakta* is dissolved in *akshara* (*suba*). From it *avyakta* comes forth with its three *gunas*. In *Brahma* without action, *avyakta* is dissolved (*bharata*). Reply This is no objection : for *Brahma* clothed in unintelligent matter has two conditions-in one the matter is so subtle that it cannot be spoken of as separate from HIM, even as His body. In this condition it is denoted by the term *tamas*. In the other condition it becomes gross, and its three qualities are manifested. This is a product and is known as *avyakta*. The texts quoted refer to this latter condition. Even in the condition of complete cosmic rest (*pralaya*) matter in a very subtle form exists as the body of *Brahma*, as stated in the text, "When *tamas* existed, there was neither day nor night". Hence it is stated, '*akshara* is dissolved in *tamas*, *tamas* becomes

heard before is heard about. Thus oneness of the two causes is affirmed. The same teaching is conveyed by the creation-text, which follows, by the assertion of the existence of one thing only before creation, and by the denial of a second.

3. The texts from the *mantrikopanishad* quoted in para 1 of the *first view*, which it is stated, show *pradhāna* to be without beginning and end, and therefore eternal, and to be the material cause of the world, have now to be explained. The text refer to the highest *Ātmā* in the causal condition, in which He was without names and forms; for then nothing else existed. On the theory of *Kasakritsna*, which the author of the *sūtras* adopts, He is the inner ruler of every thing intelligent and non-intelligent, and at all times (1). Sometimes He has names and forms differing from one another; He is then said to be many and to be products. Sometimes He is without them; He is said to be one, without a second, and to be in the causal condition. In this condition He is referred to by the terms 'go (cow) without beginning or end' and the creator of products (2).

4. In the world clay and other material causes, being non-intelligent, cannot direct the change from one condition to another; while the potter and other operative causes are unable themselves to change in this unusual manner; and do not possess an unfrustrated will. Hence the two causes are seen to be different. But the highest *Ātmā* stands apart from everything else; and He is omniscient and omnipotent. He can therefore be both the causes at the same time.

24. अभिध्योपदेशाच्च ।

And because willing by the highest *Ātmā* is stated.

one with the highest *deva*' (*suba*); thus there is no destruction of *tamas*. By the term 'becomes one' reference is made to the existence of *Brahma* in His matter element without diverse names and forms. The term does not mean destruction. This will be clear from the following texts "*Tamas* existed before; by *tamas* the world was enveloped and could not be well perceived; from *tamas* one came forth in a gross form"; "This was in the condition of *tamas*, and could not be perceived; for it had no marks like colour; it could not be known by arguments; it could not be known by arguments; it could not be known as separate from *Brahma*; it was, like one in deep sleep, united to *Brahma*; this was not a partial union, but a thorough going one" (*manu* 2-5). In the second text reference is made first to the condition in which *tamas* may be known to be separate from *Brahma* as His body, and then to the condition in which it is not so separated.¹

¹The text regarding the creation of the world from *māyā* will be presently explained; for *Brahma* does not undergo change of substance.

The statement is made in *chāndogya* (VI-2-2). "He willed I will become many" and in the *anandavalli* (VI-2) "He desired 'I will become many'. Here the creator willed Himself to become many. He was therefore the material cause; and as this becoming many was by the same Being who willed. He was also the operative cause. The becoming many was not by *avataras* as Rama and Krishna, but by appearing in the form of the elements first, and then of the products of evolution.

25. साक्षाच्चोभयाम्नात् ।

And because both (the causes) are expressly declared.

We are not dependent solely on the reasons stated in the two preceding *sūtras*. There is the following text.

Brahma was the forest; *Brahma* was the tree; from which heaven and earth were shaped. You wise ones, I tell you having decided with my mind; *Brahma* bearing the worlds used Himself as the instruments.

This was the reply to a question put from the worldly point of view-what was the material cause on which *Brahma* worked and what were His instruments. The answer was that He himself was the material cause and the instruments. Being entirely different from everything else, omnipotence of this kind was not inappropriate.

26. आत्मकृतेः ।

Because He made Himself (as material).

In *anandavalli*-7-1 reference is made to *Brahma* as wishing to evolve as the world, and it is stated. "Then He of Himself made Himself." Here *Brahma* was both the maker in the work of evolution, and the object made. The maker was the Being without name and form ; and the object made was the same Being with diverse names and forms - i.e., the world. There is therefore no impropriety in one being both the maker and the object made. Hence He was both the causes.

The opponent here raises an objection. How can *Brahma* become the world? He is by nature without evil of any kind found in matter and *jeevas*,

1. Earth passes through an intermediate stage known as *gandha tanmatra*. So do water, fire air and ether pass through their own *tanmatras*.

(2) The original has "ether in the senses ; the senses in *tanmātrās*". Here the term dissolves (*liyate* and *liyante*) used before and after is not found. Hence the meaning is that ether, and the senses unite. the former is dissolved in the *sabda tanmatras*, and the senses unite with it. The *tanmutra* and the senses are then dissolved in *ahamkāra*. The

and is the seat of unlimited *jnāna* and bliss; while the world is full of endless misery ? The next *sūtra* is the reply :

27. परिणामात् ।

Because everything evolves in its own way.

The evolution taught here is not such as to bring imperfections on *Brahma*. On the other hand, it shows His unlimited power of control. The evolution is thus described. When the period of cosmic activity came to an end, all the products of evolution, which formed His bodies, and of which He was the *Ātmā*, were dissolved in Him alone. The order of dissolution is thus stated in the *subala upanishad*-earth is dissolved in water (1); water in fire; fire in air; air in ether; ether and the senses (2) in *sabda tanmatra*; *sabha tanmatra* in *ahamkaria*; *ahamkāra* in *mahat* ; *mahat* in *avyakta* (3); *avyakta* in *akshara*; and *akshara* in *tamas*. The term *tamas* means matter in the finest condition. All the products disappeared; and *tamas* alone remained, and became one with *Brahma*. This means that it became so subtle, that it could not be spoken of as separate even as His body. Even then the matter and *jeeva* elements existed; and the *karmas* of the *jeevas* and the tendencies developed by them in the period of cosmic activity survived. When the period of cosmic rest came to a close, *Brahma* embodied in His inseparable elements willed I will become many. This

plural of the word *tanmātrās* was not intended; for reference is made to the *sabada tanmatra*, which is one.

1. *Tamas* exists in two conditions-in one it is in a position to evolve as *akshara*; and in the other it is not. In this latter condition it becomes one with *Brahma*. *Akshara* and *avyakta* are further stages in evolution; and in all of these the three *gunas*, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are balanced. The differences among these conditions are thus illustrated. *Tamas*, that is one with *brahma* is, like a grain in a granary; the next condition of *tamas* is like the same grain put into the ground; *akshara* is the same grain, when it is wet and its parts are loosened; and *avayakta* is the same, when it has swollen; *mahat* is the same, when it sends forth a shoot.

2. The same thing is stated in a *smṛiti* text. As the marks of *ritus* (a group of two months) are different in different *ritus*, and as when they come round, the marks of each *ritu*, alone appear in that *ritu*, as it did before, so in *yugas* and *kalpas* the same things appear as before (*Vishṇu*- 1-5-65).

3. That the whole world forms the body of *Brahma* and that he is its *Ātmā* is stated (See *bṛihad.*, V-7 in Vedic Texts under chap I, section 2, Sub-section 4). The *upanishad* enumerates many things, and states that every one of them is the body of the inner ruler. The *subala upanishad* has the following additions-*buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *chitta*, *avyakta* *akshara* and *mrityu*. The last term denotes *tamas*; for the order of dissolution is stated in the same *upanishad* thus - *avyakata*, *akshara*, and *tamas*. As it is the cause of the contraction of the *janana* of all *jeevas*, and as this is an unwelcome thing *tamas* is stated to be *mrityu*, which means death.

means that He willed to become the universe in which the matter and *jeeva* elements of His body would come to a gross condition and would be fit to appear in diverse forms and bear diverse names. It is stated:

He made *tapas*; and having made *tapas*, He created all this (*ana* VI-2).

The term *tapas* means consideration; and *Brahma* considered what the form of the universe was in the preceding evolution. For in every world-age the mode of evolution is the same. This is stated:

The creator made the sun and the moon as before and heaven earth, the intermediate world, and the *suvar* world (*marā*., I-38)*(2).

He then successively evolved up to the formation of the great elements, the matter and *jeeva* elements being His body at every stage (3). He then became the universe consisting of *devas*, men, beasts and vegetables, every product among which being a 'mixture of matter and *jeeva*. He, who was the *Ātmā* in the causal condition, became the *Ātmā* of the products of evolution, and appeared as those products. The purpose of the evolution was play (*lila*), and the matter and *jeeva* elements were His toys (1).

In the aggregate thus formed of *Brahma*, matter and *jeevas* the *jeeva*-element evolved by a slight expansion of its consciousness, and all the misery experienced in the world falls to its lot; and the matter element evolved by change of substance. *Brahma* evolved by becoming the inner ruler of the products of evolution; and being such He is not touched by the changes of the one or by the painful experiences of the other. And this is stated in the *anandavalli*, 6-3.

He became *sat* (*jeevas*) and *tyad* (material products); but he himself remained unchanged.

In order to indicate this freedom of *Brahma* from the changes undergone by the elements that form His body, the *upanishad* states "From this the lord of *māyā* creates this world," and speaks as if He were separate from matter, whereas before evolution commenced, they were one, i.e., both matter and *jeevas*

1. This is stated in the following texts: All this, beginning with *avyakta* and ending with the diverse products of the world, exhibiting change and growth are the toys of *Hari*; know all this to be *kshara* (perishable); *Vyakta*, *avyakta*, *purusha*, and time (*kala*) are *Vishṇu* i.e., are His aspects; and they are to Him what toys are to a child that is playing; hear His doings (*Vishṇu*, I-2-20); as a child with his toys (*vayu puruana*). This will be stated in *sutra* II-1-33.

were in such a subtle condition that they could not be spoken of as being different from *Brahma* even as His bodies (1).

28. योनिश्च हि गीयते ।

And because He is declared to be *yonī*.

This is in the *mundaka*:

The wise perceive Him to be the cause (*yonī*) of all that exists (I-1-6); and When the medicator sees the brilliant Maker and Ruler, who is *purusha* and the world cause (*yonī*) (III-1-3).

The term *yonī* refers to the material cause, as will be seen from the text which follows the former text (I-1-8) (1).

SUB-SECTION 8

29. एतेन सर्वे व्याख्याता व्याख्याताः ।

By this every other text is explained.

By the body of arguments stated in these four sections every other *vedic* text, which deals with the evolution of the universe, may be shown to refer to the highest *Ātmā* alone.

END OF CHAPTER I

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

1. The interpretation given here is the correct one. as it should agree with the following texts: Then He of Himself made Himself¹ (*ana.*, 7-1); Desiring to create diverse products from His own body, He considered, and created first the materials for forming the egg-shaped universe (*manu.*, I-8).

2. The *sūtras* of this sub-section are thus connected: In the first oneness of the two causes was established; and in the second a reason found in a verse, which follows the first text, was urged. By these two *sūtras* the authority known as *arthapatti* was applied to the two texts. The third *sūtra* cited a *vedic* text, and the fourth *sūtra* brought up another text, which was clearer, and which was therefore independent of any help. It was for this reason that the particle 'and' (*cha*) finds no place in the *sūtra*. The fifth *sūtra* removes a doubt raised by a consideration of this text with those before and after it. The texts of the last *sūtra* labour under two defects. One of them states the fruit of meditation on the world-cause; and the other relates only to the material cause. To indicate the operative cause it has to be connected with certain verses, which precede it; and it therefore conveys its teaching with some delay. It is therefore made the last *sūtra*.

1 I.e., used Himself as the material

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER II

SECTION I

In the first chapter it was established that the highest *Ātmā* was the only cause of the evolution of the universe. The purpose of the second chapter is to refute the objections which are or may be urged against this conclusion. The first section deals with the objections of those outside the *vedic* fold; the second demolishes the theories of evolution put forward by them; and the last two sections remove the doubts felt by those within the *vedic* fold. The first two sections deal with the question from the point of view of the cause, while the remainder deals with it from the point of view of the products, and show that they have evolved in response to the will of the highest *Ātmā*, omitting of course those things which the *upanishads* state to be eternal. In the first two sub-sections the objection is answered that the theory of evolution is inconsistent with the *sāṅkhya* and *yoga* systems. The remaining eight sub-sections reply to the arguments urged.

SUB-SECTION 1

1. स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्गात् ।

If it be contended "This will result in the charge of ignoring the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*," the reply is "No ; it will result in the charge of ignoring other *smṛitis*."

The *vedāntin* raises an objection : He argues thus : It was decided in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* that a *smṛiti* opposed to the *veda* should be ignored (Intro., para 10). The *Sāṅkhya* replies : This conclusion holds, when a text of the *veda* is capable of itself of conveying its meaning. But in the *vedānta* the matter is difficult to understand ; and it cannot be stated for certain that this is the meaning in a particular place. To rely on the *smṛiti* of the great seer, and in case of conflict with the *veda*, to treat the latter as meaning something else is not objectionable. *Kapila* fully accepts the various *karmas* taught in the earlier part of the *veda* as the means to one's advancement, like *agnihotra*, *darsa purnamasa*, *agnishtoma* and the like ; and he is described in all sacred literature as our best friend. His *smṛiti* has been written with the special object of pointing out the highest good, and its means. Without its help we, who have read but little, and are of dull intelligence, cannot ascertain the meaning of the *vedānta* ; if we take the superficial meaning, we shall have to ignore the whole of that *smṛiti*. *Objection*. By following this *smṛiti* the *smṛitis* of *Maṇu* and others,

which state the highest *Ātmā* as the only cause of the evolution of the world, will have to be ignored. *Reply.* Those *smṛitis* elucidate the earlier portion of the *veda* treating of *dharma*, and will serve their purpose; but this *smṛiti* treats only of truth; and if it be not accepted, it will become wholly useless. This is stated in the first half of the *sūtra*.

The second half of the *sūtra* gives the reply. The other *smṛitis* are the *smṛiti* of *Manu*, *bhagavad-gītā* : *Mahābhārata*, *vishṇu purāṇa*, and *āpastamba dharma* (1).

The authors were our best friends, and their works follow the teaching of the *veda*, and were written to elucidate its meaning. The ignoring of them will result, if we follow the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*, which conflicts with *vedic* teaching. And this will be a very serious offence. Elucidation means to bring home the meaning conveyed; and this cannot be done by a work which conflicts with it.

(1) These *smṛitis* teach the following :

Manu - He begins with the statement 'This was in the condition of *tamas*' ; and then observes 'When the time for creation came, *Bhagavān*, who exists of himself, appeared in the form of *avykta* ; and in order to make the universe of diversity appear. He moved *tamas* and willed to appear as *mahot*, *ahamkāra*, and the great elements. He considered ; and desiring to create diverse products from His own body, He created first the materials for making the egg-shaped universe, and gave them the capacity for its formation (I-5, 6 and 8).

Bhagavad-gītā. - I am the place from which all the worlds go forth ; the place in which all the worlds dissolve (VII-6). I am the place from which everything goes forth; and everything acts as directed by Me (X-8).

Mahābhārata - The question is put 'All this world consisting of movables and immovables - from whom was it created ; and at the time of rest to whom does it go; tell me this grandfather'. The reply was - "*Nārāyaṇa*, with the world as His body, without limitations, and eternal."

"From Him *avykta* with the three *gunas* came forth" *avykta* is dissolved in *Brahma*, known as *Purusha* and without action".

Parāśara - The world came forth from *Vishṇu*; it rests on Him alone; He sustains and destroys this world ; He is the world (I-I-32).

Āpastamba - All living beings are the bodies of Him, who abides in the cavity of the heart, who cannot be injuriously affected, and who is free from blemishes; from Him all bodies come forth ; He, the root, ever exists, and undergoes no destruction.

2. The remark that these works serve another purpose cannot be admitted. They enjoin *dharma*s as the worship of the highest *Ātmā* (1) ; but unless they describe the highest *Ātmā*, who is to be worshipped, their injunctions will serve no purpose. Even the *karma*s, that yield fruits to be gathered by men of the world here, or in *svarga*, are His worship (1).

3. The praise of *Kapila* in sacred literature does not count for much. *Bṛihaspati* is cited in sacred literature as an example in referring to those that possess extraordinary learning ; and if the opponent's argument were valid, the *veda* should be elucidated by the athiestical *loka-yata* written by him.

Opponent. *Kapila* saw by the merit of his *yoga* things as they are : The next *sūtra* replies :

2. इतरेषांचानुपलब्धेः ।

But because it (what *Kapila* saw) was not seen by others.

Many like *Maṇu*, who by the merit of their *yoga* perceived the true nature of *tatvas*, high and low, and who are well known in the *veda* as the authors of works that serve as medicine for the ills of all the world, did not see truth as he saw it. His perception being opposed to the *veda*, was due to misapprehension. The conclusion as to its teaching arrived at cannot be shaken.

SUB-SECTION 2

3. एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ।

By this the objection to the rejection of the *yoga smṛiti* is answered.

The reason for adding a *sūtra* on this point is thus explained : *Yoga smṛiti* recognises the existence of an all controlling Being ; it enjoins meditation

(1) This is stated as follows :

Man reaches the goal, worshipping with his own *karma* (work) that Being, from whom all that lives comes forth, and by whom all this world is pervaded (*bhagavad gītā*, XVIII-46) : Meditate on *Deva Nārāyaṇa* in bathing and in other actions ; by doing so one attains the world of *Brahma* ; and he does not return here (i.e., to *samsāra*) (*dakṣa smṛiti*). Those men, that intent on doing their *karma*, worship you in order to be released, over come all this *maya*, (*viṣṇu*, V-30-16).

(1) Those that worship other beings with love and fervour, they too worship Me alone ; but not in the manner directed by the *veda*. For, I am the Being worshipped in all the *yajnas* ; I alone give the fruits ; but they do not know me as I am ; they therefore lose the full benefit of the worship (*bhagavad-gītā*, IX-23 and 24) ; *Achyuta* ! you who are in the forms of all *devas*, you are ever worshipped with *yajnas* ; you alone receive what is offered to *devas* and *pitṛis* ; you who bear the forms of the *pitṛis* and *devas* (*viṣṇu*, V-20-95).

taught in the *upanishads* as the means to release ; and its author is the four-faced one, whose special function is to spread the knowledge of the whole of the *veda* in the world. It may be presumed therefore that his *smṛiti* should be followed. The reply is that it teaches that matter evolves without being directed by the highest *Ātmā* from within ; that it regards Him as only the operative cause ; and that in the meditation, which it teaches, and which is differentiated from other meditations by the objects on which the mind dwells, the *jeeva* is not regarded as ruled by Him from within, and *Brahma* is not regarded as being the material cause of the world and as the seat of all good qualities. The teaching is therefore opposed to the *veda* ; and it may be presumed that the four-faced one also, being a *jeeva* in bondage, was influenced by the *gunas-rajās* and *tamas*. His *yoga smṛiti* should therefore be rejected like his *purāna*, which labours under the same defect.

SUB-SECTION 3

4. न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ।

No (because this one world) is dissimilar ; and this is taught in the *upanishads*.

The opponent, having failed, now resorts to argument. The conclusion that the world is a product that has evolved from the highest *Ātmā* is not sound. This world, consisting of matter and *jeevas*, is perceived to be non-intelligent, impure, subject to another's control and full of suffering. The highest *Ātmā*, on the other hand, is described by you as all-knowing, as opposed to all evil, as the ruler of all, and as full of bliss. The world is thus entirely dissimilar to Him. How can it then come forth from Him? On this point one need not depend upon sense-perception only ; the dissimilarity is seen from the *veda* also.

The intelligent and the non-intelligent (*āna.*, VI-3); So those *bhutas* (including the organs) rest on the *jeevas*, and the *jeevas* on *prāṇa* (the highest *Ātmā*) (*kaushi.*, II-6) ; On the same tree man, immersed, grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly objects. When he sees the other, the ruler of all, pleased with his actions, and sees His greatness to be such and such, his grief passes away (*munḍa.*, III-1-2) ; The *Ātmā*, who is ruled, is bound from his desire for enjoyment (*śvetā.*, I-8).

It is observed that a product is not dissimilar to its cause. Examples. A jar is similar to the lump of earth from which it is made (1), and a ring is

(1) In support of the contention that the world-cause should be similar to the world, and that *pradhana* should be that cause in accordance with Kapila's *smṛiti*, the need of *tarka* is emphasised by the opponent. He observes : Though the *veda* is independent authority, and deals with matters beyond our senses, it should nevertheless use *tarka*; for all sources of knowledge (*pramāna*), only when helped by *tarka*, enable

similar to the piece of gold, that is its cause. Hence, the world, that is dissimilar to *Brahma*, cannot be a product made from Him, and *pradhāna*, which is similar to the world, should be accepted as the cause in accordance with the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*.

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2. Here three objections are raised, which the opponent answers :

(i) When it is decided from the *veda* that *Brahma* is the only cause of the universe, it should be accepted that the universe too, which has come forth from Him, possesses intelligence. It exists in jars and the like, but is dormant, as the attribute *jñāna* of a *jeeva* is dormant, when he sleeps or falls into a trance. This is the distinction between intelligent beings and non-intelligent objects. Hence, the universe is not dissimilar to *Brahma*. *Reply*. This is not a sound view, Intelligence is never observed in jars and other objects ; and this proves that it does not exist at all. For the same reason it cannot be contended that they have the capacity to possess intelligence. For, when a capacity does not produce an effect at any place and at any time, how can it be said to exist? Further, when it is known that the *veda* shows *Brahma* to be the material cause of the universe, one may state that jars and other objects possess intelligence in a dormant condition, or that they have the capacity for it. When this fact is known for certain, one may state that the *veda* shows *Brahma* to be the material cause of the universe. This will be arguing in a circle.

(ii) What is meant by similarity between the cause and the product, by the absence of which you state that *Brahma* cannot be the material cause of the universe. Does it refer to agreement in all respects or in any one respect? The former alternative will not do; for then the relation of cause and product cannot subsist. In a jar made of a lump of earth, the lump condition does not continue. The latter alternative also should be given up; for the universe and the highest *Ātmā* agree in being substances that exist. *Reply*. They must agree in that respect, by which the cause is distinguished from other substances. The character, by which a piece of gold is distinguished from a lump of earth, continues in the ornaments made of it. Here the highest *Ātmā* is opposed to all evil, is all-knowing, is full of bliss, and controls all; while the world is just the reverse.

one to arrive at a decision in some matters. *Tarka* is a help to a source of knowledge, and determines that it shows a particular thing, by discussing either its nature or the materials, from which that thing is known. It is known also as *uka*. Its utility is common to all sources of knowledge ; but testimony needs it specially in all cases, as its meaning depends upon certain conditions viz., (i) The sentence must be complete, and should not need another word to convey its meaning ; (ii) the words that make up the sentence should be spoken at the same time ; and (iii) it must not state what is impossible. *Manu* points out its value thus - 'One that examines with the help of *tarka* knows dharma ; but not others'. The *veda* also, when it enjoins *manana* (thinking), refers to fixing its teaching in the mind with the help of *tarka*.

(iii) The relation of cause and product is found between things, that are dissimilar : from the intelligent *jeeva* hair, nails and teeth, which are non-intelligent, come forth; from a lump of non-intelligent cow-dung the intelligent scorpion is generated; from the intelligent spider the non-intelligent web issues forth. *Reply*. In all these cases the relation of cause and product is found in the non-intelligent element only.

A by-stander offers an explanation. What is regarded as non-intelligent does possess intelligence. The *veda* says "To him the earth said"; "water desired." "These *prāṇas*, quarrelling as to who was the greatest among them, went to the four-faced *Brahma*". Those, that read the *purāṇas*, speak of rivers, seas and hills also as possessing intelligence. The opponent replies :

5. अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ।

But here reference is made to controlling beings (*devatas*). This is known from the epithet applied, and from the entry of these beings into them.

Every material thing is under the control of an intelligent being known as *devata* ; and the words 'earth', and 'water' refer to the beings that control them. In the *chāndogya* reference is made to fire, water and earth in the words, "These three *devatas*" (VI-3-2). The epithet *devatas* shows that the term 'earth' denotes not merely earth, but also the being that controls it. 'All *devatas* quarrelled as to who was the greatest among them.' 'Those *devas* knowing greatness to be in *prāṇa*. Also, "Agni, becoming speech, entered the mouth ; the sun, becoming the sense of sight, entered the eyes ; *vāyu*, becoming *prāṇa*, entered the nostrils" (*aitareya*, 1-2-4). Hence by the use of the epithet and by the statement of entry of beings into what they control, it should be decided that reference is made to these beings in the texts quoted.

The objection raised in the first *sūtra* therefore remains.

These two *sūtras* state the objection of the *sāṅkhya*. The next *sūtra* is the reply of the author of the *sūtras* :

6. दृश्यते तु ।

But it is seen (the relation of cause and product is seen in things entirely dissimilar).

A worm springs from a fly, which is dissimilar.

Sāṅkhya.—Have I not stated that the relation of cause and product appears in the non-intelligent element only; and that there is therefore similarity. *Reply*. True, you did say so ; but the similarity which you have in your mind, does not exist. You apprehended that if similarity in any particular were accepted, everything would be similar to everything else and that everything

could be made of everything else. You therefore stated that there must be similarity in a character by which the cause is distinguished from other things. This restriction is not found in the example given. For a common character, such as is seen in a lump of earth and a jar, or in a piece of gold and a crown, is not found in the fly and worm, or in the cow-dung and scorpion. Hence, the universe may evolve from *Brahma* though it is dissimilar to Him.

On the receipt of this reply, the opponent raises two objections, which are stated and refuted in the next three *sūtras*.

7. असदितिचेन प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ।

If it be contended "The product was previously non-existent," the reply is - "No, because the need for similarity only is denied".

The first objection is this : If you recognise that the world may evolve from *Brahma*, who is dissimilar, then the cause and the product being different substances, the world did not exist in *Brahma*; and you give up your theory that a product exists in its cause. *Reply*. It is not so; what was denied in the preceding *sūtra* is merely the view that the cause and product should invariably be similar ; but it was not stated that the product is a substance different from the cause. The view that *Brahma*, the cause, becomes by evolution the world, which is not similar to Him, has not been abandoned. In the instance given, though the fly and worm are dissimilar, they are one substance, as are an earring and the piece of gold of which it is made.

The second objection is stated :

8. अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ।

If your view be accepted, in dissolution and evolution, (1) undesirable things must result as in the world. The *veda* will become mere prattle.

The meaning is : if the cause and the product be admitted to be one substance, then *Brahma* becomes the world in evolution, and the world becomes *Brahma* in dissolution ; and all the conditions belong to Him alone. The impurity of matter and the misery of the *jeevas* must be found in *Brahma* ; as the character of the earring is found in the piece of gold. *Vedic* texts, which in one place state *Brahma* is ever pure and bliss, and in another place that He is not so (2) cannot be regarded as anything but absurd.

(1) Though the *sūtra* refers to dissolution only, the intention is to refer to evolution too; for it is preceded by dissolution ; for in the texts 'Before creation, my dear, this was Sat only (*chundo.*, VI-2-1) ; Before creation this was *Ātmā* ; one only (*aitarejya*, I-1-1); we see that dissolution is first described and then evolution.

(2) Who knows everything and every (attribute) of everything and every (attribute) of everything (*munda.*, I-1-10) ; He is free from *karma*, and free from old age and death

2. *Objection.* As *Brahma* is the cause and the product only as clothed in the matter and *jeeva* elements, which form His body, the faults pointed out pertain only to these elements, but do not affect *Brahma* in either condition. *Reply.* The relation of body and *Ātmā* does not subsist between the universe and *Brahma*; for the matter and *jeeva* elements cannot be the body of *Brahma*. A body is the means for experiencing the fruits of *karma*-pleasure or pain; it is the seat of the senses, and is supported by *prāṇa* with its fivefold activity; and it is an aggregate of earth and the other elements. A body of this description only is well-known to be body in wordly usage and in the *veda*. *Brahma* has no *karma* (1) and has not to experience its fruits; His enjoyment does not depend upon the help of the senses; and He has no *prāṇa*. Hence the matter and *jeeva* elements cannot form His body. Among these elements there are many things that do not come within the definition of body. Straw and wood, among the unintelligent products formed out of the compounded five elements, and the finest forms of the uncompounded elements are not the seat of the senses; and the latter are not aggregates of earth and the other elements; in the case of the *jeeva*, who is only *jñāna* (shining substance) none of these things is possible; much less his being a body.

3. Here the objector puts forward other definitions of body. First, a body is the place, in which one has experience (*bhoga*). *Reply.* A house is a place, in which one experiences pleasure and pain; this would be a body under your definition: but it is not known to be a body in wordly usage. *Objector.* That place is a body, remaining in which alone one has experience of pleasure and pain. *Reply.* When one enters the body of another, and experiences pleasure and pain, that body is the seat of his experience; but it is not known to be his body. In regard to *Brahma*, whose bliss exists of itself, and is eternal and unlimited, the matter and *jeeva* elements cannot be the invariable seat of His enjoyment. The same objection holds to the definition of body as the mere means of experience.

4. Another definition. That is a body of a person, on whose will its existence as an object, its continuance and movements depend. As on the will of *Brahma* the existence of all objects as objects, their continuance and

(*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5); He has no body or senses; His equal or superior is not seen (*śvetā.*, VI-8); of them one eats the ripe fruit (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-1); The *Ātmā*, who is ruled, is bound from his desire for enjoyment (*śvetā.*, I-8); grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly objects (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-2).

(1) He is free from *karma*, and free from old age (*chāndo.*, viii-1-5); The other does not eat, but shines on all sides (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-1); He sees, but has no eye; He hears, but has no ear; He goes and He takes; but has no hands or feet (*śvetā.*, III-19); He is indeed without *prāṇa* and without mind (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-2).

movements depend, they form His bodies. *Reply*. Even this is not sound. Objects known as bodies do not depend for their existence as objects on the will of their owners; the movements of a body affected by illness do not depend upon the will of its owner; the continued existence of a dead body does not depend upon the will of the 'departing *Ātmā* an image depends upon the will of an intelligent person for its coming into existence, for its continuance and movements; but it is not known as his body; and finally the *jeeva* being eternal, his existence as a *jeeva* does not depend upon the will of *Brahma*; and he cannot be His body.

5. *Objector*. That is a body of a person, which is supported and controlled by him alone, and which exists for his service only. *Reply*. Action answers this description; but it is not a body. Further, it is stated that *Brahma* has no body. 'Without a body, He dwells in bodies; enduring He is present in perishable things (*katha*, 1.2.22) ; He is without hands or feet; but he goes and takes' (*ṣveta.*, 3-19). Hence, the relation of body and *Ātmā* between the universe and *Brahma* is impossible, and even if it be possible, the imperfections resulting from connection with a body cannot be escaped from. If therefore the *upanishads* state Him to be the material cause of the universe, they will become absurd.

To this objection the next *sūtra* replies.

9. न तु दृष्टान्तभावात् ।

But no, because an analogy exists in explanation.

The same being may exist in two conditions; and yet the elements, to which good and evil pertain, may be different; and an *analogy* in explanation of this may be pointed out. *jeevas* dwell in material vehicles; and the changes that take place, as they grow youth, manhood, old-age relate to the vehicle, not to the *Ātmā* within; perception of things, and experience of pleasure and pain pertain to the *Ātmā*, but not to the body. And the expressions used. He is born a *deva*; he is born a man; and the same man was a baby; he is now a youth; and hereafter he will be old' have their primary meanings. For the *Ātmā* clothed in a material vehicle is called a *deva* or man. This will be explained in chapter III, section 1 sub-section 2. Similarly, though *Brahma* changes from one condition to another, the existence of good or evil in one or another element is fixed. *Brahma* has matter and *jeevas* as His bodies, and he is their *Ātmā*. Expansion and contraction of consciousness take place in the *jeeva* element; and the changes from the subtle to the gross condition and back again to the subtle condition occur in the matter-element. But these defects of the body do not touch *Brahma*, the *Ātmā*. And omniscience and bliss belong to Him and not to His vehicles.

2. The objection stated by the opponent in paras. 2 to 5 under the preceding *sūtra* is not sound. All the *upanishads* state everything to be the body of the highest *Ātmā*, whether it be a material product or a *jeeva* : and whether it be in the subtle or gross condition. See the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7). This mentions material products and *jeevas* one by one, and states them to be the bodies of *Brahma* (1). the subala *upanishad* follows the same course, and closes with the remark 'He, the inner ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*, etc., (2) The same teaching is given by the *smṛitis* (3) In the world also the term 'body', (*sartra*) is not confined, like the term jar, to objects possessing the same form ; but it is used to denote objects entirely different from one another in form, like insects, flies, snakes, men, beasts and the like ; and it cannot be said that it is used in a secondary sense. Hence the connotation of the term should be determined, so as to cover all the cases, in which the term 'body' has been used either in the world or in the *veda*.

3. The definitions given by you do not satisfy this condition, as shown below :

(i) A body is that, which helps one to enjoy the fruits of past *karma*. This definition has been framed so as to cover the cases of *jeevas*, that are bound ; but it is not applicable to *Brahma* or freed *jeevas* ; for their bodies are taken up at their mere pleasure, but not for working out *karma* ; and they have no *karma*. That freed *jeevas* ; take up bodies at their mere pleasure is known from texts like "He becomes one' (*chando vii-26-2*).

(ii) A body is a compound of earth and other elements. This does not cover the case of *Brahma*, the bodies taken up by whom in *avatara* are not so made (1).

(1) Who stands in earth ; whose body the earth is ; who stands in *vijnana* (*jeeva*) ; whose body *vijnana* is ; who stands in *Ātmā* ; whose body the *Ātmā* is.

(2) Who moves within earth ; whose body the earth is ; he, the inner ruler of all beings ; is free from *karma*, dwells in the highest heaven ; has a shining body ; has no equal or superior. He is *Nārāyaṇa*.

(3) All the world is your body (*ramayana*) ; which water is the body of *Vishṇu* (*vishṇu*, II-12-37) ; all that is indeed the body of Hari (*Ibid.*, I-22-37) ; all that is indeed the body of Hari (*Ibid.*, I-22-86) ; He considered, and desiring to create diverse products from His body (*maṇu.*, I-8) ; 'His body' means subtle matter, which forms His body.

(1) The body of the highest *Ātmā* is not an aggregate of the elements (*Mahābhārata*).

(iii) A body is what is supported by prana in a five-fold form. This does not cover the case of the vegetable kingdom; for though *prāṇa* does exist in vegetables, yet it does not assume a five-fold form in them. If the definition be merely that which is supported by *prāṇa*, it will leave out the *jeevas* and *prakṛiti*, with its products *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, ether, air, fire, water and earth, which are all bodies of *Brahma*.

(iv) A body is the support of the senses. If this means the possession of senses or motor organs capable of producing sensation or action, the definition does not include the case of *Ahalya*, and others, who were turned into stones or logs of wood as punishment for past sins. If it means merely the possession of the senses, or motor organs, it will exclude the bodies of *Brahma* referred to under the preceding head.

4. A proper definition, which will cover all cases, is the following : A body is that substance, which an intelligent person in every way supports, controls and uses for his own purposes, and which exists only to serve him. To this definition a few objections have been raised. First, it will not apply to a diseased body, which its owner is unable to control? *Reply*. The power to control exists ; but it is for the time being obstructed. Example. Fire has the power to burn but owing to obstruction this may not be observed sometimes. Secondly, the definition does not cover a dead body. *Reply*. On the departure of the *jeeva* the body begins to decompose, and will soon disappear. Because a portion of what was previously a body remains, it is referred to as a body.

5. Hence, as everything in the universe is in every way supported and controlled by Brhama for His own purposes, and as it exists only to serve Him, it forms His body. The text "Without a body in perishable bodies" (*katha.*, I.2.22) denies the existence of a body brought about by *karma* ; but it has no reference to the body formed of the universe ; for everything is stated to be His body in the *upanishads* referred to above. This will be explained in the subsections that follow. These two *sūtras* state what will be proved in subsection 7 of this section.

10. स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ।

And because the opponent's theory is faulty.

The theory of evolution of the universe from *Brahma* should be accepted, not merely because it is free from defect ; but also because evolution from *pradhāna* is objectionable.

According to this theory evolution cannot take place. In this theory the *jeeva* is not subject to change, and is mere *jñāna* (a shining substance) ; but by the near presence of matter, he regards its attributes as belonging to himself ; and this delusion brings about evolution. What is this near presence

of matter? Does it mean its mere existence, or some change in it, or some change in the *jeeva*? The last alternative must be ruled out, as the *jia* does not change. The second alternative is equally untenable ; because the change is the effect of the *jeeva*'s delusion, and cannot therefore be its cause. The first alternative, if admitted, would mean that even the freed *jeeva* will be deluded. This matter will be explained more fully under chapter II, section 2. *sūtra* 8. Hence the *Sāṅkhya*'s theory must be abandoned in favour of the theory of the *upanishads*.

11. तर्कप्रतिष्ठानादपि ।

Also for the reason that no final conclusion can be reached by mere argument.

The buddhist, the nyaya, the jaina, the *Sāṅkhya* and the *yoga* schools, depending on mere argument, demolish one another. It may therefore be concluded that it is profitless to depend upon mere argument.

12. अन्यधानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ।

If it be stated "the theory can be maintained with fresh arguments not open to the criticisms levelled against it," the reply is "even so there will be no escape."

It may be presumed that persons may exist in other places or at other times, who are cleverer in argument ; and that they will demolish his pet theory easily. Hence, in matters which are beyond the senses, one must depend on testimony alone ; and resort to argument merely for its elucidation. This is stated by *Maṇu*. He who examines the teaching of *dharma* given in the *veda* and in the *smṛitis* with arguments (*tarka*) which are not opposed to the *sastra* in the form of the *veda*, knows *dharma*, but not another who does not do so (XII-106).

SUB-SECTION 4

13. एतेन शिष्टपरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ।

By this (refutation of the *sankhya* theory) the arguments of the remaining schools also, which are not based upon the *veda*, are refuted.

The need for this additional *sūtra* arose from the agreement among a number of schools that atoms (*parama āṇu*) are the ultimate cause, and from the possible contention that the argument relating to it cannot be so easily dismissed. The reply is that in spite of agreement on this one point there are irreconcilable differences as to the nature of the atoms. For instance, there are the following views : that they do exist, and that they do not exist ; that they are *jñāna* (shining things), and that they are *jada* (not shining things) ; that they exist only for a minute and then perish, and that they are permanent;

that they are of one character, and that they combine inconsistent characters; and that they are real, and that they are unreal. The remark that it is futile to reply on mere argument is fully justified.

SUB-SECTION 5

The *sāṅkhya* appears again and pleads : In *sūtra* 9 of this section it was stated that *Brahma* has bodies made of matter and *jeevas* ; that He is the cause, when the elements of His body are in a subtle condition; and that he becomes the universe, when they come into a gross condition. If *Brahma* had bodies, he must as the *jeeva* does, experience pleasure and pain, that are caused by the possession of a body, and this cannot be avoided.

2. He anticipates an objection. This question was settled in *sūtra*, I-2-8. He replies no. What was settled in that *sūtra* was that *Brahma* does not become liable to suffering on the ground that He resides within the body of another for the purpose of being meditated on ; but here *Brahma* has a body of His own like a *jeeva* ; and the possession of a body must subject its owner to the experience of pleasure and pain. The changes undergone by the body may not touch the *Ātmā* within it; but every one has seen that a *jeeva* experiences pleasure, when the elements of his body are well-balanced, and pain when they are out of gear. And this is confirmed by the *veda*.

From one in a body welcome and unwelcome things do not depart ; and one that is without a body they do not touch (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-1).

Hence on the theory that *Brahma* in a body formed of matter and *jeevas* is the world-cause, there will be no distinction between His nature and the nature of the *jeeva*. On the theory that *Brahma* alone is the cause, like the lump of earth and the piece of gold, all the undesirable results that attend on the world must be found in Him. The *Sāṅkhya's* theory is therefore preferable. This is stated in the first half of the *sūtra* :

14. भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवत् ।

If it be said "By *Brahma's* becoming liable to the experiencing of pleasure and pain, there will be no distinction."

And the reply is stated in the second part :

There is distinction, as in the world.

Reply. There is difference between the natures of *Brahma* and of the *jeeva*. The possession of a body by a *jeeva* does not of itself carry with it a liability to suffering, that is brought about by disturbance in the elements of his body. It is a consequence of *karma* in the form of good or evil deeds. The

text quoted refers to a body brought about by *karma*. There are other texts, which state that a freed *jeeva* "appears as one ; appears as three" (*chāndo.*, VII-26).

If he desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his mere will the fathers come up (*Ibid.*, VIII-2-1). There he enjoys Him all round, eating, playing and amusing himself (*Chāndo.*, VIII-12-3).

These texts mean that he may take one or three bodies, or as many as he may desire ; and yet this is not accounted as an evil. Similarly, *Brahma* being without good or evil, possession of the universe for His body brings with it no liability. In the world those that obey the king's commands are in his good grace and are happy ; and those that disobey them incur his displeasure and suffer. But the king himself, though he dwells in a body, is not like the one set or the other ; for he is not subject to any one's command. Similarly here. The *jeeva* is subject to *Brahma's* commands, and is happy or the reverse, according as he is in harmony with them or not. But *Brahma* is not subject to any such liability.

Compare with what *Dramida* states "When a king stays in an unpleasant place abounding in mosquitoes, and full of trouble, as he is fanned by some one, he is not touched by any inconvenience ; he protects his country ; and has enjoyments with fragrant substances not available to others. Similarly the Lord of all the worlds, with fans in the form of His power whirling round Him, is not touched by imperfections ; He protects the world of *Brahma* and other worlds, and has enjoyments not available to any other." Evolution of *Brahma* in His substance, like the lump of earth and the piece of gold, is not admitted ; and the remark on this point needs no reply. Our authority is the texts stating that He does not change, and that He is free from imperfections.

Criticism - This *sūtra* has been interpreted differently by others. They say 'If *Brahma* be the material cause of the universe, this doubt will arise, viz., the Person who enjoys (*bhoktā*) will not differ from what is enjoyed (*bhogyā*). They proceed to show by the analogy of the sea appearing as waves and foam, that they do differ. This interpretation is unsound. *Brahma* becomes the universe under the influence of *avidyā* (ignorance) in the view of one of them; by contact with an *upādhi* in the view of another; and owing to an innate capacity (*sakti*) in the view of the last. In their views the first view will not arise ; for *Brahma* affected in any one of the three ways is *bhoktā*, and the *avidyā*, *upādhi* or innate *sakti* is the *bhogyā* ; and these being different from one another, one cannot be the other. None of them states that *Brahma* changes in His substance ; for they accept the view stated in *sūtra*, II-I-35, that the *jeeva* and his *karma* have had no beginning. If His change in substance be accepted, the doubt cannot occur to any one ; for a lump of earth differs from the jar made

out of it; and a piece of gold differs from a bracelet made out of it ; similarly, the *bhoktā* and *bhogyā* may appropriately differ. If the substance changes, the objection stated in *sūtra* 8 of this section will remain ; for *Brahma* Himself will be the *bhoktā* and *bhogyā* ; and the reply given in the succeeding *sūtra* will not apply.

SUB-SECTION 6

1. In *sūtra* II-1-7 it was assumed that *Brahma*, the cause, was not different from the universe, the product. This point is now taken up and proved. This is known as the *sat-kārya* theory. The opponent is the *vaisesika*. He recognises the lump of earth as cause, and the jars and other vessels as products ; but he regards the products as different from the lump of earth. His arguments are as follows : (i) Consider a lump of earth and a jar, or a piece of cloth and the threads, of which it is made. There is first difference in perception. The perception of the cause and the perception of the products are not alike. (ii) There is difference in the names by which they are known ; for the threads are not spoken of as the piece of cloth ; nor is the piece of cloth spoken of as threads. (iii) There is difference in the uses to which they are put; for the lump of earth is not utilised to fetch water ; nor is a wall built with the jar. (iv) There is difference in time ; the cause exists first, and the products come subsequently. (v) There is difference in form ; the cause is in the form of a lump ; and the product has a large body and bottom. Similarly, while the lump of earth remains, the jar is spoken of as having been destroyed. (vi) Difference in number is also seen ; for the threads are many and the piece of cloth is one. (vii) As everything exists under the *satkārya* theory at all times, the division into permanent and impermanent will disappear. (viii) And finally, the activity of the person, who makes the jar, will be fruitless ; for if the cause itself be the product, what is there to be produced with his activity? The reply may be given that though the product exists, the activity of the maker is necessary to help the product to do its work. Then the activity of the maker should never cease. It may be explained next that the product existed before ; but was not manifest ; and that it is made manifest through the activity of the maker. Then the activity would be fruitful ; and the division into permanent and non-permanent becomes intelligible. This explanation cannot be accepted. Has this manifestation (*abhivyakti*) always existed, or did it exist, but was non-manifest, or is it newly made?. In the first alternative the product under consideration must ever be manifest. In the second alternative another manifestation is required to make *abhivyakti* manifest, and this needs another manifestation, and so on ad infinitum. In the last alternative the theory, that a thing exists but merely changes its condition, is abandoned. Further, if the activity of the maker makes the product manifest, the activity for making a jar manifest

should make other products also manifest. For in things that are admitted to be the means of making other objects manifest, as a light, no limitation is seen as to the objects to be made manifest. Does not a lamp lighted for the sake of the jar show other objects as well? Hence the activity of the maker becomes useful only by originating a product, which did not previously exist. For these reasons the theory put forward fails.

2. The *vaiṣeṣhika*, having thus made out his case to his own satisfaction, next answers the objections that may be raised from the other point of view. First, a lump of earth is taken to make a jar ; and a piece of gold to make an ornament. Thus a definite cause produces a definite effect ; and does not this prove the *satkārya* theory? *Reply* ; no ; for the definiteness of the cause may be explained as due to the capacity of each cause to produce its own product. Next, on your own theory the purpose of the activity of the maker cannot be explained. Is the activity applied to the product, or to something else? The first alternative does not hold, as the product does not exist before it is made. In the second alternative, the activity applied to threads may be expected to produce a jar ; for so far as the product is concerned, it makes no difference, where the activity is applied - to a lump of earth or to threads ; both being different from the product. *Reply*. The activity of the maker is applied to that cause, which has the capacity to produce the desired product ; it is not therefore wasted. ¹

This view of the opponent is refuted in the *sūtra* :

15. तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ।

That the universe is not different from *Brahma* is shown by the text containing the term *arambhana* and other texts.

These texts show that the universe consisting of the matter and *jeeva* elements does not differ from *Brahma*. In the *chāndogya*, chapter VI, the father taught his son what is stated in the *sūtra*. Bearing in mind the fact that the whole world evolved from *Brahma* alone, and that the product is not different from the cause, he asked him whether he had been instructed in the knowledge of that Ruler, by knowing whom every thing would be known. The son, not knowing the fact, asked how by knowing one thing another thing could be

¹ Here the original brings in *Sankara* to criticise the opponent. This gives a loophole to *Vāchaspati* to come in and state his own theory, viz., that he who is under the influence of *avidyā* is not *Brahma*, but the *jeeva*, and that the *jeeva* is a condition of *Brahma* Himself. This theory is criticised by *Ṣankara*, and his criticism is criticised by the opponent. All this as not relevant to the sub-section is omitted here. But it is embodied in the Three *Tatvas*.

known. To explain his meaning the father gave three illustrations, which men in the world perceive. Of these the first was this 'My dear, by knowing one lump of earth, all that is made of its known. The meaning is that the various vessels made of the lump of earth, being of the same substance as the lump, by knowing that lump they are all known. As the *vaiśeshika* holds the view that a product is a different substance from the cause, to refute this view he appealed to ordinary perception in these words.

For facility of speech (and handling) the lump of earth assumes different forms and receives different names ; but the truth is only that all this is earth. (VI-1-4).¹

So is it seen by all ; and the vessels' are not perceived to have been made of another substance (1).

2. The objection of the *vaiśeshika* may be replied to thus : The differences in perceptions, names and the like may be referred to the different conditions of the same substance. A person, say A,B is one, and referring to the conditions, through which he passes, it is said 'he was a boy ; he is now a man ; and he will become old", and all the differences apply to his conditions. It was stated that while the earth remains, we speak of the jar as being destroyed, and that therefore the product is different from the cause. This objection is removed by admitting that origination and destruction mean that the same substance that is the cause comes into particular conditions. Thus when two halves of a jar are first made of a lump of earth, and they are then joined together to form the jar, the condition of the half jar is its origination and the destruction of the lump condition ; the condition of the jar is its origination and the destruction of the half-jar condition, and so on. As objects assume their new conditions through the activity of the maker, that has its use. The objections in regard to manifestation do not call for a reply, as the theory of manifestation is not put forward.

3. *vaiśeshika*. When you say that a condition appears in an object, that was not there before, you admit origination of non-existing thing. Does not this amount to the abandonment of your theory?

(1) The first four words in the text are *vacha arambhanam, vikaro namadheyam*. The first term means 'for speech' ; the termination shows purpose ; and the other part of the word indicates not merely speech, but also action following it. When it is said 'with the jar bring water,' the action stated follows. The root in the second word means to touch ; and the termination refers to the object of the action. The meaning therefore is the earth, which was in the condition of a lump, appears in a new form with a large body and a large bottom ; this change and the name 'jar' arising from this change, are touched, i.e., attained by the lump.

¹ The original here quotes the texts of the *chāndogya*, that bear on the point, and adds that similar texts also in other upanishads, are intended by the author. The quotation is omitted, as they are considered further on one after another.

Reply. Though we accept the origination of conditions, there is no conflict with the *sat-kārya* theory ; for what exists originates.

Vaiśeshika. You say what is contradictory, when you state that what previously existed comes into existence.

Reply. This objections arises from ignorance of the nature of origination and destruction. The attainment by a substance of a new condition is the destruction of the substance in the previous condition; and the origination of the substance in the new condition. As substance, that comes into all the conditions, exists, the *sat-kārya* theory is not affected.

Vaiśeshika. If the conditions, that did not previously exist, newly come into existence, you accept my theory.

Reply. In your theory does origination originate or not? If it does not, but previously existed, you accept the *sat-kārya* theory. If it originates, you will need a second origination to account for the first, and so on *ad infinitum*. Under the *sat-kārya* theory the conditions cannot be perceived separately from the object, of which they are the conditions, nor can they act apart from it. Hence origination, destruction and the like relate to an object in a particular condition. The theory does assume the origination and destruction of the conditions, and only affirms the permanency of the object. As the half-jar condition is abandoned and the jar condition is attained, the condition of oneness is abandoned, and the condition of manifoldness is attained. This condition is abandoned and the condition of oneness is re-attained.

4. The same teaching is conveyed by other texts :

(i) Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only ; one only ; without a second (VI-2-1).

The term 'this' refers to the world now seen to possess different forms and to bear different names. It was one only before creation ; because it was without name and form ; and being omnipotent, *Brahma*, who evolved as the world, could not suffer another to direct the evolution. There was therefore no second then. This text also establishes the identity of the cause and the product.

(ii) He willed 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve' (VI-2-3).

First He became fire, water and earth, and then by mixing them in different ways. He became the many things movable and immovable—which constitute the universe. Hence the universe, the product, is none other than *Brahma*, the ultimate cause.

5. Here a doubt may arise how all that has been stated (1) could have happened.

It is therefore added :

(iii) That same *devatā* willed, I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva*, and make diverse names and forms. I will make each of them a triple compound (VI-3-2 and 3).

By the term “these three *devatas*” reference is made to the whole of non-intelligent matter, beginning with the three elements—fire, water and earth. In to this *Brahma* entered along with the *jeevas* as their inner ruler. ‘Making names and forms’ means making the products of evolution assume diverse forms and receive diverse names. This work resulted from the entrance into the products of evolution of both *Brahma* and the *jeevas*. The *Brahma* entered the *jeevas* and the universe as the *Ātmā* is clear from the *ānandavalli* text Having created it, He entered into the same ; having entered. He became *jeevas* and material products (VI-2). Hence every thing, composed of matter and a *jeeva*, whether in the subtle condition known as the cause, or in the gross condition known as the product, is the body of *Brahma* and He is its inner ruler. This fact stated in the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7) is recalled here. The doubt stated will disappear with this explanation.

Brahma remaining as the *Ātmā* of the *jeevas* and material products, and names and forms being formed as stated, *Brahma* Himself with the intelligent and non-intelligent objects forming His body is denoted by the them ‘universe’. Hence the texts quoted in para 4 state what is very appropriate. The changes of substance that take place in the matter element and the unwelcome experiences of the *jeeva* element pertain to the bodies ; that *Brahma* remains free from imperfections, and the seat of good qualities is fully settled. This will be stated presently in *sūtra*, II-1-22.

6. Finally, (iv) ‘All this is identical with that (*Sat*) (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7). This states that all the world composed of matter and *jeevas* is identical with *Brahma*; and the *upanishad* concludes with the injunction “That thou art”. In other places in the same *upanishad* and in other *upanishads* also oneness of

(1) All that has been stated - *Brahma*, denoted by the term *sat*, is all-knowing, the possessor of an unfailing will and without any imperfection ; how could He be the universe, which is fit to be referred to as this in the text. “This was *sat* only.” How could the universe denoted by the same word *sat* be one by the absence of names and forms ; and how could it dispense with the help of another to direct its evolution? How could the very same will to become many as the universe in the form of diverse movable and immovable objects? and how could He create as He willed?

Brahma and the universe is stated (1), and the perception of difference is condemned (2) The text, that the ignorant man perceives more than one thing, and that the wise man sees one thing only, shows that the truth is that *Brahma* and the universe are one (3).

Criticism - Others explain the *sūtra* differently. They observe 'The product does not differ from the cause; for in truth there is no such thing as product different from the cause; all objects are perceived and spoken about owing to *avidyā*. In the products jars and plates formed from a lump of earth, the cause,— we see only the earth: nothing more than this. The products serve only for speech and action, and are unreal; the earth alone which forms the cause, is real. Similarly, the whole world other than *Brahma*, the cause, who is *nir-visesha* and mere *chit*, viz., *ahamkāra* and the rest serves only for speech and action, and is unreal. *Brahma* alone, the cause, who is merely *sat*, is real. Hence, as no product exists other than the cause, the product is not different from the cause. This view is unsound. For what is real and what is unreal cannot be identical. If they were, *Brahma* would be unreal, or the universe would be real.

(1) The texts are : All this indeed is *Brahma* (*chāndo.*, III-14-1) ; when the *Ātmā*, dear, is seen, heard about, thought on and meditated on, all this is known (*brihad.*, VI-5-6) ; All this is the *Ātmā* (*Ibid.*, VI-5-7) ; *Brahma* Himself is all this : *Ātmā* alone is all this (*chāndo.*, VII-25-2).

(2) All this will overcome him, who sees all this elsewhere than in *Ātmā* (*brihad.*, VI-5-7) ; Here there is no difference whatever ; he attains *samsāra* after *samsāra*, who perceives difference as it were (*brihad.*, VI-4-19) ; where one previous difference as it were (*brihad.*, VI-4-19) ; Where one perceives difference as it were (*brihad.*, VI-4-19) ; Where one perceives difference as it were, the one sees another ; but when everything is *Ātmā* alone to him, then whom will he see with what (*brahad.*, VI-5-15).

(3) Here the original gives a summary, which is as follows - *Brahma* Himself, having the *jeevas* and material products as His bodies, and appearing for that reason as the *jeevas* and material products, is at all times denoted by every world. At one time His body (matter and *jeevas*) becomes so subtle, that it cannot be stated to be different from Him even as His body. *Brahma* in this body is *Brahma* in the causal condition. At another time the same body becomes so gross, as to be fit to appear in diverse forms, bear diverse names and to be dealt with in diverse ways. *Brahma* in this body is *Brahma* in the evolved condition. Hence the universe, the product, is not different from *Brahma* the cause. The natures of the *jeevas* and material products forming His body and of *Brahma* the *Ātmā*, differ from one another, as taught by a hundred upanishads, whether the condition be the casual or evolved condition ; hence imperfections and good qualities pertain each to their own element in the aggregate. This has been stated in *sūtra* 9, *supra*.

Another view on the same subject is thus stated. The product also is real; *Brahma* and *jeevas* are not really different; the apparent difference has been brought about by *upādhi*. The difference and no difference between *Brahma* and matter—both are real. This view also is unsound; for in this theory there is no object other than *Brahma* and *upādhi*; *Brahma* has no parts, that can be separated one from another. Hence the *upādhi* must contact *Brahma* Himself, and His substance itself assumes by a change undesirable aspects. It may be urged that there is a capacity in *Brahma* which changes, but not His substance. Assuming that this is so, as the capacity and *Brahma* are not different, there will be conflict with the texts that state the *jeeva* to be subject to *karma* and *Brahma* to be free from it, and also with the texts that state matter to be subject to change and *Brahma* to be free from this liability. ¹

The opponent asks. The differences in perceptions and the rest appear to relate to different conditions of the same object in the case of childhood, youth and the like. In the case of earth, wood, gold and the like they appear to relate to differences in substances. In regard to a lump of earth and a jar, which are respectively cause and product, how is it decided that they relate only to differences in the conditions of the same object. The next *sūtra* replies :

16. भावेचोपलब्धेः ।

And because in the product the cause is perceived.

For, the perception is in this form - "This ear-ring is gold ; and no other material is so perceived in it. Hence, as the same person is now a child and then a young man, the material, that is the cause, changes its condition and is said to be a product. Even the *vaiśeṣhika*, who regards the product as a different substance from the cause, does recognise changes of condition ; and if the perception of different forms, the calling by different names, and the differences in the uses to which the products are put, can be explained with reference to change of conditions, the assumption of a different substance, which is not perceived, cannot be justified. Assumption will be very necessary, when no explanation is available ; but as pointed out, an explanation is possible here.

2. An *objection* is raised. When one sees a cow and says "This cow is that", referring to another cow seen before, it is the *jāti* (common character) that is recalled ; and the same may be the case here. *Reply*. A second article possessing the *jāti* is not seen here. What is perceived is a single article of the class gold existing as cause and as effect.

¹ Here the original criticises the theory of *Yādava prakāśa* in detail. This is omitted here, but is embodied in the "Three *Tatvas*".

3. A further *objection* : The ear-ring is different from the gold; which as the 'samavāyi cause (that of which a thing is made) continues in the product; and it is therefore recalled. *Reply*. If the gold were different from the ear-ring, the perception would be - 'There is gold in this article', as one says, 'there is water in this jar'. The perception is, however, 'this earring is gold'.

4. A still further *objection* : In the generation of a scorpion from a lump of cow-dung, no one sees the cow-dung in the scorpion. *Reply*. Even there earth which has become the cow-dung, is perceived. The *vaiśeṣhika* must admit that earth continues as the *samavāyi* cause in the scorpion, and this explanation we will accept.

5. In smoke, the effect of fire, the fire is not perceived. *Reply*. Be it so; but this is no objection ; for there fire is only the operative cause ; and the smoke comes forth from the undried fuel put into the fire ; and this is confirmed by the fact that the smell of the fuel and of the smoke is the same. The conclusion is that as the cause is perceived in the product thus "This is that alone", the differences in perceptions and the rest are due to difference in conditions only, and that therefore the product is not different from the cause.

17. सत्त्वाच्चापरस्य ।

And because in the cause the other, the product, exists.

'Exists in the cause' means exists in the causal condition. Thus, in the world it is usual to say "All these-jars and other products were in the forenoon merely a lump of earth". And in the *veda* it is stated "Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only ; one only ; without a second" (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1).

18. असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषाद्युक्तेश्शब्दान्तराच्च ।

If it be contended "No ; because it is said to have been non-existent then," the reply is "no. Because reference is made to the existence in another form. This is seen from the remainder of the sentence, from arguments and from other statements".

The opponent disputes the statement made in the preceding *sūtra*, and points to the following statements :

First in the *veda*. Before creation this was only *asat* (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1); Before creation this was indeed *asat* (*ṣatapatha brāhmaṇa*, VI-1-1); Before creation this was indeed nothing whatever (*yajur*, 2nd *ashtaka*, 2-50).

In the world also "all these-jars and other products—did not exist in the forenoon". *Reply*. The objection is not sound. The term *asat* (non-existent) and these statements have reference to the absence from the products of the forms, in which they are now seen. They existed in other forms; they do not mean that

the objects did not exist as you think. The terms *sat* and *asat* refer to the attributes of a substance. The attribute *satva* (*sat-ness*) is name and form. *Asatva* (*asat-ness*) is the reverse, the subtle condition without name and form. Hence, the statements mean that what is now seen with diverse names and forms did exist before, but in a subtle condition, without names and forms.

Question. How is this known? *Reply.* First, from what follows the third of the texts quoted ; which is this "That existing indeed as *asat*, resolved' I will become". This indication of resolving shows that the term *asat* did not refer to non-existence, and that the thing did exist. As all the texts should agree, the term *asat* has the same meaning in the other texts also. Secondly, a lump of earth is shaped in a particular manner with a large bottom and body ; and the new form assumed helps us to speak of it as a jar. Before this shape was given, the material did exist, but in another form. When the jar is broken into two pieces the material is in a different condition; and it is said that the jar does not exist. This broken condition of the material is the non-existence of the jar; and there is no such thing as non-existence (1) of a thing as alleged by the *vaiśeṣika*. For such a thing is not perceived, and it need not be assumed for facility of speech; as the condition of the broken jar is sufficient for the purpose. And lastly, there is the statement already quoted "Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only; one only; without a second" (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1). There non-existence was objected to in these words 'But my dear, how could this be so; and it was decided 'But this was *sat* alone, dear, before'. This is very clearly stated in the text 'Then this was indeed *avyākṛita* (without name and form); the same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms' (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7).

This sub-section closes with two illustrations as to the conclusion—that the product is not different from the cause :

19. षट्पञ्च ।

And like a piece of cloth.

Threads arranged in a particular manner form the product known as cloth, and in this new condition they serve particular purposes. Similarly *Brahma* coming into a gross condition is called the universe.

20. यथा च प्राणादिः ।

(1) No such thing as non-existence. The *vaiśeṣika* classifies all nameable things into seven groups. One of which is *abhāva* (non-existence). Of this there are four varieties, one of which is *prāk* (previous) *abhāva*, which is the non-existence of a product before it is made, and another is *dhvamsa* (destruction) *abhāva*, its non-existence after it is destroyed. The text denies that these varieties exist. The previous *abhāva* of a jar is the lump of earth, and the *dhvamsa* *abhāva* of the lump is the jar.

And like *prāṇa* and its modifications.

An atom of air (*vāyu*) enters the body, and performing different functions is known by the names *prāṇa*, *apāṇa*, *vyāṇa*, *samāṇa* and *udāṇa*. In the same way one and the same being is *Brahma* in the subtle condition, and is the universe in the gross condition, appearing as diverse things movable and immovable (1).

SUB SECTION 7

21. इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ।

If *Brahma* be stated to be other (i.e.), the *jeeva*. He will be open to the charge of not having done what was good for Himself, and the like.

This sutra states an objection raised by the opponent. It was stated in the preceding sub-section that *Brahma* and the world are one. From this he argues that *Brahma* and the *jeeva* must be one, as stated by the texts "That thou art (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7) ; This *Ātmā* is *Brahma* (*Bṛihad*, VI-4-5). But as the *jeeva* is known to be the seat of endless sufferings of various kinds (2), it follows that *Brahma* has made misery for Himself. If He were ignorant or impotent, one can understand the position ; but he is stated to be both omniscient and omnipotent. How does it happen that He has not made a world full of bliss, and that on the other hand. He has created a world, which is the reverse? It cannot be maintained that He has done so for mere pleasure ; for no one in his senses will cut off his own hand even in play. The *vedāntin*, who asserts that the world and *Brahma* are one, throws overboard the texts showing the *jeeva* to be other than *Brahma* ; for if difference be true, then one-ness of *Brahma* and the world cannot also be true.

2. *Bhāskara* comes forward with an explanation. The texts affirming difference refer to difference created by *upādhi* ; the texts affirming oneness refer to the natural no-difference. The opponent replies. You should explain whether *Brahma*, the world-cause, uncontacted by *upādhi*, knows the *jeeva* to be not different from Himself by nature or not? If He does not, His omniscience disappears; if He knows, as the *jeeva* is not different from Himself, he must know his suffering to be His own suffering; and the charge that knowing this he did not make what was good for Himself, and that He made what was not good cannot be escaped from.

(1) The first illustration is from the world ; and shows that many things assume the condition of oneness ; while the second is from the *veda*, and shows that onething exists in the condition of many.

(2) *Sufferings of various kinds*. Those arising from the body (*ādhyātmika*). those arising from *devās* (*ādhidaivika*) and those arising from the elements (*ādhibhautika*).

3. *Śankara* next explains. The difference between the *jeeva* and *Brahma* is made by *avidyā* ; and the texts affirming difference relate to it. The opponent replies. If the *avidyā* be in the *jeeva*, the alternatives mentioned in the criticism of *Vāchaspati's* theory hold; (see the Three Tatvas); as also the inferences that follow therefrom. If the *avidyā* be in *Brahma*, as He shows Himself without help. He cannot perceive *avidyā* ; nor evolve the world, which can happen only under *avidyā*. *Śankara* - The light is prevented by *avidyā* from appearing.

Reply. This will mean that the light disappears; hence, as light alone is *Brahma*, He will disappear.

4. Hence the theory that *Brahma* is the world cause is absurd.

The next *sūtra* replies ;

22. अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ।

But *Brahma* is other than the *jeeva* ; because difference from the *jeeva* is expressly stated.

Difference from the *jeeva*, who is fit to experience suffering arising from the body and the rest. The following are the statements :

Who stands in the *Ātmā*, who is within the *Ātmā*, whom the *Ātmā* does not know, whose body the *Ātmā* is, and who rules the *Ātmā* from within. He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-26) ; meditating on the *Ātmā* and the Ruler as being separate, one secures the grace of the Ruler, and by this means becomes immortal (*ṣveta.* I-6). He is the ultimate cause who is the Lord of the *jeeva* who are the lords of the mind and the senses (*Ibid.*, VI-9) ; Of them one eats the ripe fruit ; the other does not eat, but shines on all sides (*Ibid.*, IV-8); Both are unborn ; but they are respectively all-knowing, and ignorant; ruler and ruled (*Ibid.*, I-9) ; Embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-21); The all-knowing *Ātmās*, having mounted, on him (*Ibid.*, I-9) ; embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-21) ; The all-knowing *Ātmā*, having mounted, on him (*Ibid.*, VI-3-35); From this the owner of *māyā* creates this universe; and in it another is bound, deluded by *māyā* (*ṣveta.*, IV-9) ; He is the lord of matter, and of the dwellers in bodies, and the controller of the *gunas* (*Ibid.*, VI-16); who being Himself eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired by those, that are eternal, intelligent many (*Ibid.*, VI-13); who moves within *avykta*, whose body *avykta* is, whom *avykta* does not know; who moves within *akshara*, whose body *akshara* is, whom *akshara* does not know, He the inner Ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*, dwells in the highest heaven, has a shining body and has no equal or superior. He is *Nārāyaṇa* (*suba*).

23. अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ।

It is inappropriate for the *jeeva* to be *Brahma* ; as inappropriate as for a stone and the like to be *Brahma*.

A stone, a bit of fuel, a pot-shred, a blade of grass and other non-intelligent objects can never be identical with *Brahma*; for they are very inferior things, and the seats of ever-occurring changes ; while *Brahma* is without change of substance, the enemy of all blemishes, the one seat of good qualities, different from everything else, the possessor of unlimited *jñāna* and bliss and the lord of diverse and endless objects under His control. The inappropriateness is equally great in the case of the *jeeva* too, who is fit to experience endless misery and is like a glow-worm ; while *Brahma* is as stated above the enemy of all blemishes and is the seat of endless good qualities immeasurably high. Wherever a word denoting a *jeeva* is put in apposition with the term *Brahma*, the Identity should be explained as in *sūtra*, I-4-22. The *jeeva* is a body of *Brahma* as stated by the text 'Whose body the *Ātmā* is, and *Brahma* is his *Ātmā* for that reason. Hence the words in apposition denote *Brahma* appearing as the *jeeva*. Hence there is no conflict with the statement of difference ; on the other hand it explains it. The conclusion reached in the preceding sub-section refers to the oneness of *Brahma* and the world, understanding each of these terms to mean an aggregate made of *Brahma*, the *jeevas* and matter. The aggregate in a subtle condition is *Brahma*, and the same in the gross condition is the world ; and as the former evolves as the latter, *Brahma*, the cause, and the world, the product, are said to be one. The nature of matter is to change ; of the *jeeva* to suffer ; and of *Brahma* to be the seat of good qualities ; they remain without being confounded. In this view conflict with any *vedic* text is avoided. Even in the condition of oneness stated in 'Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only' matter and *jeevas* existed as the body of *Brahma*, but in a subtle form. This must be admitted on the authority of *sūtras* 34 and 35 *infra*. The absence of diversity is explained by the absence of names and forms.

Criticism. Others explain *sūtra* 22 differently, as referring to the condition of the *jeeva* himself, when he is freed from *avidyā*. Nothing stated here will fit in with their view ; for in the *jeeva* in that condition the following attributes do not exist omniscience ; being the highest ruler ; being the cause of all objects ; being the *Ātmā* of all ; the controlling of all ; and the like. It was by this feature that the difference of *Brahma* from the *jeeva* was proved by the texts quoted. But in the view of these commentators all these are made by *avidyā*. *Śankara* - *Iswara* under the influence of *avidya* differs from the *jeeva*, as the shell-silver differs from silver, and this is proved. *Reply.* This is not what the author of the *sūtras* proves by this *sūtra* ; for at the outset he announced that enquiry into *Brahma* should be made ; he has shown that the *upanishads* prove Him to be the cause of the world's evolution and the rest ; and what he does in this place is to answer the objections that the conclusion established conflicts with *smṛitis* and is opposed to valid arguments. The *sūtra* therefore does not deal with difference made by *avidyā*.

Sūtras 8 and 9 of this section (sub-section 3 supra) repeat what is settled in this sub-section ; what was done in that sub-section was merely to show that the relation of cause and product may subsist between dissimilar things. The seventh *sūtra* repeats what was settled in sub-section 6 ; the reconciliation of texts affirming difference and no-difference is made in this sub-section.

SUB-SECTION 8

24. उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेतिचेन्न क्षीरवद्धि ।

If it be contended, "No ; as a maker is seen to work with instruments," the reply is "No. He evolves like milk".

It has been established that the highest *Ātmā* may be the *Ātmā* of all, and at the same time different from every thing else. It will now be shown that by mere will He may create the world of diversity ; for He has an unfailing will.

In the world persons, capable of making this thing or that, are seen to require the necessary instruments. Though they have the capacity they utilise some instruments, and only then are they seen to make products. Those, that have not the capacity, are unable to make them, though they have all the instruments. Those, that are capable, make them utilising the instruments. This is the only difference. This fact must apply to *Brahma* also. Though omnipotent, he could not have created the universe for want of the necessary instruments (1) That he was without them follows from the statement that before creation there was only *Sat*? The second part of the *sūtra* furnishes a reply. Every thing, capable of producing another thing, does not require instruments. Milk, for instance, becomes curd, and water freezes ; and no instrument is needed by either. Similarly, *Brahma* can evolve as the world without any help ; because He is omnipotent. *Question*. Is not a drop of buttermilk dropped into the milk to convert it to curd? *Reply*. It is not necessary. It is done merely to quicken the change, and to bring about a particular taste. The *sūtra* has the particle *hi*, which draws attention to a well-known fact. It has been put in to show that the objection is frivolous.

25. देवादिवदपि लोके ।

And like the *devas* in their world.

(1) *Question*. How can this doubt arise? The need for instruments is perceived in persons of limited capacities. How can this be put forward in the case of the omnipotent *Brahma*? *Reply*. The doubt may be felt by some person of dull intelligence ; and it is removed by the *sūtra*.

The *devas* in their world by mere will create what they require. Similarly *Brahma* creates the whole world by mere will. That the *devas* have got this power is known from the *veda*; and the same authority shows that *Brahma* can create by mere will. The mention of *devas* is to serve as an illustration, so that the point may be easily grasped.

The following are other illustrations: a piece of magnet attracts iron by mere proximity; the spider weaves its web; and seers possessing abnormal powers do what they like. Finally - and this the opponent must admit - the *jeeva* by mere will moves his limbs. *Brahma*, of whom the universe is a body, can likewise bring about what He pleases by mere will.

SUB - SECTION 9

26. कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निर्वयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ।

The whole of *Brahma* must be expended; or the texts teaching His indivisibility must be ignored.

Before creation *Brahma* was one only, that is, He did not consist of separable parts (1); and could not be divided into *Brahma*, the *jeevas* and matter. When He became many in evolution, it is stated that He became ether, air and other non-intelligent products, and also sentient beings from the four-faced one to the lowest worm. Then one of two things must have happened - either the whole of *Brahma* was expended in the creation of products; and nothing remains. Or He consisted of elements, of which the intelligent element evolved into the beings mentioned; and the non-intelligent element into ether, air, etc. But this will be opposed to the teaching of indivisibility.

2. The following explanation may be given. The cause was *Brahma* with the *jeevas* and matter in a subtle condition as His body; and the products is the same *Brahma* with the same elements in a gross condition. This explanation will not do. The *Ātmā* element also, i.e., *Brahma*, is admitted to have evolved; and there is no escape from the objection. Being indivisible, when He became the inner ruler of one product, there would be no inner ruler of other products. Nor can it be maintained that *Brahma* not expended in the evolution remains. Hence, the theory of evolution of *Brahma* as the world is absurd.

The next *sūtra* gives a reply:

(1) Before creation, my dear, there was Sat only (*chāndo*, VI-2-1); Before creation, this was indeed nothing whatever (*yajur*, *ashtaka*, II-2-50); Before creation this was *Ātmā* only; one only.

27. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ।

But because the *veda* teaches so, and because this is a matter to be known only from testimony.

There is no absurdity as alleged. The *veda* teaches that *Brahma* is indivisible, and that from Him this world of diversity comes forth. In a matter to be learnt from the *veda* facts must be accepted as stated. *Question*. How can even the *veda* state what cannot co-exist, like the statement 'one wets with fire'. The second part of the *sūtra* meets this objection. *Brahma*, being known only from the *veda*, is unlike everything else; and one may believe that He possesses unique powers; He should not be tested by any co-existence that may be observed in the world.

28. आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ।

Similarly in regard to the *jeeva* too. The powers of different things are, as is well-known, different.

The opponent seeks to fasten on one thing the peculiarities observed in an entirely different thing. If this attempt be permitted, then the attributes observed in matter, a jar for instance, may be looked for in the *jeeva* who is of an entirely different nature, and who is eternal; and it may be stated that like the jar he is also perishable. But this is not so; because their natures are different. This is stated in the second part of the *sūtra*. Fire and water differ from one another; and their attributes-heat and cold-are peculiar to them. Similarly, in *Brahma* who is different from things seen in the world, powers not observed in them exist by thousands. This is stated by *Parāśara*-

Brahma being without the qualities *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, being full of everything that one may need, not being subject to *karma*, and being unfit to be connected therewith how is it admitted that He created the world and the like.

This question being put from what is seen in the world, the following reply was given -

The capacities of all objects cannot be perceived from the sources from which they are known. Hence *Brahma* has capacities pertaining to His nature, that are utilised in creation as fire has the capacity to heat (*vishṇu* I-3-1. 2 and 3)

The *veda* too has this text -

Where was the forest, what was the tree from which *Brahma* made heaven and earth? Oh, wise men, what was the instrument which He who supports the worlds, used; ask, considering with your mind.

The reply was

Brahma was the forest, *Brahma* was the wood, from which He made heaven and earth; you wise men, I say this to you having decided with my mind; *Brahma* bearing the worlds used *Brahma* (i.e., Himself) (*yajur*, *ashṭaka*, 8-76 and 77).

The objection made from what is seen in the world cannot come down on *Brahma*, who is an unique Being.

29. स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ।

And because the opponent's theory is faulty.

Pradhāna (matter), which is the final cause on the opponent's theory, is not different from things seen in the world; and the arguments drawn from observation may be applied to it. *Pradhāna* is indivisible; how can it evolve into *mahat* and other products and begin to make the world of diversity? *Sāṅkhya*—It consists of three elements—*śatva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Question, Is *Pradhāna* a group of the three elements, or a product made of them? In the latter alternative, there will be conflict with your theory that *Pradhāna* is the ultimate cause; and conflict with the number of the *tatvas* that you accept. In the former alternative, as the three elements are indivisible, and as products are formed by the accretion of a portion of one thing to a portion of another, they cannot by coming together produce any gross substance. The same impossibility will be found on the other theory that atoms are the final cause; for, they are indivisible, and have no sides like finite things, to which they can attach themselves. The union may take place either by one atom attaching itself to one side of another atom or by becoming one with the other completely. The former is not possible as the atoms are not many-sided. In the latter case the coming out of a gross thing is impossible.

30. सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात् ।

And *Brahma* possesses every power. And this the *veda* teaches.

His power is said to be superior, to be of many kinds, and to pertain to His nature; also His capacity to know (*jnāna*) to support and to create and destroy (*ṣveta.*, VI-8); He is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst. Showing thus that He is an unique Being, the *upanishad* states that He has an unfailing will (*chāndo.*, VII-1-5); see also *Ibid*, III-14-2.

31. विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम् ।

If it be contended No, because He is without senses or organs of action," the reply is "This has been answered."

The following objection is raised: There is a text that states that *Brahma* has no senses or organs of action. "He has no body and no organs" (*ṣveta.*, VI-8). Though He is an unique being and omnipotent, yet for want of the organs of action He cannot begin any work. The second part of the *sūtra* states that the answer to this objection was given in *sūtras* 27 and 28; and this is also what the *upanishads* say-

He sees, but has no eye; He hears, but has no ear; He goes and he takes, but has no hands or feet (*ṣveta.*, III-19).

The unique Being known only from the *veda* is competent to do everything even in the absence of the necessary instruments.

SUB - SECTION 10

32. न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ।

No, because there must be a purpose for the evolution.

Though *Brahma*, being an unique Being, has the capacity to do everything, and can therefore Himself create the world of diversity, yet He cannot be the cause; for there must be a purpose for such creation. A person consciously begins a work either for himself or for another. Now *Brahma* cannot work for Himself for He has by nature what ever one may desire; and there is nothing, which He has not which He has to gain by the evolution. Nor can He be said to work for others. Being Himself full, He must work for others merely from a desire to benefit them. How can He, being full of mercy, create a world so full of endless misery of many kinds arising from residence in a womb, with old age, death, and hell. On the other hand one, that is actuated by mercy would make a world full of happiness alone. Hence, having no purpose to serve, *Brahma* could not have been the 'world-cause.

To this objection the next *sūtra* replies:

33. लोकवत्तु लीलकैवल्यम् ।

But mere amusement as in the world.

In the world kings, who rule over earth consisting of the seven islands, and who possess power in full, are seen to play with balls for mere amusement. So does *Brahma* for no purpose other than amusement only create, sustain and destroy the world with His mere will. He is said to be full of objects of desire. This means that when He wishes a thing, it is attained; not that everything is ever present.

34. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति ।

No partiality or cruelty; because reference was made (to the *karma* of individuals), and it is so stated.

The world contains numerous differences. There is first the broad distinction of *jīvas* into *devas*, men, brute creation and the vegetable kingdom. Next, among men themselves some are high; others are low; and others still occupy a middle position. This reveals partiality. Because intense suffering is caused to most persons, *Brahma* must be devoid of mercy. To this objection the *sūtra* replies - no; there is neither partiality nor cruelty. *Brahma* is the common cause; but the differences are due to the *karmas* of the individuals. And this is stated by the *upanishads*.

One that did good deeds attains a good body; one that did evil deeds attains a bad body. One does good deeds, having done good deeds in the past; one does evil deeds, having done evil deeds in the past (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-5). This is also stated in the *viṣṇu purāṇa*. 'In the creation of products He is only the *nimitta*; for the principal cause is the *karmas* of those that are created. Leaving out the mere *nimitta*, nothing whatever is needed; each object becomes an object from its *karma*' (I-4-52).

35. नकर्माविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यतेच ।

If it be contended "No *karma*; because *Brahma* alone existed then," the reply is "No, because the *jeevas* and their *karmas* have had no beginning; And the existence of one being only (in spite of this fact) can be explained; and their preexistence is taught".

It was stated in the preceding *sūtra* that in the creation of differences reference was made to the *karmas* of individuals. The opponent states that before evolution commenced there were no *jeevas*; for the text 'Before creation, my dear, this was Sat only' states that there was no division and therefore there were no pre-existing *karmas*. How can it be said that the differences in creation were due to *karmas*? This objection is stated in the first part of the *sūtra*, and is refuted in the second part. If *jeevas* existed at the beginning, how can this fact be reconciled with the remark that only *Sat* remained then? Thus the *jeevas* were then without name and form, and were so subtle that they could not be described as separate from *Brahma* even as His body. If this explanation be not accepted, this undesirable result will happen. Some persons would lose the benefit of what they have done, and others would reap what they have not sown. That *jeevas* have had no beginning is known from the following text:

He, who is fit to become all-knowing, is not born, nor does he die (*katha*, II-18).

That evolutions follow one another in a stream, and that this stream has had no beginning is stated in the text. "The creator made the sun and the moon, as before" (*nārā.*, 1-38). The text- "Then this was *avyakrita* indeed; the same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms" (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7) teaches that merely the making of names and forms took place, and that the *jeevas* themselves were not made. This is also stated in the *bhagavad-gītā*. Matter and the *jeeva*-know both to have been without a beginning (13-19). Hence *Brahma* alone was the world-cause; for He is an unique Being; He is omnipotent; His purpose is mere amusement; and He created differences in accordance with the *jeevas Karmas*.

36. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

And because all the attributes would be appropriate (only on the theory that *Brahma* is the cause).

All the attributes pertaining to the world-cause described already and to be described as inapplicable to the *pradhāna* of the *sāṅkhya* and to the atoms of the *vaiśeṣika* and others are applicable to *Brahma*. He alone is therefore the world-cause. This *sūtra* concludes the reply to the opponents' objections.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER II

SECTION II

We have established *Brahma* as the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe; we have also answered the objections raised by opponents. In order to strengthen the theory of evolution from *Brahma*, rival theories not based on the *veda* will now be examined, and refuted. Otherwise, persons of dull intelligence, not knowing that they are based on specious arguments, might regard them as supported by proper authority, and their regard for the theory based on the *veda* might suffer diminution. Hence, for the purpose of refuting those theories this section is begun. The *sāṅkhya*'s theory of evolution is first taken up; for it accepts the *sat-kārya* theory, and enumerates twenty four *tatvas* or substances as the *upanishads* do; and there is therefore greater risk of its being mistaken for one of the accepted systems.

SUB - SECTION 1

From *sub-section* 5 of chapter I, section 1, the *sāṅkhya* has been with us; but it was only shown hitherto that *vedic* texts do not state his theory. That theory is now examined. There is therefore no room for thinking that there is repetition.

This is connected with the name of the sage *kapila*, and enumerates twenty-five *tatvas* or substances. The first is *mūla-prakṛiti* or *pradhāna*, consisting of three substances known as *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. They are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by the senses; but they can be described and distinguished one from another only from the effects which they produce. *Satva* is light, enables one to see correctly, and conduces to pleasure. *Rajas* is ever restless, supports things and leads to pain. And *tamas* is heavy, conceals the true nature of things and brings about misconception. These three are substances, but not qualities, as taught by the *upanishads*. In the cosmic condition of general rest the three substances were well-balanced, no one of them being more or less than the others; and in this condition the aggregate was known as *prakṛiti*. It is described as being one, all-pervading, and eternal, and as devoid of intelligence. It is ever changing and exists for the enjoyment of *jeevas*, and helps them to obtain release from bondage. It is the final cause of the universe; for it is not itself evolved from anything else. From this *prakṛiti* twenty-three substances came forth by evolution, seven of which in their turn produced other substances. They are known as *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, and the five *tanmātras* connected with the five elements known, for want of better terms, as ether, air, fire, water and earth. *Ahamkāra* exists in three forms, which are respectively known as *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The five senses of perception, the five organs

of action, and the mind came forth from the *satva* variety; and the five *tanmātras*, which produced the five elements, from the *tamas* variety, the third variety co-operating with the others in the formation of their products. From these sixteen products nothing else comes forth. The twenty-four substances enumerated constituted matter in its various forms. The twenty-fifth is the group of *jeevas*, who are not subject to any change. They are not evolved from anything else, and nothing else evolved from them. They are eternal and all-pervading; and the *jeeva* in one body differs from the *jeevas* in other bodies. They are mere *chit*, which means that they are shining substances. An earthen jar, for instance, standing in a dark place, cannot make itself known; and it needs a light to show its existence. On the other hand a light needs no such help. Similarly, the *jeeva* makes himself known without the intervention of anything else. He is therefore said to be *jnāna*. The term 'mere' in the expression 'mere *chit*', conveys the idea that he is not a knower, i.e., that he is not the seat of the attribute known as *jnāna*. He is also devoid of the capacity to act, and does not experience pleasure or pain. Yet owing to the presence of the body in proximity to himself, the *jeeva* from ignorance of the real nature of things mistakes the activity of the matter in the form of his body as his own, and fancies that he himself is the actor or enjoyer, as one perceives the red colour of a *japā* flower in a crystal placed by its side. From this misconception results his bondage; and release is obtained from the perception of the truth. The *sāṅkhya* denies the existence of an all - controlling being.

2. These things the *sāṅkhya* proves by sense perception, inference and *āgama* (*Kāpila's smṛiti*). In regard to the *tatvas*, which he proves by sense perception, there is not much room for difference of opinion (1). As to the *āgama* it may be taken to have been rejected by the first chapter of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (Intro., para 10); for it is based on the knowledge of one that was not all-knowing. The inference that *pradhāna* alone is the world-cause is refuted here. This will be in effect the refutation of the whole of the *sāṅkhya's* theory.

3. This is what the *sāṅkhya* states: The whole of the universe must have had a single cause. This view must be accepted. To assume that it has come forth from several causes would never lead to a definite result. Take, for instance, a piece of cloth. It is made up of a number of threads, each thread being contacted on one side by one side of another. Each of these threads was

(1) There is difference of opinion on one point only. In the teaching of the *upanishads* each element evolves from the preceding one through an intermediate condition known as *tanmātrā*. Earth comes forth from water through the *gandha tanmātrā*; water from fire through the *rasa tanmātrā*; fire from air through the *rūpa tanmātrā*; air from ether through the *thespāsa tanmātrā*; and ether from *ahamkāra* through the *sabda tanmatra*. In the *sāṅkhya's* theory all the *tanmātrās* come directly from *ahamkāra*.

similarly produced from its parts: and each of these parts again form its component elements. Arguing in this manner, one arrives at the atoms (*parama ānu*); as he should proceed from the known to the unknown, he must presume that the atoms themselves are made up of parts; and that each part of each atom is similarly made up of its own parts. To assume that atoms do not consist of parts would not be correct; for then one atom should be in contact with the whole of another atom; and a thing possessing extension would not emerge. Thus no finality can be reached. It must therefore be assumed that the universe has come forth from a single cause, which is capable of endless transformations, without at the same time losing its own *svarūpa*. This single cause is *pradhāna*, in which *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are in the same proportion. This result is reached as shown below: The universe is constituted of parts, each differing from the others and is therefore a product. Being a product, it must have come forth from a cause possessing the same nature as itself. This is what is seen in the world. Every product comes forth from a cause similar in nature to itself, and it is dissolved in the same. An earthen jar has been made from a lump of clay, and a crown from gold. Now the universe is full of pleasure, pain and misconception, which are the effects respectively of *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These three elements must therefore have produced the world. In the causal condition, or the condition of rest, there is no activity; and in the active or manifested condition, one or another of these three elements ever predominates over the others. It may therefore be inferred that in the former condition the three causes were in equipoise. The three elements in equipoise are known as *pradhāna*, which is therefore the ultimate cause. It is appropriate that this should be so; for it exists in every place and at all times. Its products like *mahat* and *ahamkāra*, being limited cannot transform themselves into the universe. This theory is refuted in the next *sūtra*.

1. रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानं प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

Pradhāna is not the cause, because creation is not possible; and action being possible (only under direction).

The theory of evolution is not sound; for *pradhāna* is non-intelligent, and is not directed by one, that knows its nature. Whatever answers this description produces no effect, like mere timber in the making of a car or of a palace; and this is seen in the world. On the other hand, it is perceived that non-intelligent matter, when directed by one that knows its nature, begins to produce a product.

2. *Sāṅkhya*. - What is found in a product is seen to be the cause, like the earth found in a jar. Similarly, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are found in the products of evolution through the effects, which they produce; and they must be the cause of evolution. Reply. The argument is faulty. Put in logical form the

arguments is this - *Satva* and the rest are the world cause; for they are found in the products. This *hetu*-being found in a product-is seen in the quality white and the *jāti* cow in an animal of this class, which is a product; but they are not causes. Hence, the *hetu* is not found only where the *sādhya* exists.

3. The opponent replies. - reference was made not to a quality of *jāti*, but to a substance; and gold, which is found in an ear-ring, is its cause. *Satva* and the rest are substances, and being found in products, must be the cause. *Reply*. This explanation does not help; for *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are attributes of substances, but are not themselves substances. They are the attributes of earth and other elements and make them appear light or heavy and the like; nor are they seen in products as substances as gold is so found. They are well-known as attributes alone.

4. The arguments, that to attain finality a single cause should be found, also fails; for *satva* and the rest are not one, but many; and it was stated that when equally balanced they constituted *pradhāna*. It will be futile to look for finality by assuming that they are unlimited; for then they would be all-pervading, and no one of them could predominate over the others, and no evolution could take place. To bring about evolution they must be limited.

The opponent cites cases in which direction by an intelligent person is not clearly perceived:

2. पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि ।

If it be said 'like milk and water' the reply is 'there also' (the question is under consideration).

The conclusion reached in the preceding *sūtra* is not sound. Milk, for instance, changing into curd, does not require any help from anyone from the first motion to the completion of the product through the intermediate changes; and rain water, which is of one taste, is of itself converted into the juices of cocoanut, palmyra, mango, woodapple, margosa and tamarind fruits. Similarly, *pradhāna*, being an ever-changing substance, and undergoing like transformations in the condition of rest. Undergoes unlike changes in evolution brought about by the predominance of one or another of the *guṇas*; but never needs any direction. This argument is stated in the *sūtra* and is refuted. In *sūtra* 24 of the preceding section the example of milk was cited; but the object was to show that there was no need for any instrument to produce the change; but not to deny the need for direction. For *Brahma* is present in it as stated in the text 'Who stands in water' (*bṛihad.*, V-7-8).

3. व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ।

And because if direction be not needed, the condition of rest cannot be reached.

If *pradhāna* is directed by *Brahma*, it is possible for it to be successively in the conditions of rest and activity, and to evolve into diverse products; but not otherwise; for He has an unfailing will. The opponent states that on the theory of direction also there are difficulties. Why does *Brahma* direct the evolution of *pradhāna*? He has everything that one may desire; He is full; His bliss is infinite; He is free from imperfections; and He is unfit to be connected with them. If he created differences, He would be changed with want of mercy. There is therefore objection on each side. His attention being drawn to the replies given in the last preceding sub-section, he turns round and asks again if *karmas* in the form of good and bad deeds of *jeevas* bring about evolution and cosmic rest, why is an *Īśvara* required to direct? *Pradhāna* itself influenced by *karma* in the form of good or bad deeds may change so as to give to each the fruits of his own *karma*. Food and drink polluted with poison bring on death; while helped by particular medicines they conduce to good-health. Hence the distinction between evolution and cosmic rest, the creation of differences, and the bondage of some by *prakṛiti* and its being the means to release are all appropriate in *pradhāna*, which has the capacity to change in all possible ways. *Reply*, The objection reveals ignorance of the nature of good and bad deeds. What are good deeds and what are bad deeds are known only from the *sastra*; and the *sastra* is the *veda*, which has had no beginning or end, which has come down without a break from teacher to student, and which is therefore free from the touch of imperfections characterising statements made by any one. And they are stated to be the worship of the highest *Ātmā* or the reverse; and according as He is pleased or displeased, one is happy or miserable (1).

There can be no charge of partiality, if the facts be known. The highest *Ātmā* has divided *Karma* into two varieties-good and bad; He gives to all *jeevas* bodies and instruments suitable to doing them and power to use them at pleasure; He gives them the *veda* to know His will; and to enable them to carry it out, He enters into them as their inner ruler, and co-operates with them. The *jeevas*, having received their bodies and instruments and therewith

(1) This is stated by *Dramida* - In order to attain fruits men wish to please *Ātmā* with *karmas*; He being pleased is competent to yield the fruits. This is the arrangement stated by the *veda*. Similarly, the *veda* states - 'The supporter of the universe receives as His own worship the deeds of many kinds done or being done under the injunctions of the *veda* and *smṛitis*' (*nārā.*, I-1-6); *bhagvad-gītā*. 'He reaches the goal, who worships with his own *karma* that Being, from whom all that exists comes forth, by whom they exist and by whom they act, and by whom all this world is pervaded'; "I ever throw into the wombs of persons of *asura* nature those that hate me, those that put forward specious arguments to show that I do not exist. those that knowing me do not yet approach me and those that do not know that I exist" (XVIII-46, and XVI-19).

the power to control them and being supported by Him, of their own choice do good and bad deeds; and are rewarded or punished according to their deserts. There is therefore no room to object that the *jeeva* has no free-will. Nor can the highest *Ātmā* be charged with being devoid of mercy. Mercy means inability to see another suffering, and a desire to remove the suffering without an eye to one's own good. If it be shown to one, that is determined to disobey Him, it will not be a merit; on the other hand it will be regarded as impotency. to punish such a person-this alone is a good thing; otherwise to put down an enemy must be treated as a fault. When an offender gives up the idea of disobedience, with this alone the highest *Ātmā* is pleased, excuses the numberless sins committed by him in countless world-ages, and of such a nature as cannot be put up with, and Himself makes efforts to bestow on him indescribable bliss (1).

In *sūtra* 2 an example given to show that *pradhāna* could evolve without direction was rejected. In the next two *sūtras* other examples are similarly treated: First, the grass consumed and the water drunk by a cow change of themselves into milk. *Pradhāna* may evolve likewise. Here there is no question of direction by a person that wills. Mere proximity to a *jeeva* suffices; for even when the cow sleeps, the conversion of the grass and water into milk goes on uninterruptedly. It cannot be urged that this case also is included in the enquiry; for when the effect can be produced without conscious direction, to assume its existence is not legitimate. To this the *sūtra* replies:

4. अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ।

Not like grass and water, because it does not occur elsewhere.

This example does not apply; for grass and water undirected by an intelligent Being do not change into milk. This is seen in the case of a bull. If the opponent's contention were valid, the grass and water too consumed by the bull or rejected by it would be converted to milk; but this conversion does not take place. Hence, it is the highest *Ātmā* that wills the conversion in the case of the cow. What was stated in *sūtra* 2 *supra* is further explained here; the object being to point out a case in which a change does not take place when it is not directed.

5. पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि ।

(1) This is stated in the *bhagavad-gītā*- "To those, that wishing to be ever with me meditate on me, I give with love that *buddhi*, with which they will reach Me. To favour them I remain as the subject of their thoughts and with the bright lamp of knowledge I destroy the darkness born of past *karma*" (X-10 and 11).

If it be said "Like a person or a magnet", the reply is "(Not) even there".

Two other examples are stated here. Helped by a lame man, who is able to see, a blind man, who can walk, acts. By proximity to a magnet a piece of iron is moved. Similarly by the co-operation of *pradhāna* and *jeeva* the world evolves. The *jeeva* is *jnāna*, but does not act; while *pradhāna* can not see, but can act. To this contention the *sūtra* replies. These examples do not help. The lame man sees the road and directs; and the blind man understands his directions and acts. But the *jeeva* of the *sāṅkhya* cannot act and cannot therefore direct *pradhāna*. And *pradhāna*, being non-intelligent, cannot receive any direction and act. Nor does the *jeeva* approach *pradhāna* like the magnet; for as already stated he does not act. If it be said that being present everywhere, he need not approach, then by his proximity, which ever exists, evolution must be eternal, and there will be no period of rest. The *jeeva*, being ever free, there will be no bondage and no release.

6. अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

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And because it is not possible to attain predominance.

In the condition of cosmic rest all the three substances - *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*-are in equipoise; and unless this is disturbed, and one or another of them predominates, there can be no evolution; for so states the *sāṅkhya*. If the disturbance could take place without direction from an intelligent being, evolution would be eternal (1).

7. अन्यथानुमितौ च शक्तिवियोगात् ।

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In inferring differently too; the capacity to know being wanting.

If the opponent should say - 'I will give up these arguments, which are shown to be unsound, and adopt another and better inference, and prove that *pradhāna* can evolve without guidance,' the reply is that the same faults must recur; for *pradhāna* has not the capacity to know.

8. अभ्युपगमेप्यर्थाभावात् ।

Because even admitting its possibility, there will be no use.

Assume that you can establish your point as proposed. Even then it will serve no purpose. According to your theory. *Pradhāna* serves for the enjoyment of the *jeeva* and helps his release. But the *jeeva* is mere *chit*; he does not act; he does not undergo any change; he is pure, and for that very reason he is ever

(1) Taking this *sūtra* and the third *sūtra* together, it will be seen that *pradhāna* left to itself must be either in the condition of change or in the condition of rest, and will be powerless to go from one condition to another.

free. It is not possible for him to see *pradhāna* and derive enjoyment; and as there is no bondage, there is no need for release. If nevertheless he experiences pleasure and pain by the proximity of *pradhāna*, as the proximity ever exists, he can never be released.

9. विप्रतिषेधाच्चसमञ्जसम् ।

And because it is full of inconsistencies, it is not a sound theory.

The *sāṅkhya* states that *prakṛiti* (matter) exists for another, i.e., for the *jeeva*; it must therefore be an object that can be seen, and that can yield enjoyment; and the *jeeva* must be one that sees, directs and derives enjoyment. In the same breath he states that he is ever without change, and that he is mere *chit*; hence he cannot act; for action is change of condition; and he cannot see, direct and enjoy. Here is a contradiction.

Sāṅkhya. There is really no contradiction. *Prakṛiti* being in the presence (*sannidhi*) of the *jeeva*, there is mutual *adhyāsa* that is, the activity of matter is perceived in the *jeeva*, and his intelligence in matter; and this is misconception. Hence the *jeeva*, sees directs and enjoys, though in reality he is without change and does not act.

Reply. This explanation is untenable. *Ādhyāsa* is the perception by an intelligent person of the attributes of one object in a different object. This perception is a change of condition, and is not possible in one that never changes. Nor is it possible in matter; for this perception is an attribute of an intelligent-person; and matter possesses no intelligence.

Sāṅkhya. The mere existence of matter in the presence of the *jeeva* will suffice. He need not see it.

Reply. This also is untenable, for the same reason, i.e., as he never changes. If nevertheless *adhyāsa* can take place, it must ever occur. That presence (*sannidhi*) cannot help has been already stated (*vide sūtra* 10 of the preceding section).

2. *Another contradiction*. The *sāṅkhya* states that matter is the means by which the *jeeva* attains release; and also that he is ever free. Hence what is bound, adopts the means to release and attains release is matter alone. If the latter statement be correct, how can matter be said to serve the *jeeva*?

3. *A still further contradiction*. Matter is said to withdraw from sight the moment it is seen by a *jeeva* in its true nature, thinking 'I have been seen'. This is unsound. The *jeeva* being ever free, and never changing, never sees matter; nor can matter see itself, being without intelligence; and cannot think 'I have been seen'.

Sāṅkhya. Mere presence (*sannidhi*) is perception.

Reply. As the presence ever exists, matter must be ever perceived; and it cannot be said to withdraw from sight.

Sāṅkhya. There is a presence (*sannidhi*) other than the substance of matter, which newly comes into existence.

Reply. Even this is not possible in one that never changes. Further, if perception in the form of presence be the means to release, the same must be the means to bondage also; and bondage and release will ever happen.

Sāṅkhya. Misperception is the means to bondage; the perception of an object as it is the means to release.

Reply. Both kinds of perception do not differ from the presence; and both bondage and release will ever happen. If the presence be not permanent, but newly comes into existence, we ask what is its cause. If you mention something as the cause, we ask again what is the cause of that cause; and this will lead to the *adinfinitum* difficulty.

Sāṅkhya. The mere existence of matter is the presence.

Reply. Then as matter is eternal, bondage and release will ever occur. Hence owing to these and other contradictions, the *sāṅkhya's* theory is unsound.

Criticism. The objections urged apply with greater force to *Śankaras* theory; for his *Brahma*, like the *jeeva* of the *sāṅkhya*, is *kutastha*, i.e., He never changes; He is ever *nir-visesha*, self-proved and mere *chit*. Hence he cannot see *avidyā*, and *adhyāsa* will not be possible. There is this difference. In order to limit birth and death to particular individuals, the *sāṅkhya* accepts the view that the *jeevas* are many; but this is not accepted by *Śankara*. Hence if one person dies, all others must cease to exist at the same time; but this is not in accordance with facts.

Śankara. In the *sāṅkhya's* theory *prakṛiti* and bodies made of it, real; but in my theory *prakṛiti* and the bodies made of it are all unreal. Hence one *jeeva* will suffice.

Reply. Whether *prakṛiti* be real or not, a Being that never changes, that is mere *chit* and shines without help, cannot see anything other than himself. If matter be unreal, its first perception and the subsequent nullification of the perception being accepted, the absurdity is still greater. In the theory of *Bhaskara* too contact of *Brahma* with *upādhis* will be impossible, as He is of this nature (1) and the theory is therefore unsound.

(1) Is of this nature - is ever without change. To contact an *upādhi* is a change, and it is therefore impossible.

SUB - SECTION 2

We stated that the *sāṅkhya*'s theory was untenable, as it is based on specious arguments, and as it is full of contradictions. We proceed to show in this sub-section that the *vaiśeṣika*'s theory of evolution from atoms is also untenable.

This is based on the *sūtras* of *Kanāda*. It recognises the existence of the five elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether, all of which except the last are formed each from its own atoms (*paramś aṇu*). Ether is one and indivisible; it is eternal and pervades all space. The mind is atomic, and is eternal, each *jeeva* being furnished with a mind to serve him as an instrument of knowledge. The senses of perception-those perceiving smell, taste, colour and touch - are products respectively of the four elements, earth, water, fire and air; and they do not come from the subtlest variety of *ahamkāra* as in the *sāṅkhya*'s theory. The sense of hearing is the ether itself limited by one's ear. The *vaiśeṣika* does not recognise the existence of *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, the five *tanmātras* and the organs of action. The evolution of earth, water, fire and air from their atoms proceeds on this plan. Two atoms unite and form two-atom compounds; and three of these compounds unite together to form what is known as *tryaṇuka* (three two-atom compounds). From these secondary compounds the elements are formed by aggregation. The atoms move towards one another and form compounds prompted by *adṛiṣṭam*. the *jeevas* do *karmas* (action) to procure fruits of various kinds. And as the *karmas* disappear quickly, something relatively permanent is needed to intervene between them and the fruits, and to wait till the time for yielding them arrives. This something is known as *adṛiṣṭam* (unseen); and it is recognised by the *mīmāṃsaka* also under the designation of *apūrva* (new). The same need does not arise in the *vedānta*, as there is *Īśvara*, who sees the *karma* of each and gives him its fruit. Now, as evolution is for the benefits of the *jeeva*, his *adṛiṣṭams* move the atoms to form compounds of various kinds and furnish him with a body. The *sāṅkhya*'s criticism of the evolution of the universe from atoms is recognised; and to avoid the difficulty pointed out, it is assumed that the atoms are eternal, indivisible and without parts.

This, theory is criticised in the next *sūtra*:

10. महदीर्घवद्वा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ।

Like the evolution of *tryaṇuka* from *dvyaṇuka* and of *dvyaṇuka* from *paramaṇu*, the rest of the theory is unsound.

The *sūtra* assumes that this theory is untenable, and proceeds to state that other minor items of this theory are also untenable. First, as to the theory of evolution itself. It is seen in the world that a number of threads uniting with one another yield the product - a piece of cloth. This union is brought about by

one side of a thread being joined to one side of another thread, and in this it is implied that each thread has six sides. The formation of compounds from atoms must proceed on the same plan, and it must be assumed that atoms also have six sides. Otherwise, being indivisible, one cannot be united to another to form a compound of any size; and from even a thousand atoms a compound exceeding one atom in size cannot emerge (1).

Hence, evolution would be impossible. If it be admitted that atoms also have six sides, they must consist of parts, each of which is made up of similar parts; and these again must be similarly produced. Proceeding in this manner, there will be no end. The theory therefore fails.

2. The subject of atoms should be examined a little further. Both the *mīmāṃsaka* and the *vedāntin* recognise the existence of atoms as the smallest unit of extension; and their atoms are the 'small specks of dust seen flying about in a bundle of sub-beams, which stream into a dark room through a window. The *vaiśeṣhika* goes further and sub-divides each of these *atoms* into *dvyanuka* or two-atom compounds, and each of these again into *parama anu*. This sub-division rests on this inference, viz., the atom seen in the sun's rays is made up of parts; for it is a substance seen by the eye, like a jar. He requires an ultimate cause, that does not consist of parts. His *parama anu* is not made up of parts and is indivisible; but this has now here been seen. In making an assumption one should be guided by what one actually sees. As a theory of atoms this is cumbersome, as it assumes two kinds of smaller atoms while the atoms seen in the sunbeams suffice for all purposes.

3. *Vaiśeṣhika*. A mustard seed and a hill differ from each other by the small or large number of their parts; and if the smallest atom should consist of numberless parts, there would be no difference between the seed and hill, as each will consist of numberless parts. Hence, some limit to the smallness of size must be accepted. *Reply*. If the smallest atoms do not consist of parts, there will be no objects exceeding the smallest atom in size; and the mustard seed and hill will not exist. Further though the mustard seed and hill consist of numberless parts, there is a difference between them. The mustard seed has

(1) This needs explanation. when several parts are put together to form a whole, each part is in contact with another, the place of contact being a portion of the part. If atoms unite to form compounds, one atom must contact another at a portion of its surface. But being indivisible, it cannot do so; and must contact it throughout its surface; Then the two atoms will cover the same space as one atom. This objection is disregarded in cases in which the contact of an indivisible object with objects consisting of parts is accepted on proper authority. But when the *vaiśeṣhika* puts forward a theory based on mere speculation, the objection may be legitimately urged. His assumption of the existence of *parama anu* is of this character.

numberless parts no doubt; but the hill consists of numberless parts of the size of the mustard seed, each of which consists of endless parts. Again a fortnight and a month consist each of numberless parts; and yet even you must admit that they differ. You recognise *jāti* as being found in all the individuals of a class; and thought the members of each class are numberless, yet you recognise a higher and a lower *jāti*, the *jāti* in jars being the lower and the *jāti* in the element earth being the higher; and these *jātis* are therefore different.

Vaiśeshika. What shall we do? *Reply*. Accept the theory taught in the *upanishads*.

Criticism. This *sūtra* has been interpreted by others as refuting an objection to the theory of evolution of the world from *Brahma*. This is unsound, and will be a repetition. the objections raised by several opponents were answered in the preceding section; and thier theories are now refuted in this section. That evolution of the world from an intelligent Being is possible was proved in sub-section 3 of the section.

What are the other things that are unsound in this theory? the author proceeds to point them out.

11. उभयथाऽपि न कर्मातिस्तदभावः ।

In either view, there will be no motion of atoms (towards one another); hence no formation of compounds of atoms.

In this theory the atoms should move towards one another; this motion leads to the union of two atoms; these compounds form other compounds; in this manner the world is formed. The question is-how is the first motion in each atom caused. The *vaiśeshika* states that this is caused by *adrishṭam*. Now the *adrishṭam* must be in the atom or in the *jeeva*; and the *sūtra* states that in neither case will there be motion.

2. Being generated by the *jeevas* good and bad deeds, the *adrishṭams* cannot be in *parama āṇu*. If they were, they must ever lead to creation. The *adrishṭams* in the *jeeva* cannot bring about motion in the *parama āṇu*. If the *adrishṭams* in the *jeeva* move the *parama āṇus* through the *jeeva* who contacts them, then the stream of *adrishṭams* being permanent, there must be creation at all times.

Vaiśeshika. *Adrishṭams* must mature before they yield their fruits. Now some *adrishṭams* yield their fruits at once; some in another life; and some in another *kalpa* (world-age). Hence there is no risk of eternal creation. *Reply*. To bring about the creation of the world at the same time, it must be assumed that all the *adrishṭams* of all the *jeevas* mature at the same moment, and that

this maturing is of the same kind. This is, however, an impossible task. The *jeevas* are numberless; each produces numerous *adrishṭams* by actions of various kinds; and they do not act in concert or at the same moment. It cannot therefore be imagined that all these *adrishṭams* mature at the same moment, and that the matured fruits all tend to creation. For the same reason the dissolution of the world at the same time, and the waiting of the *adrishṭams* to mature till the life-time of *Brahma*, the creative agent, comes to end are also out of the question.

Vaiśeshika. *Īśvara's* will gives a capacity to the *adrishṭams*, and they join together and cause motion in the *parama aṇus*. *Reply*. The existence of *Īśvara* in your theory rests on mere inference. It has been shown in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 3 that the inference fails. Hence your theory of evolution of the world from the motion in *parama aṇus* fails (1).

12. समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ।

And because *samavāya* is accepted; as the same reason applies; and as there will be want of finality.

The *vaiśeshika* states that *samavāya* (1) exists and that it is eternal. It is the relation of the whole to its parts, of a substance to its attributes or actions,

(1) If the *adrishṭam* can create the world, there is no need for an *Īśvara*; and the attempt to prove His existence by inference will be useless. *Vaiśeshika*. The *adrishṭams*, being non-intelligent, must be moved by an effort of *Īśvara*. *Reply*. This effort being non-intelligent another effort will be needed to move it; this will need another and so on *ad infinitum*. *Vaiśeshika*. The first effort of *Īśvara* will suffice. *Reply*. We plead that similarly the *adrishṭams* of the *jeeva* will suffice, though non-intelligent; an *Īśvara* is not needed.

(1) The *vaiśeshika* enumerates six things in addition to substances (*dravya*), viz., *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *jāti*, *samavāya*, *viśeṣa* and *abhāva* (non-existence). Of these *jāti* is stated to be one, to be eternal and to be found in all the members of a class; such is the peculiar feature of the class; but *jāti* is considered to be different from it. In criticising *Śankara's* theory in the 'Three Tatvas' it is shown that the assumption of *jāti*, which is not perceived by any one, is unnecessary, and that whatever purpose it to be served by *jāti* will be served by the peculiar feature of the class. *Samavāya* is dealt with here. *Viśeṣa* is an attribute that is found in the *parama aṇus* and serves to distinguish one *parama aṇu* from another. It is not perceived; and the assumption of its existence rests on the same ground as the assumption of *samavāya*. It fails for the same reason. *Abhāva* was referred to under *sūtra* 18 of chapter II, section 1 (page 481), and it was shown that such a thing as *abhdāva* does not exist. The result is that there are only three classes - *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*; as the last two are aspects of *dravya*, the only proper division is into *dravya* and what is not *dravya*. This is the division adopted by *Sri Desika* in the *nyāya siddhānjana*.

of an individual of a class to the generic character. Its existence is assumed in order to explain why two particular things are always found together, one resting on the other and qualifying it. The same need exists for explaining why this *samavāya* is found in the things to which it is related; and a second *samavāya* must be assumed to satisfy this need; this will lead to a third one and so on *ad infinitum*.

Vaiśeṣika. It is the nature of *samavāya* to be always found with another; there is therefore no need for a second *samavāya*. Reply. It is the nature of qualities and actions to be always found with substances, and of *jāti* to be always found in individuals of a class. Why should the existence of an unknown thing as *samavāya* be assumed, and why should it be then stated that such and such is its nature? The assumption of a new thing is cumbersome and unwarranted.

The objection pointed out is found in *samavāya* whether it is eternal or not. If it be eternal, there is another objection, which is stated in the next *sūtra*:

13. नित्यमेव च भावात् ।

And because (what is connected with *samavāya*) must be eternal alone.

Samavāya being a relation, if it were eternal as alleged, the things with which it is connected, i.e., the world, must be eternal also; and there would be no need to prove the existence of *Īśvara* or to assume that atoms exist and form the world.

14. रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ।

And because atoms are said to possess colour and other attributes; the reverse of what is intended, being so seen.

The atoms (*parama āṇu*) are of four classes corresponding to the elements earth, water, fire and air, and are said to possess the attributes smell, taste, colour and touch. They are at the same time described as being eternal, subtle, and indivisible. But this description cannot be correct; for whatever has colour and the other attributes is seen to be perishable and to have been made, like a jar, from causes that are similar; and as already stated in making an assumption one should proceed on what is seen. Hence it is not possible to assume a thing as possessing a particular character that appeals to one.

To ward off this attack it may be stated that the view that atoms possess colour and other attributes will be abandoned. The next *sūtra* replies:

15. उभयथाच दोषात् ।

And because in both ways it is faulty.

It has been pointed out that the possession of colour and other attributes by atoms conflicts with the view that they are eternal. Their being devoid of the attributes will conflict with the other view that the colour and other attributes of products come from similar attributes of the cause, and the earth and other elements will be without smell, taste, colour and touch. Thus, in either way the theory is faulty.

16. अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ।

And because it has not been accepted, it should be completely ignored.

In the *sāṅkhya* theory one or two elements are acceptable, like the *sat-kārya* theory; but in this theory of the *vaiśeṣika* there is nothing, which those that follow the *veda* can accept (1).

SUB - SECTION 3

We have refuted the theory of the *vaiśeṣika* that the universe comes forth from *parama ānus*. We pass on to the *saugata*, who holds the same theory of evolution. There are four schools, which together go by the name *saugata*. The first school, that of the *vaibhāṣika*, recognised the reality of the external world, consisting of the four elements-earth, water, fire and air- and of their compounds. Both the elements and their compounds are aggregates of atoms. The reality of the inner world also was recognised, and it consisted of streams of perceptions, feelings, or thoughts, in which each perception, feeling or thought is followed by a like perception, feeling or thought. The existence of both the worlds might be proved by sense perception and by inference. The second school, that of the *soutrāntika*, held the view that the external world was not capable of direct perception and that its existence was inferred from the perceptions which it produced. The third school, that of the *yogāchāra*, denied reality to the external world. There was nothing outside corresponding to perceptions; what was perceived by the senses was unreal like dream perceptions. All the three schools agreed in teaching that everything, which they recognised, existed only for a moment, and that it was replaced by another thing exactly alike. They denied the existence of ether, of the *jeevas* and of

(1) The *vaiśeṣika*'s views regarding the *jeeva* are opposed to the teaching of the *upanishads*. He regards him as *jaḍa*, i.e., as not capable of showing himself without help. He is a knower; but his knowledge comes only when he contacts the mind; *jñāna* is not his inseparable attribute. These views are refuted in the next section.

Īśvara. The last school, that of the *mādhyaṃika*, denied the existence of everything.

Vaibhāshika and *soutrāntika* schools. To deal first with the two schools which recognised the reality of the external world. The following is what they stated; The earth-atoms possess colour, taste, touch and smell; the water-atoms exhibit colour, taste and touch; the fire-atoms have only colour and touch; while touch is the only quality of the air-atoms. Each group of atoms coming together produces its own element. From these elements other aggregates are formed, known as the body, the sense, and objects of sense enjoyment. Within each body is a stream of perceptions, feelings or thoughts, which stream is an apprehending entity and which is the *Ātmā* of the body. With the agencies described all operations in the world proceed.

Sūdras 17 to 26 demolish the momentary character of external objects alleged by the first two schools of *saugatas*:

17. समुदाय अभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ।

In the aggregates formed by both classes the production of the world does not result.

It is stated that atoms form by aggregation earth and other elements; and that these elements similarly form the bodies of *jeevas*, their instruments, and objects of sense enjoyment. The *sūtra* states that by the aggregated of both kinds the aggregate known as the world cannot be formed. For the atoms and the elements are held to have a momentary existence only. The following questions rise to one's lips. The atoms and the elements, which perish in a moment-when do they begin to unite; when do they unite; when do they become objects of perception; and when do they become fit to be taken up or thrown away? Which knower-*Ātmā* touches what object; what object does he know and when; and who takes up what object perceived, and when? On this theory he that has touched an object has disappeared; and the object touched has gone; similarly, he that has seen an object is no more, as also what has been seen. How can one know what has been touched by another; and how can one take up what another has known? The *saugata* explains: Each stream of momentary objects is one. *Reply*. This will not help, so long as you do not admit that there is some one other than the streams, who is permanent and connected with each of the streams. Also, perceptions-individual perceptions or streams of perceptions - are not the *Ātmā*. The *Ātmā* is the 'I' and is the knower.

18. इतरेतत्प्रत्ययत्वादुपपन्नमिति चेन्न संघातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ।

If it be said "As each produces another, what has been stated is appropriate," the reply is 'No, because they are not the cause of aggregation.'

The *saugata* offers an explanation. Though all objects are momentary, yet *avidyā* will show all this to be appropriate. *Avidyā* is misconception, i.e., the thought that a thing is permanent, eternal, and pleasant, while it is momentary, perishable and unpleasant. This produces desire and aversion; from this the shinning of the *chitta* (mind) takes place; from this again come thoughts and their products and earth and other products possessing colour; from them mind and the five senses; from them bodies; from them experience of pleasure and pain and the rest. Then follow *avidyā* and the rest in the same order, like a wheel turning round and round, and this has had no beginning. What has been descried cannot take place without the aggregates-the elements and their products. The *sūtra* states this explanation, and then replies: *Avidyā* and the rest cannot keep the element and their products in the condition of aggregation. The notion that shell-silver is silver does not make two pieces of shell-silver aggregate. Further, as he, that has the *avidyā*, and regards a momentary thing as permanent, perishes that moment, who is it that is the seat of desire and aversion ? so long as you do not accept a permanent being, who is the seat of desire and aversion, as long will you be unable to maintain that these feelings continue.

19. उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ।

And because when the succeeding thing comes into existence, the preceding one disappears.

This is another reason for the universe not coming into existence on the *saugata*'s theory. In a stream of jars, each of which exists for one moment only, when the jar of one moment appears, the jar of the preceding moment has gone; and it cannot be the cause of the appearance of that jar. What is its cause? It cannot be non-existence (*abhāva*); for then everything may appear at every place and at every moment. Next, it cannot be existence of the jar in the preceding moment; for then the jar of the preceding moment may cause the appearance in the succeeding moment of objects in the three worlds, as a cow, a buffalo, a horse, a wall, a stone and the like. Next, it cannot be the existence of a like object in the preceding moment; for then the jar of one moment may cause the appearance of all the jars in all places. Next, it cannot be maintained that the existence of a jar of one moment causes the appearance of one jar only; for then it cannot be known which appears out of those in all places. If the reply be-the jar that appears in the place, where the jar of the preceding moment stood, is produced by the jar, it will be an admission that place is not momentary. Further, it cannot be known that a jar stood at a particular place; for after the eye is turned to the jar, it disappears before it can be known.

20. असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ।

In the absence of the preceding thing there would be conflict with (the *saugata*'s) statement; otherwise both would be seen at the same time.

In the preceding *sūtra* one absurdity was pointed out, and here others are mentioned. It was stated that in the absence of the preceding thing the succeeding one cannot appear. If it appeared in the absence of a cause, everything may be produced everywhere and at every moment. This is not the only difficulty. The *saugata* states that four things are necessary for perception, of which the object to be perceived is one; and this implies that the object remains for one moment after the eye is turned towards it. If it does not (and it cannot remain on this theory), then there will be conflict with the statement. To ward off this attack, if it be assumed that, while the jar of one moment remains, the jar of the next moment appears, then both the jars, one of which is the cause and the other is the product, should appear at the same time; but this is not seen. And the theory of momentariness will be abandoned. To obviate this last objection, if it be stated that an object is seen at the same moment at which the eye is turned towards it, the relation of cause and effect will cease, as the effect should follow the cause.

21. प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् ।

Neither variety of destruction can happen because the substance remains.

In the two preceding *sūtras* the creation of an object out of nothing was disproved; and in this *sūtra* it is shown that an existing object cannot be completely annihilated. The *saugata* distinguishes between two kinds of destruction—the gross one, which all can see, when a jar is destroyed by the fall of a hammer upon it; and in which the stream of like substances comes to an end; and the subtle one alleged by him, which takes place every moment in a stream of like substances, and which cannot be seen. The *sūtra* states that neither of them can happen; for an existing object cannot be completely annihilated. The creation and destruction of an object mean only change of condition of existing substance; and the substance itself, capable of this change, is one and is indestructible. This was established in chapter II, section 1, sub-section 6.

Saugata. When a lamp is extinguished, complete destruction is observed; and it may be presumed that the same thing happens in other cases also. *Reply*. In jars and cups, which are broken, and cease to exist as jars and cups, the earth, of which they were made, is perceived to continue; and it is decided that the destruction of an existing substance is merely a change of its condition. This conclusion is extended to the case of the lamp; and it is inferred that the flame of the lamp has assumed another condition, which being subtle cannot be perceived by the naked eye. In the case of the jars and cups the recognition of the continuance of the earth not being nullified, its suppression is not

legitimate. For one should proceed from the known to the assumption of what is unknown, and not ignore the known.

22. उभयथा च दोषात् ।

And because in both ways the theory is faulty.

The *saugata*'s position disproved in the last three *sūtras* is that creation is possible out of nothing, and that what has been created may become nothing. From this position absurd results follow. What is made out of nothing must be nothing; for the cause and product should be similar, like a jar and a lump of earth, or a crown and a peice of gold. The universe should therefore be nothing; but this is not perceived by any one, nor is it admitted by the *saugata* himself. Next, after one moment the whole world would be nothing; and if it comes into existence again, it would be nothing as just stated.

23. आकाशे चाविशेषात् ।

And in regard to the element ether (the theory is faulty, for) no difference (in perception).

This question of the existence of the element ether comes in incidentally, for it is regarded as non-existent by the *saugata* along with the others; and this view is now refuted. Like earth and other elements, which are admitted to be positive substances, the element ether (*ākāśa*) is perceived, and this perception is not subsequently nullified. And it is thus perceived - 'There the hawk falls; here the vulture'; and ether is the place where these birds fall. The existence of the element ether is thus recognised. *Objection*. Ether is the non-existence (*abhāva*) of the elements-earth, water, fire and air. *Reply*. This view is incorrect. Non-existence is of four kinds. When an object is made, there was its non-existence before that moment and when it is destroyed, there is after that moment non-existence of another kind. After the object is made and before it is destroyed, neither variety can exist. Neither can therefore be predicated of ether. While these elements exist; and the world will be without ether. The third variety occurs when it is said 'A is not B'; and non-existence of 'A is in B, and non-existence of B is in A. Similarly, if ether be not the others, this non-existence must be in each of the other elements; but not elsewhere; but it is seen in the interspaces among them. The last variety is utter non-existence, which cannot be stated while the other elements exist. Hence, the element ether is a positive substance. As *abhāva* (non-existence) is only change of condition of an existing substance, the element ether cannot be mere negation. Though in itself it has no colour of its own, and though it is not perceptible to the eye, both are facts, as what is seen is the element compounded with the others.

24. अनुस्मृतेष्व ।

And because of recognition.

And object seen before is thus recognised - 'This is that only'. Its existence in two different moments proves its permanency. *Saugata*. The perception of oneness is a misconception engendered by likeness between two different objects as in the case of the flames of a lamp. *Reply*. This explanation is untenable; for the oneness of the perceiver, who is duped by the likeness, is not admitted. It will be no explanation to reply that one sees an object to be the object or like the object seen by another. The opponent, who refers to misconception engendered by likeness, unwittingly admits that the same person perceives the object on both the occasions. In regard to the flames of a lamp there is reason to hold that they are different; but in the case of a jar there is no authority to hold that the jar of one moment is different from the jar of the next moment. If such an authority existed, you may assume that the jars of two different moments are recognised as one owing to their likeness.

2. *Saugata*. I will prove by sense perception and inference that jars exist only for a moment. First as to sense perception. Here is a jar existing at the present moment. Sense perception distinguishes it from the jar of the preceding moment and from the jar of the succeeding moment, in the same way as it distinguishes a blue thing from a yellow thing. In other words the jar of this moment is a different substance from the jar of the preceding moment and from the jar of the next moment. Next, inference is as follows: A jar exists only for a moment; for it has existence, and is capable of doing an action. What is non-momentary, as the horn of a hare, has no existence and is incapable of doing an action. Here no example is given of the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*; but a negative example is stated in which the absence of the *sādhya* is accompanied by the absence of the *hetu*. This raises a presumption that where the *hetu* exists, there the *sādhya* also is present. The example selected is the horn of a hare, which has no existence, and which may be said to be anything-momentary or non-momentary, and it suits the *saugata* to take the latter view. Again, in a jar which is destroyed by the fall of a hammer, its existence at the moment is seen and along with it perishability. Therefore, the jars of the moments preceding the moment of destruction were also perishable; for they were jars existing at the moment.

3. The attempts to prove the momentariness of objects in the external world (1) are futile. The differentiation effected by sense perception of an object

(1) The *saugata* appears to have caught the idea of momentariness of things from a burning lamp. It is admitted on all hands that though the flame appears to be one, it is really a quick succession of many flames, each flame being started by the contact of fire with a portion of the wick, and going out by the burning up of that portion and

of the present moment from the objects of other moments does not prove it to be a different object. It shows only its connection with the present moment, and does not preclude its connection with other moment also. The proof by inference fares no better. Two facts were adduced in proof of the momentariness of a jar. We will use them to show that it is relatively permanent. Thus, the jar is permanent; for it exists, and is capable of doing an action. What is not permanent does not exist, and is incapable of doing an action, as the horn of a hare. The fact that an object is capable of doing an action proves of itself that it does not exist merely for one moment. For a thing that comes into existence and disappears the next moment can never do any work. It may be noted that the *hetu* proves the reverse of what is intended. The second proof by inference must share the same fate. When the jar is destroyed by the fall of a hammer, the destruction is brought about by a visible cause, and it may be affirmed that the jars of the moments preceding the moment of destruction remained in the absence of a similar cause of destruction. *Saugata*. the fall of the hammer was not the cause of destruction, but it merely started a stream of unlike existences in the form of broken pieces. *Reply*. To reach the condition of broken pieces is itself the destruction of the jar, as has been shown in sub-section 6 of chapter II, section 1, *Saugata*. Destruction is other than coming into the condition of broken pieces. *Reply*. The fall of the hammer is the cause of destruction, as it follows immediately on the fall of the hammer. This is appropriate.

4. Hence, by recognition objects are shown to be relatively permanent; and this cannot by any means be ignored. It shows that an object connected with two points of time is one; to say that it shows something else is to assert that the perception of the blue colour, for instance, relates to some other colour. Those, that assert the existence for a moment only of a person who perceives and of the thing perceived, cannot accept inference as a source of authority; for to draw an inference one must have perceived the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* and must remember it when he sees the *hetu* in a place; and these things will be impossible in their view. Similarly, they cannot say 'This exists for only a moment' and then adduce the *hetu*; for at the very moment, in which he makes the statement, he ceases to exist. It is not possible for one to complete what another began; for he does not know it.

25. नासतोऽदृष्टत्वात् ।

What is non-existent cannot be the cause, for this has not been seen.

the consequent cessation of that contact. Owing to the rapidity with which each flame is replaced by another, the flames of the lamp appear to be one. The *sangata's* contention would be that as momentary coming into and going out of existence is seen in this case, it may be assumed to exist in other cases also.

Under (1) *sūtra* 19 at the end of the explanation it was pointed out that after one's eye is turned to an object, if it disappears, it cannot be known. The *soutrantika* comes forward to dispute the statement. This is what he states. The non-existence of an object at the moment for knowing it does not prevent its being known. To be the object of knowing is merely to be the means of knowing. *Objection.* The eye and other senses are the means of knowing. Are they the objects known. *Saugāta.* An object bestows its character on cognition, and thus causes knowledge of itself. This is what I meant. Hence, when the object disappears, its previous existence and what it was are inferred from its character imparted to the knowledge. Here, the *yogāchāra* of the third school comes forward with an objection. An outside object is not necessary; for one knowledge imparts its character to the next one. The *soutrāntika* replies. In a stream of perceptions marked by the blue colour a perception marked by the yellow colour cannot find a place without the intervention of an yellow object. Hence differences in perceptions are brought about by the differences in objects themselves. This contention of the *soutrāntika* is refuted in the *sūtra*. The particular character of a perception cannot be the character of an object that has disappeared and has ceased to exist. for, such a thing has not been seen. When an object disappears, its attribute cannot be seen in another object. A reflection on a mirror subsists only so long as an object is present before it; but not after it has moved off. Even there it is not the attribute only that appears; the object too is reflected. Hence the peculiar character of a perception imparted to it by an object needs the existence of the object at the moment of knowing it.

26. उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ।

And even to those that sit fruits will come on this theory.

This *sūtra* points out one more flaw in the theory of both schools. In the world one makes efforts to procure a good or avert an evil; but if everything exists only for a moment, and if objects, the efficacy imparted to persons, and meditations do not continue in succeeding moments, there is nothing to be sought by effort. Hence, fruits must come without a cause; and those that sit still may reap the fruits of this world or of the next, or even attain final release.

SUB - SECTION 4

In the sub-section the view of the third school of the *saugatas*, known as the *yoyachara*, is dealt with. The tenets of this school are that outside objects

(1) Hitherto the views of the *vaibhāshika* and *soutrāntika*, who recognise the existence of the external world, were criticised; and the criticism applies equally to both. In this *sūtra* the view of the latter that the external world can be known only from inference is dealt with.

have no existence, and that perceptions alone are real. To these remarks certain objections are raised, which the *yogāchāra* meets. *First objection.* One perception is distinguished from another by the objects perceived; how can they be denied? *Reply.* Perceptions have forms of their own, as objects are said to have, and distinguish themselves from one another without any outside help. The difference among perceptions depends upon *vāsana*, which means that one perception perfumes another similar perception that follows it, so as to form a stream; and the perfume of one stream is different from that of another. Hence there are streams of perceptions differing from one another. *Second Objection.* How does the perception of a different kind arise? *Reply.* The last perception in a stream of perceptions gives rise to a different perception; and it is capable of doing so. *Third objections.* Why is it said that the characters of a mustard seed and hill, which are outside, appear in the perceptions that are inside? *Reply.* Objects become fit to be spoken about by the shining of perceptions. This must be admitted; otherwise the distinction between what shines without help and what needs help will disappear, and in order to shine it must have a form; without a form it cannot shine. There is but one form that is seen; and it belongs to perception. Its appearance as the form of an outside object is illusion. This is proved also by the fact that perception and the object are invariably perceived together. Hence, the object is not different from the perception (1).

2. Further the assumption of the existence of outside objects is not legitimate. One, that recognises their existence, must admit that in the perception of a jar the perception has the form of the jar. Forms in perceptions being admitted by both sides. While all speech is possible with reference to them alone, why should outside objects be assumed to exist?

This view is refuted in the next *sūtra* :

27. नाभाव उपलब्धे ।

No non-existence : because it is seen.

To deny the existence of objects other than perceptions is not possible; for perception is seen as possessing this character-to make it possible for a knower-*Ātmā* to speak about a particular object. Every one, as is well-known, perceives thus - 'I see a jar'. This act of perception is connected with a person as perceiver and with a thing as its object; and it is vivid perception, of which all the world is witness. For one with this very evidence to allege that perception alone is real must expose him to the derision of the whole world.

2. The opponent's argument, that perception and object being invariably perceived together, the quality blue and its perception do not differ, is untenable.

(1) When one sees two moons owing to a defect in the eye, the two moons are always seen together ; and for this reason the second moon does not differ from the other.

It conflicts with his own statement; for being together in the perception must result from difference in the objects seen. The perception makes an object fit to be spoken about; how can it be identical with the object?

3. Again, *vāsana* cannot be alleged in regard to perceptions, which completely disappear every moment, and which therefore do not possess a permanent form that may continue in all the perceptions in a stream. How can a perception be perfumed by another that has disappeared?

4. Hence, differences in perceptions are due to differences in objects; and they are brought about by the connection of the attribute *jnāna* with objects; and this connection is in the form of contact, as *jnāna* is a substance, being an inseparable attribute of a *jeeva*, as light is an inseparable attribute of a flame.

The opponent cites the case of dream perceptions, and contends that like them the perceptions of the waking condition, which perceptions of the outside world are, do not rest on anything. This is refuted in the next *sūtra*:

28. वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ।

And not like dream perceptions, for there is a difference.

Dream perceptions are caused by a drowsy mind, and are nullified, when one rises from sleep; while perceptions of the waking condition are the reverse. Your attempt to prove that knowledge of all kinds is without any foundation is futile. For the inference, by which this is to be proved, would be of this form—'knowledge' is without foundation; because it has the character of knowledge. Now, the knowledge to be obtained from this inference being covered by the general term 'knowledge', must also be without foundation, and would serve no purpose. If to obviate this defect, it be thought that it rests on a solid basis, then the *hetu* would be found in this knowledge, and the *sādhyā* would be absent from it. Hence, the argument would be faulty, as the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhyā* is not invariable. the attempt therefore fails.

29. न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ।

No existence, because it is not seen.

Knowledge, not resting on a thing as its object, does not exist; for it is nowhere seen, i.e., knowledge without a person that knows, and an object known. Even dream perceptions do not rest on nothing. What is seen in dreams is created by the highest *Ātmā* so as to be experienced only by the dreamer and that only for the time being. This will be explained in chapter III, section 2, *sūtra* 3.

SUB - SECTION 5

This sub-section deals with the last school of *saugatas*, that of the *madhyamika*, whose argument is as follows; That the world is a void is the final decision of the *saugata* system. The teaching had to be suited to the capacity of students; and external objects were accepted, and the theory of momentariness was added; but as a matter of fact neither knowledge nor the external world exists. 'There is nothing' is the truth and to become nothing is release. Such was the view of *Buddha*. And that is proper; for nothingness does not need any cause to produce it; for it exists of itself. It is only for *sat* (what exists) that a cause should be searched. Now, how is *sat* caused? The cause cannot be anything that exists; for a jar does not come from a lump of earth, as it is, i.e., without its being worked up. It cannot be anything that does not exist. When the lump of earth disappears, the jar that comes out of nothing must be nothing.' Next is *sat* (what exists) made by itself or by another? It cannot be the former alternative; for then the products would depend upon itself as cause; and it would serve no purpose, as it already exists. The latter alternative too will not do; for if another can make it, then anything can come out of anything else, there being no difference in the matter of being another. As nothingness has no origin, it is not liable to destruction. Hence nothingness is the truth; and the notion of origination, destruction, existence, non-existence and the rest is mere illusion.

Here an objection is raised by *Śankara*. There can be no illusion without a real base on which it rests. Hence something must be accepted as real. *Reply*. You accept an illusive world, though the *avidyā*, which causes the illusion, its resting on *Brahma*, and His perception of it are all unreal, and though it is opposed to what happens in cases of illusion (1). Similarly with an unreal base illusion may happen.

This theory is refuted in the next *sūtra*:

30. सर्वथाऽनुपपत्तेश्च ।

And because in every way it is inappropriate.

The nothingness, which you have in view, cannot be established, whether we consider the sources of authority or what they prove. First, the terms 'exist'

(1) In the typical case of illusion - the mistaking of shell-silver for silver-the cause is twillght; it affects the shell-silver, and prevents its being clearly seen; and there is also a person who sees and is delude. In *Śankara's* theory the cause is *avidyā*, which is unreal; it cannot affect *Brahma* as alleged, as He is light (*prakasa*) and can shine without any help; and being destitute of attributes, He cannot see. Nevertheless he states that *Brahma* sees an unreal world. It is open to the *mādhyamika* to report that if *sankara* may disregard the necessary conditions, he may also do the same.

and does not exist' and the perceptions with which they are connected refer only to particular conditions of an object that exists. (See *final decision* in chap II, sec. 1, sub-sec. 6.) Hence, when it is stated that nothing exists it amounts to saying that everything exists; but in a particular condition. Next, the statement that nothing exists is made on some authority; and the reality of that authority is admitted. If this be not so, there is no proof; and everything is real.

SUB - SECTION 6

In this sub-section the theory of the *ārḥata* or *jaina* is examined; for he too states that the world has evolved from *atoms*. The *jaina* states that this world, consisting of *jeevas* and what are not *jeevas* is without a superior Being who controls and guides it. There are six classes of substances; (i) *Pudgala*¹ - substances possessing colour, smell, taste and touch, and consisting of atoms (*parama āṇu*) and of their aggregates - earth, water, fire and air, the bodies of living creatures, and places of enjoyment. The atoms are not of four classes as in the *vaiśeṣhika* and *saugata* theories; they are of one class only, and the other elements are formed by change of condition. (ii) Ether, which is one and is of infinite extent. (iii) Time, which is an atomic substance, helping us to speak of the past, the present and the future. (iv) *Dharma* and (v) *adharma*, which are substances extending everywhere, and which are respectively the cause of motion and of immobility. (vi) The *jeevas*, who see, know and experience pleasure, and are capable. They are of three classes; first, there are those that are bound. What bind them are of eight classes. Four of them obstruct the appearance of the four qualities that pertain to the *jeevas* by nature. The remaining four bring about the formation of their bodies, help their continuance, attach the *jeevas* to them and make them experience pleasure and pain or feel indifference. Next, there are those that do *yoga* (meditation) and have succeeded in their efforts. Lastly, there are those that have become free by the disappearance of desire and a version and have attained their true nature. Of the six substances, the atoms occupy the smallest extent of space, and ether is of infinite extent. The remaining occupy an intermediate position, this remark applying to the *jeevas* also. There is another classification from the point of view of the *jeeva's* release; (i) *jeevas*; (ii) whatever serves for their enjoyment; (iii) the senses serving as instruments of enjoyment; (iv) what binds them; this has been already explained; (v) ascetic practices helping to bring about *moksha* (release) and to be learnt from the teaching of *arhat*; (vi) meditation with the senses reduced to inactivity; and (vii) *moksha*.

¹ The matter in the original is re-arranged and is presented in a form in which it can easily understood.

The peculiar feature of this theory is that every substance is said to possess contradictory qualities-existence and non-existence, permanency and impermanency, oneness and separateness (1). To explain that such a thing is possible it is further stated that each substance has two aspects - the aspect as substance, and the aspect as condition. In the former aspect all objects are real, permanent, and one, and in the latter aspect, they are the reverse - i.e., they are unreal, impermanent and many. The conditions are said to be existing and non-existing.

This theory is criticised in the next *sūtra*.

31. नकस्मिन्नसंभवात् ।

Because they are impossible in the same thing.

It is not possible for contradictory qualities like existence and non-existence to co-exist in one and the same object, as impossible as for light and shade to co-exist. An object, which is in the condition denoted by the term exists, cannot at the same time be in the reverse condition denoted by the term 'does not exist'. For a substance to be the seat of changes known as origination and destruction is to be perishable. How can the reverse- to be eternal -be found in it? Being the seat of incompatible attributes, like the peculiar characters of a horse and of a buffalo, constitutes difference between two objects; and oneness is the reverse. How can difference and oneness co-exist in the same thing?

2. Time appears as an aspect of substances; and it is unnecessary therefore to speak of its separate existence or non-existence and the like or to answer any objections that may be urged. *Question*. If time be not a separate substance, how shall we explain the following statements-'Time exists; time does not exist'. *Reply*. *Jati* (the peculiar feature of a class) has no separate existence; and yet we are able to explain the statements '*jāti* exists' *jāti* does not exist'. The same method may be followed.

3. *Question*. You reject our view; yet you state that *Brahma* is one only, and that yet He is everything also. *Reply*. He is all material products and all *jeevas*, as they form His bodies; and this is possible, as He is all-knowing, and omnipotent, has an unfailing will and is an unique Being. The bodies are entirely different from the *Ātmā*; and their attributes also differ.

4. The *jeevas* and the other substances that you mention are not the conditions of one substance; you cannot therefore state that they are one as

(1) The possession of contradictory qualities is justified, on the plea that all objects exist in seven forms: (i) they exist; (ii) they do not exist; (iii) they exist and do not exist; (vi) they cannot be described. This last feature is added to the first three forms, and we have three more classes.

substance, and separate as conditions. *Jaina*; Each of these six substances is one in its own nature as substance, and separate in regard to its own conditions. *Reply*. Then this will conflict with your statement that everything is everything else; for no one substance is identical with another. The criticism stated in subsection 2 of the evolution of atoms undirected by an all-Ruler applies here also.

In the next three *sūtras* the view that the *jeeva* is neither infinite nor atomic, but that he is of middle size is refuted;

32. एवंचात्माकात्स्न्यं ।

And, on this theory no fullness of the *Ātmā*.

It is stated that the *jeeva* is of the size of his body. When one, that was in an elephant's body, leaves it to enter the body of an ant, only a portion can go in, and what is in the ant's body will not be the full *Ātmā*.

The *jaina* tries to get over this difficulty by assuming that the *jeeva* is capable of contraction and expansion, and that by a change of condition the whole of him goes in. This explanation is next criticised:

33. न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ।

And the difficulty does not disappear even by alteration of condition, because change and the rest will result.

By the term 'change' reference is made here to origination and destruction; and these carry with them existence for a limited period of time and incapacity to know, and to benefit by one's knowledge. The *jeevas* would then be reduced to the condition of an earthen jar.

34. अन्त्यावस्थितेश्चोभयनित्यत्वादविशेषः ।

Because the last size remains and both the *Ātmā* and the size are eternal, there is no difference.

The first portion of the *sūtra* repeats the *jaina's* explanation, which is that the natural size of the *jeeva* is the last size, i.e., that attained in final release; that this remains, as no more body is taken up; and that both the *jeeva* and his size in the condition of release are eternal. The second portion of the *sūtra* replies. Then this eternal size must have existed before; and the view that the *jeeva* is of the size of his body is abandoned.

SUB - SECTION 7

We have stated that the theories of *Kapila*, *Kanāda*, *Sugata* and *arhata* should be ignored by those that aspire for release, as they are unsound, and as they are not based on the *veda*. In this sub-section it is stated that the *āgama* of *Paṣupati* is opposed to the *veda*, that it is unsound, and that it should therefore be ignored:

35. पत्युरसामञ्जम्यात् ।

The *āgama* of *Paṣupati* should not be regarded with respect, because it is unsound.

There are four schools that follow this *āgama*, and all of them describe *tatvas* and the means for attaining the fruits of this world, enjoyment in the other world and final release differently from the *veda*. They distinguish between the material and operative causes of the universe, and regard *Paṣupati* as the operative cause only. And the practices which they recommend conflict with one another and are opposed to the *veda*. The four schools are; *kapalas*, *kalamukhas*, *pasupatas*, and *saivas*. Of them, *kapalas* observe 'One, that knows the nature of the six *mudrikas*, and also what *paramudra* is, and meditates on the *Ātmā* seated in *bhaga* posture, attain bliss'. A necklace, finger-ring, ear-ring, a bead worn on the tuft of hair on the head, ashes and the holy thread-these are said to be the six *mudrikas*. "One whose body wears these is not reborn here." The *kalamukhas* state the following to be the means to the attainment of all fruits here or in the other world: To eat out of a human skull, to bathe with the ashes obtained by cremating corpses, to put it into the mouth, to bear a stick, to fill a jar with toddy and to worship a *devatā* in it, and the like. The *pasupatas* state that five things should be known for release from bondage: (i) *kārya*-the five elements and their attributes-colour and the rest-thus ten *tatvas*; (ii) *karana*, the five senses, the five organs of actions, three inner senses in the form of the mind, *buddhi*, and *ahamkāra*, thirteen *tatvas*; (iii) *yoga* or meditation; (iv) *vidhi*, which includes the following - to bathe in ashes; to lie down on ashes; to laugh aloud; to sing and dance as one pleases without reference to the rules laid down for them; to make a sound like the bellowing of a bull ; (the last four practices should be gone through away from the resort of worldly men); to recite *mantras*; to prostrate before a superior being; to appear like one asleep, while being wide awake; to shake the body as if suffering from disease; to walk limping ; to indicate on seeing a young and pretty woman that one is in love with her; to act like one without discrimination, and do what the world will condemn; and to speak incoherently, and (v) complete disappearance of suffering; and the acquisition of the following capacities - to see or hear or touch things that are subtle, that are at a distance and that are separated by intervening objects; to go with extreme quickness; to direct all bodies and senses by mere

will and without any bodily action; and to control everything even though the body and senses are inactive (1). In the *āgama* of the *śaivas* the following things appear; to wear a bracelet of *rudraksha* round the wrist; to mat the hair on the head with a cohesive substance; to use a skull; to bathe in ashes; and the like. It is also stated that a member of any caste may by a particular action become a *brāhmaṇā*, and may attain the status of the last stage of life - 'By mere entry into *diksha*, one becomes a *brāhmaṇa* in a moment; by doing the *kapala-vrata* one becomes *yati* (one that has renounced the world).

The *sūtra* condemns this *āgama*. From *sūtra* 3 the word *na* meaning no is brought down. The meaning of the *sūtra* is that the view of *Paśupati* should not be respected; for it is unsound. This arises from the fact that each school condemns the others. One instance will suffice. Though ashes are used by all, one school uses the ashes of the burning ground; while the *pāṣupata* obtains it by begging in the houses of house-holders. *Paśupati's āgama* is also opposed to *vedic* teaching in regard to the *tatvas*, meditation and *āchāra* (right conduct). The *veda*, on the other hand, teaches that *Nārāyaṇa* alone, the highest *Brahma*, is both the material and operative causes of the universe; that only meditation on Him is the means to release; and that the help to meditation is the performance of the duties prescribed in it for each caste and each stage of life (2). And this is different in the *āgama*, which must therefore be neglected.

2. *Opponent*. Do not the terms *sat*, *brahma*, *Ātmā*, *śambhu*, *śiva* and other occur in *vedic* texts? how can *Nārāyaṇa* be said to be the highest *Ātmā*? *Reply*. The eleventh *anuvāka* of *taittirīya-Nārāyaṇam* has for its special purpose the teaching as to 'who is the highest *evatā*; and it should be followed in understanding other *vedic* texts. In the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* there is the injunction

(1) The *pasupatas* statement has been added from the *naya mayukha malika* of Appaya Dikshitar.

(2) The authority for these statement is the following texts:

(i) As to the highest *tatva*. - The being stated to be the highest *Brahma* is *Nārāyaṇa*; the highest *tatva* is *Nārāyaṇa*; the highest fire is *Nārāyaṇa*; the highest *Ātmā* is *Nārāyaṇa* (*nārā, anu*, 11); He willed 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve' (*chāndo.*, VI-2-3); He desired 'I will become many; and to that end I will evolve' (*ana*, VI); He of himself made Himself. (*Ibid.*, VII).

(ii) As to meditation being the only means to release. - I meditate on that great *Purusha*, shining like the sun, and having a figure made of a substance other than *tamas* (matter) (*puru*); meditating on Him here in this manner, one becomes immortal; no other path lies to the goal. (*Ibid.*). Similarly all other *vedic* texts.

(iii) As to the helps to the meditation. - Him *brahmanas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yagas*, by the making of gifts, by *tapas* and by fasting. (*brihad.*, VI-4-22); Desiring this fruit alone (the highest *Ātmā*) men renounce the world (*Ibid.*).

- He makes the offering with a *juhū* it only mentions the instrument for making the offering, but not the wood of which it should be made. This is done by another text 'He whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood'; and the first text is understood with reference to the second. Similarly certain text mention various *devatās*-such as *prajāpati*, *śiva*, *indra*, *ākāśa* and *prāṇa*-as objects to be meditated on; and this is their only purpose. But who these *devatās*, are must be ascertained from the texts, which have no purpose other than to determine the nature of these *devatās*; and it is the *anuvāka* referred to; and it shows that these *devatās* represent *Nārāyaṇa*, who is their inner ruler; and He it is that should be meditated on in the form of those beings. This point was explained in sub-section 11 of chapter I, section 1. The following text from the *mahopanishad* begins with this statement- "*Nārāyaṇa* alone was; no *Brahma*; no *Īśāna*"; and goes on to state. "He found no pleasure in being alone, etc." *Nārāyaṇa* mentioned in this creation-text as the world-cause is referred to in other creation-texts by the general terms *sat*, *brahma*, *Ātmā* and others. See note on page 51. Hence the highest *Ātmā* is *Nārāyaṇa*, and not *Paśupati*.

The next three *sūtra* criticise the view that *Paśupati* is only the operative cause, and that his existence can be proved by inference alone. On this point most of those that stand outside the *vedic* fold are agreed (1).

36. अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ।

And because direction (of evolution) is not possible.

Those that depend only on inference should follow what is seen in the world, and regard the maker of the world as directing its evolution, as the potter directs the evolution of jars from a lump of earth. But unlike the potter, *Paśupati* has no body; and only those that have bodies seem to be able to direct. *Opponent*. Possession of a body by *Īśvara* must be admitted. *Reply*. No; if he had a body, it must have consisted of parts; and whether it was perishable or not, there are insuperable difficulties, which cannot be got over. See chapter I, section 1, sub-section 3.

37. करणवच्चेन भोगादिभ्यः ।

If it be said 'Like (the *jeeva*) directing his instruments', the reply is - 'No', because enjoyment and the rest would follow.

(1) It is stated that in *śaiva āgama* the authority of the *veda* is accepted; and yet this fact is ignored, and the existence of *Īśvara* is sought to be proved by inference. This is probably the reason. If *Īśvara* be accepted as taught in the *veda*, as the world-cause is referred to in creation-texts-by the term *Nārāyaṇa*, and as this name is peculiar to *Purushottama*. He must be accepted as *Brahma*, the world-cause. This conclusion being unwelcome to the *śaiva*, the fact is concealed, and recourse is had to proof by inference. (*Naya mayukha malika*).

The opponent states: The *jeeva* experiencing pleasure and pain controls his body and instruments without a body; and *Īśvara* may similarly direct the evolution of the universe without a body. This explanation is first stated in the *sūtra*, and is then refuted. The direction by the *jeeva* is for the purpose of experiencing the fruits of his past good and bad deeds; and his power to direct comes from his *adṛiṣṭam* in the form of those deeds. The same result must apply to *Paśupati* also, i.e., he must be subject to *karma* and experience its fruits.

38. अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ।

Liability to destruction and incapacity to know everything.

If *Paśupati* were subject to *karma*, the results stated in the *sūtra* would also follow.

In *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. I-3-2 it was decided that a *smṛiti* opposed to the *veda* should be neglected; and this sub-section would seem to be unnecessary. But the intention is to show that the *āgama* of *Paśupati* is opposed to the *veda*, and to give the warning that one should not be deluded by the mention in it of certain *dharma*s, that are not opposed to the *veda*.

SUB - SECTION 8

The subject of this sub-section is the *āgama* known as *pāñcha rātra*, which was taught by *Nārāyaṇa* Himself, and which points out the way to the highest good. The author of the *sūtras* defends the *āgama* from the view that it is on a par with the *smṛiti* of *Kapila* and the rest, and that it should be rejected as authority.

The doubt arises from one or two apparent inconsistencies with the *veda*, which are stated in the two following *sūtras*:

39. उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ।

Because origination is not a fact.

Here is a text:

From *Vāsudeva*, the highest *Brahma*, the final cause, the *jeeva*, known as *Sankarshaṇa* is born; from *Sankarshaṇa* mind, known as *Pradyumna*, is born; from him *ahamkāra*, known as *Aniruddha*, is born.

The mention of the birth of the *jeeva* here is opposed to the *veda*, which states that he is eternal- "The *jeeva*, who is fit to be all-knowing, is not born; nor does he die" (*karha.*, II-18).

40. नचकर्तुः करणम् ।

Nor the instrument from the doer.

The coming of mind from the *jeeva* is not correct; for it comes from the highest *Ātmā*. "From Him come forth *prāṇa*, mind and all the senses" (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-3). As the *āgama* teaches what is opposed to the *veda*, its authority is denied.

The explanation of these inconsistencies is given in the next *sūtra*:

41. विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ।

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As they are the all-knowing cause, the authority of the *āgama* is not repudiated.

The terms *Sankarshana*, *pradyumna* and *aniruddha* denote the highest *Ātmā*. *Vāsudeva* Himself out of love for those that call on Him for help, appears in these forms of His own will in order to make it possible for them to approach Him. The terms *jeeva*, mind and *ahamkāra* denote these Beings, as they control them, as *ākāṣa* and *prāṇa* denote the highest *Ātmā*. There is therefore no inconsistency, and no need to question the authority of the *āgama*.

The authority for these statements are the following:

(i) That is a *āgama*, from which comes meditation on the Being in four forms as a thing to be done, meditation by *brāhmaṇas* with the names appropriate to each form, and coming to them in the order in which they (the meditators) become fit (*paushkara*);

(ii) The highest *śāstra*, of large size, gives discrimination to the *brāhmaṇas*, who worship the Being bearing the names *sat*, *brahma* and *Vāsudeva*; it is *Brāhma-upani-shad* (giving instruction about *Brahma satvata*);

(iii) By the worship of *Vibhava*, *Vyūha* is reached; by the worship of *Vyūha*, the highest *Brahma* known as *Vāsudeva*, the subtle form, is reached.

(iv) Because the unchanging highest *Brahma*, known as *Vāsudeva*, is well attained from this *śāstra* with knowledge and *karma* (*paushkara*).

The first text, though intended to explain how *pāncharātra* came to be known as an *āgama*, shows that *Brahma* exists in four forms. The second text states that meditation on the four forms is meditation on *Brahma*, known as *Vāsudeva*. In *Vāsudeva* the six qualities-*jñāna*, *bala* and the rest-appear in full; He appears as subtle (*sūkshma*) *vyūha* and *vibhava*. *Vibhavas* are *avatara* forms like *Rāma* and *Kṛishna*; *vyūhas* are *Vāsudeva*, *Samkarshana*, *Pradyumna*, and *Aniruddha*; *Sūkshma* is the highest *Brahma*, known as *Vāsudeva*, and only possessing the six attributes. This distinction appears in the third text. Those, that love Him, worship one of those forms of *Brahma* in accordance with their own fitness, and reach Him as stated in the last text.

Thus there is no inconsistency with the *veda*; on the other hand the *āgama* describes what is stated in the *vedic* text 'He is not born; yet he is born in many forms' (*pura*). That is, *Brahma* takes up forms of His own will, prompted by love of those that come to Him; and this is His birth. Hence the authority of the *āgama*, that elucidates this text, cannot be said to be repudiated.

42. विप्रतिषेधाच्च ।

And in the *āgama* itself the origination of the *jeeva* is denied.

The nature of *prakṛiti* is thus described:

It is without intelligence; it exists for others; it is eternal; it ever changes; it has three *guṇas*; it forms the bodies of those that have *karma*. The connection between it and the *purusha* (*jeeva*) is by his direction of *prakṛiti*; for he is without a beginning and without an end; this has been decided to be the truth (*parama samhitā*).

The eternal existence of the *jeeva* being similarly stated in other *samhitās*. The origination of the *jeeva* is repudiated in the *pāncharātra āgama*; there need be no doubt in the matter. References to the *jeeva*'s birth and death will be explained in the next section (*sūtra 18*) so as to agree with *vedic* statements. The *jeeva*'s origination being denied even there the doubt as to the authority of the *āgama* arising from this is completely removed.

Further objections. Here is a text from the same *āgama*:

Śāṇḍilya, unable to perceive the highest goal from the *vedas* and their *angas*, learnt the *pāncharātra*.

This shows that this *āgama* is opposed to the *veda*. *Reply.* Here the intention was merely to praise the *āgama*, non to condemn the *veda*. Illustration. The *agnihotra* offerings may be made either before or after the sun rises; and to praise the making of the offerings after the sun rises, the making of the offerings before is condemned in the following text:

Those, that make the *agnihotra homa* before the sun rises, speak untruth every morning (*aitareya brāhmaṇa*).

Another illustration. In the *chāndogya*, chapter VII, considered in chapter I, section 3, sub-section 2, *Nārada* enumerates the branches of learning that he had studied. Including the four *vedas* and observes "I know revered sir, only the texts, but do not know the *Ātmā*." The intention was to praise the *vidyā* taught in that chapter, but not to condemn the *vidyās* taught in other places.

2. Another and a better explanation: *Nārada* was unable to perceive the highest *tatva* taught in all the *vedas*, and their *angas*, and he therefore applied for instruction on the subject. The same explanation applies to *Śāṇḍilya*

also. That this is so appears from the mention further on of the Being taught in the *upanishads*, viz., *Brahma* known as *Vāsudeva*. The *veda* being difficult to understand, the teaching of the *āgama* was begun, so that the meaning might be easily known. This is stated in the *parama samhitā*.

"I have learnt, revered sir, the *vedas*, their *angas*, the *angas* of *angas*, their commentaries, and I have heard from my teacher the meaning of the *angas* along with logic. But in all of them I do not clearly perceive in any place the means by which the highest good may be attained." "The all-knowing *Bhagavān Hari* took the essence of the *vedānta*, and out of mercy towards those that love Him reproduce it, so that it might be easily understood." Clearly-free from doubt. ¹

3. Certain commentators have explained the four *sūtras* of this subsection as denying authority in regard to certain portions, that in their opinion conflict with the *veda*. Their explanation is not in accordance with the wording of the *sūtras*, and is opposed to the intention of their author. After writing the *sūtras* stating the rules for the interpretation of the *Vedānta*, he wrote the rules for the interpretation of the *Vedānta*, he wrote the *Mahābhārata* to elucidate the *vedic* teaching, a voluminous work consisting of a hundred thousand *grandhas* (a *grandha* is equal to 32 syllables). In a portion of this known as *moksha dharma* he begins with this question:

If the householder, the student of the *veda*, the forest-dweller, or the mendicant desires to attain the highest goal, which *devatā* should he worship?

He then at great length describes the teaching the *pāncharātra āgama*, and closes with the following remarks:

"Churning with my *buddhi* the voluminous *bharata* with its hundred thousand *grandhas*, this has been taken out of it, as ghee is taken out of curd. As better is in curd; as the *brāhmaṇa* is among biped animals; as the *āraṇyaka* is among the *vedas*; as nectar is among herbs (this is the best part in the *Mahābhārata*). "This great *upanishad*, containing the teaching of the four *vedas*, and teaching *karma yoga* and *jñāna yoga* (1), is known as *pāncharātra*. This is the good sought by worldly men; this is *Brahma*; this is the highest goal; it includes the four *vedas*; this very teaching will be your guide".

In the *bhishma parva* also 'By *brāhmaṇas*, *kshatriyas*, *vaishyas*, and *śūdras*, bearing His marks. *Mādhava* (the husband of *Mahā Lakshmī*) should be served and worshipped, following the ritual taught in the *sātvata* by *Samkarshana*'.

(1) The original has the terms *sankhya* and *yoga*. They refer to *jñana yoga* and *karma yoga*. Compare with *bhagavad-gītā* III-(3)

¹ The meaning of the verse is explained in the original with many epithets. It is omitted here, as the substance has been given.

How can *Bādarāyaṇa*, the foremost among those that know the *veda*, after saying all this, condemn the *sātvata śāstra* (i.e., the *pāncharātra*), which deals with *Brahma* taught by the *upanishads*, and known as *Vāsudeva* and describes how He should be mediated on and worshipped?

4. *One more objection.* Here is a verse from the same *moksha dharma*.

Sāṅkhya, yoga, pāncharātra, the vedas, paśupata-do these point to one thing as the ultimate *tatva*, or do they point to different *tatvas*?

This shows that all these should be treated with respect; but in the *sūtras* the *sāṅkhya* and *yoga smṛitis* and *paśupata āgama* are condemned. *Pāncharātra* being mentioned along with them should share the same fate. *Reply.* No; it should not be placed on a par with the others. The meaning of the question is : Do they point to one *tatva* or to different *tatvas* ? In the former case what is that one ? In the latter case, the *tatvas*, pointed out must be opposed? to one another; and the ultimate *tatva* cannot be all of them; some one of them must be accepted. Which is it? The following reply was given. "Know these works to express different views". It was then pointed out that the authors of the *sāṅkhya* and *yoga smṛitis* and the *paśupata āgama* were *Kapila, Hiranyagarbha, and Paśupati* respectively; that the *vedas* were not made; and that the "the author of all *pāncharātra āgamas* was *Nārāyaṇa* Himself". It was then added:

In all these works examining with proper arguments, it will be seen that the ultimate *tatva* is *Nārāyaṇa*."

The meaning was this: the three works were human productions; while the *veda*, not having been made, is free from the touch of misconception and other blemishes. These works conflict with one another, and teach what is opposed to the perfect *veda*; if they be understood as they are, they cannot claim any authority. If one examines them with the help of the arguments stated in the *sūtras*, he will perceive that the *pradhāna, puruṣa (jeeva), Paśupati* and other *tatvas* have an existence only as being the bodies of *Nārāyaṇa*, who is known in the *upanishads* as *Brahma*; *Pāncharātra āgama* was taught by *Nārāyaṇa*; and it describes His nature and the mode of meditating on Him. How can anyone regard it as being like the other works?

5. The same thing is stated in another place in the *moksha dharma*:

Thus the *sāṅkhya, yoga, the veda* and the *upanishads* point to the same *tatva* and are therefore one work; and this is said to be *pāncharātra*.

This means: The twenty-five *tatvas* mentioned in the *sāṅkhya smṛiti* the mode of doing *yoga* (meditation) with its helps in the form of *yama, niyama* and the rest, and the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* are all accepted; and they are connected with *Brahma* thus: The *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya* are directed by *Brahma*; *yoga* is meditation on *Brahma* ; and the *karmas* are the worship of *Brahma*. This

is the work done by the *upanishads*, which point out the existence of *Brahma*, and state what He is. The very same thing is elucidated by *Nārāyaṇa* Himself, who is no other than *Brahma*. In the *sūtras* themselves what has been condemned is not the twenty-five *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya*, but their being undirected by *Brahma*. In the other two works what was rejected was the view that *Īśvara* is merely the operative cause, the placing of *Paśupati* above *Nārāyaṇa*, and the practices that are opposed to the *Veda*: but the utility of *yoga* (meditation) and the existence of *Paśupati* were not denied. This conclusion is stated in another verse of the *moksha dharma*.

Sāṅkhya, *yoga*, *pāncharātra*, the *vedas* and *pāsupata*-these are authorities in regard to *Ātmā*; they should not be nullified with specious arguments.

This means that only the *tatvas* mentioned by them should be accepted, but that they should not be wholly rejected like the works of the *saugata* and the *jaina*. This verse should be thus understood so as to agree with the conclusion stated in the previous paragraph.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER II

SECTION 3

In the preceding section the theories of the *sāṅkhya* and others, who are outside the *vedic* fold, were shown to be unsound, on the ground that they rested on specious arguments, and that they were full of contradictions. To show that the theory taught by the *upanishads* is free from contradictions and other blemishes, the mode of evolution of the world will be examined in this section. The products of evolution will be taken up one by one, and shown to have come forth from the highest *Ātmā*, and directly from Him.

SUB - SECTION 1

The first sub-section deals with the element ether. The first *sūtra* states the *first view*:

1. न वियदश्रुतेः ।

Ether (*ākāśa*) is not produced; because there is no *vedic* text (stating its having been produced).

The doubt is whether ether is produced or not. The *first view* is that it is not.

Mention would be made of what is possible; but the origination of ether being as impossible as the to flower, it is not mentioned. For as it does not consideration of parts, and as it fills all space, its origination, like that of the *jeeva*, cannot be explained. Hence-in the *chakshsikha dogya* (Chapter VI, sec.2), where evolution is describes reference is made only to fire, water and earth having been produced; and there is no mention ether.

2. Objection. Here are some texts:

From that *Ātmā* ether came forth (*āna*, I-2); From Him, came forth *prāṇa*, mind all the senses, ether air, water and the all-supporting earth (*muṇḍa*., II-1-3).

Reply. Because they conflict with the reason assigned, they should be regarded as nullified. The reasons are non-mention in the *chāndogya* supported to argument; while the texts cited are opposed to be argument.

The next *sūtra* gives the *final* decision:

2. अस्ति तु ।

The origination of ether does exist.

The *veda* teaches what is beyond the senses; and is therefore competent to state that ether is a product though this cannot be known from other sources, matter known from the *veda* cannot be set aside by inference with the *hetus* mentioned. In regard to the *jeeva*, his being without parts is not the cause for his being made. This will be shown further on.

The opponent disputes the conclusions; and the next *sūtra* states his contention:

3. गौण्यसम्भवाच्छब्दाच्च ।

The text as to the production of ether) should be understood in a secondary sense; because it is impossible, and because of a text.

The first thing produced being fire, ether is not a product. And there is testimony confirming this pre-sumption. "The fluid is air and ether (*antariksha*) - this is imperishable" (*bṛihad.*, IV-3-3).

Here the opponent anticipates an objection which may be urged. In the *ānandavalli* text but one verb *sambhūtah* (came forth) is used, and that in the first clause; in the other clauses it has to be added. The word should therefore be understood in the same way. How can the same word be understood in its primary sense with reference to fire and water, and in a secondary sense with reference to ether? He replies in the next *sūtra*:

4. न्याचैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् ।

It may happen to the same verb, like the word *brahma*.

The word *brahma* occurs in a secondary sense, meaning matter in the *muṇḍaka* (I-1-10). "From Him name forth this *brahma*, name, form and *annam*; and a its primary sense in the preceding verse (I-1-9). By *tapas* *Brahma* evolves". Here the word *brahma* is repeated; but in the *ānandavalli* text the verb *sambhūtah* has to be carried over from the first clause to the subsequent ones; for the clauses run as follows:

From that *Ātmā* came forth ether; from ether air; from air fire; from fire water; from water earth.

But this makes no difference, as the denotation of the word is repeated, as when the word itself is repeated.

The next three *sūtras* reply;

5. प्रतिज्ञाऽहानिख्यतिरेकात् ।

The declaration will not become nil, only when ether is not different (from *Brahma*).

The attempt of yours to understand the *ānandavalli* text in a secondary sense so as to agree with the *chāndogya* is futile. For, the latter *upanishad* itself tacitly admits that ether is produced. For, it starts with the declaration that by knowing *Brahma* every-thing is known. This implies that everything has evolved from *Brahma*, and ether can be no exception. It is only then that the declaration may be taken as established.

6. शब्देभ्यः ।

From other texts.

That as a product ether does not differ from *Brahma* is established from the following texts of the *chāndogya*.

Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only; without a second (VI-2-1). All this is identical with that (*Sat*) (VI-8-7).

The affirmation that before evolution commenced there was only *Sat* shows that ether did not then exist as ether, and that it is a produce subsequently formed. The express mention in more than one text of ether being a produce cannot be nullified by the non-mention of ether in another text. The mention of the origination of fire does not show that ether is not a product.

7. यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् ।

And all things being affirmed to be products, the evolution of ether (from *Brahma*) follows, as in the world.

From the text 'All this is identical with that (*Sat*)' ether also appears to be a product. When it is said in the world. 'All these are the sons of *devadatta*,' and then some are mentioned as having been born from him, it follows that the others not mentioned are also born from him. Similarly here also. What then becomes of the text "The fluid is air and ether (*antariksha*) - this is imperishable"? *Reply*. It must be understood that they exist without destruction for a very long time, as the *devas* do (1).

(1) The objection answered in this sub-section was raised by the *vaiśeshika*. His argument is this. Ether is not produced; because it is not made up of parts. The reply is that no substance, whether made up of parts or not, is merely produced. The substance always exists; and when it changes its condition, and becomes fit to receive a new name, it is said to have been made. The opponent does admit the coming of things without parts into a new condition; e.g., ether is without parts; and from a condition without sound, it comes into a condition in which sound is manifested. The

8. एतेन मातरिश्वा व्याख्यातः ।

This explains that air also is a product.

The same reasons, as have been urged in the case of ether, apply to air also. A different *sūtra* has been made as to air, as reference to it is made in a succeeding *sūtra*:

9. असंभवस्तु मंतोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

Being a non-product applies to Sat only, because it is inappropriate in others.

This follows from the declaration that by knowing *Brahma* everything can be known. Hence everything other than *Brahma* has evolved from HIm. The special treatment of ether and air is in illustration of this fact. Hence, *avyakta* (matter entering on evolution), *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *tanmatras* and the senses- all have evolved. The first two are the first and second modifications of matter; and the *tanmātras* are the stages immediately preceding the evolution of the great elements - ether, air, fire water, earth.

SUB - SECTION 2

We have seen that all things other than *Brahma* are products. The next question for consideration is whether each product has come forth from the next preceding one without the intervention of *Brahma*, or from *Brahma* Himself appearing in that form.,

The first three *sūtras* state the *first view*:

10. तेजोऽतस्यथाह्वाह ।

Fire came forth from it (air). So is it stated.

The statement is "From air fire" (ana., I-2).

11. आपः ।

Water also from it - (fire).

"From fire water" (*Ibid.*); It (Fire) created water (*chāndo.*, VI-2-3).

12. पृथिवी ।

jeeva also is without parts; and he is accordingly to the opponent without the attribute consciousness; yet in certain conditions consciousness appears. Hence, ether may be produced, and in the *vedic* texts it is enumerated along with other things which are admittedly produced. Hence the statement as to its being produced cannot be treated as a dead letter (*adhi.*, 226).

Earth also from it (water).

From water earth (*Ibid.*). That (water) produced *anna* ' (*Chāndo.*, VI-2-4). How can be word *anna* denote earth as presumed by this quotation? The next *sūtra* replies:

13. अधिकाररूपशब्दान्तरेभ्यः ।

From the context, from the reference to color, and from other texts.

The context, in which this clause occurs, describes the evolution of the great elements; and the term *anna* must therefore denote earth. *Anna* is food, and food of every kind is produced by earth; and on the theory that the cause and its product are one, the term *anna* may denote earth. Next, reference is made to colour in the followig text, which occurs further on:

The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire; its white colour is the colour of water; its black colour is the colour of *an* ' (*chando.*, VI-4-1).

Here the term *anna* must denote earth, which is of the same kind as fire and water. Lastly, the parallel passage of the *ānandavalli* has " From fire water; from water earth".

The opponent concludes with the following remarks; The mention of fire, water and earth being illustrative, the same reasoning applies to other things also, as *mahat*, and *ahamkāra*. Each product evolves from the next preceding one, and there is no objection in understanding the texts as they are stated. The highest *Ātmā* is the cause of all indirectly.

The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra*:

14. तदभिध्यानादेव तु तल्लिङ्गात्सः ।

But *Brahma* alone is the direct cause of every produce, because of His mark, viz., willing.

The willing is the willing "I will become many". Fire and water are stated to have so willed, and to have produced water, and earth. This not being possible to non-intelligent things like fire and water, those terms denote *Brahma* appearing as fire and water those terms denote *Brahma* appearing as fire and water. The same reasoning applies to all other products. In *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* and *subala upanishad* it is stated that all things are the bodies of *Brahma* and that He is their *Ātmā* (1).

(1) Who stands in earth; Who stands in water; Who stands in fire; Who stands in air; Who stands in ether; and so on. Whose body the earth is; Whose body *ahamkāra* is; Whose body *buddhi* is; Whose body *avyakta* is.

15. विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ।

And the different order (of the products) (can be explained only by their coming forth) only from Him. And this is appropriate.

A different order is stated in the following text of the *munḍaka*, while the correct order of evolution is *avyakta*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, ether and so on;

From him came forth *prāṇa*, mind all the senses, ether, air, fire, water and the all-supporting earth (II-1-3).

This order will be appropriate only if each product came forth from *Brahma* appearing in the form of the next preceding one. If He were only the indirect cause, the statement of evolution immediately from Him would be nullified, and this *munḍaka* text therefore confirms the conclusion in *sūtra* 14.

16. अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तल्लिगादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

If it be contended "Evolution is in the order stated; the mind and senses evolve between *prāṇa* and the elements, because of the mark that they are mentioned along with them," the reply is 'no, because of non-difference'.

The opponent contends that the *munḍaka* text does not support the conclusion in *sūtra* 14 as stated above. For it lays down the order of evolution. The five elements are stated here in the same order as in the *ānandavalli* text. Because the mind and the senses (which is the meaning of the term *viñāna* in the *sūtra*) (1) are mentioned in the same text along with them, this is a sufficient mark for inferring that the senses evolve from the mind, and the mind from *prāṇa*. The *sūtra* states this contention, and then gives the reply. Because the words "From Him came forth" should be connected with every product mentioned in the text without difference. This would mean that every product came directly from *Brahma*. Hence direct evolution from *Brahma* is what is taught; but not order (2). For it would conflict with the order mentioned in another *upanishad* (3). Hence all products come forth from *Brahma* appearing

(1) The term *viñāna* means the instrument by which a thing is known. It therefore means the senses here.

(2) *Objection.* the two words may be connected with every product; but this will not help you. For, the word translated by the words 'from Him' may also mean 'from it'; and the word 'it' may be taken to refer to what precedes in each case. Then the first clause would mean 'From Him (the highest *Ātmā*) came forth *prāṇa*'; the second clause 'From it (*prāṇa*) came forth mind'; the third clause from it (mind) came forth all the senses, and so on. *Reply.* This explanation is unsound. First, the same word would be understood differently in each case. And this would not be legitimate, when it can be taken to mean the same thing in all cases. Next, when evolution may be understood either directly or indirectly, the former should be preferred.

(3) The earth is dissolved in water.....*Tamas* becomes one with the highest *Deva* (*subala*). The lays down another order.

in the form of *avyakta* and the rest. The words *ākāṣa*, *vāyu* and the rest denote the highest *Ātmā*, who is the *Ātmā* of these products.

Here, another objection is raised. If every word thus denotes *Brahma*, then the ordinary meanings of words settled by usage will be departed from; This is replied to:

17. चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वात् ।

When by words ordinarily denoting movable and immovable things, those things only are denoted, the denotation is incomplete, for its being complete depends upon the existence of the knowledge that those things are the aspects of *Brahma*.

Words denote not only those things, but also *Brahma* who appears as those things. Hence, when they denote those things merely, the denotation is, as it were, broken. Until one is taught the *upanishads*, he does not know *Brahma*, whose aspects those things are; for He is not known from the sources of knowledge, from which the aspects are known. Words will denote *Brahma*, when it is known that He appears as those things, and that they are His aspects. Till then wordly men will use words in incomplete senses to denote those things merely.

2. Another and better explanation: The words "*vyapadeso bhāktah* in the *sūtra* are split up thus: *vyapadeṣah abhaktah*. The meaning of the *sūtra* will then be: When by words ordinarily denoting movable and immovable things, *Brahma* is denoted, the denotation is not broken (i.e., it is complete); for their capacity to do so comes from the presence of *Brahma* in those things. That *brahma* is in every thing is known from the text regarding the making of names and forms.

SUB - SECTION 3

The next thing taken up for consideration is the *jeeva*: Is he made like ether or not?

First view. It is declared that by knowing one, i.e., *Brahma*, everything will be known; and this will have a meaning, if the *jeeva* also be made. Next, it is affirmed that before creation there was only one; and this being *Brahma*, the *jeeva* could not then have existed. Lastly, there are the following texts which state that like ether the *jeeva* also was made:

From whom the producer (*prakṛiti*) of the world was born. He created the *jeevas* along with water (i.e., with the elements") and sent them to earth (*nara.*, I-4); *Prajapati* created *prajas* (i.e., *jeevas*); All these beings, my dear, have their root in *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7). From whom these beings are born (*brigu.*, I-1).

As the creation of the world is thus stated, the creation of the *jeevas* included in the world follows.

Objection. How can this be. The *jeeva* is stated to be *Brahma*; and *Brahma* is eternal. Hence, the *jeeva* must be eternal.

Reply. Ether and the rest are said to be *Brahma* in the texts - All this is identical with that (*sat*); All this indeed is *Brahma*. They also will become eternal in your view. This has been shown to be not the case.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

18. नात्मा श्रुतेर्नियत्वाच्च ताभ्यः ।

The *Ātmā* is not produced, because such is the *vedic* statement; and because he is stated by them to be eternal also.

The statement is "The *jeeva*, who is fit to become all-knowing, is not born, nor does he die" (*katha.*, II-18); There are two unborn; they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant (*śveta.*, I-9). His being eternal is also stated: "Him, who being eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired to those that are eternal, intelligent and many (*Ātmās*) (*kathu.*, V-13); He is unborn; undying; ever-existing and ancient; he is not killed, when the body is killed" (*katha.*, II-18).

2. *Objection.* If the *jeeva* be not produced, how is the declaration explained that by knowing *Brahma*, the cause, everything, which is a product, is known? *Reply.* Thus: the *jeeva* also is a product; and the product and cause are not different.

Objection again. Then you admit that he is produced like ether and the rest. *Reply.* No; a thing becomes a product by a change of condition, and this applies to the *jeeva* as to other things. But there is this difference between him and other. The latter changes its condition to such an extent, that it is regarded as another substance and receives a new name. The *jeeva* is not subject to a change of this kind; his changes of condition being merely the expansion and contraction of his attribute *jñāna*.

3. This needs explanation. The *upanishads* teach the existence of three *tatvas* with natures different from one another—that which is an object of enjoyment, the enjoyer, and one that controls both. They deny in regard to the enjoyer origination similar to what occurs in objects of enjoyment, and affirm that he is eternal. They deny in regard to the controller origination of the kind found in objects of enjoyment, and being the seat of undesirable things as the enjoyer is. They describe the controller to be eternal, to be free from blemishes, to be ever all-knowing, to have an unfailing will, to be the lord of the lords of the senses (*jeevas*) and to be the lord of all. They state also that in all conditions *jeevas* and matter are His bodies, and that He is their *Ātmā*. He therefore ever appears as *jeevas* and material products. At one time these bodies

of *Brahma* become so subtle that they cannot be spoken of as separate from Him. *Brahma* appearing in the forms of *jeevas* and matter in this condition is in the causal condition. At another time the bodies of *Brahma* become gross; they appear in diverse forms and receive diverse names, *Brahma* appearing in the forms of *jeevas* and matter in this condition is in the evolved condition. When He changes from the former to the latter condition, the matter-element, which was without sound and other attributes, changes in its substance, and becomes possessed of sound and other attributes, in order that it may become objects of enjoyment. The *jeeva*-element undergoes changes in its attribute *jnāna*, which expands in such a manner, that he may experience the fruits of *karma*. The controller-element also changes His condition, being now clothed in the other elements in this condition. This change from one condition to another is common to all the three elements.

4. The texts quoted in the *first view* and in para 1 of the final decision may now be reconciled. The statement that by knowing one thing all things will be known, and the examples which follow it, have reference to this change of condition of the three elements. The text quoted in the *first view* refer to the *jeeva*'s coming into a body or departing from its, as the connection with a body makes his attribute *jnāna* expand, and his severance from it makes it contract. Connection with a body is said to be birth, and separation from it is said to be death. The texts quoted in para 1 of the *final decision* refer to the absences in the *jeeva* of changes in substance similar to those found in the matter-element. The texts regarding the controller refer to the absence of changes of both kinds in Him. "He, the great *Ātmā* is free from birth, old age and death; He is immortal; He is *Brahma*" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25). The statement that before creation there was one only refers to the absence of diverse names and forms. This is so stated: "This was then *avyakritam* (without diverse names and forms' (*Ibid.*, III-4-7). (1); (2).

(1) In note (1) on page 571, it was stated that all things are eternal, and that a thing does not come newly into existence. Why is eternity again asserted of the *jeeva* ? Does it not follow from what has been stated ? Reply. What is stated is true. The author of the *sūtras* wishes to repel the impression that like ether the *jeeva* also changes and receives a new name. As possessing a body, the *jeeva* is called a *brāhmaṇa* or *kshattriya* but in his own nature, no change takes place fit to be given a new name. He is always a knower, and sees himself (*adhi.*, 225).

(2) On this subject there are various theories as shown below : (i) The body itself is the *jeeva* ; then he is born; and had no previous existence. This view is untenable, as a baby, as soon as it is born, wishes to drink the mother's milk. How can this be, if it had no existence before. The dweller in the body regards it as "mine", as he does a house in which he dwells, and the feeling is not an illusion. On the other hand the

5. The explanation on the last point agrees with that given by other commentators. Of them one states the *jeeva* to be *Brahma* under the influence of *avidyā*; in the view of another he is *Brahma* contacted by an *upādhi*, that is real; and the last regards him as a product of *sat*, the latter appearing by evolution in three forms as enjoyers, objects of enjoyment and controller. Though at the time of cosmic rest *avidyā upādhi* not *śakti* (capacity to appear in the three forms) exist, they yet explain the existence of one thing only as we do for they admit on the authority of *sūtras* II-1-34 and 35 differences among *jeevas* and the existence of the streams of their *karmas* without a beginning. There is this difference between them and ourselves. In the view of one *Brahma* Himself is deluded; according to the second the *upādhi* being real, and having had no beginning, *Brahma* Himself is bound; for, there is nothing in this theory other than *Brahma* and *upādhi*. In the theory of the last *Brahma* Himself evolves into different forms; in the form of the *jeeva* He experiences undesirable fruits of *karma*; and though in the form of the controller. He need have no experience, being all knowing, He must regard the *jeevas* as not different from Himself and must therefore himself experience the fruits of *karma*. We, on the other hand, recognise that *Brahma* is clothed in the *jeeva* and matter elements whether they be in the subtle or gross condition. He is therefore ever free from the touch of every imperfection. He has an unfailing will; and is the seat of endless, infinite, auspicious qualities. The changes in substance and the sufferings pertain to the elements, which form His bodies. Our theory is therefore perfect.

SUB-SECTION 4

Being on the subject, the author of the *sūtras* proceeds to examine the nature of the *jeeva*. What is he- Is he mere *jnāna* (shining) in his *svarūpa* without the attribute *jnāna* as stated by the *sāṅkhya* and the *saugata*, or is he a *jaḍa* (not shining) like a piece of stone, and a knower, *jnāna* coming to him occasionally as stated by the *vaiśeṣika*; or is he ever a knower in his *svarūpa*?

First view: sāṅkhya's He is mere chit (light); for so say *vedic* texts: The *mādhyaṇdina's* text 'Who stands in *Ātmā* is read by the *kāṇva* thus - 'Who stands in *vijnāna*; *vijnānam* does *yajna* and does *karma* also (ana., V-1) He is

confounding of the *ātmā* with the body is due to ignorance; (ii) The *ātmā* is other than the body; but he exists only as long as the body lives; (iii) The *ātmā* is a succession of perceptions (*dhi santāna*); (a) It is eternal according to one school of *buddhists*; (b) It remains up to dissolution and then perishes, according to another school; (iv) The *ātmā* remains up to the attainment of release, according to the illusionist, and then it becomes *Brahma*; (v) The *ātmā* is a product of evolution, *Sat* assuming that form, as the sea becomes foam. All these views may be held to be refuted on the authority of *vedic* texts (*adhī*, 227, 228 and 229).

jnāna in his nature in reality; and is extremely pure (*vishṇu* I-2-6) These show that his nature is mere *jnāna*.

Vaiśeṣika's If it be admitted that the *jeeva* is by nature both light and a knower, as he is everywhere, he would be perceived everywhere and at all times. If he could see by nature, his senses would be purposeless. During sleep and trance, while the *jeeva* exists, *jnāna* is not observed; and in the waking state, if the conditions are available, he is seen to know. Hence, his nature is not *jnāna*; nor is he knower by nature; for *jnāna* is an accident.

2. It must be admitted that he is present everywhere. An object to be enjoyed by a *jeeva* is produced at a distant place; and this must be due to connection with his *adrishṭa*; and this connection would not be possible, unless he were present at that places, as *adrishṭa* inheres in him. The *jeeva* being thus omni present, his perception, and experiencing of pleasure and pain at all places may be explained by the going of his body to those places; and it is unnecessary to assume that the *jeeva* himself goes from place to place. In this view two assumptions are necessary - that the *jeeva* is atomic, and that he moves from place to place, while there would be one assumption only in the view that he is omnipresent. The latter view, being simpler, should be accepted in preference to the other.

3. The absence of *jnāna* during sleep is stated by *vedic* texts "He (the sleeper) does not now know himself 'I am this' nor these beings" (*chāndo.*, VIII-11-1). Similarly in final release "When he departs, there is no *samjñā* (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-12). Here the opponent uses the term *samjñā* as meaning knowledge, where as it means confounding the *Ātmā* with the body. The reference to *jnāna* in the *vishṇu purāṇa* text as pertaining to nature should be understood in a secondary sense; *jnāna* is a peculiar attribute of the *jeeva*.

Final decision : This is stated in the *sūtra*;

19. ज्ञोऽतएव ।

The *Ātmā* is a knower surely, because of the *vedic* statement.(1)

'A knower', but neither mere *jnāna* nor *jaḍa* (not shining) the *vedic* statements are :

(1) The *sūtra* has *atah eva*, which means for the very same. The intention is that the term *śruti* occurring in the preceding *sūtra* should be added in this *sūtra*. The texts relied on in both the *sūtras* being different, the reason assigned in that *sūtra* is not to be applied here. For a precedent as to this mode of application of a term see chap. I section 2, *sūtra* 16 and the note thereunder.

Chāndo., (i) He, who perceives 'I smell this' is the *Ātmā*; the nose is for smelling (VIII-12-4); (ii) He sees with the mind (the attribute *jnāna*) these noble qualities that are in *Brahma-world* and rejoices (*Ibid.*, verse 5); (iii) Who has unchanging objects of desire and whose will is never frustrated (*Ibid.*, VII-7-i); (iv) He does not think of this body lying by the side of (weeping) relations (*Ibid* VIII-1-2-3). (v) One who sees (*Brahma*) does not see death (*Ibid.*, VII-26-2); (vi) Who is the *Ātmā*? The *puruṣha*, who is a knower, shining, and who abides within the heart in the midst of the senses, is the *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-7); (vii) BY what means, my dear, can he see the knower (*Ibid*, IV-4-14) (viii) This *puruṣha* ever knows; (ix) He is indeed a seer, hearer, smellier, taster, thinker, knower doer, a shining *Ātmā* a *puruṣha* (*prasma* IV-9); and (x) In the very same way these sixteen parts of this seer (*Ibid.*, VI-5)

The *vaiśeṣhika*'s view that the *jeeva* being omnipresent, if he were a knower, he should see everywhere, and always is replied to in the next *sūtra* :

20. उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ।

Because going out of the body, going and returning (are stated).

The *jeeva* is not omnipresent, he is a mere atom. If he were omnipresent, the actions stated in the *sūtra* could not take place. Going out of the body is thus stated (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2) "With that light this *Ātmā* gets out through the eye, through the head, or through other places in the body". Going is thus stated (*kausha* I-9) Those, that depart from this world, all of them go to the moon alone". Returning is thus stated (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-6) From that world he returns to this world to do actions."

21. स्वात्मनाचोत्तरयोः ।

The last two actions (can be effected) by the *Ātmā* alone.

It is possible to explain the going out of the body by starting it to be separation from the body of one that remains where he is. But the going and the returning cannot be so explained. The *jeeva* himself must go and return. (1)

22. नाणुरतच्छुतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ।

If it be contended, 'He is not an atom, because he is said to be great' the reply is 'No, because the context refers to the to other (*Brahma*)

(1) See the last two sentences of para 2 of the *first view*. Going being stated by the *veda*, the only assumption is that the *jeeva* is an atom. Hence the simplicity claimed for the rival view disappears; and this is opposed to the *veda*.

A *brihad āraṇyaka* text (VI-3-7) beings with these words “The *purusha* who is a knower shining and who abides within the heart in the midst of the senses”. The reference here is clearly to the *jeeva*. Towards the close these words occur “He (the Being described) is great, unborn; He is *Ātmā* (Ibid., VI-4-2). The opponent regards this as referring to the *jeeva* and contends that the term ‘great’ shows that he is not an atom. The *sūtra* states the contention and replies. The *upanishad* did begin with the *jeeva*; but in the middle (VI-4-13) the subject was changed, and *Brahma* was brought in thus “Whose *Ātmā* is known in its true nature and is thought on continuously”. The verse quoted refers therefore to *Brahma*, and the greatness is His greatness, not of the *jeeva*.

23. स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्यां च ।

From the use of the word *anu* and mention of dimension.

The world *anu* (atom) is expressly stated, “That *Ātmā* is *anu*, and should be perceived with pure mind, the *Ātmā* in whom *prāna* remains in five forms” (*munḍa.*, III-1-9) A thing as minute as an atom is taken, and its size is predicated of the *jeeva*. If the hundredth part of the end of a hair be divided into hundred parts, the *jeeva* should be known as one such part (*ṣveta.*, V-9) He is seen to be of smaller size; for he is of the size of the pointed end of a goad (*āra*) (Ibid., V-8) Hence, the *jeeva* is only an atom.

By these four *sūtras* the opponent’s view that the *jeeva* is omnipresent has been refuted. His objections are now answered in the next three *sūtras*: If the *jeeva* be an atom, how can he perceive what goes on throughout the body?

24. अविरोधश्चन्दनवत् ।

There is no difficulty, on the analogy of sandal.

A drop of sandal oil placed on one place in the body produces a pleasurable sensation throughout. Similarly, the *jeeva* abides in one part of the body, and perceives the sensations in every part of it.

25. अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धृदिहि ।

If it be contended ‘There is a difference’ (The sandal oil being dropped on a definite part of the body and the *jeeva* not being so), the reply is ‘No, It is admitted that the *jeeva* abides in a definite part of the body. And that part is in the heart.

The *jeeva* is stated to abide in the heart “This *anā* is in the heart” (*praśna* III-6); The *purusha* too is a knower, shining, and who abides within the heart in

the midst of the senses, is the *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, V-3-7) This analogy has been mentioned to show at the *jeeva* abides in a particular part of the body. Here need be no such limitation in regard to the sadal oil.

The author states his own theory :

26. गुणाद्वा लोकवत् ।

But (the *jeeva* perceives) with his attribute, like light. *jeeva* with his attribute *jnāna* perceives what goes throughout the body, as the light of a precious stone, sun and the like, which are in one place, spreads round. As the light is to a lamp, so is the attribute *jnāna* to the *Ātmā*. It may exist elsewhere than in the *Ātmā* also. (1)

The texts quoted by the *sāṅkhya* in the *first view* are next explained in four *sūtras* and those quoted by the *vaiṣeṣhika* in the fifth *sūtra*.

27. व्यतिरेको गन्धवत्तथा च दर्शयति ।

Jnāna differs from the *jeeva* as smell differs from earth. And it is so stated.

In perceiving the smell of earth, it is known to be its attribute, and its difference from earth follows. Similarly, in the perception, 'I know' *jnāna* is known as the attribute of the knower; and it therefore differ's from him. The *upanishad* states this "This person is ever a knower" The emphatic particle *eva* (only) is added to the verb here, and conveys the idea that the person is never a non-knower; added to the person, it would mean that no other person is a knower.

28. पृथगुपदेशात् ।

Because it is described as separate.

It is described as separate from the knower. The *jnāna* of the knower does not perish" (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-30).

29. तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ।

But because *jnāna* is his essential attribute, he is known as *vijnāna*. Like *prājna* (*Brahma*)

Because bliss (*ānanda*) is the essential attribute of *Brahma*, He is denoted by that term. "If that unlimited *ānanda* does not exist (*āna.*, vii-1) He

(1) By yoga the *jeeva* may become capable of thoughtouting the attributes so as to reach a number of bodies.

perceived that *ānanda* was *Brahma*” (*bhṛigu.*, VI-1). *Ānanda* (bliss) is His essential attribute. This is seen from the texts ‘That is one *ānanda* of *Brahma* (*āna.*, VIII-4) meditating on the *ānanda* of *Brahma* one does not fear anything (*āna.*, IX-1).

Another instance -*Brahma* is called *jnāna* in Un-changing shining (*jnānam*) and without limitations is *Brahma* (*ana.*, I-1) From the *munḍaka* text “He known everything” (I-1-10) and from the *ānandavalli* text with *Brahma* the all-knowing *jnāna* is known to be His essential attribute.

30. यावदात्मभावित्याच्च न दोषस्तदर्शनात् ।

And because it remains his attribute so long as he remains, there is no objection. Similar usage is seen.

Jnāna is never absent from the *jeeva*; hence in denoting him by the term *vijnāna* there is no objection. Similarly cows are denoted by the term ‘go’, which term connotes an attribute, as this is never absent from them. The *jeeva* is denoted by the term *vijnāna* from another reason; that is, because He shines. (1) This is indicated by the particle *cha* (and) in the *sūtra*. (2)

What has been stated in *sūtra* 30 is objected to on the ground that *jnāna* is absent in deep sleep. The next *sūtra* explains :

31. पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ।

But it does exist, and became manifest (in the waking condition) like virile power.

Virile power exists in all males even in infancy but it is not then manifested. This power depends upon the existence of one of seven elements, which always make up a body “The body is made up of seven *dhatus* (element),

1. *Shines-jnāna* means what shows itself or other things and makes them fit to be spoken about. Both the *jeeva* and his attribute possess this character, the *jeeva* showing himself and his attribute showing other things. Who is the idea that this is done without any help is added, they are said to be *svaprakasa* (self-proved).

(2)(a) The illusionist states that the *jeeva* is *jnana* (shining), while the *vaisheshika* asserts that he is a knower, not by nature, but only when he contacts the mind. Both, being stated by the *upanishads*, are accepted impartially. Against the former it is held that he is a knower also; and against the latter that he knows always and by nature.

(b) If the *jeeva* is self-proved. Why does he not shine always? In reply we ask whether the opponent refers to distinct or indistinct shining. If he refers to the latter, he should know that he always shines indistinctly; if he refers to the former, it is true that he does not shine distinctly in sleep; because *jnana* then contracts and does not grasp outside things.

has three impurities, comes from two sources, and is a modification of four kinds of good" Similarly *jnāna* exists at all times as an attribute of the *Ātmā* but in deep sleep outside objects are not perceived, and it is not therefore manifested then. The absence of *semjñā* referred to by the *vaiśeshika* does not mean the absence of consciousness, when the *jeeva* becomes free. If this were correct, the text would conflict with the other texts quoted in the final decision under the first sūtra. It means that the *jeeva* no longer confounds himself with the body, and no longer regards its birth and death as his own birth and death.

Having established his own theory, the author of the *sūtras* proceeds to criticise the rival view that the *jeeva* is omnipresent.

32. नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतरनियमोवाऽन्यथा ।

Otherwise, there should be ever perception and ever non-perception, or one of them would ever happen to the exclusion of the other.

'Otherwise'-if the *jeeva* were omnipresent. This is what is observed in the world; the *Ātmā* is perceived within the body, and not outside. The cause of this perception and non-perception is the *Ātmā* himself. Three alternatives are possible. First, if the *Ātmā* were the cause of both, being omnipresent, he must be perceived and not perceived at all places and at all times. Secondly, if he were the cause of perception only, for the same reason his non-perception outside the body, which is a fact, would not happen at any time. Lastly, if he were the cause of non-perception only, his perception within the body, which also is a fact, should not occur at any time. It will not be possible to the opponent to state It is the nature of the *Ātmā* to be perceived within the body, and to be unperceived outside of it; for one and the same object cannot be perceptible in one part and imperceptible in another part. This expedient is available to us who do not hold the *Ātmā* to be omnipresent.

So far as to the *sāṅkhya*. Now to the *vaiśeshika* according to whom the *Ātmā* is *jada*, and sees only when he contacts the mind. Being omnipresent, he is in contact with every mind and with every body and at all times' and no *adṛishṭa* can be shown to limit the *Ātmā* to one mind and one body. (1)

(1) Pursuing the same plan, it may be asked whether the mind and body are the cause of perception only, or of non-perception only or of both. In the first alternative, the *Ātmā* must see everywhere; and his not seeing, where his body is not present. Which is a fact will not happen. In the second alternative, he cannot see anywhere at any time, and his seeing, where his body is present, which also is a fact, will not happen. In the last alternative, he must see and not see at the same time, which is absurd.

SUB-SECTION 5

In this sub-section it is considered whether the *jeeva* is a doer, or whether he remains without action as stated by the *sāṅkhya*, and yet fancies that he acts, while the actors are really his body, his senses or the *gunas* of the body.

First view. The *jeeva* is not a doer; for doership is denied in the following text, as birth, death and all other attributes of matter are denied: "If the killer thinks 'I will kill him' and if the killed thinks 'I am killed,' neither of them knows. This one does not kill; nor is that one killed" (*katha.*, II-19) Similarly, the *bhagavad-gītā* states "In regard to actions done by the *gunas* of the body, each in its own way, one, that has forgotten himself by confounding himself with the body, thinks 'I am the doer' (III-27). When the seer does not perceive a doer other than *gunas* (*Ibid.*, XIV-19): The body is said to be concerned, when the body or the senses act; the *purusha* is said to be concerned, when pleasure and pain are experienced" (*Ibid.*, XIII-20). These verses show that the *jeeva* in his nature is not a doer; that the notion that he does is illusion; that he has merely to enjoy; and that action pertains to matter in the form of his body.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

33. कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् ।

(The *jeeva*) is the doer, in order that the commands and prohibitions of the *veda* may serve a purpose.

The *jeeva* alone is the doer; not the *gunas*. The commands are like these: "Let one that desires *svarga*, do *yaya*. Let one, that desires release, meditate on *Brahma*." They are addressed to one, that desires to enjoy either fruit, and that will experience it eventually, and direct him to adopt the means pointed out. If the *gunas* were the doers, how could another be commanded? The object of commands is to induce one to act; and this is done by creating an impression on his mind. Matter and its modifications, being unintelligent, cannot be moved in this manner. Hence, the commands will serve their purpose, only when the intelligent *jeeva*, who will enjoy the fruits of action, is the doer. This is stated "The fruit of obeying a command is reaped by one that wets things in motion".

The texts quoted in the *first view* do not support it. The first text states that the *Ātmā* being eternal can never be killed, and that therefore the impression of both the killer and the killed is erroneous. In the second text it is stated that in actions of worldly men the doership of the *jeeva* is brought about by his connection with his *gunas*, and that it is not caused by his nature. The verse thus discriminates between what happens and what does not happen, and assigns doership only to the *gunas*. It is so stated in the very same work.

“Attachment to the *guṇas* and their effects causes his birth again in good or evil wombs”. (Ibid., XIII-21). See also the following verses : ‘The body, the *Ātmā* the five organs of action, *prāṇa* and *Īśvara* the fifth, in the list of causes. Whatever work of body, tongue or mind, good or evil, a mortal begins, these five are its causes. This being so, whosoever for lack of knowledge sees himself as the sole cause, does not see correctly (Ibid., XVIII-14, 15 and 16). Here the doership of the *Ātmā* is taken as a fact; and it is stated that while action depends on five things beginning with the body and ending with *Īśvara*, one, that thinks that he alone is the doer, does not see correctly.

34. उपादानाद्विहारोपदेशाच्च ।

Because of using the senses and of the statement of his amusing oneself.

A *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text (IV-1-18) cites the *analogy* of a great king, and states “In the very same way he takes hold of these senses and moves about in his own body according to his pleasure.” This shows that the *jeeva* acts in these two ways - moving the senses, and moving in the body.

35. व्यपदेशाच्चक्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः ।

And because he is said to be agent in action. If not the term would be in a different form.

In the *ānandavalli* text, “*viñāna* (the knower) performs *yajna* (offerings) and does worldly acts also” (V-1) the *jeeva* is said to be the doer. *Objection*. By the term *viñāna* mind or *buddhi* is meant, and not the *jeeva*. *Reply*. Then the form of the term would be *viñānena* (instrumental, instead of the nominative, case) as mind is an instrument)

Having established his position in these three *sūtras* the author proceeds in the next three *sūtras* to show some absurdities in the *first view* :

36. उपलब्धिवदनियमः ।

No limitation of enjoyment as in regard to perception.

In *sutra* 32 of this section certain absurdities were pointed out in the theory of the *jeeva*'s being omnipresent. Similarly if matter were the doer, not the *jeeva* as matter is common to all *jeevas* all actions must bring enjoyment to all; or to no one. The *jeeva* being assumed to be omnipresent, proximity to matter is common to all; and for the same reason any attempt to limit enjoyment with reference to the mind will be futile; because each mind will be in contact with all.

37. शक्तिविपर्ययात् ।

Because the capacity for enjoyment would disappear.

If matter were the doer, as one other than the doer cannot enjoy the fruit of the action, matter alone would have the capacity to enjoy. The *jeeva's* capacity for it would disappear, and with it the evidence for the existence of the *jeeva* himself, the opponent's position being that he exists, because he is the enjoyer.

38. समाध्यभावाच्च ।

And because *samadhi* (meditation) will be impossible.

Meditation enjoined as the means to release would fall to matter; and as the meditation is in this form "I am other than matter", matter cannot do meditation of this kind.

The opponent asks-if the *jeeva* is the doer, will he not always act and never cease? The last *sūtra* replies:

39. यथाच तक्षोभयाथा ।

And in both the ways, like a carpenter.

Though the *jeeva* commands all the organs of action, he will act or refrain from action as he pleases, as a carpenter does, though he has all his instruments. If matter were the doer, being non-intelligent, it must always act; for there will be nothing to restrain it like absence of desire for enjoyment.

SUB-SECTION 6

In this sub-section the question is considered whether the *jeeva's* doership depends upon *Brahma* or is independent of Him.

First view. It is independent of *Brahma*; otherwise commands and prohibitions would be purposeless; for he, who is competent of his own will to act or not to act, should be commanded.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

40. परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

That (the *jeeva's* doership) comes from *Brahma* alone; because it is so stated.

The statement is :

He has entered into men and controls them; He is the *Ātmā* of all (*yajur, āraṇyaka*, III-11-10); who stands in the *Ātmā* who is within the *Ātmā* whom the *Ātmā* does not know, whose body the *Ātmā* is, who rules the *Ātmā* from within. He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-26) I am seated in the heart of every one; from Me flow remembrance, knowledge as well as inability to see (*bhagavad-gītā* XV-15); The ruler of all has mounted all beings on the wheel of the body, and living in their hearts. He makes them go round and round with the help of attractive sense objects (*Ibid.*, XVIII-61).

If this be so, the commands and prohibitions of the *veda* will become purposeless. The next *sūtra* explains :

41. कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ।

But *Brahma* awaits the efforts made by the *jeeva*; in order that injunctions and prohibitions may not become purposeless.

In every action *Brahma*, the inner ruler, looks for the effort made by the *jeeva* and giving His assent, makes him do it. For, without this assent, the *jeeva* can do nothing. (1)

Question. Why does *Brahma* look for the *jeeva*'s effort? The reply is given in the *sūtra* itself. when property is jointly owned by two persons, one of them cannot give away his share to a third person without the other's consent; and as he procures the consent, its fruit belongs to himself. Similarly, here though both the *jeeva* and *Brahma* must join the act - one by making the effort and the other by giving assent - yet the fruit of the action is reaped by the former

(1) The control of the *jeeva*'s doership by the highest *Ātmā* should be examined at some length. A father divides some property between two sons, and leaves them free to utilise their portions as they please. One of them quickly squanders it, while the other improves it; and each reaps the fruit of the use made by himself and he alone. Similarly, the highest *Ātmā* gives to all *jeevas* alike instruments in the form of body, mind and senses, and the capacity to think and act; and for this reason their doership in general depends on the highest *Ātmā*. Their doership in regard to individual acts also depends on Him, for they need his assent. In making the choice, however, they possess freedom and become subject to injunctions and prohibitions; and freedom means that when they have the capacity to act in accordance with their wishes, no one prevents them. Though they depend upon the highest *Ātmā* as explained, they alone reap the fruit of their choice; and this has been shown by an example. The assentor is not touched by the fruits, as He is the ruler, and as the same authority, by which He is known, states that He is so.

alone. In regard to the effort to do an injurious act, the giving of assent by one able to prevent it does not indicate want of mercy (2). See under *sūtra* II-2-3.

2. The opponent observes "You say that *Brahma* awaits the *jeeva's* effort. But the following *kaushītaki* text contradicts this statement.

For it is He alone that makes one do a good deed whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds; it is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom He wishes to lead downwards (II-64 and 65).

This text means that *Brahma* of His own motion desires to lead one to do a good or evil deed. Reply. This does not apply to all persons. If one be exceedingly loyal, *Brahma* creates a liking in him for very good actions, which will eventually lead to His being reached. If he be exceedingly disloyal, he creates a liking in him for actions that are the reverse. These are therefore exceptional cases. *Bhagavan* states this Himself :

I am the place from which every thing goes forth; and everything, acts as directed by me. Knowing Me in this manner, wise men are filled with love and meditate on me. To those that wish ever to be with Me and meditate on Me I give with love that *buddhi* with which they will reach Me. To favour them I remain as the subject of their thought, and with the bright lamp of knowledge, I destroy the darkness born of past *karma* (bhagavad-gita X-8, 10 and 11).

As regards those that are disloyal, He observes :

They state that the universe was not made by *Brahma*; that it does not rest on Him; and that it is not controlled by Him (*Ibid.*, XVI-8). They hate Me, who abide in their bodies and in the bodies of others' and not willing to put up with My existence, they urge false arguments to show that I do not exist (*Ibid.*; 18)

Having thus described them. He states :

I ever throw into the wombs of persons of *asura* nature those that hate me, those that put forward specious arguments to show that I do not exist, those that knowing Me do not yet approach Me, and those that do not know that I exist (*Ibid.*, 19). (1)

(2) When one chooses to do something injurious to himself, does it indicate the possession of mercy in one who, though able to prevent it, gives His assent? *Reply*. It is giving him the fruit of his choice; and mercy is shown by the excuse of serious misdeeds on the appearance of obedience even to a small extent.

Question. Does not the highest *Ātmā* give the *jeeva* a body of a particular kind and place him in an environment suited to his past *karma*. Does he not bind the *jeeva*

SUB-SECTION 7

In this sub-section the question is considered whether the *jeeva* completely differs from *Brahma*, whether he is *Brahma* deluded, or limited by *upādhi* (real limiting substances) or whether he is a part of Him,. The doubt arises as statements made by *upanishads* vary: Question. This question was discussed and settled in chapter II, section 1, sub-section 7. why is a new sub-section needed. *Reply*. True; the conclusion therein arrived at, being impugned with reference to conflicting texts, is re-affirmed here by showing that the *jeeva* is a part of *Brahma*. Until this is shown, the facts that the *jeeva* is not different from *Brahma* and that *Brahma* is other than he will not rest on firm ground.

First view. (i) The *jeeva* completely differs from *Brahma* ; for the text 'Two are unborn: they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant, ruler and the ruled (*ṣveta.*, I-9) shows them to be different. The texts affirming oneness of two beings so entirely different should be understood in a secondary sense; for understanding them literally would be as absurd as to say that one wets with fire.

by this means. *Reply*. (i) the highest *Ātmā* shows no particular desire in the matter. Having an eye to the existing *karma* of the *jeeva*, he wishes to make him experience pleasure or pain, and makes objects of enjoyment appear before him; but this is not done from any intention of making him do any new *karma* to procure some other fruit. A person lights a lamp, so that another may see a jar; if a third person also sees the jar, the first must be said to have been indifferent as regards this third person; for he neither makes him see or prevents him. Similarly, the highest *Ātmā* is indifferent, while the choice is made; and it is this that constitutes the *jeeva's* freedom.

(ii) The highest *Ātmā* acts like a king, who gives his minister the necessary means, and leaves him free to act, and who himself does nothing. Freedom is not incompatible with subjection to another; for this incompatibility is not observed in the case of the minister.

(iii) The *jeeva* is no doubt subject to previous tendencies, and is led by the desire which they produce; but has is not driven like wind or water. The springing up of a desire does not destroy his capacity to act. A person has a desire for the food placed before him; if he knows it to be mixed with poison, he is seen to overcome the desire to take it. Another going to gather fuel, when he learns how a great treasure may be got, gives up his task. Similarly, when the *jeeva* becomes aware of the sin which he will commit, or of some great fruit which he may get, he can control his desire and is therefore free. Like a tendency leading him to do what is pleasant, there are tendencies that will make him avoid what is unpleasant. He is therefore capable of suppressing a desire to abstain from doing what is enjoined or to do what is prohibited; and if he disregards the evil consequences and does not suppress, it this will constitute his wrongdoing; and he becomes liable to punishment. It is because beasts are unable to see the consequences of obeying or disobeying the commands of the *veda*, they are not subject to it.

2. Here an objection is raised: The *jeeva* is a part (*amsa*) of *Brahma*; for so is it stated. Reply. This is not a correct view. The term *amsa* means a part of a substance. If the *jeeva* were a part of *Brahma*, his imperfections would redound on *Brahma*; and He is not divisible; if he were, a bit of Him might be said to be the *jeeva*.

3. (ii) The *jeeva* is *Brahma* Himself deluded; for the texts "That thou art (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7); This *Ātmā* is *Brahma* (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-5) state the *jeeva* to be *Brahma*. Texts affirming difference repeat what is known from sense perception, and are nullified by the texts quoted. These are not *anyatha-sidha* i.e., they cannot be explained away; while the former texts are *anyatha-sidha* i.e., they may be explained as affected by *avidyā* as sense perception is.

4. (iii) The *jeeva* is *Brahma* Himself limited by beginningless *upādhis*; for the same reason, *viz.*, that the *jeeva* is stated to be *Brahma*. The *upādhis* cannot be regarded as due to delusion; for bond age and release cannot be explained in that view.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

42. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत एके ।

A part (of *Brahma*): because he is said to be different and also one Some read *Brahma* is fishermen, cheats and the like".

Both sets of statements are found - that the *jeeva* is different from *Brahma*, and that he is *Brahma*. The former set of statements distinguishes them thus : One creates, and the other is created; one controls and the other is controlled; one is all-knowing, and the other is ignorant; one is independent and the other is dependent; one is pure and the other is impure; one is the seat of all good qualities and the other is the reverse; one is master and the other is servant; and the like. The statement of oneness is made by the texts quoted in para 3 of the *first view*. The followers of the *atharva veda* describe *Brahma* thus *Brahma* is these fishermen; *Brahma* is these slaves; *Brahma* is these cheats". Here oneness is stated, as *Brahma* is all these. (1)

Now, in order that both the sets of texts may have their primary meanings, it must be admitted that the *jeeva* is an *amsa* (part) of *Brahma*.

2. The argument in para 3 of the first view is not sound. The facts stated in the difference-texts are beyond the cognition of sense-perception and are not repeated: *viz.*, that the *jeeva* is created, and controlled by *Brahma*, that

(1) It is usual to identify a person with some one who is superior him; "He is *Vishṇu*" Here the reverse is the case. It cannot be explained as implying praise. Hence, the oneness stated must be accepted as a fact.

he forms His body; that he exists for His sake; that he is supported by Him, that he is protected by Him; that he is destroyed by Him, that he mediates on Him; and that he attains what he desires, including release, through His grace. The difference between the *jeeva* and *Brahma* indicated by these facts must be accepted as real. They cannot be explained away as the opponent suggests.

3. The opponent explains : The texts referred to convey this teaching-viz., though *Brahma* is by nature one, and is mere *chit*, yet He regards himself as being different. He wills to become many and creates ether and the other elements; He enters into them in the *jeeva*-condition; He makes various beings appear with diverse names and forms; He reaps the pleasure and pain yielded by the enjoyment of numberless objects thus made; He remains in them without enjoyment and controls them as their inner ruler; being in the *jeeva*-condition He mediates that He and *Brahma* in the casual condition are one; He is released from *samsara* and He makes the *veda*, which teaches the way to such release; He thus deludes himself. Reply. If this were a correct view, the texts would resemble the ravings of a lunatic.

4. The view of para 4 of the *first view* also is unsound; for the relation between the *jeeva* and *Brahma* stated in para 2 above would be meaningless; and this is a sufficient reason. The opponent, explanation's will be as absurd as to say that the same person, that has one foot in a house and the other outside it, becomes the controlled in regard to the foot in the house, while he remains the controller in regard to the other foot.

43. मन्त्रवर्णात् ।

Because it is stated in the *mantra*.

The *mantra* run thus :

A part (*pāda*) of Him is all beings (*purusha sūkta*) The plural is used because the *jeevas* are many. The singular *amsa* in *sūtra* 42 and the singular in *sūtra* 18 have reference to the class. The authority for this is *śvetasvatara* (VI-13)

Him who being eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired by those that are eternal, intelligent and many.

This shows that *Brahma* is different from the *jeevas* and that they are many and eternal. This being so, though the *jeevas* are alike in their nature, as being intelligent and shining beings, their difference from one another is perceived by those able to see them as they are.

44. अपि स्मर्यते ।

It is also taught in the *smṛiti*

Thus-

One remaining a part (*amsa*) of myself under the influence of beginningless *avidyā* becomes a *jeeva* in the world of the *jeevas* (*bhagavad-gitā* XV-7)

If the *jeeva* be a part of *Brahma*, the imperfections of the *jeeva* will redound on *Brahma*. This view is refuted :

45. प्रकाशादिवत्तु नैवं परः ।

Like light and the like, the highest is not so.

The *jeeva* is a part of *Brahma*, as light is part of a luminous substance like fire or the sun. Other instances are the following: The characteristic form of a cow or a horse, the white or dark colour of objects and the bodies of *jeevas* in their embodied condition. The inseparable distinguishing attributes in these cases are the parts respectively of the animal, the object or the *jeevas*. The term *amsa* means a part of a thing; when that thing has certain distinguishing attributes, which cannot ordinarily be separated from it, they form its parts. So do competent men distinguish the parts, which are attribute, and the part to which they pertain. When two things are thus related, their natures differ. These remarks apply to the *jeeva* also. He is a part of *Brahma* in the sense of being an attribute of Him, and his nature differs from His nature. This is what is meant by the latter half of the *sūtra*. As the light differs from the luminous substance, so does the *jeeva* differ from *Brahma*. The texts stating difference refer to this difference in their natures; while the other set of texts expressing oneness has regard to the *jeevas* being inseparable attributes of *Brahma*. In the texts That thou art; This *Ātmā* is *Brahma* the words thou, and this *Ātmā*, denote *Brahma* with *jeevas* as His bodies; the words 'that' and '*brahma*' denote Him directly; thus the two sets of words denote the same thing.

46. स्मरन्ति च ।

And the *smṛiti*-writers have confirmed this.

Reference is made to *Parasara* and others. They have confirmed this mode of reconciling the difference between the two sets of texts, and have assimilated the relation of the *jeeva* to *Brahma* to the relation of light to a luminous body, to the relation of attributed to a substance, and to the relation of the body to the *jeeva*.

As the light of a fire standing in one place spread all around, so that *sakti* (*jeevas*) of the highest *Brahma* pervades all this world (*vishṇu* I-22-56); All that is the body of Hari for the coming into existence of whatever is created by all living beings (*Ibid.*, 38)

The term 'and' (*cha*) in the *sūtra* shows that *vedic* texts also like whose body the *Ātmā* is (*bṛihad.*,V-7-26) refer to this.

It may be asked - If all *jeevas* are parts of *Brahma*, seeing that they are all alike in being *jnāna* (intelligent and shining beings) and in being controlled by the same ruler, why are they not given the same treatment? But only some are permitted to learn the *veda* and carry out in teaching, but not others. Only some may be seen or touched; but not others. The next *sūtra* explains :

47. अनुज्ञापरिहारौ देहसम्बन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत् ।

Permission and prohibition are due to connection with a body. Like fire and the like.

Fire is of the same kind, whether it be procured from the house of one learned in the *veda* or from the cremation grounds; but the former is preferred, and the latter is avoided. Similarly, food given by one of *vedic* lore is permitted, but not that of a sinful one. Similarly here.

In the last five *sūtras* the author shows how his own explanation is free from any objection and how the other are faulty.

48. असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः ।

No mixing up (of enjoyments) because the *jeevas* are not all-pervading.

Though the *jeevas* are of the same kind, as being *amsas* of *Brahma* and for other reasons, they differ from one another; and being atoms in size, the *jeeva* in one body is other than the *jeevas* in other bodies. Hence the enjoyment of one is not mixed up with the enjoyments of others. On the theories of others the enjoyments of the *jeeva* and of *Brahma* or of the *jeevas* among themselves must be mixed up. To show this defect, the author of the *sūtras* states that his own theory is free from it.

49. आभास एव च ।

And it is a specious arguments and no more.

The argument, by which the non-mixing up enjoyments is sought to be explained on the theory that the *jeeva* is *Brahma* deluded, is an argument only appearance. *Brahma* being light, indivisible, and the same nature throughout, it must be shown first how this self-proved light is prevented from appearing, and then how limitations differing from one another and made by *avidyā*. This attempt fails. *Brahma*, thought limited by many *avidyā*- made limitations, being

Himself one, the mixing up of enjoyments cannot be avoid. The term and (*cha*) in the *sūtra* draws attention to the conflict with *vedic* texts. (1)

In the other theory that the *jeeva* us *Brahma* limited by real limiting things, it is explained that the limiting things differ because of an *adṛishṭa* in each which has had no beginning. The text *sūtra* deal with this explanation.

50. अदृष्टानियमात् ।

Because the *adṛishṭas* are not differentiated.

The *adṛishṭas* themselves inhere in the substance (*svarūpa*) of *Brahma*, and there is nothing to differentiate them. The difficulty therefore remains; because is not possible for the limiting things or the *adṛishṭas* cut up the substance of *Brahma* by their connection. with it.

51. असिसन्ध्यादिष्वपि चैवम् ।

And in regard to willing also there is similar non-differentiation.

If the *adṛishṭas* be differentiated with reference to willing, the willing being that of *Brahma*, and He being one, non-differentiation cannot be got over.

52. प्रदेशभेदादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात् ।

If it be said "Owing to differences of places," the reply is "no; because all places are contacted by limiting things"

The opponent explains : The substance of *Brahma* is one indeed; and cannot be cut up; and it contacts various limiting things; yet the places of contact being different, there is differentiation in enjoyments. *Reply*. The limiting things may move about from place to place; and all places will be connected with all of them. The result will be the same. Though the limiting things are connected with different places, as they are all places in *Brahma*, the suffering of each place belongs to *Brahma* alone.

In *sūtras* 32 and 36 the defect in the theory of the *jeeva*'s omnipresence held in those outside the *vedic* fold was pointed out; here *sūtras* 49 to 52 expose the error of those that accepting the authority of the *veda* maintain that all *jeevas* are one.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) The texts - 'are - meditating on the *Ātmā* and ruler as different; both are unborn; but they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant (*sveta.*, I-9) Of the one eats the ripe fruit (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-1)

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER II

SECTION 4

In the preceding section the evolution from the highest *Ātmā* of ether and all other products was established; and it was shown that the *jeeva*, though a product of evolution like the rest, did not change in his substance like ether. In this connection the *svarūpa* of the *jeeva* was considered; and it was shown that he knows and acts, and that he is a part (*amṣa*) of *Brahma*. In this section the evolution of his instruments, the senses and *prāṇa*, is considered.

SUB-SECTION 1

The question for consideration is whether the senses are evolved like the *jeeva* or like ether.

First view. The senses evolve like the *jeeva*; the *sūtra* states this :

1. तथा प्राणाः ।

Similarly *prāṇas*.

The term *prāṇa* in the plural refers to the senses; and the *sūtra* states the view of the opponent the like that *jeeva* the senses are not produced. What is the reason? As the non-origination of the *jeeva* is known from the *veda*, so is the non-origination of the senses learnt from the same authority. (1) The authority is the *satāpatha* (VI-1-1)

Before creation this was *asat* indeed. Then they said "What existed then". "Before creation *rishis* ever existed indeed" They asked - Who were those *rishis* *Prāṇas* were the *rishis*.

This shows that the senses existed before creation. This text cannot be explained so as to mean that they existed for a long time; like the texts relating to ether and air - The fluid is air and ether (*antariksha*)-this is imperishable (*bṛihad.*, IV-3-3); the *devata vayu* (air) does not set", for they are stated to have existed when the whole world was dissolved. The texts affirming origination of the senses should be explained, like similar texts regarding the *jeeva*:

Final decision. The senses are produced like ether; for in the texts "Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1) Before creation this was *Ātmā* indeed one only (*aita.*, I-1) it is state that there was only one

(1) The authority for holding the view that there is no origination, mentioned in *sūtra* 18 preceding section, is applied to the case of the senses by this *sūtra*.

before creation. In the *munḍaka* text "From Him came forth *prāṇa*, main and all the senses" (II-1-3) their origination is taught; and they could not have existed before. The case of the senses differs from that of the *jeeva*; for there are no texts as in his case denying origination and affirming eternal existence. In the text relied on in the *first view* reference is made by the term *prāṇa* to the highest *Ātmā* alone, and the term *prāṇa* denotes Him by well established usage (See *sūtra* I-1-24). The term *ṛishi* (seer) is appropriate only in the all-knowing Being, and not in the non-intelligent senses, which are not seers, but only instruments in perception. (1)

2. गौण्यसम्भवात्तत्प्राक्छुतेः ।

(The plural of the term *prāṇas*) is secondary; because of impossibility; this again because He is stated to have existed before.

Because it is stated that there was one only before evolution, the existence of many was impossible, and the plural ending should be ignored (2) See Intro., para 34) And that one is known to be *Brahma*.

3. तत्पूर्वकत्वाद्वाचः ।

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Because words must be preceded by the objects which they denote.

Before evolution commenced, there was no differentiation, and there was no object with a form and a name (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7) Hence speech and other senses did not then exist, as they had no work to do. The word *prāṇa* should denote the only thing that did exist, *viz.*, *Brahma*.

SUB-SECTION 2

How many are the senses? The doubt arises from different statements in the *veda*. The opponent states his view :

4. सप्तगतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

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They are seven; because that number is said to go about, and because seven are specified.

Seven senses only are said to go about in the worlds with the *jeeva*, when he comes to birth, or when he departs.

(1) There is no *sūtra* here stating the *final decision* as in other cases. The reasons stated follow from the nature of things, and were intended by the author of the *sūtras*. They are not stated in the next *sūtra* for it is concerned only with the explanation of the plural ending of the world *prāṇas*.

(2) See Introduction, para 3(4) In the word *pasan* the plural ending being unsuitable is ignored; and the *mantra*, in which the word occurs, is recited without change.

From Him come forth these seven worlds, in which wander the *prāṇas* that are placed seven and seven (in the various parts of the body) and that during sleep come out the cavity of the heart (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-8)

The word 'seven' is repeated to indicate that each person has seven senses. Seven senses are also specified.

When the five senses (*jnāna*) remain still with the mind, and *buddhi* does not work, that condition is said to be the highest going (*katha.*, II-6-10)

The going towards release on the abandonment of motions within the body is described in the verse as the 'highest going'. From these texts and the mention of the term *jnāna* in the second text, it may be concluded that the *jeeva*'s instruments are seven-ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose (1) *buddhi* and mind, and only seven.

2. *Objection.* Reference is made to others as being instrumental in the perception of objects thus-"Eight are the *grahas* (instruments of perception) (*bṛihad.*, V-2-9) The *prāṇas* located in the head are seven; two are below.: And in other texts describing *prāṇa* as many as fourteen are stated, including with those already stated the following - speech, hands, feet, excretory organs, sex organ, *ahamkāra* and *chitta*. How can it be said that the number is only seven? *Reply.* They are not stated to go about with the *jeeva*. Owing to the very slight service which they render to him they are termed *prāṇa* in a secondary sense.

Final decision. This is stated in the next *sūtra* :

5. हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ।

But there are hands and other (organs of action which are needed while he is in the body. Therefore not so.

These organs are required by the *jeeva* as his instruments for enjoyment, and their functions differ for those of the senses. The work, which they do, I taking up a thing and the like, is seen like the was done by he senses of perception. They also exist should not be regarded as non-existing. Hence, the number is eleven. The mind thinks, resolves and attaches itself to something and receives the names. *chitta*, *buddhi* and *akamkara*; but the mind is one. In thinking the mind is helped by previous tendencies; in resolving by the element *mahat*; and in forming attachments by the element *ahamkara*. Adding the five

(1) The first five words refer to the senses, which located in the organs of the body mentioned.

senses and the five organs of action the number is eleven (1). When a higher number is stated, reference is made to the different functions of the mind; and when a lower number is stated, reference is made to the particular functions then under consideration (2).

SUB-SECTION 3

6. अणवश्च ।

They are atoms.

First view. The senses are all-pervading; for it is said “All those are alike; all are unlimited” (*bṛihad.*, III-5-13).

Final decision. The senses are atoms.

It is stated “When *prāṇa* follows the *jeeva* out of the body, all the *prāṇas* follow it and get out of the body” (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2). From this mention of going out of the body, it is clear that the senses are of limited dimension. When they go out, they are not seen by -standers. Hence they are subtle (1). The text quoted in the *first view* refers to meditation on the senses as possessing the capacity to do very many things.

7. श्रेष्ठश्च ।

And the principal *prāṇa* (is produced).

In the colloquy of the *prāṇas* *prāṇa* the vital principle, is decided to be the principal, as it helps the continued existence of the body. This *prāṇa* also originates. Because the existence of one thing only before evolution is affirmed; because in the text “From Him came forth *prāṇa*, mind and all the senses”

(1) This number is stated; These *prāṇas* in the *jeeva* are ten; *Ātmā* (mind) is the eleventh (*bṛihad.*, V-9-4) The senses are ten and one; those that are perceived by the senses are five (*bhagavad-gītā*, XIII-5) Some say that the senses come forth from *rajasā ahamkāra* but they come forth from the *satvika ahamkāra* they are ten and the eleventh is mind (*viṣṇu.*, I-2-49)

(2) All the eleven agree in being products of the finest variety of *ahamkāra*. The mind is singled out as being the leading sense among them. The sensory organs are distinguished from the motor organs, because each set has its own functions.

(1) Though they are of limited, size, they can in the absence of obstruction grasp numberless things, as the light of a lamp does. the term ‘atom’ as applied to the senses, means that they are limited dimension, but that they are not sufficiently gross to be capable of being perceived. They are not like the *jeeva* of the smallest size possible; this is accepted having regard to a particular text.

(*munḍa* II-1-3) it is said to have evolved like the elements; and because there is no text denying its origination. It may be though that the text "That one with *svadhā* (the goddess *Lakshmi*) breathed, but without air" refers to breathing, the function of *prāṇa*; but it is not so. Reference is made, not to the *jeeva*'s instrument *prāṇa*, but to *Brahma* for the text itself states 'without air'.

The fact stated in the *sūtra* follows from the preceding *sūtras* and for the reasons given therein. This *sūtra* has, however, been added merely for the purpose of the next *sūtra*.

SUB-SECTION 4

The question for consideration is whether *prāṇa* is mere air, the second of the great elements, or its movement, or air alone modified in a particular way.

First view. It is air alone; for is stated "which is *prāṇa* that is air". Or as air in itself is not well-known to be *prāṇa* and as it is well-known to denote breathing, it is its movement.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

8. न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ।

It is not air, nor its movement, because it is separately mentioned.

The statement is made in the *munḍaka* text quoted under the preceding *sūtra*. For the same reason - i.e., its separate mention - *prāṇa* is not the movement of air. For the actions of fire, water and other elements are not mentioned in the text along with them as separate substances. The text quoted in the *first view* means that air by a change of condition becomes *prāṇa*; but that it is not a new substance like fire and the rest. The purpose of the text is to show this fact. That *prāṇa* is not movement of air is also wear from usage. Referring to breathing, it is said *prāṇa* moves about. In other words the word is used as denoting a substances which moves about.

9. चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः ।

Like sight and other senses, because it is taught along with them and for other reasons.

It is not an element like fire; but its is an instrument of the *jeeva* like sight and the others; for in the colloquy of the *prāṇas* it is mentioned along with the sense of seeing and others, which are admittedly the *jeeva*'s instruments; and it will be appropriate to do so, only if it is of the same class as they. It is also specially mentioned as one among the *jeeva*'s instrument covered by the term *prāṇa* thus "That which is the principal *prāṇa* (*chāndo.*, I-2-7)

If *prāṇa* be an instrument of the *jeeva* like sight and the rest, it must render some service, as they do; but this is not seen. Hence it is not fit to be treated like them. To this objection the next *sūtra* replies :

10. अकरणत्वाच्च न दोषस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।

The difficulty, that may be imagined on the assumption that it does not serve the *jeeva* does not exist, for such service is stated.

The service is the supporting of the body and the senses; and it is thus stated

On the departure of which this body is seen to be most despicable, that alone is the best (*chāndo.*, V-1-7)

Having made this statement, the *upanishad* explains how on the successive departure of speech and the other senses the body and the other senses functioned as before, and how when *prāṇa* began to depart, all the rest were threatened with extinction. *Prāṇa* supports the body in five forms as *prāṇa*, *apana*, *vyana*, *udana* and *samana*, and serves the purposes of the *jeeva*. It is therefore an instrument, no less than the eye and the rest.

Are not *prāṇa* and other enumerated different substances; because their names are different, as also their functions? The next *sūtra* replies :

11. पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते ।

One with five functions, like the mind, it is so stated.

It is stated :

Desire, resolve, doubt, eagerness, dilatoriness, perservance, fickleness, bashfulness, thought and fear all this is mind only (*bṛihad.*, III-5-3)

Here as mind functions in these various ways, desire, resolve and the rest are not substances different from the mind; but they are all the mind itself. Similarly in the same place the following statement is made: *“Prāṇa, apana, vyana, udana, samana - all this is prāṇa only”*. Hence *prāṇa* is one; and *prāṇa* and the rest are its conditions; but they are not different substances.

SUB-SECTION 5

12. अणुश्च ।

And an atom.

As in the case of the sense, it is said to go out of the body.

Him, when he goes out of the body, *prāṇa* follows out of the body (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2)

Hence it is of the size of an atom. This follows from *sūtra* 6 of this section; but a doubt is created by the following texts : “He (*prāṇa*) is equal to

these three worlds, equal to all this (*bṛihad.*, III-3-22); On *prāṇa* everything rests; all this is enveloped in *prāṇa* One might presume from these texts that *prāṇa* is of large size; and it is to clear the doubt that a separate *sūtra* has been added. When it is decided from the statement that *prāṇa* goes out of the body, that it is limited in size, these texts should be understood as merely describing its greatness; because all living beings depend upon *prāṇa* for continued existence.

SUB-SECTION 6

In the last five sub-sections the evolution of *prāṇa* and the sense, their number and size were described. In *sūtra* II-1-5 it was shown incidentally that they are controlled by certain *devatās*. The *jeeva* also controls them, as they are the instruments of his enjoyment; this is well-known to every man of the world; and it is also stated in a *vedic* text.

In the very same way he takes hold of these (*prāṇas* senses) and moves about in his own body according to his pleasure (*bṛihad.*, IV-1-18).

The question for consideration is whether this control by the *jeeva* and by the *devatās* is independent or whether it depends upon the will of the highest *Ātmā*.

First view. In regard to the *jeeva* it was settled in sub-section 6 of the preceding section that its control is not independent. But in regard to the *devatas* the case is different; for they are worshipped by the *jeeva* and give him the fruits that he desires. The highest *Ātmā* having placed them in this exalted position, they control the *jeeva's* instruments independently.

Final decision. The *devatās* exercise their control subject to the will of the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

13. ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्प्राणवता ।

Control (of *prāṇa* and the senses) by *agni* and other *devatās* along with the owner of *prāṇa* (*jeeva*) comes about from His will. So does the *veda* teach.

His will - the will of the highest *Ātmā*. *bṛihad āraṇyaka* chapter V, section 7, states that the highest *Ātmā* controls as the inner ruler the *jeeva*, his senses and the *devatās* in the performance of their own work (1). (See *ana* VIII-1, and *bṛihad.*, V-8-8) (2).

(1) The texts refer especially among the to fire, air, the sun, the *jeeva*, and the eye.

(2) The mention of the *jeeva* of the *sūtra* is by way of illustration. In this matter of subjection to the will of the highest *Ātmā*, there is no difference between the *jeeva*, and the *devatas*, however exalted their position may be. The meaning is not that the *devatas* are independent in themselves and that they are subject to the control of the highest *Ātmā* only in their relation to the senses. What is meant is that even their existence depends upon Him. If so, how can there be any doubt as to their control of the sense, or as to control of them by the *jeeva*?

14. तस्य च नित्यत्वात् ।

And because it (control by *Brahma*) is eternal.

This is a part of the nature of all beings and is therefore a permanent factor. Hence every being exercises control over other things subject to His control. This is due to His entry into every thing for the purpose of control (ana., VI-3-3) This is stated in the *bhagavad-gītā* also "Supporting all this world with a fragment of My power, I remain" (X-42).

SUB-SECTION 7

15. त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात् ।

They except the chief *prāṇa* are denoted by the term *indriya*, because it is so stated.

The term *prāṇa* denotes the senses and *prāṇa*. The question for consideration in this sub-section is whether all of them are denoted by the term *indriya*, or whether the chief *prāṇa* should be left out. The *first view* is that all of them are denoted by the term; for they are covered by the term *prāṇa* and are the *jeeva's* instruments. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*. The text is

The *indriyas* are ten and one; and five are objects perceived by them (*bhagavad-gītā*, XIII-5)

16. भेदश्रुतेर्वैलक्षण्याच्च ।

Because of separate mention and of difference.

In the text

From Him came forth *prāṇa*, mind, and all the senses (*Indriyas*) (*Muṇḍa.*, II-1-3)

Prāṇa is specified separately from the *indriyas*. Though mind also is mentioned separately, it is stated to be one of the *indriyas* else where - as in the *bhagavad-gita* (XV-7).

The *indriyas* (senses), with the mind as the sixth.

And they differ in action. In deep sleep *prāṇa* continues to work, while the action of the others is suspended. The senses and the mind are instruments in perception or action, while *prāṇa* supports the body and the senses. Because of this fact - the support of the senses by *prāṇa* - they are denoted by the term *prāṇa*. "All those are the bodies of that only; hence they are called by the name *prāṇa*" (*bṛihad.*, (III-5-21) By the term 'body' it is meant that their activities depend upon it.

Hence the term is used in its primary meaning as regards *prāṇa*, and in a secondary senses as regards the others (1).

SUB-SECTION 8

In section 3 and in this section up to sub-section 7 evolution of the elements and the *jeeva*s instruments from the highest *Ātmā* was established; and this is known as *samashti* evolution. This sub-section proceeds to consider whether the other variety, known as *vyashti*, and consisting in the making of names and forms, is the work of the four-faced one (1) or the work of the highest *Ātmā* appearing as his inner ruler, as He created water and earth appearing as the inner ruler of fire and water respectively.

First view. It is the work of the four-faced one; for the text states :

I will enter these three *devatas* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva* and make diverse names and forms (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2)

The words found in the original are *anena jivena Ātmanā*, i.e., by this *jeeva-Ātmā*; and they show that a *jeeva* was concerned in this work, though the sentence appears to refer to the highest *Ātmā*. He did not will to do the work in His own form; but in the form of a *jeeva*, who is a part of Himself.

2. Here certain objections are stated, to which the opponent replies :
(i) The text is of the same form as the sentence 'I will enter through a spy and ascertain the strength of the enemy' force; and if it were understood in the same way, the first person of the verb and the action of the speaker in the form of entry would be understood in a secondary sense. *Reply.* In the example given the king and the spy being different persons, resort to a secondary sense cannot be avoided. But here the *jeeva* being a part of Himself, entry by him and the other work would be His own. There is therefore no resort to secondary meanings.

3. (ii) Another objection. The word *saha* (together) should be supplied; and the instrumental case-endings of the three words should be connected with

(1) The two reasons stated in the *sūtra* constitute but one reason; and this is the separate mention supported by difference. If the reasons be regarded as different, the *sūtra* must be treated as two instead of being one. Unless difference as pointed out is proved, its separate mention must be justified as in the case of mind. One more reason. *Indriyas* are products of the finest variety of *ahamkāra*, while *prāṇa* is a product of the element air.

(2) The epithet *samashti jeeva rupa* is added to the name of the four-faced one. For the meaning of the term and for the reason for adding it see note on page 317.

it. The meaning will then be 'I will enter together with this *jeeva Ātmā*. *Reply*. The case-ending is added to a word either to indicate that what is denoted by the word is an instrument connected with an action, or because it is joined to particular words like the word *saha* here. According to the grammarian so long as the addition of the case - ending may be explained with reference to the former, resort to the latter is not legitimate. Hence the interpretation suggested will not do.

4. (iii) Still another objection. The three words indicate an instrument. *Reply*. The highest *Ātmā* does two things - He enters and makes diverse names and forms; but in neither of them is the *jeeva* a most useful instrument.

5. (iv) A last objection. The *jeeva* is concerned with the entry only; and the other action is by the highest *Ātmā*. *Reply*. The two actions should be by the same person, for the original has *anupravisya* (having entered); and the termination in the term indicates this.

6. Hence the interpretation stated in para 1 holds. In order to show that the entry by the highest *Ātmā* was by a portion of Himself, viz., the *jeeva*, and not in His own form, reference is made in the third person 'by this *jeeva Ātmā*. That the making of diverse names and forms was by the four-faced one is confirmed by the smritis; for it is mentioned in the place where creation by him is described (1).

Final decision. The making of diverse names and forms was by the highest *Ātmā* and this is stated in the *sūtra* :

17. संज्ञामूर्तिकलृप्तिस्तु त्रिवृत्किर्बत उपदेशात् ।

The making of names and forms was by Him who compounded the elements; so is it taught.

The text referred to is

That same *devatā* willed 'I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva*, and make diverse names and forms. I will make each of them a triple compound (*chando.*, VI-3-2 and 3)

This shows that the two operations were the work of one and the same. The compounding of the elements could not have been the work of the four-faced one; for it was only after the elements were compounded and the egg-shaped universe emerged that he appeared on the scene (2). Hence it was

(1) At the beginning he made the names and forms of beings beginning with the *devas*, and determined what work each class should do; this was done with *vedic* texts alone (*vishnu.*, I-5-63)

(2) The appearance of the four-faced being within the egg-shaped universe is thus stated; In this egg-shaped universe *Brahma*, the grandfather of all the worlds, appeared.

the work of the highest *Ātmā* and the other operation was therefore by Him alone. What then is the meaning of the expressing "By this *jeeva Ātmā*"? The words *jeeva* and *Ātmā* being in apposition, the term *jeeva* means the highest *Ātmā* appearing in the form of the *jeeva*, as the terms *tejas* and *āpah* in the texts 'The *tejās* willed, and 'those *āpah* willed mean *Brahma* appearing as *tejas* (fire) and *apah* (water). The making of names and forms was therefore His work appearing in the form of the four-faced one.

In this interpretation the difficulties pointed out in paras 2 to 5 of the *first view* will disappear, and the mention of the making of names and forms in the place, where creation by the four-faced one is described, will receive a natural explanation (1).

The opponent disputes this conclusion, and urges the following reasons: (i) The composition also was by a *jeeva*. Composition is taught as having taken place, after the egg-shaped universe was created, and the *jeevas* were made by the four-faced one.

Learn from me, dear, how these three *devatās* reaching the *jeeva* became each triple. Food eaten divides into three parts; of them the grossest part becomes faces; the middle part becomes flesh; the subtlest becomes the mind, and so on. See *vedic* texts.

(ii) Similarly, in the previous section of the same *upanishad* it is stated:

The red colour of fire is the colour of the element fire, the white colour is the colour of the element water; the dark colour is the colour of the element earth (*Ibid*, VI-4-1)

Composition is thus shown in the fire made by the four-faced one, and also in the sun, the moon and lighting in the verses that follow (iii) And composition is also stated after the making of names and forms. See the text quoted in the *final decision* under the preceding *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* refutes this objection:

18. मांसादिभौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश्च ।

Flesh and the others are products of earth; and in the other two cases according to the terms used.

(1) The meaning of the text is as follows; I will enter these three *devatas* i.e., fire, water and earth - clothed with all the *jeevas* in their undifferentiated conditions, and will make names and forms; i.e., I will create diverse objects beginning with the *devas* and make their names. For this purpose I will make each of the elements fire, water and earth a compound of the three; for while they remain separate substances, they will be unable to create the diverse products of the world; and by compounding them they will acquire a capacity for such creation.

See *Vedic Texts*. In the first verse food eaten is stated to separate into three parts - faces, flesh and mind, and each of them is said to be finer than the preceding one. If composition were taught here, as the elements earth, water and fire are each finer than the preceding one, and as the products should be like the causes, flesh would be a portion of the element water, and mind a portion of the element fire. But they are not; for they are stated at the beginning of the verse to be products of earth like faces. Similarly, in regard to water drunk, and fire (oil or butter) eaten dealt with in the next two verses. The water drunk separates into three parts - urine, blood and *prāṇa*; according to the opponent's view urine would be portion of the element earth, and *prāṇa* a portion of the element fire; but both are stated to be products of water. The fire eaten separates into bone, marrow and speech; of which the first two would be portions of the elements earth, and water; but they are stated to be products of fire. Next, the opponent's view would conflict with the last verse of the *upanishad*.

Mind, my dear, is a product of food; *prāṇa* is a product of water; speech is a product of fire.

For in his view they would all be portions of fire. Hence, what is shown here is how the three elements already compounded are changed on reaching man into three different products. The composition should have taken place before the egg-shaped universe emerged; for in their uncompounded state they were not able to produce anything (1). Hence the order of the operations stated in the verse - making names and forms and composition of the elements - is superseded by the order determined by the nature of things. See Introduction, para 26 (iii). The reference to the composition in section 3 of the *upanishad* was for the purpose of making the student form a conception of the operation, as being within the universe he could not be shown the composition in the elements outside of it.

If earth, water and fire are each of them compounds, why are they referred to by words denoting one element only?

19. वैशेष्यात्तु तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।

This denotation is due to the predominance of an element in each compound.

Though each compound contains the three elements one of them predominates; and the compound in which earth predominates is earth and so on.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) When the three elements unite with one another, then alone are they able to begin any work; this uniting is composition. This is stated in a *smṛiti* verse. "When the products, beginning with *mahat* and ending with the great elements, remained separate, they had different capacities; and without mixing and combining with one another, they were unable to create the products of evolution. Mixing and combining with one another, they formed the egg-shaped universe (*viṣṇu.*, I-2-53 and 54)



SRI BHĀSHYAM

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH



Published by

Srirangam Srimath Andavan Asramam

21, Sri Desikachari Road, Mylapore, Chennai-4

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER III

SECTION 1

In the first chapter the highest *Ātmā* was established as the only cause of the evolution of the worlds; and it was shown that the *upanishads* teach that it is this Being, who is free from the touch of every blemish, and is the seat of infinite good qualities, and who stands apart from every thing else, that should be meditated on by those that desire release. In the second chapter this conclusion was confirmed by answering objections brought forward by opponents' by exposing the flaws in theories not based on the *veda*, and by reconciling apparent inconsistencies in *vedic* statements in regard to the evolution of particular products. The result is to show the highest *Ātmā* as He is. In the third chapter the means of reaching Him, *viz.*, meditations, are examined. One will be induced to commence meditation, when the does not desire anything other than the Being that is to be reached, and longs to go to Him. In order that these may be brought about, the unpleasant experiences of the *jeeva* in his wanderings in other worlds and in the conditions of wakefulness, dream, deep sleep and trance, and the freedom of *Brahma* from them and the possession of good qualities by Him and described in the first and second section.

SUB-SECTION 1

In this sub-section the question is considered whether in going from one body to another the *jeeva* goes forth enveloped in the elements in a subtle condition, from which a body may be formed, or not.

First view. Wherever the *jeeva* goes, he can find the elements in a subtle condition, and he goes on without them.

Final decision. He goes on enveloped in them. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम् ।

In going from one body (1) to another, the *jeeva* goes on enveloped in the elements in a subtle condition). (This is evident) from the questions put and the explanations given.

See *Vedic Texts*. In the *chāndogya*, chapter V, sections 3-10, *Pravāhaṇa* put five questions to *Śvetaketu* one of which was

(1) The first word in the *sūtra*, *tad*, refers to the term *murti* in *sūtra* 17 of the preceding section. It means body.

Do you know how in the fifth offering water receives the name *purusha* (man).

In answering this question himself *Pravahāṇa* compares the heaven-world to a sacrificial fire, into which what is called *ṣraddhā* is offered by the *devas* - ie., the *jeevās* senses; and this *ṣraddhā* becomes a divine body, known as soma king. He then compares *parjanya* (*devatā* in charge in rain), the earth, man and women to four other fires; into the first of which the divine body referred to is offered; and it becomes rain. This is offered into the next fire - the earth, and it becomes food. This is offered into the next fire - man, and it becomes semen. And this semen is offered into the last fire - women, and it becomes an embryo, and when it grows, it receives the name man. Having given this explanation, *Pravahāṇa* closes the reply to this question with these words

Thus in the fifth offering water receives the name man.

It is clear from this explanation that in all the five offerings water in a fine condition is the thing offered; and this water is the five elements in a subtle condition, from which the future body after undergoing these transformations is formed. The *jeeva* therefore goes on from one world to another enveloped in these five elements.

Here the question arises - Why is the *jeeva* said to be enveloped in all the five elements, when reference is made to water only. The next *sūtra* replies:

2. आत्मकत्वात् भूयस्त्वात् ।

Because water consists of the three elements; and because in the compound water predominates.

By the term 'water' reference is made to a compound of all the elements as water by itself cannot make up the body. It was to make the elements capable of doing so, that they were compounded. And water in the form of blood predominates among them.

3. प्राणगतेश्च ।

And because *prāṇa* and the senses are said to accompany the *jeeva*.

(1) This is stated in a *smṛiti* text also: "He draw to himself the senses and the mind, that are in *prakṛiti* (body). when, he the ruler, enters a body, or goes out of it, he goes gathering them up, as the wind gathers scents from flower beds, (*bhagavad-gītā*, XC,7 and 8)

This is stated in a *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text :

When the *jeeva* goes out of the body, *prāṇa* goes after him out of the body; and when *prāṇa* goes out of the body, all the senses go after it out of the body (VI-4-2) (1).

Prāṇa and the senses can depart and go after the *jeeva* only when there is a vehicle to carry them; and for this reason also it must be admitted that he goes about enveloped in the five elements.

4. अग्न्यादिगतिश्रुतेरिति चेन्न भाक्तत्वात् ।

If it be contended "Because going to fire and the rest is stated," the reply is - "No, because the going is in a secondary sense."

Reference is made here to the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text

When the speech of this dead person enters fire *prāṇa* the air, the eye the sun, the mind the moon, the ear the quarters, the body the earth, the *Ātmā* the ether, the hairs of the body shrubs, the hairs of the head trees, blood and the seed water, where then is this person (V-2-13).

Here the places to which *prāṇa* and the senses go, when a person dies, are described. They cannot therefore go with the *jeeva* as stated in the preceding *sūtra*: and the text therein relied on should be understood differently. To this objection the reply is - no. Because the entering stated here is not literally true. For, the hairs of the body and the hairs of the head do not enter shrubs and trees. Hence *prāṇa* and the senses, which are mentioned with these, do not enter fire and the rest. The statement in the text refers to the departure of the *devatās*, who controlled *prāṇa* and the senses.

5. प्रथमेऽश्रवणादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः ।

If it be said "Because the term 'water is not mentioned in the first offerings," the reply is - "No, That alone, and it is only then that (the question and explanation) will be appropriate."

The statement that the *jeeva* goes enveloped in water in a subtle condition united to other elements is not correct; for what is offered into the first fire is *śraddhā*, and not water. *Śraddhā* is a state of mind of the *jeeva* viz., eagerness. Hence water is not offered into this fire as assumed. To this contention the *sūtra* replies : Because water alone is indicated by the word *śraddhā*. Otherwise an appropriate reply would not have been given to the question put - "Do you know how in the fifth offering water receives the name *purusha* (man)." It is true that at the beginning of the reply reference is made to *śraddhā* as the thing offered; but if the term doest not denote

water, the question put would refer to one thing and the reply to another. Further, the summing up at the end of the reply indicates that *śraddhā* is water. From the use of the word *how* (*yathā*) the question relates to the transformations of water. The transformations are stated to be the divine body, rain, food, semen and embryo, and having said this the summing up is "thus in the fifth offering water receives the name man". Lastly, in the *veda* the term *śraddhā* is used to denote water as in the text "he carries water; *śraddhā* indeed is water".

6. अश्रुतत्वोदिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतिः ।

If it be said "Because no mention is made (of the *jeeva*) the reply is "No because reference to those that perform *yāgas* and the rest is observed.

The opponent again disputes the conclusion on the ground that in this context no mention is made of the *jeeva*. What is mentioned is *śraddhā* and other conditions of water as offerings made. The *sūtra* replies : In section 10 of the *upanishad* verse 3, reference is made to those that remain in their villages and performs *yāgas* carry out works of public utility, give away from their possessions, and do like things without however a knowledge of *Brahma* and it is stated that they go to the heaven-world, and become soma king, and that when their good *karma* is exhausted, they return and are re-born (1). In section 4 it is stated that when *śraddhā* is offered into the fire of the heaven-world, it becomes soma king. As the texts in both places have the same meaning, it must be understood that the *jeeva* invested with a body in the condition of *śraddhā* reappears in a divine body known as *soma* king. Further, a body being by nature a qualifying attribute of the *jeeva*, every word denoting it denotes also the *jeeva* of whom it is the qualifying attribute. Hence, the *jeeva* goes about enveloped in the subtle elements.

Here the opponent makes a last stand, and draws attention to the following sentences in the same section (10) of the *upanishad*.

They become *soma* king; they are the food of the *devas* them the *devas* eat.

He contends that the words 'soma king' cannot refer to the *jeeva*. For he is not capable of being eaten. To this the next *sūtra* replies :

(1) They that live in the village and perform *yāgas* carry out works of public utility, give away from their possession and do like things, go to smoke From the world of the *pitris* to ether; from ether to the moon they become *soma* king. They are the food (*anna*) of the *devas*, them the *devas* eat (verse 4). There they dwell till all the *karma* to yield fruit there is expended. Then they return by the very same path by which they went (verse 5). Whoever eats food, or emits semen, they become those persons (verse 6).

7. भाक्तवाऽनात्मवित्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति ।

The word *anna* (food) is used in a secondary sense. Because they do not know the highest *Ātmā* so is it taught.

Those, that perform *yāgas* and the rest without knowing the highest *Ātmā*, become instruments of the *devas*, enjoyment. Here they perform *yāgas* as their worship. Pleased with this, the *devas* enable them to reach their own world, where these persons have the same enjoyment as the *devas* themselves, and become instruments in their enjoyment. And this is stated :

Now, he that meditates on another being, thinking 'This being is one, and I am another', does not know. As a beast is (to man), so is he to the *devas*. As many beasts nourish a man, so does each person nourishes the *devas* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-10) (1).

Hence, to signify what a *jeeva* becomes - an instrument in the hands of the *devas* for their own enjoyment - the words food and eating are used. They are therefore used in a secondary sense. The eating by the *devas* is merely to be pleased; this is stated :

The *devas* do not eat; they do not drink; seeing that same *amrita* (nectar) they are pleased (*chāndo.*, III-6-1).

SUB-SECTION 2

In the preceding sub-section it was shown that so long as *samsāra* lasts, connection with a body cannot be avoided. In this sub-section it will be explained that subjection to *karma*, which leads to such connection, cannot be got rid of. The question for consideration is when a *jeeva* returns from the heaven-world on the completion of his enjoyment, has he any *karma* left or not?

First View. He returns with no *karma*; for he has enjoyed the fruit of all his *karma*. This is stated:

There they dwell till all the *karma* to yield fruit there is expended; then they return by the very same path by which they went (*chāndo.*, V-10-5)

The word used in the original is *sampātam*, which means the *karma* which takes the *jeeva* to the heaven world. This is confirmed by a *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text -

Having reached the end of *karma* which he does here, whatever it be, he returns from that world to this world to do *karma* (VI-4-6)

(1) This is also stated in a *smṛiti* verse; "Those that worship the *devas* go to the *devas*; those that love Me come to Me (*bhagavad-gītā.*, VII-23)

Final decision. He returns with a remnant of *karma*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

8. कृतात्ययेऽनुशयवान्दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवंच ।

On the good *karma* being spent, one returns with a remnant of *karma* this is known from the *veda* and *smṛitis*. He returns, as he went, and also otherwise.

The *veda* states :

Those, that return here, if they have good *karma*, reach good births - birth as a *brāhmaṇa*, as a *kshatriya*, or as a *vaiśya*. Those that return here, if they have bad *karma*, reach evil births - birth as a dog, as a hog or as an out-caste (*chāndo*., V-10-7)

This shows that those that return have still good or bad *karma* left (1). The texts quoted by the opponent must therefore be understood as referring only to the *karma* which began to yield fruit. For, it is not fit that one *karma* should be wiped out by the experiencing of the fruit of another *karma*. Each *karma* must yield its own fruit or its must be neutralised by penance. The *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text also should be explained in the same way.

Those, that return from the other world, come back along the same path by which they went and also otherwise. They went along the path, which are mark by smoke, night, dark fortnight, the six months of the sun's southward journey, the world of the *pitris*, enter and the moon. The return journey is from the moon ether, air, watery vapour, cloud and rain-cloud. At they come down to ether, they return as they went. As they do not return to the world of the *pitris*, the return journey is otherwise.

9. चरणादिति चेन्न तदुपलक्षणार्थेति कार्ष्णाजिनिः ।

If it be contended "Reference is made to *charaṇa* (general conduct) the reply is - No, it must be understood to indicate *karma*. This is the view of *Kārshṇājini*."

(1) This is stated by *smṛitis* also - Those, that perform the duties of their caste and stage of life, departing from here, enjoy the fruit of their *karma*, and return with the remainder. By this they attain birth in good countries, castes and families; they have good figure, long life, learning, wealth, good conduct, comfort, and intelligence, those that act in all ways will be the reverse are perish (*Gautama*) When they return with the remainder of the fruits of *karma*, they attain good caste, good figure, good colour, strength, intelligence, knowledge truth, wealth, the doing of good deeds and the like. The happiness like a revolving wheel is in both the worlds alone (*Āpastamba*)

The opponent's argument is this : in the *chāndogya* text quoted the expressions used are 'those that have good *charaṇa* and' those that have bad *charaṇa*. the word *charaṇa* does not denote good or bad deeds, and it is used in the *veda* and in ordinary literature to denote general conduct (1). Hence the nature of re-birth is determined by general conduct, but not by the remnant of *karma*. The *sūtra* refutes this view. General conduct by itself cannot produce pleasure or pain; these are the fruits of particular acts, good or bad. Hence the term *charaṇa* must be understood as including good and bad deeds.

10. आनर्थक्यमिति चेन्न तदपेक्षत्वात् ।

If it be contended "In this view general conduct would be purposeless." the reply is - No; because it is required."

The objection is that general conduct is enjoined by the *smritis*; and that it would serve no purpose, if it did not produce its fruit. This is met by the view that good deeds depend upon general good conduct; (2) for it is only one, whose general conduct is good, that is fit to do good deeds.

11. सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु बादरिः ।

But according to *Bādari*, *charaṇa* is good or bad deeds themselves.

It is said he does (*āchāratī*) a good deed; he does a bad deed', The root *āchar* indicates *karma* - good or bad deed; and the use of both *charaṇa* and *karma* in the same text may be explained - one as indicating what is enjoined by a known text, and the other as depending upon a text, the existence of which must be inferred from the good conduct of virtuous men (3). When a word can be understood in its primary sense, it is improper to resort to a secondary sense. Hence *Bādari* is of opinion that the word *charaṇa* in the *upanishad* text means good and bad deeds themselves.

(1) In the world the terms *charaṇa*, *āchāra* (general conduct) *sita* and *uritta* are regarded as synonymous; and in the *veda*, *charaṇa*, and *karma* are distinguished thus. Those *karmas*, that are unobjectionable, should be done; our good conduct (*sucharita*) should be followed by you" (*taitti.*, *sīksha*, 11-2)

(2) It is so stated - one without *sandhya* (meditation at sunset and sunrise) is ever impure, and is unfit for all *karmas* (*manu*); the *vedās* do not purify one without good conduct.

(3) This explanation depends on what is known as the *go-balivarda* rule. The order is given 'bring the go (cow); bring the *balivarda* (bull).' Here the first order covers the bull also, as the term 'go' is a general term; but as the second order, which has been given, should serve a purpose, the term 'go' is understood so as to exclude the bull. This is a case of a general rule and exception.

The author of the *sūtras* adopts *Bādaris* view; and he accepts also he argument in *sūtra* 10 - that general good conduct is fruitful in making one fit for doing good deeds.

SUB-SECTION 3

In the two preceding sub-sections it was shown that a *jeeva* in *samsāra* cannot get rid of either connection with a body or connection with its cause, *karma*. It will be shown in this sub-section that this *karma* is not always good *karma*. The question for consideration is whether the *jeevas* who do not come within the description of those considered in the last sub-section, go on to the moon or not. The *first view* is stated in the first five *sūtras* :

12. अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ।

It (ascent to the moon) is stated regarding others also - these that do not perform *yāgas* and the rest.

By the expression "Those that do not perform, *yāgas* and the rest, reference is made to those that do not do what is enjoined and do what is prohibited. The Statement is:

Whoever depart from this world, all of them verily go to the moon (*kaushi*, 1-9)

Here no distinction is made, and all are said to go.

The following objection might be raised. In this view all would go to the moon without distinction whether they do good deeds or do evil deeds. The opponent replies :

13. संयमनेत्वनुभूयेतरेषामारोहावगेहौ तद्वतिदर्शनात् ।

In the case of the others the ascent and descent take place after they have undergone punishment under the command of the *devatā* in charge of death. And it is taught that the sinful go to him.

By the term 'the others' men of evil deeds are indicated. As to their going to the *devatā* in charge of death the authority is

One. that thinks this world does not exist, nor the other, comes frequently under my sway (*katha*, I-2-6).

14. स्मरन्ति च ।

It is also taught of *smṛiti*-writers-

All these come under the control of *yama* (*devatā*) in charge of death, (*vishṇu*, III-7-5)

15. अपि सप्त ।

And there are seven.

'Seven' — seven hells, mentioned by *smṛiti* -writers as places to which men of evil deeds have to go.

If men of evil deeds go to seven worlds, how do they come under the sway of the *devatā* in charge of death? The next *sūtra* replies :

16. तत्रापि तद्व्यापारादविरोधः ।

Because his activity extends to them also, no difficulty.

The opponent's argument elaborated in these *sūtras* is now refuted :

17. विद्याकर्मणोरिति तु प्रकृतत्वात् ।

(But the two paths are the fruits) of meditation on *Brahma* and of good deeds, and they are the topics under consideration.

The opponent's view is untenable. The path of the *devas* is trodden by those that meditate on *Brahma*, and the path of the *pitṛis* by men of good deeds. Men of evil deeds have no access to either. The former path is closed to them; because they do not meditate on *Brahma*; similarly they do not go on the latter path, because they have not performed *yāgas*, carried out works of public utility, or given away from their possessions. How is this known? *Reply*. From the fact that meditation on *Brahma* is the principal topic in the consideration of the path of the *devas* and that meritorious works are the principal topic in the description of the latter.

Those, that in this manner meditate on this (the nature of the pure *jeeva*) and those, that in the forest meditate on *Brahma* with eagerness, go to light. But they, that remaining in the village perform *yāgas*, carry out works of public utility, give away from their possessions and do similar things, go to smoke; etc.

This being so; the text relied on by the opponent should be restricted to those described in the latter part of this text; it will then mean that all of them go to the moon.

The opponent asks - if men of evil deeds do not ascend to the moon, the fifth offering being impossible, how can their body be made; for the fifth offering must be preceded by the ascent to the moon. The next *sūtra* replies :

18. न तृतीये तथोपलब्देः ।

In the third (place) so need (see the fifth offering), And so it is seen.

By the expression 'third place' men of evil deeds are meant. In their case the fifth offering is not necessary for the making of their bodies. In reply to the question.

"Do you know why that world is not filled" it was stated "These petty creature, that continually returns, do not go on either path; they die only to be reborn immediately. This is the third place. Hence that world is not filled". (*Chāndo.*, V-10-8).

There is therefore neither ascent to the moon nor descent from it, and the heaven-world is not therefore filled. The reference to the fifth offering is merely to show that when the fifth offering is made, water receives the name man. It does not negative other ways; for it has not been stated to be the only way.

19. स्मर्यतेऽपि च लोके ।

It is also affirmed by *smṛiti*-writers in the case of some persons in the world.

In the case of some men of meritorious deeds their bodies are stated to have been formed without the need for the fifth offering. They are *Dhṛaupadi*, *Dhṛishtadyumna* and the like.

20. दर्शनाच्च ।

And this is seen (in the *veda*)

Vide the *chāndogya* text

Of all these beings, those sprung from eggs, those sprung from living beings and those sprung from shoots (*udbhid*), these three only (fire, water and earth) are the causes (VI-3-1).

Of these the beings springing from shoots or from sweat do not need the fifth offering.

To the doubt, that may be expressed that the last class is not mentioned in the text, the reply is :

21. तृतीयशब्दावरोधस्संशोकजस्य ।

The third term (sprung from shoots) includes the class of beings springing from sweat.

The final decision is that men of evil deeds do not go to the moon.

SUB-SECTION 4

22. तत्स्वाभाव्यापत्तिरुपपत्तेः ।

The attainment of likeness to it, because of its fitness.

Under *sūtra* 8 it was shown that a person of meritorious deeds descends from the moon to the ether and from the ether to the air. Having been air, he becomes watery-vapour, cloud and rain-cloud, and then comes down as rain (*chāndo.*, V-10-5 and 6). Here the question for consideration is in what sense does he become ether, air and the rest. Does he become these, and he becomes *deva* or man, or does he only attain their likeness?

The *first view* accepts the former alternative on the analogy of the *jeeva* in *Śraddhā* becoming soma king, while the *sūtra* states that the latter is the correct view. The taking up of a divine or human body is for experiencing pleasure or pain. But here there is no occasion for it; and becoming ether and the rest must therefore mean that the descending *jeeva* attaches himself to them and becomes like them. Owing to the absence of a gross form, he cannot be perceived to be separate from them (1).

SUB-SECTION 5

The next question is - How long does the descending *jeeva* remain in contact with ether and the rest, until he reaches the vegetable kingdom? It is answered in the next *sūtra* :

23. नातिचिरेण विशेषात् ।

Not very long, because of the statement of a difference.

Further on the *upanishad* states :

They come down as rain; they are born here as paddy or *yava* (a kind of grain), herbs or trees, gingerly seed or back-grma and the like. From thence escape is more difficult (*chāndo.*, V-10-6)

From this special mention of greater difficulty it may be concluded that escape from the previous stages is easier and does not take a long time.

(1) He is denied the pleasure of taking up ether and the rest as his bodies; for they serve as the bodies of certain *devatās* who use them for their own enjoyment; and he cannot use them at the same time. Nor can he become the *devatās* themselves; for they were at the beginning of evolution placed in charged of what they control, and will exercise their functions to the very end of the current world-age, and cannot make room for a *jeeva* descending every now and then (*Nayamayūkha mālikā*, p.237)

SUB-SECTION 6

On reaching the earth is the descending *jeeva* born as described under the preceding *sūtra* or is he merely in contact with what is mentioned? The *first view* is that as shown by the term *jāyante* (are born) he takes up one of them as his body, as he takes up a divine or human body, when he becomes a *deva* or man. The *sūtra* states the final decision :

24. अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदभिलापात् ।

Attached to bodies controlled by others; because the statement is as in the previous cases.

Where the experiencing of pleasure or pain is intended, there will be mention of the *karma* leading thereto, as in the text.

Those that return here, if they have good *karma* reach good births, etc. (*chāndo.V-10-7*)

Here no mention of *karma* is made, as it is not made in the case of becoming other, air, etc. The *karma* which had to yield fruit, *yāgas* and the rest, has been expended by enjoyment in the heaven-world, and what has yet to yield fruit is referred to further on in the *upanishad* by the expressions "those of good *charaṇa* and those of evil *charaṇa*. And between these two stages there is no *karma*, the fruit of which has to be experienced. Hence, the expression, "are born" in the *upanishad* should not be taken literally.

25. अशुद्धमिति चेन्न शब्दात् ।

If it be contended "Mixed with sin," the reply is "No, because it is stated".

The opponent disputes the conclusion reached, and argues, There is cause for the experiencing of pleasure or pain. The *karma* which leads one to the heaven world for enjoyment - like a *yāga* - is mixed with sin; for a goat is injured by the offering of its membrane to the *devatā agnishoma*; and the prohibition. 'Do not injure any living being' is disobeyed. Here certain explanations are offered to show that no sin has been committed by this offering, and the opponent criticises them as shown below :

(i) The offering, being made under a *vedic* injunction, is an exception to the general rule. *Criticism*. This is not a case of exception. There is a general rule - whatever offering has to be made should be made into the *āhavaniya* fire. In the *soma yāga* a cow, with which the *sōma* creeper is purchased, is led seven steps; and the earth under its hoof at the seventh step should be made into a heap and an offering of ghee should be made on the heaped earth. Here are two injunctions indicating two places for but one offering;

and owing to this conflict an exception to the general rule is accepted. Here, however, there is no such conflict. The injunction to make the offering states that the offering of the goat serves the *yāga*; while the general rule attaches sin generally to the injury of living beings; and the two matter are different.

(ii) The general prohibition refers to cases where one acts from a desire to reap a fruit; but not to cases where something is enjoined by the *veda*. *Criticism*. Here also the offerings is made from desire. The text "One desiring heaven-world should do *yāga*" points out a *yāga* as the means to enjoyment in that world; and one sets out to do the *yāga* only from a desire for the fruit. In the offering also of a goat's membrane to the *devatā agnishoma*, knowing it to be serviceable in the doing of a fruit-yielding *yāga*, the sacrificer is led by desire. In this matter there is no difference between an injury done under cover of *vedic* injunction, and that done in the world to attain a personal benefit through an injury. Even in regard to actions, that are thought to be compulsory, the motive is to obtain some fruit, which is held up as superior and imperishable.

Hence, *yāgas* being blended with sin, the descending *jeeva* enjoys the fruit of the meritorious element in the heaven-world, and in order to experience the fruit of the sinful element, he is born into the vegetable kingdom. That to be so born is the fruit of evil *karma* is stated :

Man becomes a vegetable, owing to *karma* done with his body (manu., I-2-9).

The *sūtra* dissents from this view. The killing of goats in *yāgas* is not injury; for it leads the goats to the heaven-world. For it is said:

It (the goat) goes up in a shining body in (heaven-world).

An action, which leads to a superior good, cannot be characterised as injury, merely on the ground that it causes a little pain; on the other hand it should be regarded as a great benefit conferred (1). A medical man, who makes a successful operation on a patient is hailed as a benefactor and is praised, even though he causes temporary pain.

26. रेतस्सिग्योगोऽथ ।

There is mention further on of contact with one that emits semen.

(1) This is stated in a *mantra* 'you are not now killed; nor are injured. Go to the *devas* alone by easy paths. The *devatā* sun will take you to a place to which men of good deeds go, but not men of bad deeds' (*yajur*, *ashtaka*; 3, VII-92).

The following is the text :

Whoever eats food or emits semen, he becomes that person (*chāndo.*, V-10-6).,

The descending *jeeva* becomes that person. This cannot be taken as literally true; and the only way to understand it is to regard him as attaching himself to the person eating the food or emitting semen. Similarly, being born as paddy or *yava* must be taken to mean attaching oneself to the paddy or *yava*.

27. योनेश्शरीरम् ।

It is only after reaching the womb that a body is got.

In all the previous stages beginning with coming to the ether there is only contact; and a body is attained only in the last stage, i.e., on reaching the womb; and here it is possible to experience pleasure and pain (1).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) Thus the descent of the returning *jeeva* is described. In the fifty sub-section, it is shown that in contact with paddy or *yava* he remains a long time without enjoyment of pleasure. When the corn is cut, the *jeeva*, who ensouled it, departs; but not so the returning *jeeva*, who continues while the corn is cut, gathered, dried put onto a granary, husked; cooked and eaten. Having got into a man, he attaches himself to his semen. Even then he may not reach a woman's womb; for the husband may have no sexual appetite, or the wife may be barren, or her menstrual period may have passed. He must manage to be eaten again by a man with his food. When he gets into the womb at last, he is enveloped by a thin membrane known as the amnion, and the misery of his position may be easily imagined. When the time for coming into the world arrives, he has to squeeze himself and get out through a narrow aperture. The *upanishad* has all this in view, when it states "Let one be disgusted with *samsāra* (*chāndo.*, V-10-8)

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER III

SECTION 2

HAVING depicted the undesirable plight of the *jeeva*, the author of the *sūtras* proceeds to point out the greatness of the highest *Ātmā*. Among this are the creation of a wonderful dream-world, and the receipt of all the *jeevas* in deep sleep. These are referred to in the first two sub-sections. They show incidentally that in the dream-condition the *jeeva* remains bound, his real nature being covered up by the will of the highest *Ātmā*. In the deep sleep condition, though he is for the time being without name or form, having no connection with his body, he is not conscious.

SUB-SECTION 1

In this sub-section the dream state is taken for consideration.

1. सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराहहि ।

In the dream state the creation (is by the *jeeva*); for so states the *veda*.

Regarding dream (1) a *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text states :

There are in that state no chariots, no chariothorses, no roads; but he creates chariots, chariot-horses, roads For he is the maker (VI-3-10)

Here the doubt is whether this creation is by the *jeeva* himself or by the highest *Ātmā*. the *first view* is stated in this and the next *sūtra*. The creation is by the *jeeva*; for only he that perceives the dream is seen here.

2. निर्मातारं चैके पुत्रादयश्च ।

And some state him to be the maker; and the things made are sons and the like.

Reference is made to the following text from the *katha* :

That *purusha*, who is awake, while those (all *jeevas*) sleep, and who creates one *karma* (object of desire) after another (V-8).

The term *kāma* refers to what is desired. It does not mean mere desire. The objects of desire are sons and the like; for in 1-2-3 of the same *upanishad* reference was made to sons and grandsons reaching the full age of a hundred years, to cows, elephants, and horses, and to gold as objects to be desired. Hence, the dreaming *jeeva* creates the chariots and the rest. And in

(1) The term used in the original is *sandhya*, which interpreted as the place of dreams *vide* the text, "Sandhyam is the third place of dreams."

the teaching of *Prajāpati* (*chāndo.*, VIII, sections 7-12) he is stated to be capable of creating by mere will. Hence even in the absence of the requisite instruments creation is possible by him.

This view is now refuted :

3. मायामात्रे तु कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ।

But the creation is verily wonderful, and (it is not possible to the *jeeva*) whose nature is not fully manifested.

The expression used in the *sūtra* means mere *māyā* and the term *māyā* denotes something wonderful, as in the following verse "She was born in the family of *jānaka* made as if she were the wonderful creation (*māyā*) of the *deva* (*Īshvara*)" Here also what is created is wonderful. The chariots, horses and roads cannot be perceived by others; in that sense they do not exist. But they exist in the sense that they are perceived by the dreamer; and they come to an end with the dream. And a wonderful creation of this kind is possible only to the omnipotent *Brahma*, but not to the *jeeva*. His omnipotence exists; but in his bound condition it does not fully appear. In the *katha* text relied on by the opponent the creation is by the highest *Ātmā* alone. Both in the beginning and ending of the *upanishad* the powers to be found only in Him are stated (1); and in that text also reference is made to Him. As the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text conveys the same teaching, the creator is not the dreaming *jeeva*, but the highest *Ātmā*.

If omnipotence is natural to the *jeeva*, why is it not manifested? The next *sūtra* replies:

4. परभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततोह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ ।

By the will of the Supreme is it hidden. From that same cause the bondage of the *jeeva* comes about, and his release should result from the same will.

The *jeeva* has made a chain of *karmas* reaching to the beginning - less past and is an offender; and as its result his natural divine power is prevented from appearing (2).

(1) Who is awake while those (all *jeeva*) sleep; He alone is light; He is *Brahma* He alone is said to be immortality. All the worlds rest on Him; no one excels Him (V-8).

(2) When in order to attain freedom from fear he obtains the power to meditate continuously on that Being, who cannot be seen, who has no body, who cannot therefore be described by words denoting attributes, and who has no support, he attains freedom from fear. When he makes even a small break in this, then fear comes to him (*āna.*, VII-2) He alone makes one blissful, (*Ibid.*, VII-1) From fear of Him the wind blows (*Ibid.*, VIII-1).

5. देहयोगाद्वा सोपि ।

Even this (non-appearance) results from connection with a body.

In the manifested condition the *jeeva* is connected with matter in the form of a body; in the state of rest with subtle matter unfit to take a name and assume a form. In either case the connection with matter brings about the non-appearance of his true nature. To remain awake while all sleep, and to support all the worlds and the rest are possible only to the highest *Ātmā*. Hence He creates objects, that last only during the *jeeva*'s dream-condition, and that can be enjoyed only by him. so as to make him experience the fruits of very petty *karma*.

It may be thought that power to create the dream-world comes to the *jeeva* in the dream-condition. This is next shown to be impossible.

6. सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेगचक्षते च तद्विदः ।

The dream indicates (coming good or evil) as known from the *veda*. And this is affirmed by those that know about it.

This being so, the dreaming *jeeva* does not create the things seen in dreams. If he did, he would create only what would indicate coming good. The fact that dreams indicate both good and evil (1) shows that dream creations do not depend upon his will. Hence the creator of things seen in dreams is the highest *Ātmā* Himself.

SUB-SECTION 2

7. तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छुतेरात्मनि च ।

The absence of dream (i.e., deep sleep) takes place in the *nādis* (blood vessels) and in the *Ātmā*; so is it stated.

"The place where the *jeeva* remains in deep sleep is next considered. Here are the following statements :

When a person sleeps, with his senses drawn in, and free from the turmoils of the day, and sees no dream, he has then entered the blood-vessels. Then no suffering touches him; for he has then reached Light (*Brahma*) *chāndo*, VIII-6-3). Again When he sleeps and does not know anything

(1) This is stated in a *vedic* text - 'while *karmas* are being done for fruits, if one sees a woman in dreams, he should know that the *karmas* will be properly completed (*chāndo*, V-2-9) If one sees in a dream a black person with black teeth, he will kill him.'

he rests in *purīta* (pericardium) (*bṛihad.*, IV-1-19) Again, When this persons sleeps he is then, my dear, united to *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-8-1).

Thus, the blood vessels, the pericardium and the highest *Ātmā* are stated to be the places where the *jeeva* rests in deep sleep. The question for consideration is whether he chooses any one of the three places at pleasure, or whether he rests in all of them at the same time. The *first view* adopts the first alternative; as the places are stated to be independent of one another and as one cannot be in many places at the same time. The *sūtra* takes the latter alternative as the correct view; for all the three places are specified in the *upanishads*. When it is possible to take in all the places with reference to the function performed by each, it is improper to assume an option, which nullifies the alternatives not selected for the time being (Intro., para 39). And they do perform different functions, as do a palace, a bed-stead, and a bed to a sleeper. The blood vessels are like the palace; the pericardium is like the bed-stead; and the highest *Ātmā* is like the bed itself. Hence, He alone is the immediate resting place.

8. अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ।

Hence the awakening from Him.

The conclusion reached in *sūtra* 7 explains why the *jeeva* is said to go forth from the highest *Ātmā* when the awakes-

When they return from *Sat*. they do not know 'We go forth from *Sat*' (*chāndo.*, VI-10-2).

SUB-SECTION 3

9. स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः ।

The same (that went to sleep awakes); from *karma* recognition, *vedic* statement and *vedic* injunction.

The doubt arises whether the same person that went to sleep rises from it. For he is freed from all limitations, and unites himself with *Brahma*. This is also what happens to a *jeeva* released from the bondage of *karma*. Hence one that goes into deep sleep is released; and the *jeeva* that appears is some other. This *superficial view* is refuted in the *sūtra*. First, the *karma* done by the sleeper should be experienced by him alone, until he knows the truth and strives for perfection. Next, the person that awakes recognises himself thus "I who went to sleep am the very same that awakes". Next, the *vedic* text states :

Whatever they were before - whether a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a bear, a worm, a moth, a gnat or a fly - that again they become (*chāndo.*, VI-10-2).

Lastly the injunctions in regard to striving for release will become meaningless, if every person on going to sleep should be released from *karma*. It is not true that the person going to sleep is released from all limitations, and that he attains his true nature. regard to such a person it is said :

In truth he does not now (in sleep) know himself thus "I am he" nor these beings. He has gone to annihilation. I do not see any good in this (*chāndo.*, VIII-11-1).

As to one who is released from bondage it is stated :

Reaching the highest Light, he appears in his true nature.... He moves about (1) there, eating, playing and rejoicing with women, carriages or relatives ((*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2 and 3).

He becomes his own master (*i.e.*, is no longer subject to the bondage of *karma*) He may move about in all the worlds according to his wish (*Ibid.*, VII-25-2). The seer sees everything; he attains everything in every way (*Ibid.*, VII-26-2). The released *jeeva* is all knowing. Hence, the sleeping person is still within the wheel of births; but for the time being all his instruments of knowledge and action are tired; he is incapable of perception and enjoyment. He finds a resting place in the highest *Ātmā*; and being refreshed, he rises again for new enjoyment.

SUB-SECTION 4

10. मुग्धेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् ।

In trance one goes half the journey (towards death); because not included in others.

In regard to one lying in a swoon, the question arises whether his condition is one of those already examined, or whether it is a separate condition altogether. The *first view* is that it is one of the other conditions; for it is so known; and there is no ground for assuming it to be a new condition. The *sūtra* states that the latter is the correct view. It is not the waking or dreaming state; as the person is incapable of perception. It is not deep sleep, as the cause that brings it about is different, like a blow on the head and the like. Nor is it death, as the appearance of the person in a swoon is different.

(1) The term in the original is *paryeti*, which has been interpreted also as enjoying *Brahma* all round.

Hence, as it cannot be included in any of these conditions, it must be concluded that it is a different condition altogether. It is a half-way house on the road to death. In death *prāṇa* is completely severed from the body, while in a swoon *prāṇa* remains in the body, but in a subtle condition.

SUB-SECTION 5

We have considered the several conditions of the *jeeva*, so that one may see his undesirable plight, and become disguised with it. In order to create a longing to reach *Brahma*, it is shown in this sub-section that the highest *Ātmā* is free from all imperfections, and is the seat of all noble qualities (1).

The form of the question for consideration is whether the blemishes that attach themselves to the *jeeva*, when he is in one of the conditions - wakefulness, dream, deep sleep or swoon, or when he rises from his body in death, will affect the highest *Ātmā* also, when as the inner ruler He abides with him in those places or whether He remains free.

First view. He is affected; because He abides in the *jeeva's* body in those conditions.

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2. *Question.* Was it not decided in *sūtras* I-2-8 and I-3-6 that not being subject to *karma*, the highest *Ātmā* is not affected by stay in another's body. Why is the question re-opened? *Reply.* *Karma* connects a person with a body, and produces its fruit as stated in *sūtra* 5 of this section; and this indicates that connection with a body is undesirable. Otherwise *karma* can itself yield pain without the intervention of a body. The body being impure in various ways, its connection must be undesirable, even to one that is not under the sway of *karma*. That the highest *Ātmā* enters the *jeeva's* bodies of His own choice for the purpose of control cannot make a difference. For one to smear himself with pus, blood and the like, even if done by himself, must be unwelcome. The highest *Ātmā* may be the only cause of the evolution of the

(1) Why is this sub-section necessary? Was not this proved in the first two chapters? *Reply.* The means to release are two-fold. One is the highest *Ātmā* Himself, who takes off the fetters; and the other is meditation on Him. The former is known as *siddhōpāya* - the means that already exists, and the latter is *sādhyaopāya* - the means that has to be brought about. To impress this distinction on the mind this sub-section has been added. Further, in the third section of this chapter the various modes of meditation have to be dealt with, which differ with reference to the attributes to be meditated on; and it is necessary to establish the fact that the highest *Ātmā* is not only free from all imperfections, but that He is also the seat of all noble qualities. For, the opposite view is held by some, which, if correct, would render section 3 of this chapter unnecessary; as also sections 2 and 4.

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world; He may be all knowing and possess every other noble quality; yet as He is said to abide in the element earth, the *jeeva*, the eye, man's semen and the like, He must be polluted by them.

Final decision. The highest *Ātmā* is not touched by any blemish even by his stay in these places. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

11. न स्थानतोपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि ।

No imperfection in the highest *Ātmā*, even by the places; for in all texts possession of two-fold marks by Him is stated.

In all texts' - all texts of the *veda* or *smṛitis*. The marks are freedom from all imperfections, and possession of noble qualities - "He is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst; He has unchanging objects of desire; and His will is never frustrated" (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5) (1).

The opponent meets this reply thus : Another text describes the *jeeva* in the same terms; and yet he reaps unwelcome fruit by being in a *deva* or human body. Similarly, two conditions of the highest *Ātmā* may be imagined, in one of which He is in Himself marked by the two marks, and in the other He abides in *jeevās* bodies, and is polluted by contact with them. This argument is stated in the next *sūtra* and is refuted :

12. भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात् ।

If it be said "Owing to different conditions. "the reply is "No, because freedom from it is stated in every text.

In the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7) each verse states that the highest *Ātmā* abides in a particular things, the element earth, the eye, and the like, and concludes with the remark "This inner ruler is your perfect *Ātmā*. The term used in the original is *amrita*, which may mean immortal, i.e., eternal, if it occurred but once. But it is found in every verse and must mean perfect. Between Him and the *jeeva* there is a difference. The former abides within every object of His own will for the purpose of control; while the *jeeva* has no choice, and must enter the body that has been made for him,

(1) See also the following verses : "He has all noble qualities by nature; he carries out the creation of beings with a fragment of His *śakti* .. He is the one seat for the six qualities *tejas*, *bala*, *aisvarya*, *jnāna*, *virya* and *śakti* which are infinite; He is great among the great; He is the ruler of superior and inferior beings; in Him *kleṣa* and the rest cannot find a place (*vishṇu.*, VI-5-84 and 85). The highest goal, called *vishṇu*, is devoid of all imperfections (*Ibid.*, I-22-53).

and must experience the fruit of his past *karma*. For this purpose his true nature is, as has been said already, hidden.

Objection. Choice or no choice; the nature of things cannot be altered; and the connection with matter must subject the highest *Ātmā* to imperfections. *Reply.* No. It is not true that even matter in itself is bad. The same object causes pleasure at one time and pain at another time; and is pleasurable to one person and is painful to another. If this effect were due to the nature of the object, then every object must cause either pleasure or pain at all times and to all persons. But this is not one's experience (1). It must therefore be concluded that the highest *Ātmā* causes an object to appear pleasurable or otherwise according to the *karma* of each individual. But He is subject to no control, and the connection with matter, which in the case of the *jeeva* produces undesirable results, only helps Him to control an object as may be necessary in its case, and derive amusement.

13. अपिचैवमेके ।

And some (teach) thus.

Some *upanishads* explicitly state that connection with one and the same body is for the *jeeva* a source of disadvantage, while for the highest *Ātmā* it is not so. On the other hand it conduces to His glory, following on the exercise of control over all.

Two birds, inseparable and possessing similar qualities owing to the same tree. One of them eats the ripe fruit; the other does not eat, but shines on all sides (*munḍa.*, III-1-1)

The opponent comes forward with a fresh objection. It has been said that the highest *Ātmā* entered everything, and gave it a name and a form; that He is the *Ātmā* of that thing. He has therefore a body-divine, human or otherwise, and a name; and like the *jeeva* He is subject to *vedic* injunctions and prohibitions; i.e., He is bound by *karma*. To this the next *sūtra* replies:

14. अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

That (*Brahma*) is verily as one without form, because of His prominence.

(1) This is stated in the following verses : good and bad deeds are called heaven and hell; the same object causes pain, pleasure, envy and anger. Hence how can an object be said to possess but one character? The same thing, having given pleasure, subsequently leads to pain; the same thing first leads to anger, and afterwards leads to good will. Hence there is nothing that in itself is painful or pleasurable (*viṣṇu.*, II-6-46, 47 and 48)

Though He has entered every body, and has thus become connected with various forms, yet He is like one without them; i.e., without the effect produced by the connection. He does not therefore share with the *jeeva* subjection to *karma*. For, it is said :

Ether is the maker of name and form; because He is between them, He is *Brahma* (*chāndo.*, VIII-14-1)

'Is between them' is untouched by the effect produced by them. He is merely their maker. The *jeevās* connection with his form is by the experiencing of the pleasure or pain produced by it; and as similar experience does not exist for the highest *Ātmā*, He is unconnected with the form. Injunctions and prohibitions are for those that are bound by *karma*.

The opponent appears again and observes - The text "Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*" (*āna* I-1) states Him to be devoid of attributes and to be mere light (*prakāsa*). One that is *jnāna* (light) 'cannot possess *jnāna*. Everything else is expressly denied by texts such as, not so not so' It must therefore be concluded that the possession of the two marks is a myth. The first point is replied to in the following *sūtra* :

15. प्रकाशवच्चावैयर्थ्यात् ।

And like light (*prakāsa*), so that the texts may not become meaningless.

Brahma is admitted to be light, in order that the text quoted may not become meaningless. The same argument compels the admission that He possesses other attributes also. He is therefore omnipotent and all knowing. He is the world-cause, and the *Ātmā* of all things, and He transcends *avidyā* and all other imperfections.

16. आह च तन्मात्रम् ।

And (the text) says so much only.

That is, that *Brahma* is *jnāna* (light). The text does not negative other attributes affirmed by other texts such as omnipotence and the like. The text 'not so' will be presently explained.

17. दर्शयति चाथो अपिस्मर्यते ।

And *vedic* texts show, and also *smṛitis*.

Upanishad texts affirm that *Brahma* is free from all imperfections and is the seat of all blessed qualities.

Vedic Texts :

Him, who is the highest ruler among rulers, and who is the highest *devatā* among *devatās*; He is the world cause, who is the lord of the lords of the senses (*jeevas*) He has no maker or lord; He has no body or senses; no one that is His equal or superior is observed. His capacity (*śakti*) is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds, and to pertain to His nature; so also His capacity to know to support, and to create and destroy (*śveta*, vi) He knows everything and every attribute of everything; His *tapas* is thought (*munḍa*., I-1-10). From fear of Him the wind blows; from fear the sun rises; It is one *ānanda* (bliss) of *Brahma* (*āna*., VIII); From which speech returns with the mind without reaching (its higher limit), one that meditates on the *ānanda* (bliss) of *Brahma* does not fear anything (*Ibid.*, IX) Without parts, without action (1); free from hunger and the other five evils; without blemish and without attachment (*śveta*, VI)

Smṛiti texts :

Those among men, that know Me as unborn, as having had no beginning and as the great ruler of the worlds (*bhagavad-gītā* X-3); supporting all this world with a fragment of My power, I remain (*Ibid.*, X-42) with me to direct, *prakṛiti* sends forth from itself the world with the moving and unmoving things. From this cause the world goes round (*Ibid.*, IX-10) But other than these is the highest *Purusha*; He is called the highest *Ātmā*, who pervading the three worlds, sustains and controls, Himself remaining unchanged (*Ibid.*, XV-17).

He is everything and is all-knowing; He sees everything; He has all capacities, all knowledge, all strength and fallness; He has neither increase nor decrease; He is his own master; He has had no beginning; He has every one in His control. He is devoid of fatigue, laziness, fear, anger, desire and the like. He is free from blemishes; He excels all others; He is free from hunger and the other five evils. He needs no support, He is imperishable; His enthusiasm is never impeded (*viṣṇu*, V-1-47), 48 and 49).

18. अत एव चोपमासूर्यकादिबत् ।

And for that very reason comparison with the sun and the rest.

The reason is that He is not touched by the imperfections of the various places in which He abides. A comparison is made in the sacred books between Him and the sun reflected in water, mirrors and the like. As the

(1) 'Without action' - as whatever need be done has been done. 'Without blemish,' i.e., without blemishes like indifference to those that come to Him.

sun's purity is not thereby affected, so the purity of *Brahma* remains unaffected.

As the ether, though one, appears as many in jars and the like, so *Ātmā*, though one, abides in many things, and is like the sun on sheets of water. The *Ātmā* of beings, though one only, remains in all beings; and is seen as one and as many, like the moon reflected from watery surfaces.

The opponent points out a flaw in the comparison :

19. अम्बुवदग्रहणात्तु न तथात्वम् ।

But because *Brahma* is not perceived as the sun is perceived in sheets of water, no likeness.

The analogy is not correct. The sun does not really abide in sheets of water, nor the face in mirrors; and their appearance within them is illusion. Hence their purity is not affected. But here *Brahma* as a fact abides in earth, and other things; and His freedom from imperfections does not follow from the analogy.

The next *sūtra* replies :

20. वृद्धिहासभात्तत्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्याद्रेवं दर्शनाच्च ।

(The comparison is intended merely to deny in respect of *Brahma*) increase and decrease as a result of His abiding in all things. This must be so from the appropriateness of both the comparisons. And this is seen.

The terms 'increase' and 'decrease' denote the imperfections which attach to all things. From the fact that He abides in them *Brahma* is not touched by their imperfections either in His *svarūpa* or in His attributes. The intention in making the comparison with the sun was merely to deny this point. How is it known? *Reply*. From the fact that it is only then that both the comparisons will be appropriate. In the verse quoted (see *sūtra* 18) *Brahma* is compared to ether and to the sun. Ether fills vessels of various sizes - some small, others large; but it is not affected by their size. The sun, on the other hand, does not enter sheets of water, but appears to be within them; and though his reflections are large or small, the sun himself remains the same. Similarly, *Brahma* though abiding in things of various forms - in intelligent beings and in non-intelligent things - is not affected by their imperfections, but ever remains the same - the possessor of the two-fold marks.

If the stay of the highest *Ātmā* in all things were unreal, comparison with ether would not be appropriate; if it is real, comparison with the sun

will be equally inappropriate. Hence an element which is common to both the examples should be found; and this is being untouched by the imperfections of the objects, in which the ether is or the sun appears to be; and it is this that is affirmed of the highest *Ātmā*. One is affected by the imperfections of a thing by nearness in place, nearness in time, and nearness in nature. Nearness of the three kinds should combine to make it possible; and in the absence of one of them no pollution can take place. The sun and sheets of water illustrate distance in place; and the ether and jars illustrate distance in nature; and the author's intention is to show that distance in the nature of objects is as good a reason for the freedom of the highest *Ātmā* from the imperfections of the objects as distance in place.

The last portion of the *sūtra* explains that *comparisons* are made between two things that are not similar in all respects, provided that there is a likeness in that point which is under consideration. *e.g.*, 'The student is like the lion'.

An objection is raised. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka upanishad* the third *brāhmaṇa* of the fourth chapter begins with the words "There are two forms of *Brahma*" (See *Vedic* texts). It then describes the whole universe, consisting of the gross and the subtle, as His form; it states a particular colour for Him and concludes with the teaching 'Not so, not so; for there is no other than that'. Here all the forms of *Brahma* described are referred to by the word *iti* (so), and they are denied. *Sat* alone, in which all the attributes appear, is *Brahma*, and all the attributes, which appear in Him, are imagined by Him out of ignorance of His own essential nature. To this the next *sūtra* replies:

21. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः ।

For the text denies the limitation implied by the preceding description. And it then declares some further attributes.

The interpretation put upon the text 'Not so, not so', cannot be accepted. After stating certain things as the attributes of *Brahma*, things that are not known by other means as His attributes, will the *upanishad* deny the very same as attributes. This would be like the ravings of a mad man. Among the things mentioned some are no doubt known by other means; but their being attributes of *Brahma* was never known. Other things were not known either in their *svarūpa* or in their connection with Him. The statement is not therefore a repetition of what was previously known and their denial is inappropriate. It must therefore be understood that the text denies that *Brahma* is merely what has been stated. Certain attributes of Him were stated. The text says 'Don't think that He is merely as described'. A limitation is implied by the foregoing description, and that is referred to by

the word *iti* (so) and is denied. Further, after this denial further attributes of *Brahma* are stated. Hence the expression 'not so' must mean not merely this. The statement of further attributes in these words:

For there is no other higher than that (*Brahma*) described by the expression 'not so';

higher in *svarūpa* or in attributes.

And His name is the unchanging among the unchanging.

What this means is next explained. "*Prāṇas* are unchanging". By the term *prāṇas jeevas* are referred to from their close union with *prāṇa*. They are unchanging, as they do not undergo modifications of substance like ether and are the rest. *Brahma* is unchanging among them; because even contraction and expansion of *jūāna* do not take place as among *jeevas*. Hence, from this mention of other attributes it must be decided that by 'not so' the denial of all attributes was not intended.

The next *sūtra* confirms the remark that *Brahma* cannot be known except from the *veda*:

22. तदव्यक्तमाह हि ।

He (*Brahma*) is not known from other means of proof ; for this the *veda* declares.

Thus —

His form does not stand within the scope of sight: no one sees Him with the eye (*Kaṭha*, II-6-9). He is not perceived by the eye, not by speech (*muṇḍa*, III-1-8).

Another reason is stated:

23. अपिसंराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।

And (He is seen) in loving meditation; from the *Veda* and *smṛtis*.

Brahma cannot be perceived 'othewise:

This *Ātmā* (*Brahma*) cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, by hearing many times. Whomsoever he chooses, by him alone can He be reached. To him He reveals His own form (*Kaṭha*. I,1-2-23). When by the grace of *Īṣvara* the mind is purified, then one sees in meditation Him who is without parts (*muṇḍa*., III-1-8); I cannot be seen in this form, as you have seen Me, either by recitation of the *veda*, by *tapas*, by the making of

gifts or by *yāgas*. But by love, not looking forward to any other" goal, is it possible for one to know Me, to see Me as I am, and to enter into me (*bhagavad gītā*, XI-53 and 54).

Hence the text considered in *sūtra* 21, which points out the form of *Brahma* for the purpose of meditation, cannot be said to repeat the description of the form; for it was not previously known.

24. प्रकाशादिवच्चैवैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात् ।

And like *jnāna*, bliss and other attributes; no difference (between them and other attribute); this appears in meditation repeated many times.

Those like *Vāmadeva*, who have direct perception of the *svarūpa* of *Brahma*, perceive not only *jnāna*, bliss and other attributes constituting the *svarūpa*, but also of His being clothed in the forms described. As attributes *Brahma* they are all alike and all are perceived at the same time. This perception takes place in meditation frequency repeated.

The subject is brought to a conclusion in the *sūtra*:

25. अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् ।

Hence (*Brahma* is clothed) with endless blessed attributes. Only then will the possession of two marks be appropriate.

SUB SECTION 6

In the preceding sub - section it was shown that the highest *Ātmā* appears in the form of unintelligent matter in the gross and subtle conditions; that this is not His only form by the words 'not so, as so'; and that there is nothing superior to Him. It was also added that He does not change, and that therefore He is unchanging among the, unchanging (see under *sūtra* 21) There are certain other texts which explain what is meant by His form "He is the lord of matter, and of the dwellers in bodies; and the controller of the *guṇas* (*śveta*, VI-16); Lord of all; controlled by Himself (*narā.*, XI-3); Who, being Himself eternal, intelligent, and one gives what is desired by those that are eternal, intelligent and many (*Śvetha*, VI-13). The question in what sense matter is the form of the highest *Ātmā* will now be considered, in order to confirm His freedom from imperfections settled in the preceding sub-section. Three alternative are possible: The highest *Ātmā* and matter are the same substance in two conditions, like a snake when stretched at full length and the same when coiled up; they are of the same class like a shining substance and its light; and they are two different substances inseparably connected like the *jeeva* as decided in chapter II section 3, sub section 7, The conclusion to be reached here is that the relationship is as last stated;

and this was assumed in chapter I-4-7 and chapter II-1-6 and it was stated that the highest *Ātmā* clothed - in the two inseparable attributes in the subtle condition came forth as the universe clothed in the same two attributes, but in the gross condition; and that the two are one. Which of the three alternative is the correct one? The *first view* is stated in the *sūtra* :

26. उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् ।

Like the snake and its coil ; because both are stated.

The statements are : “*Brahma* only is all this; *Ātmā* only is all this”. These state identity. “I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva*.” This affirms difference. In order that both the sets of statements may have a meaning, it must be assumed that the highest. *Ātmā* and matter are really one substance in essence, but in two different conditions like the straight snake and the coiled up snake.

The second alternative is urged in the next *sūtra* :

27. प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् ।

Or they are related like light and its seat, possessing the same character - light.

The first alternative - that *Brahma* Himself comes to the condition of non sentient matter - will conflict with the text affirming difference between them and unchangesibility. Hence, the second alternative should be accepted. A shining substance and its light are one in essence, but differ; for the substance remains in one place, while its light spreads all around. Similarly, *Brahma* and matter are one yet different from one another.

The *final* decision is stated :

28. पूर्ववद्वा ।

But the relationship is as already stated.

The second alternative also is untenable. To a shining body and its light there is something common; what is it that is common to *Brahma* and matter? If it be *brahmatva*, i.e., *brahmahood*, then *brahma* would be an attributes found in the all-Ruler, in sentient beings and in the material universe, as the generic character of horses and cows are found in all the individuals of each class. This would be opposed to all texts of the *veda* and *smṛitis* and usage (1).

(1) A word connoting generic character is put in apposition with another word denoting an individual, as in ‘broken-horned cow’, but not words denoting two individuals, like ‘broken - horned is hornless’. Now *Brahma* must be a concrete entity or an attribute. If He were the former, belonging to the class of *Īśvara*, *jeevas* and matter He could not be said to be the universe. If He were the latter. He could not

Hence, it is necessary to fall back on the theory stated in chapter II-3-7. It was pointed out in that sub-section that *Jeevas* are inseparable attributes of *Brahma*. Master also is an inseparable attribute, and is therefore a part of *Brahma*, which term means an aggregate of all the elements. In this view there are the following good points. Because they are all parts of an aggregate, the statement of oneness is correct literally. As the elements differ among themselves in their *svarūpas* and in their natures, the *vedic* texts affirming difference also are literally correct. And the freedom of *Brahma* from imperfections is preserved. There are several instances of things that are inseparable parts of other things - lustre is part of a gem; generic qualities are parts of individuals making up a class; qualities are parts of the persons or objects that possess them; and bodies are parts (for the time being) of *jeevas*. Similarly, *jeevas* and matter are parts of *Brahma*.

29. प्रतिषेधाच्च ।

And because of denial.

This denial is stated in the following text "He the great *Ātmā* is unborn, never old, and undying (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25). By the old age of the body He does not age" (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5). Thus, the changes that take place in unintelligent matter are denied in regard to *Brahma*. The conclusion reached is therefore sound; and the decision in the preceding sub-section remains unshaken.

SUB - SECTION 7

It has been shown that the highest *Ātmā* is the material and operative causes of the universe. It will now be considered whether there is any Being greater than He, and certain specious arguments, which are brought forward, will be examined. If such a Being existed, the highest *Ātmā* would not be the highest goal, nor the seat of noble qualities needed for enjoyment of Him. The possession of the two marks settled in sub-section 5 would not then be full. In the immediately preceding sub-section freedom from imperfections was the question considered, and in the sub-section the examination will deal with His being the seat of noble qualities.

First view. There is a being greater than the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

30. परमतस्सेतून्मानसम्बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः ।

A greater than He, because of the use of the term setup (bridge) and mention of measure, connection and difference.

be the world - cause and its support; He could not be all-knowing and the seat of other attributes.

First, "The *Ātmā* is a protecting *setu* (bridge) (*chāndo*, VIII-4-1). Here *Brahma* is said to be bride; and a bridge takes one to the farther side of river. Hence there is something other than *Brahma* that has to be reached with His help. Further on, it said "Crossing this *setu* (bridge), the blind man cease to be blind" (*Ibid.*, VIII-4-2). Here reference is made to crossing *Brahma*; and what has to be reached is something else. Secondly, *Brahma* is said to be measured, i.e. limited "*Brahma* has four feet; and sixteen parts" This reference to limitation implies that there is a being without any limitation, who has to be reached by this bridge, Thirdly, *Brahma* is connected as the means with something to be reached.

The principal bridge to immortality who shines like a fire that has burnt its fuel (*svetva*, VI-19); He is the bridge to immortality (*muṇḍa*, II-2-5).

Hence, there is something higher than *Brahma*. Lastly, difference between *Brahma* and something higher is stated:

One reaches the *purusha*, who is higher than the high (*muṇḍa*, III-2-8; He who is higher than the high, and greater than the great (*nārā*, 1-5) ; By that *Purusha* all this is filled; that which is beyond Him, is without form and without suffering (*sveta*, III-9 and 10).

Now follows the refutation :

31. सामान्यात् ।

But (the term *setu* is used) in the sense of likeness.

He protects the world as a band protects; but He is not stated to be a means of reaching some particular thing. Fair, further on these words occur "so that these worlds may not be confounded". Taking that etymological meaning also, the term means - He who blinds to Him self the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without confusion. The world *tirtvā*, which in the first, first view was rendered into 'crossing', means reaching, as in the sentence "He crosses the *vedānta*", which means that he has completely learnt the *vedānta*.

32. बुद्धयर्थः पादवत् ।

The limitation is for the purpose of meditation; as in the case of feet.

The object of the limitation implied in the texts '*Brahma* has four feet' and 'sixteen parts', and 'one foot of him is all beings'. (*chāndo*, III-12-6) is that one should meditate on *Brahma* in that form. The text "Unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma*" (*āna*, I-1) shows that *Brahma* in Himself is without any limitations. And the same Being is stated to be the world-cause in the texts. "From that same *Ātmā* ether came forth" (*Ibid.*, 1-2); and 'He willed I will become many' (*Ibid.*, 6-2). In the text.

Speech is one foot; *prāṇa* is one foot; the eye is one foot; the earth is one foot (*chāṇḍo.*, III-18-2); the reference to speech, *prāṇa*, eye and ear as the feet of *Brahma* is for the purpose of meditation. So here also.

How can *Brahma*, who in Himself is unlimited, become limited even for the purpose of meditation ? The next *sūtra* explains :

33. स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत् ।

With references to the places (specified); as in the case of light and the like.

The *sūtra* relates to the example mentioned in the preceding *sūtra*. When some places are specified, as the tongue, *prāṇa*, eye and ear, as connected with it, even an unlimited thing may be thought on as limited, Light.ether and the like though spreading everywhere, are thought on as limited, with reference to their connection with a window, a vessel and the like.

The third argument is next dealt with :

34. उपपत्तेश्च ।

And it is appropriate.

The argument urged was that the statement "He is a bridge to immortality" connects *Brahma* as the means with something to be reached, and that something is different from Him. This denied *Brahma* Himself is to be reached; and He is also the means. And such a thing is not inappropriate. "This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation by mere hearing many times. Whomsoever He choose, Him by along can He be reached; To him he reveals His own form (*kaṭha.*, I-2-23). This states that *Brahma* can be reached by no other means.

The last argument is dealt with in the next *sūtra*:

35. तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात् ।

Similarly, because another is denied.

In the *munḍaka*, in which the text "one reaches the *Purusha* who is higher the high" is found (III-2-8), another being higher than the highest *Ātmā* is expressly denied.

There is no other superior to Him in whatever way it may be considered; nothing is subtler than He, nothing is larger than He (*munḍa.*, I-1-7). This may be seen in other *upaniṣads* also; There is no other higher than that (*Brahma*) described by the expression. Not so' (*bṛihad.*, IV-3-6). Again 'No one controls Him; His name is great glory' (*nārā.*, I-9).

And He is stated to be the material cause of the world after this - "All moments came forth from the *Purusha* with the brilliance of lightning (*Ibid.*, 1-8); He churned the elements and both these (heaven and the intermediate world)" (*Ibid.*, 1-9). The text "From the elements (water) came forth *Hiranyagarbha*" (*Ibid.*, 1-11) recalls to one's mind the *Purusha*, who is the world-cause.

Question. What then is the being referred to in the text "That which is beyond Him" (*śveta.*, III-10), *Reply.* This text is preceded by another—

I meditate on that great *Purusha*, who shines like the sun, and who has a body made of a substance other than matter. Meditating on Him alone one overcomes death; no other path to the goal exists (*Ibid.*, 8).

Having stated this, the next verse explains :

There is no other superior to Him; nothing is subtler than He; nothing is larger than he; He stands in heaven unbending like a tree prominent ; by this *Purusha* all this is filled (*Ibid.*, 9)

This verse declares that this *Purusha* is the highest Being, and that all others cannot be superior. Then comes the verse under consideration, which concludes the teaching with a statement of the reason therefor. It should be rendered as follows: "That is Being, who is the highest, He alone is without form and without suffering. Because it is so those alone that meditate on Him become immortal; others reach only suffering". On any other rendering the text would conflict with verse 8. in which the subject is introduced, and with verse 9, which follows it. The other text may be explained similarly, viz., "one reaches the *Purusha* higher than the high and standing in heaven" (*muṇḍa.*, III-2-8). In the same *upanishad* (II-1-2) reference was made to "Him who is higher than what is higher than *akshara*". The term *akshara* denotes matter, which is indestructible, though continually changing its form. What is higher than this is the *jeevas* without name and form; and higher than they is the *Purusha* referred to as possessing invisibility and other qualities. The same *Purusha* is referred to in the text under consideration.

In the preceding five *sūtras* the views that there is a higher than the highest *Ātmā* was criticised; in the next an authority in support of the *final decision* is stated :

36. अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ।

That everything is pervaded by Him is indicated by words denoting extension.

This is proof that there is being higher than the highest *Ātmā*. The words are :

By that *Purusha* all this is filled (*ṣveta.*,III-9); Whatever in this world is seen or heard about. *Nāryaṇa* pervades all that inside and outside (*narā.*,XI); Who is eternal, omnipresent, and all -pervading, because of His highly subtle nature and the wise perceive. Him to be the material cause of all that exists (*muṇḍa.*,I-1-6).

The following texts also are contemplated “*Brahma* alone is all this; *Ātmā* os all this”.

SUB - SECTION 8

So, far in the first two sections of this chapter the following points have been settled: The *jeeva* is full of belmishes, whatever be his condition ; the highest *Ātmā*, who is to be reached by him, is free form all imperfection; He is the seat of all noble qualities; and He is higher than any one else. In the next section meditation on the highest *Ātmā* has to be dealt with; and in this sub - section it is shown that those that do the meditation attain the fruit known as *apavarga* (i.e., reaching Him) only from Him. Being on the subject, and the same reason applying, the auother of the *sūtras* states that such fruits as are attainable here or in the heaven-world by adopting the means declared in the *veda* come only form Him (1).

37. फलमत उपपत्तेः ।

Fruit comes form Him (alone), because it is appropriate.

For He alone is all-knowing all powerful, and supremely liberal. Those, that worship Him with *yāgas*, gifts, *homas* and the like receive form Him enjoyment here or in the heaven-world. Those that meditate on Him attain their own nature. *Karma*, being non intelligent, and transient, cannot bestow the fruits to be enjoyed at some future time. He alone is able to give the fruits.

The bestowal of fruits but he highest *Ātmā* was made to rest on the unfitness of *karma*, and on the capacity and willingness of that Being. The next *sūtra* states that there is express statement on the point.

38. श्रुतत्वाश्च ।

And because it is so stated.

In the following texts :

He, the great *Ātmā* unborn, is the giver of food the giver of wealth (*bṛihad.* VI-4-24); For, He alone gives bliss (*āna.*,7-1).

(1) There is an object in describing this point in general terms; for one that desire should meditate on this point also.

The next *sūtras* states the *first view*:

39. धर्म जैमिनिरत एव ।

For the very same reasons the giver of fruits is *dharma*; so *Jaimini* thinks.

For the same reasons - because it is appropriate and because it is taught in the *veda* : and *dharma* is *karma* in the form of offerings and gifts or of meditation. For in the world actions like ploughing and making of gifts directly or indirectly bring about their own reward without the intervention of any being. The *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* may not directly yield fruits; but they may do so indirectly through what is called *apūrva*; and this is appropriate. The *vedic* injunction "Let one that desires the heaven - world do *yāga*" mentions *yāga* as the means of reaching the heaven - world. As it will not endure till the fruit is gathered, it is assumed that *apūrva* intervenes.

The *final decision* is reiterated in the last *sūtra* :

40. पूर्व तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात् ।

But *Bādarāyaṇa* leans to the former view, because the causes are stated.

The former view is that the highest *Ātmā* alone gives the fruits. The *vedic* texts, which enjoin particular, *karmas*, refer also to certain *devatās* like *Agni*, *Vāyu* and the like as being pleased with *karmas* and as giving the fruits desired.

Let him, that desires prosperity, offer a white goat to *Vāyu*. for *Vāyu* is a quickly-acting *devatā*. One should approach *Vāyu* alone with his won share; and he himself leads the sacrificer to prosperity.

Here, though the text explaining how the *yāga* helps in the attainment of the desired fruit is *artharvāda*, it is needed by the injunctions - text as pointed out at is chapter I-4-7, and should not be set aside as added for another length is purpose. When the mode of attaining the fruits is expressly stated, to abandon it, and to assume the coming into existence of an *apūrva*, which is not stated in the *veda* is improper, and right-minded persons will never accept this view.

Objection - *Apūrva* is not assumed; but is denoted by the termination of the verb in the injunction - text *Reply*. The termination points out that the action denoted by the root (which is the worship of the *devatās*) should be done by the person, that desires the fruit. This is the recognised meaning of the termination, and is approved by the grammarian. Nothing else, which is unseen like *apūrva*, is denoted by it. In this contention there are two

assumptions instead of one first, the *apūrva* and next that is is denoted by the termination.

Now, this and other texts state that *Vāyu* and other *devatās* give the fruits sought. And the highest *Ātmā*, as the inner ruler of the *devatās*, receives the worship and yields the fruits (1). It is so taught:

The supporter of the words receives (1) as His worship all the *karmas* taught in the *veda* and *smṛitis* which have been done or which are being done in many ways (2) ; He alone is *agni*; He is *vāyu*; He is the sun He alone is the moon (*nārā.*, 1-6 and 7) ; Who stands in *vāyu* whose body *vāyu* is who stands in *agni*; who stands in the sun (*antaryāmi brāhmaṇa, bṛihad.*, V-7); whosever leaves whatsoever body of Mine and wishes to worship it with fervour. I Myself make his favour continue to the end. With such favour he laborus for the worship of that body of Mine, and obtains from the worship the desires that be sought; but they are given by Myself (*bhagavad gītā*, VII-21 and 22) Those that worship the *devas* go to the *devas*: those that love Me come to Me (*Ibid.*, VII-23). For I am the Being worshiped in all the *yāgas* ; I alone give the fruits . . . They reach the *devas* ; who will to worship the *devas*: they reach the *pitṛis* who will to worship the *pitṛis*; they reach the *bhūtas* who will to worship the *bhūtas*; but those, that do same actions with the will to *bhūtas*; but worship Me in the forms of the *devas*, *pitṛis*, or *bhūtas* come to Me (*Ibid.*, IX-24 and 25).

(1) The following objection may be raised; If the highest *Ātmā* is pleased and gives the fruits, there are difficulties, First when the principal *karma* is done immediately after the *prayāja* offering are made, though other subsidiary *karmas* remain to be done, the fruit of the principal *karma* should be bestowed; for being omnipotent, His grace cannot remain even for a moment fruitless. Next, there is a rule that one that parades his performance will make the *karma* incapable of producing fruit. Now the fruit cannot be delayed to see if the sacrificer offends against this rule; for the highest *Ātmā* being completely independence. His grace should become fruitful at once. If the fruit be given and the offence be committed subsequently, it will reveal ignorance on the part of the highest *Ātmā* that He did not foresee this. Hence the help *apūrva* should be sought. It must be assumed that when all the *karmas* are done - principal and subsidiary- and no cause exists for the destruction of the principal *karma* by parade, the highest *Ātmā* is pleased. If this be so, the *apūrva* being required necessarily, why should intervention by the highest *Ātmā* assumed? Reply The difficulties raised do not exist as the *devatās* take the place of the *apūrvas*; and when they are pleased, and there is nothing to cancel their grace the highest *Ātmā* comes forward and towards the worshipper.

(1) As being the yielder of the fruit of *karmas*.

2. In many ways - as being connected with *Ātmā* *Indra* and other *devatās*.

In the world also men obtain various objects by cultivation of land and other occupations and attend upon the king with those objects either through his servants or directly. The king, being pleased, gives them what they desire in accordance with the attention paid to him by them. This is what is seen. The *upanishads* teach the existence of *Purushottama*, who is beyond the capacity of every other source of knowledge, who is untouched by *avidyā* and by every other imperfection, and who is the seat of endless, infinite, noble qualities, pertaining to His nature; They show that *yāgas*, making gifts, and *homan* are His worship, as also to praise to fall down before Him, to recite His names, to place flowers at His feet, and to meditate on Him; and that worshipped by these means, He gives either enjoyment here or release from bondage to *karma*. This view of the *upanishads* is thoroughly sound.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER III

SECTION 3

In the two preceding sections so much was stated as would frighten one in regard to the horrors of hell, and in regard to the ever going to, and returning from, the heaven - world and would create a strong desire to reach the highest *Ātmā*. In this third section the various meditations, by which He is reached are examined to determine whether a *vidyā* of the same name, occurring in two or more *upanishads*, is the same or different. In the former case the qualities of the highest *Ātmā* enumerated in all the *upanishads* should be combined in meditation; while in the latter case only those qualities are to be taken into consideration, that are specified in the particular *upanishad*. The point will be stated in *sūtra* 5.

SUB SECTION 1

In this sub - section the tests are pointed out by which it may be determined whether a *vidyā* of the same name enjoined by two *upanishads* is the same. This question was considered in the *pūrva* a *mīmāṃsā* and it was settled that the same *karma* was enjoined by two texts, if the fruit to be attained, the form of the *karma*, the injunction regarding it and the name of the *karma* be the same. See Introduction, para 16. The question for consideration here is whether this decision applies to *vidyās* also taught in the *upanishads*.

First view The decision does not apply. when an injunction is repeated, and there is nothing to distinguish it from the same injunction previously given, it must relate to a different *vidyā*. Similarly if the injunctions be found in two contexts, the difference of *vidyā* follows as a matter of course (*Vide* Introduction, para 15-ii and vi). If this be so in regard to the same branch of *veda* how can there be any doubt when a *vidyā* is taught in different *upanishads*? In the *munḍaka* it is stated:

Let one teach this *brahma - vidyā* to those only, by whom *śirovrata* has been properly done (III-2-10)., and this injunction is repeated in the next verse to the student. This restriction of this *vidyā* to the followers of the *munḍaka upanishad*, who alone perform this ceremony, will become intelligible, if the *vidyā* taught in the *upanishad* be a different one. If it were identical with a *vidyā* taught in other *upanishads*, then as the ceremony would be an *anga* of the *vidyā*, it must be performed by others also; and the limitation enjoined would not be appropriate. Hence the *vidyā* taught in the *munḍaka* is not the same as the similar *vidyā* in other *upanishads*.

Final division. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् ।

The *vidyā* enjoined in all the *vedānats* is one, if the injunction and the rest do not differ.

The same decision applies to the *vidhyās* taught in the *upanishads* also. Take the *vaisavānārā vidyā* taught for the *chāndogya* and *agnirahasya*. See the *Vedic* texts under chapter I, section 2, sub-section 6. The injunction is the same, being given by the words *upasta*, *vidyāt* and the like, all of which mean 'meditate'. The words 'and the rest' in the *sūtra* refer to the form, the fruit and the name of the *vidyā*. The form of the *vidyā* is determined by the object to be meditated on; and this being *vaisavānārā* in both places, the form is also the same. So also the name and fruit of the *vidyā*, the latter being the reaching of the highest *Ātmā*. Hence the *vidyā* is recognised as one in both the *upanishads*.

The next *sūtra* sates the objection urged in the *first view* and refutes it :

2. भेदान्नेति चेदेकस्यामपि ।

If it be contended "No; because of difference ", The reply is "Even in the same *vidyā* " (there may be repetition).

Repetition without difference and a new context will be necessary, when the person to whom a *vidyā* is taught is different. But where the person, who receives the teaching is one and it is repeated without difference or the subject is introduced in a new context, then because the repetition or the new context cannot be explained otherwise the subject matter is assumed to be different ; and then the *vidyā* the form of which depends upon the subject matter differs.

The next *sūtra* replies to the other objection in the *first view* :

3. स्वाध्यायस्य तथाम हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च सवच्च तन्नियमः ।

To secure such qualification for one's *veda* ; and so is it stated in the work named *samāchāra*: and this restriction is like the restriction of the *sava* offerings.

The objection is not valid. For, the ceremony referred to does no services to *vidhyā* and is not therefore its adjunct (*anga*). On the other side hand it imparts to a follower of the *munḍaka* a qualification for learning it. This is known from the direction addressed to the student - "This should not be learnt by one that has not performed the ceremony (*munḍa.*, III-2-11). The ceremony is therefore connected with the learning of the text of the

Veda. The expression "*brahma-vidya*" in. The text quoted in the first view therefore means the learning of the text of the *veda*; but no mediation on *Brahma*. This view derices support from the statement in the treatise know connected with the *veda*". The work gives full directions in regard to the ceremony known as *sirovrata*; and taking up another ceremony it makes this statement. The meaning is that it should be done in the same manner as *sirovrata*. and as *samāchāra*, which states; "This too is explained by the ceremony In applying the same mode of performance to the new ceremony it uses the expression *veda-vrata*, i.e, *vrata* or ceremony connected with the *veda*. As to the restriction to those that do the ceremony, there is a precedent in the restriction of the *sava* offerings, beginning with a *sapta-surya* and endings with the *satodāna*, to a single fire in the case of the followers of the *atharva veda*, instead of being made into three fires as is usual. The restriction applies to them only, as the other restriction does.

4. दर्शयति च ।

And the *veda* declares this.

Having brushed aside the objections raised, the author of the *sūtras* cites a *vedic* precedent to show that the same *vidyā* may be taught in two *upanishads*. The *chāndogya* (VIII-1-1) teaches a meditation on the small ether in the heart of man and on the qualities that are within it. "What is within it should be sought" To the query "What is in it, that should be sought" (*ibid.*, 2), the reply is given that they are eight qualities beginning with freedom from all *karma* (*Ibid.*, 5). The *taittirīya* refers to this declaration, and states "In that is a small ether, free from grief; what is within it should be meditated on" (*nārā.*, 10-23). It thus teaches meditation on the highest *Ātmā* and on His eight qualities. This is possible only, if the *vidyā* in both the places is one; for then the qualities mentioned in both the places should be combined.

Having thus confirmed the unity of *vidyā* under certain conditions already taught in the *pūrva mimāṃsā*, practical effect is next stated :

5. उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विधिशेषवत्समाने च ।

Vidyā being the same, the *guṇas* should be combined because they serve the same purpose. Like the *guṇas* mentioned in the injunctive - texts.

When a *vidyā* taught in two places is the same the *guṇas* mentioned in one place should be added those specified in the other place also. The former set is useful to the *vidyā* and has therefore been mentioned in connection with it. The second set also similarly useful, and should be combined in doing the meditation.

SUB - SECTION 2

In this and following sub - sections certain *vidyās* will be examined to see whether the reasons stated for organising them to be the same *vidyā* exist. The first *vidyā* to be considered is that known as *udgītha vidyā*. *Sāman* is the name given to certain *mantras*, which are in verse and are sung; and *udgītha* is the second out of five parts into which every *sāman* is divided ; and *nīti* is sing before certain offerings of *soma juice* are made in *soma yāga*. A meditation on *udgītha* is taught in the *chāndogya* and in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* (See *Vedic Texts*).¹ The *devas* wished to overcome their enemies, the *asuras* by this *vidyā*, and succeeded; and it is stated that whoever does this meditation similarly overcomes his enemies. The termination giving the injunction is not found in the texts ; but as meditation is said to be the means to a fruit, it is assumed that an injunction exists. The *udgītha vidyā* is for the purpose of a *kratu* (offerings); and it enables the reaping of the fruit without obstruction. It cannot therefore yield any fruit of its own; and the mention of the fruit is treated by the *mīmāṃsāka* as mere praise. But it was settled in chapter I-2-3) page 261, that the fruit mentioned in an *arthavāda* may be accepted, provided that the fruits is not opposed to the fruit of the *kratu*. The question for consideration is whether the same *vidyā* is taught in the two *upanishads*. The *first view* is stated in the *sūtra*, and the argument, that may be urged for the *final decision*, is anticipated and is replied to :

6. अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

If it be said : 'Not one, because the description is so' the reply is - 'No because there is no difference'.

The *vidyā* is one. For in both the *upanishads* the *udgītha* alone is to be meditated on as *prāṇa*; the fruit is the same - the overcoming of enemies. The form of meditation is also the same - as the object to be meditated on is one - *udgītha* to be looked upon as *prāṇa*; and the injunction is the same, as the terms conveying to have same meaning, and the name is the same, *udgītha vidyā*.

2. Here an objection is raised from the point of view of the *final decision*. No; the form of meditation is different. In one place *prāṇa* was appealed to and requested to sing the *udgītha*; and *prāṇa* did so. Hence the singer was meditated on as *prāṇa* and in the closing words reference is made by the term 'so' (*evam*) to the singer of the *udgītha* and meditation on him is enjoined. In the other place it is expressly stated that *udgītha* that was sung was to be meditated on as *prāṇa*. Hence of the form the *vidyā* is different;

¹ The original states the narrative contained in both the *upanishads*; but as this will be found in the '*Vedic Texts*' it is omitted here.

and the identity of the injunction and of the rest does not count for anything. For there must be agreement in all the four respects; and non-agreement even in one respect will lead to difference.

3. The opponent replies. No; for in both the places the beginning announces *udgītha* as the means overcoming enemies; and according to the well-known rule giving prominence to the beginning in the determination of a doubtful point (See Introduction, para 24) the reference to the singer in the text "*prāṇa* sang on their behalf" must be taken to refer to the *udgītha* itself, not to the *udgāthā*, the singer. In other words the term denoting the singer should be understood in a secondary sense as in the sentence "Food cooks". Then the form of the *vidyā* would be the same, as the two *vidyās* would be one and the same.

The final decision is next stated :

7. नवा प्रकरणभेदात्परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् ।

But no, because the contexts are different, Like *parovariyastva*, i.e. being higher than the high.

The two *vidyās* are different. For, in the *chāndogya* the meditation is on the syllable, known as *prāṇanva*, which should be prefixed to the *udgītha* and which is therefore a part of it. The *upanishad* begins with the injunction.

Meditate on this syllable, which is a part of *udgītha* and adds.

Description of meditation on this syllable follows (1-1-10).

Then comes the second section of the *upanishad*, which is the subject under consideration. Hence the object to be meditated on is not the whole of the *udgītha*, but only a part thereof – the syllable referred to. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, however, there is no similar beginning to limit the signification of the term to a part, and reference must therefore be taken as made to the whole of the *udgītha*. Hence the two *chāndogya* the meditation is on a part of the *udgītha*, in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* it is on the singer of the whole. Hence, the forms of meditation and the *vidyās* are different.

In the first view reference was made to the beginning rule. The explanation given here does not conflict with it. If the singer of the *udgītha* be meditated on, as *udgītha* is what is sung, it is necessarily required; and it may be regarded as the means of overcoming enemies. It is this that is stated at the beginning of the narrative.

2. On this point the *sūtra* adds an illustration. In the same *upanishad* (See Vedic Texts under chapter I-1-7) meditation on the same syllable as the

highest *Ātmā* is enjoined in two sections ; and yet it is directed in section 6 that He should be thought of as a *purusha* shinning like gold, and in section 9 as higher than the high. The two *vidyās* are therefore different. Similarly here.

8. सज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि ।

"If that (oneness of *vidyā*) be stated; because of name" the reply is - The same name is applied even though what is enjoined differs.

Oneness is name is not conclusive. The name *agnihōtra* is applied to the offering made every day throughout life, and also to the offering made in a *satra yāga* daily for a month and then discontinued (Introduction,, para, 15-vi). The name *udgītha vidyā* is similarly applied to many meditations described in the first chapter of the *chāndogya*.

9. व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् ।

And because it extends to the whole of the chapter it is all right here.

It, i.e., the injunction (to meditate on the syllables a part of the *udgītha*),. Hence it must apply to what is in the middle. A term denoting a whole often indicates a part only, e.g., The cloth is burnt, meaning only a part.

SUB - SECTION 3

The next *vidyā* considered is *prāṇa vidyā*. It is described in the *chāndogya* and *bṛihad āraṇyaka upanishads*. (See Vedic Texts). *Prāṇa* is to be meditated on as being the oldest and the best; and as possessing certain other qualities, which are found in speech, eye, ear and mind for *prāṇa* supports the body and the organs specified, and enables each organ to perform its own function. In the *kaushītaki brāhmaṇa* also meditation on *prāṇa* as being the oldest and the best is enjoined ; but the qualities of speech, eye, ear and mind are not stated as connected with *prāṇa*. The doubt here is whether the *vidyās* are the same or different. The *first view* is that the *vidyās* differ; for the form of the *vidyās* differs. Though *prāṇa* has to be meditated on in both the places as being the oldest and the best, yet in one place the qualities of speech, eye, ear and mind enter into the meditation as connected with *prāṇa* ; in the other they do not enter. The next *sūtra* states the *final decision*. The *vidyās* are the same. Those that follow the *kasushītaki brāhmaṇa* should therefore meditate on the qualities of speech, eye, ear and mind as connected with *prāṇa*.

10. सर्वादादन्यत्रेमे ।

Because of non-difference in anything, these qualities should be added in the other place.

'In the other place' - in the *prāṇa vidyā* of the *kaushītaki*. Why ? because all the reasons urged for regarding *prāṇa* as the oldest and the best are the same in both places. These reasons are that *prāṇa* supports the body and the organs, and makes each organ capable of performing its own function. This was tested by each organ going in succession out of the body for a time; yet the body remained with the other organs, and their functions went on as usual. But when *prāṇa* began to go out, all the organs became paralysed and powerless to do any work. Then speech, eye, ear, and mind stated that they all depended on *prāṇa*, and that their own qualities belonged to *prāṇa* alone. A similar statement by speech and the rest is not found in the *kaushītaki brāhmaṇa* ; but this does not make a difference.

It is stated that speech and the rest, possessing their peculiar qualities mentioned in the *upanishad*, depend upon *prāṇa* for the performance of their functions. This shows that *prāṇa* is the cause of the senses possessing those qualities. And this alone is the connection of *prāṇa* with those qualities.

SUB - SECTION 4

Another matter, which is subsidiary to *prāṇa-vidyā*, will be taken up presently. In the preceding sub-section it was decided that *prāṇa's* being the oldest and the best cannot be meditated on without meditating on the other attributes, and that these other attributes should be added in the *prāṇa vidyā* of the *kaushītakis*. It will now be established that those attributes are to be meditated in all *brahma-vidyās*, without which it is not possible to think of the *svarūpa* of the highest *Ātmā* (the substance, the seat of the attributes).

First view. The attributes in question should be added, where they are not mentioned. There is no ground for doing so; and only those attributes should be meditated on, that are mentioned in a context.

Final decision. This stated in the *sūtra*:

11. आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ।

(In meditations on; *Brahma*) bliss and other attributes should be meditated on; because (*Brahma*) the principal object of meditation does not did)

The term *abhedāt* is brought down from preceding *sūtra* and the meaning will then be as stated. There are certain qualities, without which one can never think of *Brahma*. Bliss is one of these, and the other are stated in the definition of *Brahma* - "Unchanging shining and without limita-

tion is *Brahma* - (*āna.*) In every *vidyā* on *Brahma*, as the object of meditation is the same, and as attributes do not exist apart from an object, His qualities referred to should be meditated on.

Certain other qualities are stated in the *upanishad* further on (V-2 and 3) "Pleasure is his head; *mōda* is his right wing; *pramoda* is his left wing; *ānanda* is his trunk, *brahma* is the tail that supports them all". (See *Vedic Texts* and note under the verse). Are these also to be meditated on? For, the reason given applies; as like bliss and the other qualities they cannot exist apart from Him. The next *sūtra* says no.

12. प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरूपचयापचयौ हि भेदे ।

Having *priya* for the head and the rest do not come in, for with difference of members, there would be thickness and thinness.

For they are not attributes of *Brahma*; they will not therefore be included in the enumeration of the essential attributes, that should come into meditation; they are elements only to make up a representation of *Brahma* in the form of a human being. If He had different members, such as head, wings and tail, some would be large, and some small; some would be thick, and some thin, and this would conflict with the text already quoted as to His unchangeability, and with the text which states that He is neither stout nor lean.

There are certain other qualities of *Brahma*, such as the power to control, generosity (1), and compassion, which similarly cannot exist apart from Him. Are they from this fact to be meditated on in every *vidyā*, even though they are not mentioned in connection with it? Because they are numberless, it will be impossible to meditate on them all. The next *sūtra* explains:

13. इतरेत्वर्थसामान्यात् ।

But the others only, because they are like the object

The others-those first mentioned, viz., bliss and the rest - come into all *vidyās*. For, one cannot perceive *Brahma* without perceiving those qualities also. Meditation on Him must therefore include meditation on them also. *Brahma*, stated to be the world - cause is defined as being *satya* (unchanging) *jñāna* (Shining), *ānanta* (without limitations), and *Ānanda* (bliss). His sub-

(1) The original has two words *gāmbhīrya* and *audāry* both of which mean generosity; but there is a shade of difference between them. see notice (1) on pages 141)

stance (*svarūpa*) can be described only with reference to these qualities, and in order to perceive this svarupa, they must come into the meditation. But the order qualities, like the power to control and the like, are not needed to perceive Him. And though they cannot exist apart from Him, yet they must be meditated on only in those *vidyās*, in connection with which they are specified.

If having *priya* for the head and the rest are not attributes of *Brahma*, why is He represented as something, which He is not? There must be some purpose to be served by this representation, as in the representation of the *jeeva*'s body as a chariot in the *katha valli* (see chap I, sec, 4, sub-section 1)? But this does not, how ever, appear. They must be regarded as the attributes of *Brahma*. The next *sūtra* replies:

14. आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् ।

For meditation, for there is no other purpose.

Meditation is enjoined in the text "One who meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest". For this purpose is necessary to form a conception of Him, who is bliss; and He is divided into *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda* and *ānanda* (all varieties of joy). and these are represented as head, the two wings (*i.e.*, hands) and trunk. Similar representations have been described and for the same purpose in the case of *annārāsamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vijnānmaya* (*āna.*, sections 1 to 4). The attributes under consideration do not enter into the perception of Him.

15. आत्मशब्दाच्च ।

And because the term *Ātmā* is used

That the representation of *Brahma* in this manner is for easy comprehension will be evident from the application of the term *ātmā* to Him in the text.

There is a Being known as *ānandamaya*, who is other than this *vījñānmaya* and who is within it. He is the *Ātmā* (*āna.*, V-2).

An *ātmā* has no divisions as head, wings and tail.

In the previous sections of the *upanishad* (sections II-2 and III-2) the term *ātmā* has been applied to *prāṇa* and mind which are not *ātmās*. How can it be decided that in the text quoted under the preceding *sūtra*, the term really denotes an *ātmā*? The *sūtra* replies:

16. आत्मगृहीतिरितरबदुत्तरात् ।

The term *Ātmā* refers (to *Brahma*) as in other places, from what follows.

In the text under consideration the term *ātmā* does for to *Brahma*, as in texts like the following; "Before creation this (world) was *Ātmā* indeed; one only; He lied I will create the worlds" (*aita* I-1-1), And this supported by what follows; "He (the Being full of as) desired 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve'" (*āna.*, VI-2).

17. अन्वयादिति चेत्स्याद्वधारणात् ।

If it be said "(one cannot be sure of this because the term was previously applied to what was not *ātmā*' the reply is - 'There is certainty, because of the affirmation'.

At first there is the text "From the *Ātmā* came forth ether"(*āna.*, I-2); and He occupies the mind. This idea of the highest *Ātmā*, as the world-cause, was transferred in succession to *prāṇa*, to mind, to the *jeeva* and finally to the Being of bliss, and there it rests; because there is nothing beyond. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage quoted. Thus, the application of the term even in the beginning to things, which are not *Brahma*, was from the notion that they were. Hence, the conclusion is free from all flaws (1).

SUB - SECTION 5

In this sub-section the question in *prāṇa vidyā* left over for consideration in sub-section 3 is taken up. In both the *upanishads* (See *Vedic Texts* under sub-section 3) after prescribing a meditation on *prāṇa* as the oldest and the best, water is mentioned as the clothing of *prāṇa* (*chāndo.*, V-2-2) and (*bṛihad.*, VIII-1-14).¹ The question for consideration is whether what is enjoined is *āchamāna*, or meditation that the water sipped in *āchamana* is the clothing of *prāṇa*.

(1) This is what the opponent means. From the beginning rule (Intro para 24) a subsequent text should be understood as to agree with a text at the beginning 'the meaning of the latter cannot be settled with reference to the former. In the reply attention is drawn to what precedes even the beginning, and it is shown that the succeeding text does not nullify the text at the very beginning. Why then is the term *Ātmā* applied to other things? The reply is that the application was that they were the highest *Ātmā*; and in each case by showing that there was another within it, the conception was withdrawn from it, and was fixed on this inner thing; and this went on, till the *ānandamaya* was reached. As there was nothing within Him other than Himself, and as he is said further on to have willed, the conception that He is *Ātmā* and the highest *Ātmā* became established.

¹ The original quotes portions of the *upanishads* bearing on the point. As they are stated in '*Vedic Texts*' they are omitted here.

First view. In the *mādhyandina* reading the termination denoting injunction is found in connection with *āchamana*, but not in connection with meditation. Hence, one *āchamana* being prescribed by the *smṛitiḥ* as part of the taking of food, another *āchamana* is enjoined as subsidiary to *prāṇa vidyā*. This view is taken on the strength of the injunction. The reference to the clothing of *prāṇa* is mere praise.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

18. कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् ।

A new thing (is enjoined), because it is the business of the *veda* to enjoin what has not been taught already.

The *sūtra* take the latter view; because this has not been taught already. The *veda* serves its purpose, only when it teaches something to be newly done. As to *āchamana* it is already enjoined by the *smṛitiḥ*; and referring to the water sipped under this injunction, it is taught that the water should be regarded as the clothing of *prāṇa*. This appears from the sentences at the beginning and end. In the beginning there is the query of *prāṇa*. "What will be my clothing" and the reply is "Water is the clothing". The closing words of the *upanishads* state "They clothe (*prāṇa*) with water" and "They make that *prāṇa* other than naked". Hence in the *chāndogya* reference is made only to clothing with water; but not to *āchamana* (1).

SUB - SECTION 6

In the *śāndilya vidyā* taught in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* and *agnirahasya* a meditation is prescribed on the highest *Ātmā* as abiding in the heart of man, and as possessed of certain attributes.¹ The question for consideration is whether the same *vidyā* is taught in the two *upanishads*.

First view. Though there is agreement in respect of the fruit, the injunction and the name of the *vidyā*, its form differs, for in one place reference is made to the possession of an unfrustrated will, and in the other

(1) Preceding this topic there is the injunction that the food offered to all animals should be meditated on as the food of *prāṇa*; and by the side of this another meditation on the water sipped in *āchamāna* as the clothing of *prāṇa* is clearly intended. The termination denoting injunction is found in connection with *āchamāna* only in the *mādhyandina* text, but not in the others. Hence the conclusion stated stands.

¹ The description of the *vidyā* in the original by quotations is submitted here, as it is given in the 'Vedic Texts.

to being the controller of all, the lord of all and the supporter of all by will. Hence they are two *vidyās*.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

19. समान एवं चाभेदात् ।

And the set of qualities being thus the same (the *vidyās* are one); because there is no difference.

The same set of qualities is stated in both - perceivable with a pure mind, and having a brilliant body; and the following addition is made. In one "He controls all; He is the lord of all; and he supports all this, whatever exists". In the other "with an unfrustrated will". These additions do not differ. The addition made in one place is an amplification of the addition made in other. For, having an unfrustrated will, the highest *Ātmā* controls all and supports by His will, Being the lord of all is also useful; for the control over one, that is not His own, may suffer obstruction occasionally ; but as everything is His own, He may control them at His pleasure. Hence, the form being the same, the *vidyā* is one (1).

SUB - SECTION 7

See *bṛihad āraṇyaka* (Vedic Texts), which describes meditation on the unchanging *Purusha* in the sun's orband on the unchanging *Purusha* in the right eye as having a body made up of three *mantras*. Two secret names are stated - *ahar* of the former and *aham* of the latter; and meditation on these names is subsidiary to the other meditation. The question is whether each name is connected with the *Purusha* in regard to whom it is stated, or whether both may be connected with either indifferently.

First view. The Being to be meditated on is the same - the unchanging highest *Ātmā*, whose body is made up of the three *mantras*; and as He is connected with both the places, He is one; the form of *vidyā* is therefore one, and the fruit and the rest are also one. The *vidyā* is therefore one; and the names may be meditated on in the *vidyā* on one or the other *Purusha*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

(1) Here the opponent may contend - Both the *upanishads* are portions of the same branch of the *veda*; and the repetition in one of what is stated in the other without any difference cannot be explained as in *sūtra* 2, with reference to difference in the persons learning the *vidyā*. Nor is it possible to justify the repetition as serving some purpose. Hence there are two *vidyās*. *Reply.* The repetition serves the purpose of explaining what is stated briefly in one place, and it is usual to mention a thing briefly and then to explain it.

20. सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ।

Similarly elsewhere also, because of the connection.

The reasoning in the preceding sub-section is applied here by the opponent. There, as the same attributes were found in the object of meditation, it was held that the form of meditation was the same, and that the attributes mentioned in both places should be combined. Similarly, the object of meditation being the same here also, both the names should be combined in each meditation. The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra* :

21. न वा विशेषात् ।

But no , because of difference.

The object of meditation differs. Though it is the highest *Ātmā* in both the *vidyās*. He is to be meditated on in one as being in the orb of the sun; and in the others as abiding in the right eye of man. Hence the form of the *vidyās* differ. In the *śāndilya vidyās* the place of meditation does not differ; for in both it is the heart.

22. दर्शयति च ।

And the text shows this.

This - that the attributes mentioned with reference to the orb of the sun and with reference to the eye should not be combined. The text is

That which is the form of that *Purusha* (*Purusha* in sun's orb), the very same is the form of this *purusha* (*Purusha* in the eye) (*Chāndo.*, 1-7-5).

This special application of the form indicates that the form of the first mentioned does not apply to the next one of itself, and that the two *Purushas* are different (1).

SUB - SECTION 8

The following text occurs in the *yajur veda*. "By *Brahma* invincible powers have been obtained; this invincible *Brahma* pervaded heaven before (the birth of *Indra*); *Brahma* appeared before all beings; who is fit to quarrel

(1) What is stated above requires some explanation. The meaning of the opponent is that the beginning and end are alike, and that the name being one , viz, *vyāhṛti vidyā* the meditation is one, and that therefore the *vidyā* may be done in one place or another, and with either name. The *final decision* denies that the beginning and the end are alike. The beginning mentions two persons, and this number indicates difference in the principal objects of meditation. In the end also the fruit of meditation on the *Purusha* in the sun's orb is stated, and after finishing this the other *vidyā* is dealt with.

with this *Brahma*". Here two attributes are mentioned - obtaining invincible powers and pervading heaven; but not after commencing description of any particular *vidyā*. Are they to be included in every meditation? Thus *sūtras* says no:

23. सम्भृतिद्युव्यास्यपि चातः ।

The obtaining. of invincible powers and the pervading of heaven (should also be restricted); for the same reason.

Even though the text is not connected with any particular *vidhyā*, and the attributes should therefore be included in all, yet because the places differ, the attributes should be restricted (1). Why? Because in *vidyās*, in which the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as abiding in a small place like the heart, it is not possible to think of Him also as pervading heaven. The other attributes, being connected with it, shares the same fate.

2. *Objection*. In the *śāṇḍilya vidyā* and *dahara vidyā* considered in chapter I-1-2 and I-3-5, in both of which the highest *Ātmā* abiding in the heart is meditated on the following description occur - "larger than the earth", and "As large as this ether is, so large is the ether within the heart". How is it possible to meditate on Him as being in the Heart and at the same time as being larger than earth or ether? *Reply*. The large size is not intended to form a part of the meditation. The fact that in Himself He is without limitation is stated (1).

(1) For a precedent see *pūrva mimāṃsā*, III-6-1. The text 'He whose *juhū* is made of *prāṇa* wood, does not hear unpleasant statements, occurs unconnected with any place in which a *yāga* is enjoined.' The question was considered whether this applies equally to *prakṛiti* and *vikṛiti yāgas*. (For the meaning of these terms see Introduction, para 31). It might be thought that as the *juhū* is used for making offerings in both, the injunction applies to both. This was the *first view*. The *final decision* is that it applies to *prakṛiti yāgas* only. For in a *vikṛiti yāga* the *juhū* finds no place, before the ritual of a *prakṛiti yāga* is adopted for the *vikṛiti yāga*; and when this adoption is made the condition that the *juhū* should be made of *prāṇa* wood will come along with the *juhū* from the *prakṛiti yāga*.

(1) *Another objection*. Among the attributes, which should enter into every *vidyā* as stated in sub section 4, that of being without limitations is one; and in this is included absence of limitation in place, How is it possible to think of this aspect in the *śāṇḍilya* and *dahara vidyas*? *Reply*. As the highest *Ātmā* is by nature all pervading this aspect may be thought on by meat the same time, as he thinks that out of infinite mercy. He is present in his heart to help him. There is no incongruity in this; one aspect pertaining to nature and the other due to a limiting place. If the meditation were as stated by the text under consideration, there would be two limitations- one by

SUB - SECTION 9

This deals with *Purusha vidyā* taught in the *chāndogya* and *taittirya upanishads*. See *Vedic Textst*. The question for consideration is whether the *vidyās* differ or not.

First view: They are one, First the name is the same, viz., *Purusha vidyā*. Next, meditation on the attributes of a person as the parts or adjuncts of a *yajna* is taught, and this is the same in both; hence the form is the same. In the *taittirīya* no fruit is mentioned. But in the absence of a conflicting fruit (for that would lead to a difference in the *vidyās*), the one ness of name and form makes one recognise the *vidyā* as one; and as what is not mentioned in one place may be supplied from another, the fruit stated in the other. *upanishad*, which is itself the fruit of *Purusha vidyā*, should be added the *taittirīya*. The result is that the same fruit is connected with the *vidyā*. Hence, the same *vidyā* is taught in both the places (1).

Final decision: The *vidhyās* differ. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

24. पुरुषविद्यायामपि चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् ।

And in *Purusha vidhya* too (the *vidyās* differ) ; because what is stated in one place is not stated in the other.

Thus in the *taittirīya* the parts of the day - morning, midday and evening - are stated to be *savānas* (See note in *Vedic Texts*) ; while in the other man's life - period divided into three parts are to be so regarded. Next hunger, thirst and abstinecne from sexual intercourse are to be looked upon as *dīkshā* according to the *chāndogya*; but this is not found in the other. On the other hand the meditator should think of himself as the *uajanmāna* (doer

the size of the heart, and the other by the size of earth or ether; and the resulting sizes would conflict. This reply removes a still further objection. The text under consideration describes the highest *Ātmā* as He is no meditation is stated; and there is therefore no room for any enquiry. *Reply*. In the case of being who is omnipresent, the statement that He pervades heaven can serve no purpose other than that He should be meditated as so limited.

(1) *Objection*. At the end of the *upanishad* this statement is made: "He attains the greatness of *Brahma*". How can it be said that no fruit is mentioned ? *Reply*. A mere meditation on man is not meditation on *Brahma*; and the fruit referred to as stated is inapplicable to it. As *Brahma vidyā* is dealt with in the preceding section of the *upanishad*, the sentence should be taken out and added therein.

See the precedent in *pūruva mīmāsmā*, III-3-13. A text prescribing three *upasads* for a *soma yāga* with one *sutyā* day and twelve for *ahīna yāgas* occurs in a place that

of *yāga*), and his faith as the wife according to the *tattirīya* ; but this is not taught in the other. Hence the form of *vidyās* differs.

2. Similarly the fruit also differs. In the *tāttirīya* in the preceding section one is asked to offer himself to *Brahma* in these words - "Offer yourself with the *prāṇava mantra* saying 'for you, the great *Brahma*' This is a *brahma vidyā* : and its fruit is next stated "He reaches the greatness of *Brahma*" Then follows the section dealing with *Purusha vidyā*. It means that the person who does the meditation should also meditate on himself as *yajna*, *Purusha vidyā* is therefore a *vidyā* subsidiary to *brahma vidyā* and has the same fruit as the other. For the rule is that when a thing is mentioned without fruit by the side of another with fruit, the former is subsidiary to the latter. The *Purusha vidyā* in the *chāndogya* yields as its fruit the attainment of a full life. As both the form and fruit differ the two *vidyās* are not identical (1).

SUB - SECTION 10

In the preceding sub-section it was decided that the *Purusha vidyā* taught by the side of a *brahma vidyā* was connected with it as a subsidiary *vidyā*. The opponent in this sub - section proposes to extend this rule to certain *mantrās* and to certain *karmas*, which are stated in *upanishads* by the side of *brahma vidyās*. They are as follows:

(1) Pierce through the bright body (of my enemy) pierce through the heart (*atharva upanishad*); (2) *Deva, savitah*, permit the *yajna* to be done (*sāme veda*); (3) May *Mitra* be the yielder of happiness to us; may *Vāruṇa* be the yielder of happiness (*taittirīya*); (4) you are a horse white, green and blue (*sātyāyanin*). The *aitareyins* begin their *mahāvrata brāhmamṇa* thus; "*indra* killed *vṛitra* and became great". The *kaushūtakīs* also begin the same with the text - *Prajāpati* is the year;

deals with the *jyotiṣṭoma yāga*. A *sutyā* day is the day in which the offerings of the *soma* juice are made. There is only one such day in the *jyotiṣṭoma yāga*; and a *yāga*; in which there are more than *sutyā* day up to twelve is known as *ahīna* and this is its recognised meaning. It is therefore decided that the portion of the text prescribing twelve *upanishads* for *ahīna yāgas* should be taken out of the context.

(1) *Question*. Why is reaching the greatness of *Brahma* stated at the end of section of the *upanishad* dealing with *purusha vidyā*. *Reply*. The mention of the fruit in the former section is to show that one, that desires it, should carry out the injunction as in the text "He that desires *svarga* should do *yāga*". In the next section the subsidiary meditation is described; and the fruit of the *brahma vidyā* with its helper is stated at the end.

this *mahāvrata* is his *Ātmā*; and the *vājasaneyinas* begin the *pravargyua brāhmaṇa* with the words "*Devas performed satra*".

The question for consideration is whether those *mantras* and *karmas* are connected with *brahma vidhyas* and serve them or not.

First view : They are so connected; for they are taught together in the same place.

2. An objection is raised - They are connected with *karmas*, each with each, by authorities like *śruti*, *linga* and *vākya*, all of which are stronger than the authority known as *sthāna* or place. The first text is a prayer to a *devatā* in a *yāga* done for destroying one's enemy; and the *mantra* is connected with it from the capacity (*linga*) of the term 'pierce though'. Other *mantras* are similarly connected by *linga* or *śruti*. The *karma* as *pravargya* though described without reference to anything else, is known to be subsidiary to *jyotishtoma* from text "They do *pravargya* before *upasad*". and *upasad*, as is well-known, serve the *jyotishtoma yāga*. In the same way the *karma* known as *mahāvrata* serves what is known as *gavamayāna*. How can they be said to be connected with *brahma vidyās* ?

Reply. Be this as it may (1). The text no.3 and the corresponding *mantra* 'may he guard us together' have no use elsewhere, and being included in the *upanishads*, where *vidyās* are taught, they must be subsidiary to *vidyās*. Hence these *mantras* be utilised in all *vidyās*.

Question again. Why is this sub-section added. The only thing common to the two *vidyās* is the name, while the difference in the form is patent. *Reply*. The intention is to show that the *nyāsa vidyā* in *taittirīya* is principal and that the *purusha vidyā*, which follows it, is subsidiary to it.

One more question. If the meditator in the *purusha vidyā* is to meditate on his belongings as parts of *yajna*, why are certain things like the *chātumāsya* which are not parts of *yajna*, mentioned in the *upanishad* ? *Reply*. The intention is merely to praise one that does the *nyāsa vidyā*. In this view there is no *vidyā* in the *taittirīya*; and the oneness contended for in the *first view* fails.

(1) Though they are connected with *karmas* as stated, they may yet be connected with *vidyās* also, so that their inclusion in the *upanishads* may not become useless. There is a precedent for this in the *pūruva mīmāṃsa*. There is a direction to build the place for the *āhavanīya* fire with specially - made bricks so as to be of the shape of a bird; and one is directed to do the *jyotishtoma yāga* with this fire. Here the direction which is *vākya*, nullifies the place (*sthāna*) authority, which connects *jyotishtoma* with a fire - place made in the usual way as described in that context. Yet this latter fire becomes also useful, when the brick - made fire is not resorted to. Similarly here. *Reply*. This explanation is untenable. To apply the *mantras* to *brahma-vidyā*, it will be necessary to resort to secondary meanings; but the words themselves indicate connection with particular *karma*, but not with *vidyās*, and this cannot be got over (*bhava*).

Final decision. They are not subsidiary to *vidyās*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

25. वेदाद्यर्थभेदात् ।

Because they are for destruction and other purposes.

The first text is applied to a *karma* to bring about the destruction of one's enemy; and the use of the other texts is stated by the objector in paragraph 2 of the *first view*. This is patent. Similarly the third text and the text quoted by the opponent in the same paragraph are connected with learning the text of the *veda*. For, further on in one of the *mantras* the following words occur : "I will recite *ṛitam* (1); I will recite *satyam*". This is stated in beginning the learning; and when it is closed for the day, the words are 'I recited *ṛitam*. I recited *satyam*'.

In the other *mantra* the latter portion is "May the text recited by us (teacher and student) be bright (*i.e.* efficacious). May we not dislike each other". These marks clearly connect the *mantras* with learning the text of the *veda*. This is done by the teacher's reciting a text and the students repeating it after him.

2. The argument in paragraph 2 of the *first view*, that the inclusion in the *upanishads* indicates a connection with *brahma vidyā*, is not correct. The inclusion is for another purpose. They have to be recited in the day, and in a desert place, where they will not be heard by women and by those that have not gone through the *upānayāna*, ceremony. As the *upanishads* are of this description, the *mantras* and the portion dealing with *pravargya* and *mahāvratā* find a place in them.

SUB - SECTION 11

The following texts state that one, that does *brahma vidyā*, should include in it the thought that he abandons his *karma* good and bad deeds, and that they go to his friends and enemies respectively. They are :

(i) Shaking off *karma* as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rāhu* (in an eclipse) and throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma*-world the purpose of my life having been attained (*chāndo.*, viz., VIII-13-1); (ii) Then the meditator shaking off good and bad deeds, and free from all touch of matter; attains the highest likeness to Him (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-3) (iii) His sons take

(1) The terms *ṛitam* and *satyam* refer to the texts, as they are unchanged either in the letter or in meaning.

his property; his friends his good deeds; his enemies his bad deeds (*sātyāyāna*); and (iv) Then, he shakes off good and bad deeds; his dear cousins take the good deeds, his enemies his bad deeds (*kaushītaki*).

Thus, the abandonment of *karma* is stated in two texts; its going to friends and foes in one; and both in the last. Meditation on both points should form part of all *vidyā*. For the meditator, whatever be his *vidyā*, in reaching *Brahma* should shake off his good and bad deeds, and what is shaken off should go to some one (1). The question for consideration is whether the meditation may be one or the other point or on both at pleasure or on both without option.

first view. The former is the proper alternative; for the points are stated in various ways. Their combination in every *vidyā* could not have been intended; for as this would follow from the fourth text, the reference to them in the other texts would serve no purpose. This objection cannot be got over on the plea that the teaching is conveyed to different students; for the only case in which this will be a satisfactory explanation is stated in *sūtra* 2 of this section - i.e. repetition without difference; but here the statement is not the same. Nor can the objection be answered with reference to difference in *vidyās* for it has been stated to be a part of every *vidyā*.

Final decision. Both points should be meditated on in every *vidhyā*. The reason is stated in the *sūtra*:

26. हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाछन्दस्स्तुत्युपगानवत्तदुक्तम् ।

In the mention of abandonment (the other is implied), for the text as to disposal is subsidiary to the other text; as in the case of *kuṣū*, metre, stotra and upagāna; this is stated.

The meaning is that, when only one point is mentioned (1), the other also is meant; and that both should be combined. Because the texts as to the disposal of the good and bad deeds supplement the information conveyed in

(1) The mention of both the points is for the purpose of meditation, like the place, in which the object of meditation should be located and like His attributes. The purpose is not merely to state the fruit; for in the *śāṇḍilya vidyā* it is stated; 'Departing from here, I shall reach Him'. (*chāndo.*, III-14-4). Here meditation on one variety of fruit is enjoined in the first text this is connected with the abandonment of good and bad deeds; and in the fourth text this again is connected with their disposal. Hence both points should be included in meditation.

(1) The term *hānau* (in the abandonment) is intended to include the other, i.e. the disposal also. Hence when one of them is mentioned, it should be combined with the other.

the other set of texts ; and this is appropriate; the former set explains what becomes of the *karma* when abandoned. It does not matter that the two sets are found in different places. There are precedents for this in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* : There is the text “*kuṣas* are parts of a tree”. another text states “*kuṣas* are parts of the *udumbara* tree; and the latter text is taken to explain the former. The term *kuṣā* means pegs used by the *udgātā* in counting the number of times songs are repeated (1). Next, the text “with the metres of the *devas* and *asuras*” does not state the order in which they should be taken. The term *devāsura* in the original is a compound; and though its members occur in a certain order, a rule of grammar requires that the word with fewer syllables should come first. The order in the compound is not therefore conclusive. Another text is needed; and this is found in another place thus : “The meters of the *devas* term *devasura* come first” Next, the text ‘Let him cause the *stotra* of the *shodasi graha* (2) to be commenced with gold’, does not state when this should be done. Another text states” when the sun is half set, he causes the *stotra* of the *shadoṣi graha* to be commenced’. Lastly, the general permission to the helpers in a *yāga* to sing with the *udgātā* ‘*ritviks* sing along with the *udgātā*’ is limited by the text. “The *adhvaryu* shall not sing”.

If it not admitted that one text in one place stating a thing in general terms can be explained or limited by another text in another place, it must be assumed that option is given to the meditator; but its exercise is objectionable, as long as any other course is open; and this principle is laid down in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (X-8-1). See Introduction, para 36. Thus the texts mentioning only abandonment of *karma* and only its going to others form a connected whole; and as neither one nor the other by itself exists, there is no room for the exercise of option. The mention of both in the *kaushītaki* is explained with reference to the difference among the person taught.

(2) In a *soma yāga* the *yagātā* and his two assistants have to sing certain *mantras*, which are known as *stotras*. Each verse sung is known as *stotrīya*, and in each *stotra* there should be a fixed number of *stotrīyas*, nine fifteen seventeen or twenty one. In many cases, there are only three verses and therefore only three *stotrīyas*. The number required is made up by repeating the *stotrīyas* There are three rounds, in each of which one *stotrīya* is sung more than once, and the others but once.

(3) In a *soma yāga* the juice of the *soma* creeper is offered in small cylindrical vessels, known as *grahas*. Of these many are offered after the *udgātā* sings a *stotra* and the *hotā* recites a *ṣastra* (a number of verses from the *ṛikveda*). The sixteenth offering thus made is known as the offering of the *shodasi graha*.

SUB SECTION 12

In the preceding sub-section reference was made to the abandonment of good and bad deeds by a meditator. When does this take place? Is it partly at the departure from the body, and partly on the way to the highest heaven, or wholly when he departs?

First view. It is the former alternative; for so is it stated. The *kaushītaki* begins with these words;

He reaches the way known as the *devayāna*, and goes to the world of *agni* and concludes thus:

He comes to the stream *virajā*; he crosses it with his mind (*i.e.*, an effort of the mind); then he throws off good and bad deeds.

Thus is authority for the abandonment on the way. On the other hand the time is stated to be the moment of departure (see the first text quoted in the preceding sub - section from the *chāndogya*); also the *ṣatyāyāna* text, which shows that it takes place at the same time as the sons take the property of the departed. Hence a part is abandoned at the time of departure from the body, and the remainder on the way.

Final decision: The whole of the *karma* is abandoned at the times of departure from the body. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

27. साम्परायेतर्तव्याभावात्तथाह्यन्ये ।

(The abandonment of *karma* takes place) at departure, because of the absence of enjoyment; for so other declare).

Because after such departure there is no more fruit of good or evil deeds to be expended by enjoyment. The only thing that remains is the fruit of *brahma vidyā viz.*, the reaching of *Brahma*. And this is what some *upanishads* say:

One that is without a body welcome and unwelcome thing do not touch (*chāndo.*, VII-12-1); For him there is delay only so long as he is not released (from the body). Then he is united to *sat* (*Ibid.*, VI-14-2); This *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light and appears in his own form (*Ibid.*, III-12-2).

28. छन्दत उभायाविरोधात् ।

(The text to the contrary should be interpreted) at pleasure, so that both may not conflict.

Reference is made to the *kaushītaki* text quoted in the *first view*. In the preceding *sūtra* the decision was arrived at from a consideration of the nature of things. In order that this decision and the text may not conflict, the last part of the text "He throws off good and bad deeds" should be placed before the beginning, as the sentence stands at present. This follows the rule stated in Introduction, para 26 (iii).

Here the opponent comes forward with an objection;

29. गतेरर्थवत्वमुभयथाऽन्यथा हि विरोधः ।

The text regarding going on the path will have a meaning only (on the hypothesis of *karma* being abandoned) in both ways. Otherwise, there will be contradiction.

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If all *karma* is left behind at departure, even the subtle body must disappear. Then the *jeeva* by himself cannot go, being a minute atom; and the capacity to do anything at will has not yet come.

The next *sūtra* replies.

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30. उपपन्नस्तद्वृत्त्यर्थोपलब्धेर्लोकवत् ।

The theory is appropriate, because the fact of a released *jeeva* being connected with a body is seen, as in ordinary experience.

The theory that all *karma* is left behind at departure is appropriate. Because it is known that a *jeeva*, that has left all *karma* behind, and has attained his own nature, may still have a body. Referring to one, that has reached the highest Light and attained his own nature, it is said:

There he enjoys Him all round; he eats, enjoys (as he pleased); he amuses himself with women, carriages, or cousins (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2 and 3); He becomes free, and he can go about at pleasure in all words (*Ibid.*, VII-25-2); and He appears as one; appears as three; as five (*Ibid.* VII-26-2).

Hence, one, whose *karma* has disappeared, may retain the subtle body and proceed on the *devayāna*. *Question*. But does not even the subtle body go with the *karma*, which brought it into existence? *Reply*. It remains owing to the peculiar merit of the *vidyā*. The *vidyā* did not bring it into existence; but it retains it in order that the *jeeva* may perform the journey. Such a thing is seen in the world. People dig a tank for irrigation; and even when this purpose has been served, and even when this purpose has been served, and motive for the excavation has disappeared, and tank is retained in a good condition for drinking purposes.

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The opponent raised another objection; If what is stated be a fact, how does it happen taht the stage *Vasishta* for instance, who has seen the highest Being, entered into another body, when he died, and experienced pleasure at the brith of a son and greif at his death? The next *sūtra* replies:

31. यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ।

Those holding certain offices, have some *karma* left. so long as the office lasts.

It is not asserted that every wise man abandons good and evil deeds at death., This is true only of those that depart from the body to enter on the *devayāna*. *Vasishta* held an office in the economy of nature; and he did not enter on the *devayāna*, when he died; because his office had come to him as the fruit of *karma*, and it continued. This *karma* remains as long as the office lasts (1).

SUB SECTION 13

In the *upakosala* and other *vidyās* journey on the *devayāna* is described. See *Vedic Texts*. Is progress on this path limited to those that do these *vidyās*, or is it common to them and all others also?

First view. It is limited; for it is not mentioned in connection with other *vidyās*; and there is no authority for extending it to them (1).

Final decision; There is no limitation. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

32. अनियमस्सर्वेषामविरोधशब्दानुमानाभ्याम् ।

No limitation. If common to all, there will be no conflict with the *veda* and *smṛitis*.

(1) It should be noted that though no *karma* is left at the point of death that will yield fruit, there is still some small portion, which prevents the full expansion of the attributes *jnāna*. Even this disappears, when the highest *Ātmā* is reached.

2. *Objection*. *Chāndogya*, V-10 and the corresponding portion os the *bṛihad āranyaka* (VIII-2) bring up before the mind all other meditators. *Reply*. It is not made out they do so. If the path were common to all, why is the description in chapter V-10 of the *chāndogya* repeated in chapter IV, section 15 of the same *upanishad* ? The explanation that the students were different cannot be put forward as the repetition occurs in the same *upanishad*. It cannot be contended that progress on the path is taught in one place and that it is repeated in the other; for there is no ground for determining which place teaches for the first time and which repeats the teaching. The purpose of the repetition cannot be to praise the path, as in the preceding section the fire told the student "your teacher will teach you the path "*chāndo*.,IV-14-1). See *Vedic text* under chapter 1-2-3. This shows that the teaching was not complete without instruction on this point, and that is therefore peculiar to that *vidyā*.

Those that do all *vidyās* have to go along the same path. if this were not so, there would be conflict with the teaching of the *veda* and the *smṛitis*. The *bṛihad āraṇyaka* states. "Those that thus meditate on this (the nature of the *jeeva*) (1) and those that in the forest meditate on *Brahma* (*Satyam*) with eagerness, go to light" (VIII-2-15); and the *chāndogya* has the same teaching (V-10-1). Here the term used in the original are *satyam* in one , and *tapas* in the other. The former term denotes *Brahma* from *vedic* usage - "Unchanging, (*satyam*), shining and without limitation is *Brahma*" (*āna.*,1-1) and *satyam* alone should be meditated on" (*chāndo.*,VII-16-1). The other term *tapas* should have the same meaning, as the two texts convey the same teaching (2). The *bhagavad gītā* is to the same effect: "The light of fire, the day, the bright for night, when the moon waxes, the six months of the sun's north ward progress - men that meditate on *Brahma* go on this path and reach *Brahma*" (VIII-24).

2. The repetioin on which the *first view* relies is for the purpose of praise. This is evident from the reference to the performance or non performance of the obsequies of the departed. See the text under consideration in *Vedic Texts*. Or the purpose was to add the information that those that go on the path do not return (3).

SUB - SECTION 14

See the texts in *Vedic Texts* under chapter I-2-5 and chapter I-3-3. They refer to *Brahma* by the term *akshara*, and deny of Him a number of attributes that are found in *jeevas* or matter. The effect of this is to affirm that He cannot be touched by any imperfection, and that His nature is unquie. The question for consideration is whether this nature should be included in all *brahma vidyās*, or only in the *vidyā* in which it is stated.

First view. Only in the particular *vidyā* in which it is mentioned. There is no authority for importing into a *vidyā* the attributes that consitute the form of another *vidyā* ; and being in the form of denial, the attributes denied

(1) The first clause refers to those that do the five fires meditation described in that place; and the second clause to those that meditate on *Brahma*.

(2) Meditation with eagerness is stated elsewhere after referring to meditation on *satyam* "Eagerness should be obtained" (*chāndo.*,VII-19).

(3) The Meditation on the abandonment of *karma* at the point of death, on its going to friends and foes, and on the progress on the *devayāna* are subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*. But as they partake of the nature of meditation, they are included in this section; and the intention is also to distinguish these subsidiary meditations from certain *karmas* which are also subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*, and which are dealt with in the next section.

cannot be useful like bliss and other attributes denied cannot be useful like in the perception of *Brahma*. It is only when the substance has been grasped with their help, that these attributes can be denied; for it is not possible to make a denial, unless the subject regarding which it is made is present.

Final decision: Meditation on this nature of the highest *Ātmā* should form part of every *brahma vidyā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

33. अक्षरधियांत्वबरोधस्सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तुक्तम् ।

The conception of *Akshara* enters into every *vidyā*: because He is the same, and the attributes come into His perception. Like the *mantras* of *upasad*; it has been stated.

Because the objects to be meditated on in all *vidyās* is the same, viz., the highest *Ātmā*; and because also in the perception of that object the nature declared by the denials comes in. An object is perceived by perceiving its specific character, i.e., that character by which it is differentiated from everything else. The possession of bliss and the other attributes stated in subsection 4 does not by itself being before the mind His specific character; for they are found in *jeevas* also. To bliss and rest should be added incompitibility with all imperfections. This feature is not found in the *jeeva*, who though without imperfections in himself, is fit to be connected with them. This trait, which is needed, is the reverse of the attributes found in this universes consisting of matter and *jeevas*; and it is stated in the two texts cited.

The *sūtra* adds an illustration to show that attributes are inseparably connected with the seat of them. In a *soma yāga* in which the offerings of the *soma juice* are repeated on four days, and which is connected with the name of *Jamadagni*, a subsidiary *karma* known as *upasad* is done on twelve days; and the principal offering in it on each day is cake of fried rich flour. This is prescribed in the *yajur veda*, while the *mantras* for making the offerings are stated in the *sāma veda*. The *mantras* have to be recited in an undertone like *mantras* in the *yajur veda*, while those of the *sāma veda* are recited in a loud tone. This follows the principle laid down in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (1).

(1) The principle referred to is as follows: In the *karma* known as *ādhāna* (establishing the three fires) certain *sāma mantras* have to be sung. The *karma* is the principal one, and the singing of the *sāman* is subsidiary to it. As subsidiary things should follow the principal, the *sāman* should be sung in an undertone, as *mantras* in the *yajur veda* are; and not like verses in the *sāma veda*, which should be recited in a high tone (Intro., para 24) *ādhāna* is enjoined in the *yajur veda* (III-3-2)

Here the opponent raises an objection. The object meditated on in every *brahma vidyā* being the highest *Ātmā*, and He being the seat of numberless attributes, which are inseparably connected with Him, they would all come into every *vidyā*, and their limitation to particular *vidyās* would be futile. The next *sūtra* replies:

34. इयदामननात् ।

So much only, for meditation.

Only those attributes come into all *vidyās* without which the highest *Ātmā* cannot be perceived; and they are those stated in sub section 4 and in this sub - section. All other qualities should be taken into account only in those *vidyās*, in which they are specially mentioned.

SUB-SECTION 15

See *Vedic Texts*. *Yājñavalkya* was questioned by two persons. The question was the same.

Tell me about Him, who is *Brahma* in the primary meaning of the term, who is eternal and omnipresent, and who is the inner ruler of all.

The answers were different - To *Ushata* it was

He, who with *prāṇa* does the work of *prāṇa*, is your *Ātmā*, abiding within all and other words to the same effect. To a further question from the same person, the answer was.

Do not see him that sees, do not hear about him that hears, do not think about him that thinks, do not meditate on him that meditates.

The answer to *Kahola*, the questioner, was.

He is the inner ruler of all, who transcends hunger and thirst, grief and confusion, old age and death.

Here the question for consideration is whether one *vidyā* is taught or two *vidyās*.

First view. Two *vidyās* are taught; for their forms are different ; and this follows from the different replies given, though the question was one, In the former reply the worker with *prāṇa* is stated to be the *ātmā* within all, and in the latter one that is without hunger and the rest. Reference is made in the former to a *jeeva*, who breathes, and who is other than the body, the senses, the mind, *prāṇa* and the attribute *jñāna*, and in the latter to the highest *Ātmā*, who is other than the *jeeva*, and who is without hunger and the rest.

2. Here a question is put to the opponet. How can a *jeeva* be the *ātmā* within all ? *Reply.* The *jeeva* has a number of elements forming his body, and he is within them and controls them all. it is no doubt true that this is a

limited control; but there is no help for it. If it be assumed out of a predilection for unlimited control that the highest *Ātmā* is referred to in the first reply, the difference in the replies cannot be got over. The first answer refers to the *jeeva*; for breathing with *prāṇa* can never apply to the highest *Ātmā*; the latter reply refers to Him; for He is without hunger and the rest.

The *sūtra* states this *first view* and then reject it:

35. अन्तराभूतग्रामवत्स्वात्मनोऽन्यथाभेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नोपदेशात् ।

If it be said - "The first reply about being within all pertains to the *ātmā*, the owner of the group of elements, otherwise impropriety in the form of different replies" the reply is - No; like the teaching (in *sad vidyā*)

The *final decision* is stated in the last part of the *śūtra*; Only one *vidyā* is taught. For in both the places the question and answers relate to the highest *Ātmā*. First as to the question. The term *brahma*, though denoting Him only, is sometimes applied to the *jeeva* also in a secondary sense. To distinguish Him from the *jeeva* the epithet *sākshāt* (directly) has been added. The term *aaparākshāt* means one, that is present in one's view; and this will be possible only, if he is connected with all places and with all times, it is appropriate only in the highest *Ātmā*, who is stated to be without limitations in the text "Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*" (*āna.*, I-1). And being within all is also true only of Him. for He is stated to be in everything, beginning with earth and ending with the *jeeva* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-7 to 27). Next, the first reply also relates to Him. It refers to one that does the work of *prāṇa* using it as an instrument, and to one that does this at all times, and not only during waking moments. Such an one is *Brahma*, not a *jeeva*; for in deep sleep he does not do this work. *Ushata* did not grasp the full scope of the answer. He thought that mere working with *prāṇa* was meant, and that this was found in the *jeeva* also. He therefore questioned again. *Yājñavalkya* replied giving an unmistakable mark, that separates Him from the *jeeva*; and that shows that reference was made to one that does the work *prāṇana* (breathing) without any limitation - "Do not look upon the *jeeva* as He that does the work *prāṇana*; for he is dependent upon the senses for seeing, hearing, thinking and meditation; and in deep sleep and in trance he cannot direct *prāṇa*". And the text "Who will attain worldly pleasure (*ānyat*), who will attain the bliss of release (*prāṇyāt*), if this limitless bliss does not exist" (*āna.*, VII) shows *Brahma* alone to be the cause by which all beings live. This is true of the second reply also. For the transcending of hunger, thirst and the rest is His specific attribute. In both the places the closing of the teaching is the same - "Other than He is miserable".

The repetition of the question and reply is for the purpose of showing that the highest *Ātmā*, who makes all beings breathe, is beyond hunger, thirst

and so on. The *sūtra* refers to a parallel case in the *sad vidyā*. That *vidyā* begins with the question of the father. "Did you enquire about that *Adeṣa* (all-controller) etc". *Chāndo.*, VI-I-3); and the son asked "Will you your self, revered sir, tell me" (*Ibid.*, VI-1-7). Again and again he said "Revered sir, teach me further" (*Ibid.*, VI-5-4). The father replied every time, giving further information regarding it. Similarly here.

Here the oppoonent shifts his ground and states that even so, the *vidyās* must differ. In one place the meditation is on the highest *Ātmā* as causing all being to breathe; and in the other as being beyond hunger, thirst and the rest. The attributes being different, the form differs, and the questioners also differ. The *sūtra* replies:

36. व्यतिहारो विशिषन्ति हीतरवत् ।

The instruction given to them should be interchanged The replies differentiate the object of meditation (from the *jeeva*) as in the other place.

The *vidhya* do not differ, for the questions and replies deal with the same Being; and the term conveying the injunction is used only once, after the reply to the second questioner - 'Hence the meditator should attain *pāṇḍitya*, and be like a child'. It is therefore concluded that the two sections of the *upanishad* form a connected whole. first, both the questions refer to the highest *Ātmā* viewed as the inner ruler of all. The word *eva* (only) added in the question of *Kahola* indicates that he referred to the same Being viewed in the same aspect as *Ushasta* did. In both the replies the same Being in the same aspect is stated. As meditation is to be on this aspect only, the form of the *vidyā* is the same. *Yājñavalkya* taught *Ushasta* and *Kahola* how this object should be differentiated from the *jeeva*. For this purpose he referred first to the aspect of making all breathe; next to the aspect of transcending hunger, thirst and the rest. It was his intention that each should view *Brahma* in the aspect pointed out to the other, in addition to that in which He was presented to himself. By this means each would perceive *Brahma* as differentiated from the *jeeva*. Hence the attribute that enters into the *vidhya* is that He is the inner ruler of all. The other two features pointed out serve merely to explain it.

2. *Questions*. If this be so, why should two aspects be stated to differentiate the highest *Ātmā* from the *jeeva*? *Reply*. The aspect presented to *Ushasta* did not satisfy *Kahola*, who wished to know an aspect which could never be found in the *jeeva*; and *Yājñavalkya* knowing his thought replied.

3. In the *said vidyā* by the questions and replies repeated several times the same Being was differentiated in several ways. The object was not, however to require the disciple to meditate on the highest *Ātmā* as clothed in a new attributes at each step. simialrly here also.

Question. How is it known that in the *sad vidyā* too the same *vidyā* is dealt with. when the questions and answers are different? The *sūtra* replies:

37. सैव हि सत्यादयः ।

The same Being, for the statements beginning with 'This is true' (*satya*) are repeated in every reply.

The same Being, that is denoted by the term *sat* and that is the final cause, is held up as the object of meditation in all the sections beginning with the ninth. For, the statements made in the text. "All this is identical with that; this is true; He is *ātmā*" are repeated in all the sections' and the teaching is brought to a close.

Criticism. Some commenctators treat *sūtras* 36 and 37 as forming two separate sub-sections. they consider the following text in the first sub - section "Revered *devatā*, 'I am thou' 'revered *devatā*' Thou art I: hence I am he; and he is I" They state that the text directs that the *jeeva* and *Brahma* should each be regarded as the other. This view should be rejected. for the text does not teach any new thing. The identification of *Brahma* with everything is already known from the texts "All this is indeed *Brahma*; All this is identical with that (*sat*); That thou art". It is not correct view that *Brahma* should be thought on as the *jeeva*, and that the *jeeva* should be thought on as *Brahma*. The only correct view is that *Brahma* is the *ātmā* of all, and is therefore the *ātmā* of every *jeeva*. One should therefore meditate on *Brahma* as his *ātmā*. This will be taught in *sūtra* IV-1-3.

2. They consider the following text in the second - section; He that meditates on that (the heart) as the great respected, first born, *satya*, *Brahma*'. The term *satya* means the Being, who appears as *sat* (the unlimited ether and air), and as *tyad* (the limited fire water and earth) *Vide bṛihad.*, VII-5-1). This text enjoins meditation on the heart as *satya*. They regard this meditation and the meditations considered in sub - section 8 supra as one. This view also is incorrect. It has been shown already in that sub - section that there are two meditations on the *Purusha* in the sun and on the *Purusha* in the eye. The meditation on the heart has a form of its own, and will yield a separate fruit viz., the winning of these worlds. and it is threfore complete. In the other two meditations. *Brahma* should be meditated on as having three *mantras* as parts of His body; and their fruit is destruction and abandonment of *karma*. Hence the form and the fruit are different. How can the meditation on the heart and the other meditations be one?

3. The commentators explain: The meditatives are one; the fruit in the form of the destruction and abandonment of *karma* is not the fruit of the

meditation; It is the fruit of an *anga* - i.e., a subsidiary parts. *Reply.* There is no authority for regarding it such.

4. Further explanation. The authority is that the *vidyās* are one. *Reply.* This would mean; If it be decided that the meditations are one, the fruit in question will be the fruit of a subsidiary part; if the fruit be decided to be of this character, the meditations will be one. This would be arguing in a circle.

5. For this and other reasons the two *sūtras* should be treated as has been done by us.

SUB - SECTION 16

The *dahara vidyā* is taught in the *chāndogya* and *bṛihad āraṇyaka upaniṣhads* thus:

There is in this city of *Brahma* a dwelling place in the form of a small lotus. The small ether (*ākāṣa*) within it and what is within it - both should be sought and be meditated on (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-1); He that was described as the great unborn *Ātmā* lies in the ether (*ākāṣa*) within, the heart of him that was referred to as possessing the attribute *jnāna* and as dwelling in the midst of *prāṇas* He has every one in His grip; He controls every one (*Bṛihad.*, VI-4-22).

Here are there two *vidyās* or is there one *vidyā* only?

First view. There are two *vidyās*, for the object to be meditated on is in one case *ākāṣa*, and in the other He that lies in *ākāṣa*. The attributes also differ; for in one they are the eight qualities beginning with freedom from *karma*, and in the other having every one in His grip and the rest. Hence the forms being different, the *vidyās* are different.

Final decision. The *vidyā* is one. This is stated the *sūtra*:

38. कामादीतरत्र तत्र चायनादिभ्यः ।

The attributes are *satyakāma* and the rest in that place and in the other, because of the mention abode and the rest.

The form of the *vidyā* is the same; for in both places the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on a possessing the quality of being *satyakāma* and the other qualities. This is known from the mention of His dwelling in the heart, and of His keeping the worlds like a bundle from being confounded (See *Vedic Texts*). From these marks the *vidyā* is recognised as one. The attributes mentioned in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text are particular varieties of the attribute of being *satyasankalpa* (having an unfrustrated will), which is included in the

eight qualities enumerated in the other. Hence the attribute of being *satyakāma* and the others mentioned along with it enter into the *vidyā*. Thus the form is the same. The fruit also is the same, as shown by the following texts "Reaching the highest Light, he attains his own nature" (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2) and "He that thus meditates becomes *brahma*, who is free from fear" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25). He becomes like *Brahma*. The term *ākāṣa* denotes *Brahma* in the *chāndogya* (*vide sūtra*, I-3-13); and in the other element ether. From the mention of the attributes the Being that lies in the *akasa* is decided to be the highest *Ātmā*; and *ākāṣa*, in which He lies, must be ether. Compare with the text of *Nārāyaṇa* "The small ethe within it" (*āna.*, 11).

The opponent disputes the correctness of the conclusion reached. This is his argument. You assume that the object of meditation possesses certain qualities; but as a matter of fact they are not found in Him. This is affirmed by the texts, which precede and follow verse 22 under consideration:

In this (*Brahma*) there is no difference whatever; one that suspects even a small difference in Him attains *samsāra* after *samsāra* (verse 19); This unlimited, unmoving *Brahma* should be meditated on as possessing oneness (verse 20); That *ātmā* is to be described by no, no (verse 22).

The object to be meditated on is therefore without any quality (*nir-viśeṣa*). Hence the attributes mentioned in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text are stated only to be denied, as grossness and subtleness are denied by the *upanishad* in another place. For the same reason the qualities mentioned in the *chāndogya* are not real. In *vidyās* done to attain release these attributes should therefore be ignored (1).

Hence the *vidyās* differ. The next *sūtra* gives a reply:

39. आदरादलोपः ।

No ignoring of the attributes; because they have been enumerated with earnestness.

They have been enumerated with earnestness as the attributes to enter into meditations done for obtaining release. Thus :

What is within it should be sought (*Chāndo.*, VIII-1-1); He is *Ātmā*; He is free from *karma*; He is free from old age, death, grief, and hunger and thirst. He has unchanging objects of desire; and His will is never frustrated (*Ibid.*, VIII-1-5); He has every one in His grip; He controls every one (*bṛihad.*,

(1) The opponent's meaning is that in the *chāndogya* the meditation is on *Brahma* as possessing attributes for securing certain inferior fruits. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* it is on *Brahma* in His real nature as having no attributes.

VI-4-22). He is the ruler of all; He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of beings; He is the protective bund that keeps the world from being confounded (*Ibid*).

Similar descriptions are found in the *upanishads* also. These attributes are not known from any other source, as the attributes of *Brahma*; hence the view that they are stated here merely to be denied is untenable. The intention of an author may be known from several marks, of which one is stating a new thing; and this mark is present here. Next, the *chāṇdogya* prescribes meditation on *Brahma* as possessing the eight attributes stated, and blames one that does not so meditate.

Those that meditate here on the *Ātmā* and on those unchanging divine qualities and depart, can wander at will in all worlds. Those, that without meditating here on the *Ātmā* and on those unchanging divine qualities depart, cannot wander at pleasure in all worlds (VIII-1-6)

This is another mark of the interest taken by the *upanishad* in this matter. The other *upanishad* exhibits the same interest by mentioning the power of control again and again. This is a third mark. Now how can the *veda*, which loves us more than a thousand parents, teach with interest, like one that deceives, the possession by *Brahma* of qualities, that are unreal, that have to be ignored, and that cannot be known by any other means? Men are already bewildered by being carried on the whirlpool of *samsāra*; and how can it be thought that it further deludes them (1) ?

(1) The absurdity of the opponent's position may be exposed as follows :

Opponent. The mention of attributes is to delude.

Reply. The denial of attributes is from the same intention.

Opponent. The *veda*, which has undertaken to teach what is good for us, cannot delude.

Reply. This remark applies also to mention of attributes.

Opponent. The mention of unreal attributes is for the purpose of securing particular fruits.

Reply. The denial of attributes is for the same purpose. The possession of attributes is a true fact.

Opponent. Meditation as without attributes being for the attainment of release, the negation of attributes states the true fact.

Reply. Meditation as possessing attributes being for the attainment of release, the affirmation states the true fact.

Opponent. That meditation as possessing attributes leads to release is a statement springing from an intention to delude.

Reply. The same remark applies to the other statement.

2. *Question.* How then are the texts quoted by me to be explained ?

Reply. The texts denying difference and affirming oneness show that all things are products of *Brahma* and that they are therefore identical with Him. It is therefore enjoined that they should be seen as one in this respect. After teaching this the *upanishad* proceeds to condemn the seeing of the world as consisting of independent parts, as was previously supposed. In the other text also by the word *iti* reference is made to the form of the material world perceived by other means; and this form is denied of *Brahma*. This therefore differentiates Him, the inner ruler of all, from the world. This point is developed immediately after:

He is other than those that can be perceived by other means; and He is therefore not perceived; He is other than those that fall to pieces; and He does not therefore fall to pieces; He is other than those that are attached and He is therefore not attached; He is other than those that suffer and he does not therefore suffer nor perish (verse 22).

A similar description is found in the *chāndogya* also:

By the old age of the body He does not age; by the killing of the body he is not killed. This city like *Brahma* is not subject to change. In Him all divine qualities are contained (VIII-1-5).

This text shows *Brahma* to be different from everything else, and to be the seat of the qualities mentioned.

The opponent raise another objection. The text quoted as conferring on the meditator the capacity to wander at will in all worlds adds — “If he desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his mere will the fathers come up; and joining them he is respected” *chāndo.*, VIII-2-1). This is a fruit desired by bound *jeevas*. Those that desire release and the attainment of *Brahma* should meditate on Him as possessing qualities. Also, the fruit of *Brahma vidyā* is to attain one’s own nature. The next *sūtra* replies.

40. उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ।

(The fruits referred to are those to be reaped) by one reaching *Brahma* and he does so from that fact, so it is stated.

The statement is thus made:

Opponent. It is not appropriate that the veda should delude, having undertaken to teach us what is good.

Reply. This applies to the mention of attributes also.

This *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light and appears in his natural form. He (who is reached) is the best of all persons. The *jeeva* (on going thither) enjoys Him all round; he eats, enjoys (as he pleases) : he amuses himself with women, carriages or cousins; he does not think of this body lying by the side of (weeping) relations (*chāndo*, VIII-12-2) and 3). He becomes his own master; and he can order at pleasure in all the worlds (*ibid.*, VII-25-2).

This point will be fully dealt with in the next chapter. Hence the conclusion reached in the first *sūtra* remains unshaken.

SUB SECTION 17

This text occurs in the *chāndogya*:

Meditate on this syllable (known as *prāṇava*), which part of *udgītha* (I-1-1).

The singing of the *udgītha* (See *Vedic Texts*) is a part (*anga*) of *soma yāga*. The question for consideration is whether this and similar *vidyās* are essential parts of a *soma yāga*.

First view. They are. For the *vidyā*, though not enjoined in the earlier portion of the *veda*, in which *soma yāga* is prescribed is connected with the singing of the *udgītha*, which is enjoined as an essential part of the *yāga*. In this manner the *vidyā* also becomes an essential part of the *yāga*. There is a precedent for this conclusion. The text 'with *juhū* make *homas*' is found where *soma yāga* is prescribed: and *juhū* is thus connected with the *yāga* as an instrument. Another text states that the *juhū* should be made of *parana* wood; and this is not connected with any *karma*; yet this feature of the *juhū* is connected through it with the *yāga*. Similarly here. The *udgītha vidyā* should be done as a part of the *yāga*; and no separate fruit is needed as a motive for its being done.

2. *Objection.* A fruit is mentioned in the last verse of the same section of the *upanishad*; The *udgītha vidyā* is not therefore an essential part of the *yāga*. *Reply.* It is mere praise (*arthavāda*). For an essential part of a *karma* cannot be connected with a separate fruit (1). Here the fruit is stated in the

(1) This follows the rule laid down in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* *juhū* is an instrument with which offerings are made; and a text states that it should be made of *parna* wood. The text adds the following as a fruit to come from this. He, whose *juhū* is made of *parna* wood, does not hear unpleasant statements", This is mere praise. For, it is not stated that the fruit should be brought about; there is the mere statement that he does not hear. The injunction is therefore for the benefit of the *yāga*. In regard to what exists for the benefit of a *yāga*, there is no question what is its fruit? It is concerned only with the helping of the *yāga*. The mention of the fruit is therefore *arthavada* (IV-3-1)

last verse while, the *vidyā* is enjoined in the first verse. And there is no connection with the injunciton text, as in the following text - "For one that desire cows, in the vessel in which cows are milked" (1). Further, there is a mere statement of what will happen; but there is no injunction. Hence, the *vidyā* should invariably be done in every *sōma yāga*.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

41. तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

The meditation (on *udgītha*) is not compulsory; so does it appears from *vedic* text. Fruit separate *viz.*, non-obstruction.

The *vedic* text in support of the option to meditate or not to meditate is as follows:

With the help of this (the syllable) both do their work-one-that thus meditates on that and one that does not meditate (I-1-10).

This recognises the singing of the *udgītha* without meditating on it. If the meditation were an essential part of the *yāga*, its non-performance would be in-appropriate.

Question. Why is it then enjoined? The injunction should point to a fruit. *Reply.* When the *udgītha* is sung with the meditation, the *yāga* becomes more efficacious; and this is a fruit different from the fruit of the *yāga*. This is stated:

Whatever is done with meditation, with eagerness, and with knowledge of everything being ruled from within by the highest *Ātmā*, that alone becomes most efficacious (I-1-10).

What is becoming most efficacious? *Reply.* The fruit of the *yāga* - going to the heaven - world - is not obstructed and delayed, as it is often obstructed, by the need of a more powerful *karma* to yield its own fruit. The meditation on *udgītha* removes the obstruction; and this fruit is different from that of the *yāga* itself. And this is stated in the *sūtra*. Though the fruit is stated in an *arthavāda*, it may be connected with the injunciton (1). The conclusion is that the *vidyā* is not an essential part of the *soma yāga*, as filling the milking vessel is not an essential part of the *darṣa* and *pūrṇamasa ishtis* (Introduction, para 25).

(1) See Introduction, para 25.

(1) See the footnote on page 92, the portion dealing with the second text.

SUB SECTION 18

In the *dahara vidyā* meditation should be on the highest *Ātmā* (referred to as the small ether (*akasa*) in the heart of man, and on His eight qualities as stated in the text "Those that meditate here on the *Ātmā* and on these unchanging divine qualities and depart, etc". (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-6). See *Vedic Texts*. Here meditation on the *Ātmā* is first prescribed, and then a separate meditation on the qualities. The question for consideration is whether in the meditation on each quality meditation on the *Ātmā* also should be repeated as possessing it or not.

First view. Repetition is not necessary for the qualities pertain to the same *Ātmā* and He can be meditated on but once.

42. प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् ।

Only as in making offerings, this is stated.

Meditation should be repeated. Though the small ether is the seat of all qualities and meditation on Him has been done already, yet His aspect in His nature merely is one thing, and the aspect as invested with each quality is another; and the injunction as to the second meditation refers to Him in these words "He is free from *karma*, free from old age, etc". (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5). Hence the meditation on each quality should be on the small ether as possessing the quality; and meditation on the *Ātmā* is therefore repeated. The *sūtra* gives an analogy. Offerings are made "to *Indra* the king," "to *Indra* the supreme ruler;" and "to *indra*, master of himself". Though *devatā* is the same, the aspects in which offerings are made to him differ; and the offerings are repeated. This is stated in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. "The *devatās* are different; because the aspects differ".

SUB SECTION 19

In the *taittirīya - nārāyaṇa* the *dahara vidyā* is stated in verse 23 of section 10, and then follows the eleventh section - See *Vedic Texts*. The question for consideration is whether this latter section is connected with that verse, and determines who the particular Being is, that is meditated on in that *vidyā*, or whether it is independent, and performs the same duty for all *vidyās*.

First view. The former is the correct view; for the preceding section refers to *dahara vidyā*, and this section mentions the lotus - like heart, and thus connects the two sections as dealing with one subject only (1).

(1) The texts are - "There is a small, pure lotus in the middle of the city (human body), which forms the palace of the highest *Ātmā*; and in it is a small ether (*gagānam*)

Final decision: The latter section is independent. The reason is stated in the *sūtra*:

43. लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्धि बलीयस्तदपि ।

Because the marks are many; it is stronger; that also is stated.

The section exhibits many marks - that is there are many sentences, which take the terms used in many *vidyās* to denote the object of meditation, such as *akshara*, *siva*, *sambhu*, *param brahma*, *param jyotis*, *paratatva*, *paramatma*, and the like, and state that they denote *Nārāyaṇa*. This shows that the Being, who is meditated on in all *vidyās*, who is quite unlike the *universe* and who is bliss, unchanging, shining and without limitations, is *Nārāyaṇa*. The sentences, which state this, are numerous; and being the authority known as *vākya*, they possess greater force than mere context or *prakaraṇa* (See Introduction para 18 (iii) and (iv) and 19). When it is thus settled that this section is common to all *vidyās*, the *dahara vidyā* being one of these, and *Nārāyaṇa* being therefore the object of meditation in that *vidyā* also, the reference to that *vidyā* becomes intelligible.

Objection. In the first verse of this section the words are in the accusative case, and must be connected with the injunction to meditate given in the preceding section. *Reply.* No. For in the term *upāsītavyam* (should be meditated on) used in the injunction, the termination indicates the object of meditation and words in the accusative case will not be appropriate. Also, an examination of the verses, that follow it, shows that the accusative case is used in the sense of the nominative case. The verses are 2, 4, 5, and 12. This will be clear when the original is examined. If the objection be accepted, it will be necessary to regard the nominative case in all these verses as used to mean the accusative case, and to supply the term *upāsīta* (meditate) to govern the words in the accusative case. Hence the objection should be overruled.

SUB SECTION 20

In the *agnirahasya*, which is learnt by those that learn the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, a *kratu* (1) is first described, in which the fire that receives the offerings is placed on an altar made of specially - made bricks piled one over

which is free from grief. What is within it should be meditated on (X-23). "The heart like a lotus bud with its tip downwards" (XI)

(1) *Yāga* is one offering made to a *devatā* *kratu* is a *karma* in which many offerings are made to many *devatās* *Soma yāga* is a *kratu*. the term is also used to denote meditation; hence a *kratu* proper is often described as *yajna kratu*.

another so as to represent the figure of the bird. This will be referred to as brick-made fire. In this *kratu*, which occupies several days, the offerings of the *soma juice*, which constitute the principal *karma* take place on the last day; and they consist of several operations—the crushing of the *soma creeper*, taking its juice and placing the vessels in their places, the singing of *vedic verses* by one set of helpers, which are known as *stotras*, the recitation of verses by another set known as *ṣaṭras* and making the offerings. Then the *agnirahasya* goes on to prescribe certain meditation in imitation of the *kratu*. In these there is no action whatever; but every article, every instrument and every manual operation is mere thought. In this thought made *kratu* the fires to receive the offerings are the mind, speech, *prāṇa*, eye, ear, organs of action and the stomach; and all the activities of each of these are to be regarded as the operations in the real *kratu* - the taking of the *soma juice*, singing *stotras*, reciting the *ṣāstras* and making offerings. And this is to be done throughout one's life. For convenience one fire may be taken - the mind - made fire. That this fire partakes of the nature of meditation is undoubted. The question for consideration is merely whether it is of the nature of action by entering into a real *kratu* consisting of actions, or whether it is of the nature of *vidyā* by entering into a *kratu* consisting of thoughts only. The first two *sūtras* put forward the former view; and the next five *sūtras* refute the same, and establish the latter view.

44. पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात् स्यात्क्रियामानसवत् ।

An alternative to the previous one, from the context (*prakaraṇa*) it is of the nature of action, like the *māṇṣa* operations.

The mind - made fire requires a *kratu*, into which it can enter; but where it is described, there is no injunction to do a *kratu*. The preceding chapter refers to a brick made fire, and this fire, being invariably connected with a *kratu* consisting of action, is brought up before the mind. It may therefore be concluded that option is given to perform the *kratu* either with the brick-made fire or with the mind-made fire; and that therefore the latter is of the nature of action. There is a precedent for regarding what is really of the nature of meditation as partaking of the nature of action by entering into a real *kratu*. In a *kratu* known as *dvādaśāha*, in which the offerings of the *soma juice* are repeated on twelve days, on the eleventh (1) day known as *avivākya* all the operations are carried on mentally, including the taking of the *soma juice*, the placing of the vessels in their places, the singing of the

(1) The day known as *avivākya* is the tenth day of the *dasaratra* which consists of all the days of the *ḍaṣarātra*, which consists of all the days of the *dvādaśāha* except the first and the last. The *avivākya* day is therefore the eleventh day of *dvādaśāha*.

stotras, the reciting of the *śāstras*, the making of the offerings, the bringing back of the vessels to the *hotā*, and the drinking of the remainder of the juice by the helpers concerned. They are thus of the nature of thought only, and yet as they form a part of real *kratu*, they held to be of the nature of action. Similarly here also.

45. अतिदेशाच्च ।

And because the fruit of the brick-made fire is extended to the mind-made fire.

This *sūtra* gives an additional reason for the conclusion stated in the preceding *sūtra*. The text is "Of these each one by itself is as capable as the preceding one". This means that whatever capacity there is in the brick-made fire will be found in the mind-made fire. Hence, as the two fires do the same work, either may be resorted to. And as like the other it helps in the performance of the *kratu*, it is auxiliary to it, and is of the nature of action.

The final decision is stated in the next *sūtra*:

46. विद्यैवतु निर्धारणाद्दर्शनाच्च ।

But it is of the nature of meditation only; because it is so affirmed, and because it is seen.

The view put forward is rejected; for the mind-made fire is connected with a *kratu*, which is itself of the nature of meditation. It is so affirmed in the following text:

They are made with *vidyā* alone; for with *vidyā* alone of one that thus meditates these are made.

As the activities of the mind cannot be built up like bricks, it is evident that the fire is made of thought only, and that it is of the nature of meditation; yet the affirmation here by the particle *eva* (only) of the very same fact is intended to show that it has this character from its connection with a *vidyā*-made *kratu*. A *kratu* of this kind, which the mind-made fire serves, is stated in the very same place.

They (the fires) were established by mind only; by mind alone the altar was made; by mind the *soma juice* was taken in them (mind-made vessels); by mind *stotras* were sung; by mind *śāstras* were recited. Whatever *karma* is done in a real *kratu*, whether the principal offering or anything auxiliary to it, all this was done by mind alone mentally in those mind-made fires.

This shows that the *kratu* also is of the nature of thought.

The opponent disputes the correctness of the reply; on the plea that there is no injunction to do the *kratu*, that no reference is made to fruits,

and that the context relates to a *kratu* consisting of operations in a brick made fire. The next *sūtra* replies:

47. श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः ।

And the conclusion is not affected, because *śruti* and the other authorities are of greater force.

The conclusion - that there is a *vidyā* - made *kratu*, and that the mind-made fire is connected with it - is not affected; for the context cannot prevail over *śruti*, *linga* and *vākya*. See Introduction, para 19. *śruti* has been already quoted under the preceding *sūtra*. *Linga* is as follows:

In regard to one that thus meditates all persons at all times make them, even when he sleeps.

This making of the fires by all beings takes place at all times and is done by the mind; while the brick-made fire is made by a limited number of persons working for a limited time only. The mind-made fire cannot therefore enter through its work into a *kratu* consisting of actions. This indicates that it must enter into a *vidyā made krātu*. The same text is also a *vākya*, which means two words connected together.

The other two arguments are next met:

48. अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् ।

Because of the *adjuncts*, like the difference of other *vidyās*. And it is seen; it has been stated.

The conclusion is supported by the adjuncts of the *kratu*; and they are the taking of the *soma juice* in vessels, the singing of the *stotras*, and reciting of the *śāstras*.

By mind the *soma juice* was taken in them (mind made vessels); by mind *stotras* were sung; by mind *śāstras* were recited.

This *vidyā-made kratu* differs from a real *kratu*, as other *vidyās* like the *dahara vidyā* differ from it. The existence of a *vidyā* - made *kratu* being established, the injunction to perform it may be assumed; and it is seen in other places that an injunction is assumed from a text which has the appearance of a repetition. This is stated in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (1). The fruit is stated in

(1) In connection with an offering in the case of a dead person, the following text occurs - Holding the *samid* (twig) below, he should follow; for he holds it over it in connection with offerings to the *devas*. The particle *hi* occurs (in the original) in the second clause, which shows that it is a repetition. Nevertheless, as the holding of the twig over the *juhū* has not been enjoined elsewhere, an injunction is assumed, and the particle *hi* is ignored (III-4-5).

the text "Of these each one by itself is as capable as that preceding one". This means that whatever fruit is yielded by the brick-made fire through its own *kratu*, that is yielded by the mind-made fire through its own *kratu*.

The argument in the second *sūtra* of the *first view* is next refuted :

49. न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्नहिलोकापत्तिः ।

No, because extension of incidents may relate to likeness in any respect whatever, because it is known as in the statement that one is like Death; no need to go to his world.

When certain incidents of one thing are extended to another thing, it is not necessary that there should be likeness in other incidents also. The two things may be alike in one respect only, i.e., the one to which reference is made. Here is an analogous case "That *purusha*, that appears in that orb. is Death indeed". The incident of destruction alone is extended, as there is similarly in that respect. It does not follow that He should go to the world of Death.

50. परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्त्वनुबन्धः ।

And by the section that follows, the terms denoting the mind - made and other fires should be understood as stated. The addition in the *agnirahasya* is on account of plurality.

The second section of the *agnirahasya* prescribes *avidyā* with a separate fruit; and this is followed by the *vaiṣvānārā vidyā*. Hence it is not correct to say that this portion of the *veda* deals only with *karma Question*. If this be so, why was the *vidyā* under consideration not added in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, Reply. Many are the adjuncts of the fire to be imagined in this *vidyā*; the *vidyā* has therefore been added where the fire is described.

SUB-SECTION 21

51. एक आत्मनश्शरीरे भावात् ।

Some (think that only the qualities of the *Ātmā* - that he knows, acts and enjoys - should be meditated on in all *vidyās*;) because he is in a body.

In *sūtra* I-4-6 it was stated that in all *vidyās* on the highest *Ātmā* one should meditate on himself also, and in (IV-1-3) it will be explained that the meditation should be as being ruled by the highest *Ātmā* from within. The question for consideration is whether the meditator should think of himself only as a knower does and enjoyer, and as being capable of going to the heaven - world and returning here, or as possessing the qualities enumerated in the teaching of *Prajāpati* (*Chāndo.*, VIII-7-1)? The *sūtra* states the *first view*. In the opinion of some the former alternative is the correct one; for the meditating *jeeva* dwells in a body; and while he does so, what has been

stated is his form; and this is near at hand. By meditating on this form alone it is possible for him to reap the fruit of meditation. It is not necessary for one, that desires the heaven - world, and performs the necessary *karma*, to meditate while he does the *karma* on the aspect that he will attain while he reaps the fruit. By meditating only on the qualities of knowing, acting, etc., he may do the means and reap the fruit; and there is nothing to be gained by meditating on a further set of qualities. That case does not differ from the case under consideration; and it is sufficient to meditate, only on the first set of qualities. *Objection.* The meditation should be on the form to be reached; for it is specially stated :

What one meditates on in this world, that he becomes, when he departs from here (*Chāndo.*, III-14-1).

Reply. It is not so; the text quoted refers to meditation on the highest *Ātmā* as stated in the text "How he meditates on Him".

The final decision is stated in the next sūtra

52. व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावभावित्वान्नतूपलब्धिवत् ।

But no. The reverse (of the present aspect), because from meditation on it comes its attainment; like the attainment of the highest *Ātmā*.

The aspect of the meditator, while he remains bound, should not be meditated on; on the other hand, the aspect to be attained, when he will become free, should be thought on, while he does the meditation. Because as the text quoted states it is only by meditating on that aspect that it will be attained. It is not correct to say that the text refers only to the nature of the highest *Ātmā*. As the *jeeva* is His body, he also enters into the meditation. In other words, the meditation should be on the highest *Ātmā* with the *Jeeva* as his body, the *jeeva* being clothed in freedom from *karma* and in the other seven qualities stated in the teaching of *Prajāpati*: and the highest *Ātmā* in this very form is to be attained. Hence it is stated "By meditating in this manner I will, on going from here, attain that world. Hence the *jeeva* should be meditated on in the aspect that is to be attained.

2. The last term in the *sūtra* gives an illustration. The attainment of the highest *Ātmā* taught is in the aspect that pertains to Him by nature. Similarly, the attainment of the *jeeva* too is in the aspect that pertains to Him by nature.

3. This case should be distinguished from the case of one striving for the heaven-world. The latter should meditate only on his present aspect as knower, doer and enjoyer. This is an *anga* of the *karma*; and *Karmā* alone is enjoined as the means to the fruit desired, by the text "one that desires

svarga should do *yāga*". To know that he is different from his body, that he will live after death, that he can go to the other world, and that being a knower, he can experience the happiness that he will find therein - only so much is necessary to give him a qualification for performing the *karma* leading to the future fruit. Here it is different.

SUB - SECTION 22

53. अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् ।

Meditations connected with subsidiary parts of *krauts* are not limited to the *śākhās*, in which they are taught. They extend to every *śākhā* (*veda*).

Meditations are taught in various places as connected with certain subsidiary parts of *krauts*, like the *udgītha vidyā* (See chapter III-3-17). The question for consideration is whether a meditation enjoined on the *udgītha* in one *śākhā* (1) is limited to that *śākhā* or whether it extends to all *śākhās* in connection with the *udgītha* in those *śākhās*. This is taken as a typical case. This was settled at the outset by sub-section 1; but a doubt arises on the ground that the *svarās* (2) differ in different *śākhās*, and that the *udgīthas* therefore differ. The *first view* is that the meditation is limited to the *sakha*. The injunction 'meditate on the *udgītha*' is in general terms. In the same *sakha* and *udgītha* with *svaras* peculiar to itself being found near it, the injunction should be taken as referring to that particular *udgītha* (3). Hence the meditation should be confined to the *sakha*, in which it is taught.

This doubt is removed by the *sūtra*: The meditation is attached merely to the *udgīthas*; and this is done by the authority known as *śruti*. Hence, wherever the *udgītha* is found, there meditation is attached to it. The *udgīthas* in the different *śākhās* do differ by the way in which they are recited; but as reference is made to them in general terms, all of them come up before the mind; and there is no authority for confining the meditation to a particular *udgītha* (1). In case in which *karmas* prescribed in different

(1) *Śākhā* is a branch of the *veda*, like the *kanva* and *madhyandina sakhas* referred to in the discussions in chapter I, Section 4, sub-section (3) The text of the *veda* is the same in both, though there are minor variations.

(2) *Svara* is the variation in tone in the recitation of vedic texts. For certain syllables the voice is raised; for some it is lowered. In singing *sama mantras* there are seven *svaras* corresponding to the seven notes in the musical scale.

(3) In the world, the order in general terms 'Bring the cow' is carried out by taking a particular cow near at hand. See note (1) on page 5(1)

(1) In the order 'Bring the cow' as all cows, wherever they may be, cannot be brought, the term 'cow' is limited to a particular animal. This is not done by the

places are had to be one *karma* on the principle stated in Introduction, para 16, the *karma* in all the places is brought up before the mind at the same time; and its subsidiary parts like the *udgītha* are also present before the mind; and there is no difference among them in this matter. Hence there is no ground to justify a limitation to one (2) place only.

54. मन्त्रादिवद्वाऽविरोधः ।

And like *mantra* and the rest. There is no difficulty.

The *kratu* referred to in various *śākhās* being one the *mantrās* relating to it mentioned in particular *śākhās* are applied in all *sākhās* by *śruti* and other authorities. Similarly, the meditations, though mentioned in one, are common to all *śākhās*. By the term "The rest" reference is made to *jati* (class characteristic), qualities, number, likeness, order, material and *karma*.

SUB-SECTION 23

In the *vaiṣvānārā vidyā* dealt with in sub-section 6 of section 2 of chapter I (see Vedic Texts) the highest *Ātmā* is to be mediated on as possessing a body of which the heaven-world, the sun, air, ether, water and earth are parts, corresponding to the head, eye, *prāṇa*, waist, bladder, and feet of a human body. The question for consideration is whether the meditation should be on the parts of the body separately, or upon the whole body, or whether it should be in both the ways.

First view. The meditation should be on the parts of the body separately; for at the outset the teacher referred to the parts and to the fruit of meditation on each part thus:

The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānārā* ... He, that thus meditates on *Ātmā Vaiṣvānārā*, eats food found and sees dear things; and a son comes into his family with the brightness of meditation (*chando.*, V-12-1 and 2).

Similarly in regard to the other parts. Also in each of these meditations on the parts the object of meditation is stated to be *Ātmā Vaiṣvānārā*. The

presence of an animal near at hand. Here, there is no similar difficulty; and the term *udgītha* brings up all the *udgīthas* as a matter of course.

(2) In the injunction 'Do yaga with a pasu' the term pasu is restricted to a goat, as this animal is mentioned in the *mantra*, with which the *hotā* is addressed; but here there is nothing to limit the application to a particular *udgītha*. the case is analogous to the injunction "Do yaga with *urihi* (paddy):. The term *urthi* refers to the class, and not to a particular variety (*adhi*).

meditation on the whole stated at the end is merely a summary of the teaching previously imparted.

2. Another view is that meditation should be both on the parts and on the whole; for a separate fruits mentioned for the meditation on the whole thus:

Though *Vaiṣvānārā* surrounds everything, and is not therefore limited, yet he that meditates on Him as thus limited by heaven and earth, eats the food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *Ātmās* (*Ibid.*, V-18-1).

There is the analogy of the *bhūma vidyā*, in which meditation on name and many other things is first described with a separate fruit for each, and then meditation on *bhūma* is taught with its own fruit. There all the meditations, including the last, are admitted to be prescribed. Similarly here also.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

55. भूम्नः क्रतुवज्यायस्त्वं तथा हि दर्शयति ।

Appropriateness of the whole, as in the *kratu*; for so it is shown.

What is intended is meditation on the whole only. For the *upanishad* forms a connected whole. See the narrative ¹ in *Vedic Texts* under chapter 1-2-6. Six students wished to know *Ātmā Vaiṣvānārā*, and going to *Aṣvapati* they requested him to teach them saying "You now meditate on this *Ātmā Vaiṣvānārā*. Teach us about Him". He complied with the request, concluding with the words quoted in para 2 of the *first view*. The *upanishad* therefore forms a whole, teaching but one meditation. This being so, the meditations on the parts must be presumed to be mere repetitions (*anuvāda*) of parts of the meditation on the whole. The fruit of meditation on the whole is the enjoyment of the highest *Ātmā*; and to show that in this fruit enjoyment of every kind to be found in all places and at all times in include the fruits of meditation on the parts were stated. The intention is not that these part-meditations should be done. If this were intended, the unity of the context would be affected. The *sūtra* mentions an analogy. the injunction is given that on the birth of a son the father should offer to *Vaiṣvānārā* a cake of rice flour baked on twelve *kapālas* (flat, circular pieces made of earth and burnt). Parts of the same offering are referred to in these words "What is baked on eight *kapālas* becomes *gāyatri* and purifies him, giving him the brightness of *vedic* learning", and this is followed by similar statements regarding cakes baked on nine, ten, and eleven *kapālas*. It has been decided (*pūrva mīmāṃsā*,

¹ Here the original states the narrative; but as it is stated in the "Vedic texts", it is omitted here.

I-4-12) that the texts form a connected whole, that but one offering should be made, with a cake baked on twelve *kapālas*, and that the reference to other cakes is merely praise of the twelve-*kapālas*-cake.

The *upanishad* goes on to state the evil consequences of meditations on parts thus:

Your head would have fallen off, if you had not come to me; You would have become blind, if you had not come to me, etc. (*chāndo.*, V-12-2 and V-13-2).

This shows that this case is not analogous to *bhūmā vidyā*; for no evil consequences are to follow from meditations on name and the rest. The meditation on *bhūmā* is praised as yielding very superior fruit, and to justify this praise other meditations with inferior fruits are described. This does not affect the unity of the context the principal being meditation on *bhūmā* and the other meditations serving to enhance its importance.

SUB-SECTION 24

In this sub-section the *vidyās* for consideration are (i) all *brahma vidyās* (1), the fruit of which is the reaching of the highest *Ātmā*, and (ii) *vidyās* like *prāṇa vidyās*, that deal with one matter and yield one fruit. The question for consideration is whether they are one or whether they are different. The conclusion to be reached here was accepted tentatively in the previous sub-sections; and the discussions proceeded, whether a particular *vidyā* came under the rule laid down in the first sub-section.

First view. the *vidyās* are one; for the object of meditation is one; and as this constitutes the form of the *vidyā*, the form is the same, as also the fruit.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

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(They are) different, for the words and the rest differ.

The words 'the rest' refer to repetition, number, subsidiary part, context and name (see Introduction, para 15). Here these reasons exist for holding one *vidyā* as differing from another. The terms *veda* and *upāsita*, enjoining meditation, do denote continuity of thought, and this thought is of the highest *Ātmā*; yet the mind has to dwell on Him as possessing this or that

(1) Like *sad vidyā*, *bhūma vidyā*, *dahara vidyā*, *upakosala vidyā*, *sandilya vidyā*, *vaissvānara vidyā*, *ānaṇḍamaya vidyā*, and *akshara vidyā*. They may be taught in one *sakha* or in many *sakhas*; all of them are considered here.

attribute stated in the context. In one case it is being the sole cause of the evolution of the world; in another it is possessing freedom from *karma* and the other seven qualities; and so on. Hence, the *vidyās* differ. Also, the fruit in the form of reaching the highest *Ātmā* being stated in a particular context, the need of the injunction is satisfied, and the *vidyā* becomes complete. Hence the *vidyās* are different (1): This subject is dealt with in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*; and a separate sub-section here is unnecessary; but the author of the *sūtras* wishes to refute the view that *upanishad* texts do not deal, as the means to release, with mere knowledge to be imparted by *vedic* texts. If this were correct, all the labour spent on this section of the *sūtras* would be thrown away.

SUB-SECTION 25

In the preceding sub-section it was settled that *vidyās*, the fruit of which is to reach the highest *Ātmā*, are different. It will now be considered whether a person may combine two or more of them, and whether there is any use in doing so, or whether it will suffice to do any one of them.

First view. The combination also has its use. It is seen that different injunctions are carried out by one, though they contemplate but one fruit. *Agnihōtra* and *darṣa-pūrṇamāsa* yield each the same fruit, viz, *svarga* (heaven-world); and yet they are combined, so that more of it may be enjoyed. Similarly two or more *vidyās* may be combined, so that one may be with the highest *Ātmā* for a longer time and enjoy Him to a larger extent.

Final decisions. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

(1) In the text the difference among *Brahma* *vidyas* was based on difference of form and difference in the fruit. It may also be caused by difference in other respects. The *nyasa vidyā* is taught in *taittirīya-Nārāyaṇa* thus: "Unite yourself, pronouncing the syllable (known as *prāṇava*)". The term used here is *yunjita*, while the terms used in regard to other *vidyās* are *veda*, *upasiṭā*, etc. Thus the terms differ. The names are different; it is *nyāsa vidyā* here, and others have their own names. The form of this *vidyā* is the highest *Ātmā* standing in the place of other *vidyās* and giving the person, that throws himself at His feet, the fruit of those *vidyās* without any further effort on his part. This is not the form of the other *vidyās*; for the meditator has to think of Him as possessing this or that attribute prescribed for them. In regard to the fruit also there is difference in that one, that does the *nyāsa vidyā*, may reach the highest *Ātmā* whenever he wishes it, while the other has to wait till the *prārabdha karma* has been expended i.e., *karma* that has begun to yield fruit. Lastly, the qualification also differs; for the *nyasa vidyā* is for one that has not the requisite knowledge, or capacity or cannot brook delay in the attainment of the fruit. Hence *nyāsa vidyā* differs from all others.

57. विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ।

Any one of them at one's option, as the fruit does not differ.

By all *vidyās* the same fruit is reaped - viz., enjoyment of the highest *Ātmā*, who is bliss without limit to its excellence. This is stated in the following texts - "One that meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest" (*āna.*, I-1); That is one unit of the bliss of *Brahma*; and this is shared by one that know the *veda* and was not distracted by desires, i.e., by one that has become free (*Ibid.*, VIII) and when the meditator sees the *purusha*, shining like gold, the material and operative causes of the world, and its ruler, then he shakes off good and bad deeds, and free from all touch of matter, attains the highest likeness to Him (*mūṇḍa.*, III - 1-3). Thus the highest *Ātmā* is in the enjoyment of bliss without limit to Himself and to others. If this fruit can be attained by one *vidyā* only, what is the need for another? Hence no combination is required. In the case of other fruits, like *svarga* (heaven-world), there is limitation in place, in time and in their nature. It is possible to increase the quantum of enjoyment in place or time; and one that desires this increase may combine many *karmas*. Here there is no such need. All *vidyās* on *Brahma* lead to enjoyment by removing the obstacles to enjoyment in the form of *avidyā* and beginning less *karma*.

58. काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्नवापूर्वहेत्वभावात् ।

But meditations aiming at worldly objects of desire may be cumulated or not at pleasure, because the former reason does not hold.

SUB-SECTION 26

It was decided in sub-section 17 that meditation on the *udgītha* is not compulsory. the opponent disputes the correctness of this decision and urges certain further arguments, which are examined here. The decision depends on the question whether meditation on the *udgītha* is for the purpose of the *yāga* or whether it benefits the *yajamāna* (one that does a *yāga*). In the former case the meditation would be part of the *yāga* through the *udgītha*, and would be compulsory; in the latter case it may be done or not at the option of the *yajamana*. The opponent's view is stated in the first four *sūtras* and supported by arguments:

59. अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः ।

Meditations on the adjuncts of *kratus* are parts of them, as are the adjuncts on which they depend.

First, the sentence containing the injunction does into state the fruit of the meditation; and it has to be gathered from another sentence at the end of the section of the *upanishad*. This case is therefore not analogous to the case of the milking vessel:

In a *chamasa* carry the water (for *pranītā*) (to the north of the *āhavanīya* fire); for one that desires cows in the vessel in which cows are milked.

Here the fruit in using the milking vessel is stated in the injunction text itself; but in the case under consideration it is merely "meditate on the *udgītha*. As the *yāga* (*darṣa* or *pūrṇamāsa*) may be done without the milking vessel, its use is not for the performance of the *karma*; but it only benefits the *yajamāna*. Hence it is not a part of the *karma*. The right analogy is furnished by the *juhū* referred to in the text.

He, whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood, does not hear unpleasant statements.

(*Juhū* is an instrument used in making offerings). Here not hearing unpleasant statements does not at first right appear as the fruit; and it is not stated in the first clause, which contains the injunction. It is therefore regarded as helping the performance of the *yāga*, and the second clause is held to be *arthavāda*. In the case under consideration the fruit of the meditation to make the *yāga* most efficacious is stated in another sentence; and the statement is not in the form of an injunction. Hence this statement is *arthavāda*, as not hearing unpleasant statements is. Hence, as the *udgītha* is part of the *kratu*, and is invariably sung in it, on the meditation also, which depends on the *udgītha*, forms part of the *kratu* and should be invariably done.

60. शिष्टेऽथ ।

And because of the injunction.

Secondly, the injunction is merely 'meditate on the *udgītha*. There is no mention in it, as in the case of the milking vessel, of a special qualification on the part of the *yajamāna*, which would limit the meditation, and connect it with the qualification. The meditation is therefore a necessary part of the *udgītha*.

61. समाहारात् ।

Because of rectification.

Thirdly, the text "From the place of the *hōta* a *udgītha* without meditation is rectified" (*chāndo.*, I-5-5) indicates that meditation on the *udgītha* by the *udgātā* is always required. For the text states that when the *udgātā* fails

to meditate, the defect is rectified by the *hōta*, when he utters, the syllable known as *paranava*.

62. गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च ।

And because the seat of the meditation, *i.e.* the Syllable known as *pranava* is stated as going everywhere.

This statement is thus made:

With it the *karma* enjoined by the three-fold *veda* proceeds; with *prāṇava* the *adhvaryu* says *āśrāvaya*; with *prāṇava* the *hotā* recites *śāstra*; with *prāṇava* the *udgītā* sings *stotra* (*chāndo.*, I-1-9).

Here the term '*tena*' (with it) refers back to what has been mentioned before, *i.e.* *prāṇava* with the meditation. Hence, the meditation being ever found with *paranava*, it is an adjunct of the *kratu*, as the *udgītha* is.

The view of the opponent is rejected in the next two *sutras* :

63. न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः ।

But no, because their going together invariably is not declared

Here the second argument - that stated in *sūtra* 60 - is met. It is true that in the injunction there is no mention of a special qualification; but this is stated later on at the end of the section, by pointing out that the *kratu* becomes most efficacious, when meditation is done. If therefore the *yajamāna* desires to reach the fruit of the *kratu* quickly, he should arrange for the meditation being done. Meditation on what? One the *udgītha*, which is found in the context. The conclusion therefore is that meditation on the *udgītha* yields a fruit different from the fruit of the *kratu*. It cannot therefore be an adjunct of the *kratu* (1).

(1) Whether a thing enjoined is connected with a fruit does not depend upon the mention of the fruit in the injunction text or not. It depends upon the quickness in perceiving the connection between the two. In the case of the *juhū* the connection between its being made of *prāṇa* wood and the fruit mentioned in the same text is not quickly perceived; for the condition that it should be so made is not expressly stated to be the cause, and not hearing unpleasant statements' to be its effect; further, this fruit is stated not in the first clause that gives the injunction, but in a clause that follows it. Hence owing to the delay arising from both these causes 'being made of *parna* wood is connected with the *juhū*, and through it with the *kratu*; and it is decided that it is for the performance of the *kratu*; and the mention of the fruit is treated as *arthavada*.

2. The arguments stated in *sūtras* 61 and 62 may be replied to as follows: If the *yājamāna* makes up his mind at the outset that the fruit of the *kratu* should not be obstructed, and if the *udgāta* fails, the *hotā* rectifies it. If the *yajamāna* does not desire it, there will be no defect to be rectified. The text 'with *prāṇava*, the *adhvaryu*', etc., does not refer to *prāṇava* along with meditation. It refers to the syllable alone. On the other hand, there is a *linga* in support of the *final decision*. this is next stated:

64. दर्शनाच्च ।

And because the *upanishad* shows this.

The text is "the *brahmā* that knows this, saves the *kratu*, the *yajamāna*, and all the helpers" (*chando.*, IV-17-10). There is room for this saving, only if the *udgāta* is not bound to meditate on the *udgītha*. This mark is sufficient to show that the marks stated in *sūtras* 61 and 62 are generally, but not invariably, found.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

In the case of the milking vessel (*go-dohana*) the fruit is mentioned in the injunction text itself; and the only defect is that it is not expressly stated to be produced by the use of the milking vessel. The connection between the milking vessel and the attainment of the fruit has to be inferred. But as there is only one cause of delay, the use of the milking vessel and the fruit are connected. The use of the vessel is not therefore for the *kratu*, but for the *yajamāna*. In the case under consideration also there is produced by the meditation; and the only defect is that it is not stated in the injunction text. The case being therefore analogous to the milking vessel, the meditation is connected with the fruit, but not with the *udgītha*.

The case under consideration differs from the case of the *juhū* for another reason. In the case of the *juhū* there is a need of what wood it should be made; but the *udgītha* does not need meditation; for it may be sung without it. 'Being made of *parna* wood,' not being action, needs a *kratu*, into which it may enter; but meditation being itself action does not need it; but may connect itself with a fruit directly. Hence the *juhū* and 'being made of *parna* wood' are connected with each other. In the case of the *udgītha* and meditation, neither needs the other. Therefore, the meditation is not its *anga*.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER III

SECTION 4

Brahma Vidyā has been considered. In this section the helps to it will be examined, including the *karmas* enjoined in the earlier part of the *veda*.

SUB-SECTION 1

This is preliminary. The question for consideration is whether man's goal comes from meditation or from *karma*, of which meditation is an adjunct. The final decision is stated in the *sūtra*:

1. पुरुषार्थोऽतश्शब्दादिति बादरायणः ।

From it (i.e., meditation) man's goal comes, because
vedic texts state this. This is the view of *Badarāyaṇa*.

The texts are:

One that meditates on *Brahma* reaches the highest (*āna*., I-1). I know this. *vi.*, meditating here on that great *Purusha* alone, who shines like the sun, and who is far removed from *tāmas*, one becomes immortal; not other path lies to the goal (*purusha sukta* -20); similarly the meditator is released from name and form, and reaches the *Purusha*, who is greater than the great, and who abides in heaven (*munḍa*., III-2-8).

Jaimini disputes this conclusion; and his arguments are stated in *sūtras* 2 to 7.

2. शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादोयथान्येष्विति जैमिनिः ।

Because meditation serves *karma*; the mention of fruit is *arthavāda*, as in other cases. This is the view of *Jaimini*.

In *Jaimini's* opinion these texts are intended to show what is the real nature of the *jeeva*, who does *karma*. Meditation thus gives the doer of *karma* the necessary qualification for doing it; and through him it serves *karma*, and becomes a subordinate part thereof. As it cannot have a separate fruit of its own, the mention of the fruit in these texts is mere *arthavāda* (praise). 'As in other cases' - the cases referred to in the following *sūtra* of *pūrva mīmāṃsā* "In the cases of substances, qualifications and actions, which serve something else, the mention of fruit is *arthavāda* (praise)".

2. The *vedantic* raises two objections: in the following *sūtras* it was stated that a Being other than the doer of *Karma* is to be reached by one desiring release, and that He is placed before him for meditation by *vedic*

texts : I-1-17; I-1-18; I-2-3; and I-3-17. In *sūtra* II-1-22 it was pointed that the same Being, that is referred to in the text "That thou art", is other than a *jeeva*; and it was explained in *sūtra* I-4-22 how words in apposition as in this text should be understood. How then can the view stated in paragraph 1 be maintained? *Reply*. In the very texts, on which you rely, there are indications that *karma* is more important than meditation. By the light of these indications words in apposition are understood as affirming the identity of *Brahma* and the *jeeva*. Hence the texts of the *Vedānta* teach merely that *jeeva* in his nature is other than his body.

3. Secondly, the statement that the texts give a qualification to a *jeeva* is not sound; for he does worldly acts as well as those enjoined by the *veda*; and he is not connected only with the latter. *Reply*. The doing of worldly acts is possible by one that does not know that he is other than his body; but in regard to *karma* enjoined by the *veda* the doer should know that he is other than the body, and that he is eternal; and this knowledge is needed for such *karma*.

4. Hence meditation, entering into *karma* through the doer, is a part of *karma*.

These indications are stated in the next five *sūtras*:

3. आचारदर्शनात् ।

Because it is seen in the practice (of those doing meditation)

Asvapti, who was foremost among those that did *brahma vidyā*, and who was approached by certain seers for instruction on *Ātmā Vaiṣvānārā*, said "Revered sirs, I am going to perform a *kratu*" (*Chāndo.*, V-11-5). The *smṛitis* state that *Jānaka* and other persons, who were foremost among those that meditated on *Brahma*, were ever engaged in the performance of *karma*. "Jānaka and others attained their goal with *karma* alone" (*bhagavadgītā*, III-20). Having knowledge of the *Ātmā*, and doing *brahma vidyā*, he performed very many *yajñās* in order to remove *mritya* by *avidyā* (*vishṇu*, VI-6-12).

4. तच्छ्रुतेः ।

Because it is declared by the *veda*

The text is:

That which is done with meditation, with eagerness, and with knowledge of everything being ruled from within by the highest *Ātmā*, that alone becomes most efficacious (*chāndo.*, I-1-10).

It cannot be urged that this text is limited by the context to *udgītha*; for *śruti* is of greater force than the context. The text therefore applies to all *vidyās*.

5. समन्वारम्भणात् ।

Because of the statement that they contact (a departing *jeeva*)

The text is:

Him meditation and *karma* contact and go with him (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2).

This co-existence should be explained by the subordination of meditation to *karma* for the reason stated.

6. तद्वतो विधानात् ।

Because *karma* is enjoined to one that has it (meditation)

The text is:

After learning the *veda* in the house of the teacher in accordance with the rules, and when time could be spared from his service, let the student perform the ceremony known as *samavaratāna* and live in a family, etc. (*chāndo.*, VIII-15-1).

Then he is required to do *karma*. This injunction is given to one that has learnt the *veda* and the learning includes a knowledge of not merely the text, but of its meaning also. hence *brahma vidyā* is connected with *karma* for its service, and cannot yield independent fruit.

7. नियमात् ।

Because of the restriction imposed

The text is:

Let one desire to live a hundred years only doing *karma* here (*Iṣavaṣya* - 2).

The meaning is that the whole life should be spent in doing *karma* alone.

Jaimini's view is first refuted, and it is next shown in six *sūtras* that the texts quoted do not support him.

8. अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् ।

But a Being, other than the *jeeva*, is mentioned in the texts; and this is *Bādarāyaṇa's* view.

This appears from the *veda*.

The texts quoted under the first *sūtra* refer not to the *jeeva*, the doer of *karma*, but to *Brahma*, who is differentiated from him by being opposed to imperfections of every kind, and by being the seat of numberless noble qualities without limit to their excellence. The indications stated will be replied to presently. The object of meditation is a Being other than the *jeeva*. This appears from the following texts:

He is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst; He has unchanging objects of desire; and His will is never frustrated (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5); He willed 'I will become many and to that end I will evolve; He created fire (*Ibid.*, VI-2-3); who knows everything (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-10); His capacity is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds; and to pertain to His nature; also His power to know, to support, and to create and destroy (*śveta.*, VI-8); It is one unit of the bliss of *Brahma* (*āna.*, VIII); One, that meditates on the bliss of *Brahma*, from which speech returns with the mind without reaching its higher limit, does not fear anything (*Ibid* - 9); He is the controller of all; He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of beings: He is a protective bund (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22); He the world-cause, is the lord of the lords of the senses (*jeevas*); no maker or lord of Him exists (*śvetā.*, VI-9); By that unobstructed command of the *Akshara*; *Gārgi*, the sun and the moon stand supported by the unobstructed command of that *Akshara* heaven and earth stand supported (*bṛihad.*, V-8-8); From fear of Him the wind blows; from fear the sun rises; from fear of Him fire and *Indra* (go about their business); death, the fifth, runs about (*āna.*, VIII-1)

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These texts, enjoining meditation, show that the highest *Ātmā* is free from the slightest touch of any imperfection; that He is the seat of endless, noble qualities; that He by mere will and for mere amusement evolves the universe, sustains it and dissolves it in the end; that He is all-knowing, and omnipotent; that the higher limit of His bliss cannot be thought of or described; that He is the lord of the *jeeva*; and that He controls everything. These attributes can never be found in a *jeeva*, whether he is bound or has become free. The texts do not therefore contain any reference to the *jeeva*, the doer of *karma*, who is like a glow worm, and who is fit to be affected with *avidyā* and other imperfections. The *vidyās* cannot therefore be connected through him with *karma*, as being made of *parṇa* wood is connected through the *juhū* with a *yāga*. Hence, the fruit in the form of attaining the highest *Ātmā* stated in the description of *vidyās* flows from the *vidyās* themselves, and its statement is not *arthāvda* as thought by *Jaimini*.

9. तुल्यन्तु दर्शनम् ।

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Non-practice of *karma* is as much seen as its practice.

This disposes of the text quoted in *sūtra* 3. Here is a text "We are seers descended from *Kāvasha*; for what purpose should we learn the *veda*; for what purpose should we do *yāgas*" ? Seeing that *karma* is abandoned by some, that do meditation, it should be concluded that meditation is not an adjunct of *karma*. If it were, how could *karma* be given up? *Question*. How are the doing of *karma* by some, and abstention from it by others to be reconciled? *Reply*. Thus, when *karma* is done without an eye on its fruit, it serves meditation: and its performance is appropriate. This will be pointed out in *sūtra* 26. But *karma* done for fruit obstructs meditation on *Brahma*, the only fruit of which is release from the bondage of *karma*, and its abandonment is equally appropriate.

10. असार्वत्रिके

It does not apply to all *vidyās*.

The text referred to in *sūtra* 4 applies only to meditation on *udgītha*. The term *yad* (that) must refer to something already mentioned; and that something is *udgītha*, which is referred to at the outset in the injunction "meditate on the *udgītha*". What is done with meditation is referred to by the term *yad* (that), and it is said to be most efficacious. The text is not to be understood to mean "That which is done is done with meditation (1)".

11. विभागशतवत् ।

Division as in hundreds

Meditation and *karma* produce different fruits as explained under *sūtra* 9. The former goes with the departing *jeeva* to yield its own fruit, viz., to make him resume it in the next birth, and practise it, till it be comes perfect; and *karma* does the same, viz., to remove any obstructions in such resumption. Though the two go together, they are divided in their action. There is the analogous statement "one that wishes to sell land and precious stones is followed by two hundred rupees. This means that one hundred is for the land and one hundred for the precious stones.

12. अध्ययनमात्रवतः ।

(The injunction to do *karma* is given) to one that merely learnt the *veda*.

This deals with the text quoted in *sūtra* 6. The term "learning the *veda*:" means only learning the text. The injunction to learn the *veda* is fully carried

(1) The opponent's meaning is: the term *vidyayā* (with meditation) is *śruti*, and it has greater force than the context. *Śruti* is the capacity of a single word; and here the term *vidyayā* has no capacity to connect *vidyā* with *karma* as a subsidiary part, unless the sentence as pointed out.

out, when the text has been learnt; it does not require him to know its meaning also. When the text has been learnt, as it teaches *karmas* as means to fruits, one of his own motion takes up an enquiry to determine what it exactly teaches. The, if he desires wordly fruit, he seeks to know *karma*: If he desires release, he essays to find out all about *Brahma*. This text does not therefore make meditation an adjunct of *karma*.

Assume, however, that the injunction to learn the *veda* is not fully carried out, until the meaning also is known. Even then, meditation is not an adjunct of *karma*. A knowledge of the meaning of the *veda* is different from meditation. One learns how the *karma* known as *jyotishṭoma* should be done; but this knowledge is different from its actual performance, which alone leads to fruit. Similarly, one's knowledge of the nature of the highest *Ātmā* and of the mode of meditation on Him is different from the meditation itself, which alone leads to the attainment of the goal. Hence, the injunction to do *karma* not being conveyed to one that does *brahma vidyā*, this *vidyā* is not connected with it as its *anga*.

13. नाविशेषात् ।

Because it is not particularised

Here the text quoted in *sūtra* 7 is considered. There is nothing in it to show that the *karma* enjoined is a means to fruit directly - i.e. independently of meditation; and it may be understood to refer to such *karma* as will serve meditation. In the case of *Jānaka* and others referred to in the verse of the *bhagavad gītā* under *sūtra* 3 meditation continued till they departed from this world, and *karma* served such mediation. The opponent therefore draws no support from this text.

Having thus answered the opponent, the next *sūtra* explains the meaning of the last text:

14. स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा ।

Only to praise meditation is permission given

The text occurs in the *Īśāvāsyā*, which begins with the statement "All this is pervaded by the all-Ruler". The context therefore relates to meditation; and in order to praise it merely the statement is made that one may do *karma* throughout life. By the peculiar merit of the meditation, even though one should ever do *karma*, yet he will not be polluted by it. The remainder of the text shows this "If you live thus, and not otherwise, you, who find no pleasure in worldly matters, will not be stained by *karma*" (verse 2).

Having thus demolished the opponent, the next three *sūtras* support *Bādarāyanā's* view:

15. कामकारेणचैके ।

And some (state abandonment) at pleasure (of the householder's stage by one doing *brahma-vidyā*)

That is, those, that follow certain *śākhās*, teach that one may at pleasure give up the life of a house-holder (and with it is *karma*), if he practices meditation on *Brahma*: "What shall we do with children, who have this *Ātmā* in the place of this world" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22). This text, permitting one, that meditates on *Brahma*, and is disgusted with the world, to abandon the life of a house-holder, and with it its *karma*; proves that meditation on *Brahma* is not an adjunct of *karma*. If it were, one that meditates could not make this renunciation at his pleasure.

16. उपमर्दं च ।

An the destruction

(of *karma* by meditation is taught)

Taught in every *upanishad*. *Karma* is the root from which all the sufferings of the bound *jeeva* come, and is in the form of good or evil deeds. Its destruction by *brahma vidyā* is thus taught : "His *karmas* are destroyed when the Being is seen, compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior" (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-9). Such destruction would be inappropriate on the theory that meditation subserves *karma*; for a subordinate part cannot destroy the principal *karma*.

17. ऊर्ध्वरितस्मु च शब्दे हि ।

And *brahma vidyā* is found in those, that have taken the vow of celibacy; for it is stated in the *upanishad*.

Such persons, not leading a house-holder's life, cannot do *agnihōtra*, *darśa*, *pūrṇamāsa* and the rest.

This proves conclusively that meditation is not adjunct of *karma*.

This last *sūtra* raises a controversy as to whether the *āśrama* (stage of life) of persons, that have taken the vow of celibacy, is recognised. The first view is there are no such stages; for the injunction is "one should do the *agnihōtra homa* as long as he lives"; *Smṛitis*, that teach differently, are no authority. To meet this objection the *sūtra* adds the second sentence. In the *veda* itself the *āśramas* are recognised. The texts are:

There are three seats of *dharma* (*chāndo.*, - II-23-1) These that in a jungle meditate on *Brahma* (*tapas*) with eagerness (*chāndo.*, V-10-1); Desiring this same fruits they renounce the world (*brihad.*, VI-4-22).

The injunction to do *agnihōtra* throughout life is directed to those, that are not disgusted with life.

This answer does not satisfy *Jaimini*, who tries to explain away the texts:

18. परामर्श जैमिनिरचोदनाच्चापवदति हि ।

It is mere repetition of what is otherwise known *Jaimini* thinks so; because there is no injunction and the *veda* forbids it.

In these texts there is a mere statement of stages of life. For, there is no injunction. The context begins with the text "There are three seats of *dharma*" and praises meditation on *Brahma*, which is the subject under consideration. It closes with the words "One that meditates on *Brahma* attains immortality". Hence, the stages are stated for that purpose, but not for directing one to go into them. In the second text also mention is made of them in order to teach the path known as *devayāna*. There is no injunction either here. There is also prohibition of any stage other than that of the house-holder;

He, that gives up the sacrificial fire, is indeed one that destroys the virility of the *devas*

The next *sūtra* refutes *Jaimini's* arguments:

19. अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणस्साम्यश्रुतेः ।

The *āśramas* should be held; so *Bādarāyaṇa* thinks; because similarity (to the house-holder's stage) is stated in the *upanishad*.

The opponent admits that the house-holder's stage should be held. The other stages are exactly in the same position; for reference is made to the three seats of *dharma*s, in order to praise one that meditates on *Brahma*; and this reference applies to the other stages as well as to the house-holder's. *Opponent*. The reference to the house-holder's stage pre-supposes that that stage exists. *Reply*. This argument applies to the other stages also, if the thing be looked at without prejudice. See the duties enumerated in the context. *Opponent*. The duties mentioned relate only to the house-holder; and *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) and *brahmacharya* (leading a student's

life) are found only in him. *Reply*. This is not so; for the seats of *dharmas* are seated to be three in number, and they are divided thus.

Yajnās recitation of the *veda* frequently and making gifts form the first; *tapas* alone is the second; the student, that lives in the house of his teacher, and uses up his body completely in his service, is the third.

This mention of the number and division of the duties would be inappropriate, if only the house-holder's stage existed. Hence the proper explanation is as follows: The first three duties pertain to the house-holder (See *Vedic Texts*, and the notes thereunder). *Tapas* is the duty of *vaighānasas* and of those that have renounced the world; for it is their prominent function. The term *brahmacharya* denotes the disciplined life of the student, that has taken the vow of life-long celibacy. the term *brahma samsthā*, occurring further on, means from its etymology meditation on *Brahma*; and this may be found in all the stages. Among those found in all the three stages those that meditate on *Brahma* attain immortality; but those that do not do so reach worlds, in which the fruit of good deeds is experienced.

This is very clearly stated in the *vishṇu purāṇa*:

The place to be reached by *brāhmaṇas*, that perform the *nitya* and *naimittika karmas*, is the place of *Bhṛigu* and other *prajāpatis*; that to be reached by *kshattriyas*, that do not run away from the battlefield, is the place of *Indra*; that to be reached by *vaiśyas*, whose mind finds pleasure in their own duties, is the place of the *maruts*; that to be reached by persons of the *śūdra* caste, that perform the service of the other castes, is the place of *gandharvas*.... Students that dwell in the houses of their teachers reach the same places as those reached by men that renounce the world. Forest-dwellers go to the place of the seven *ṛishis*. House-holders go to the place of *prajāpatis*; those that renounce the world to *satyaloka*. Those, that meditate on certain things as *Brahma*, attain the imperishable place known as *vishṇu-pada* (above the place of *Dhruvā*). But those, that look to *Brahma* alone, and ever meditate on Him, go to that highest place, which the dwellers in the highest heaven (see I-6-34 to 39).

These verses state the fruits to be attained by those that are in the several *varṇas* (castes) and stages of life, without doing *brahma vidyā*. These fruits go up to the world of the four-faced one. The last verse beginning with 'But those' refers to the attainment of *Brahma* Himself by those that do *brahma vidyā*.

The conclusion is that the other stages are on a par with the house-holder's and that one may hold them also. In the other text also "Those that in the jungle meditate on *Brahma* with eagerness" the existence of the stage, in which *tapas* is the prominent duty, (and this is indicated by the term 'in the

jungle'), is presumed; and it is only then that the *devayāna* can be taught with regard to it.

In the preceding *sūtra* the opponent's view that the texts under consideration merely state the existence of the stages was accepted, and a reply was given. The next *sūtra* explains that the texts do enjoin the holding of them:

20. विधिर्बाधारणवत् ।

Injunction only, as in the case of *dhāraṇa*

The following text relates to offerings to be made when a sacrificer's body is cremated:

Let him follow, holding the *samid* (a twig of the *palāṣa* tree) below the *juhū* ; for he holds it above for the *devas*.

In this text, though the second clause has the form of a repetition (*anuvāda*), it is accepted by the *mīmāṃsāka* as an injunction, on the ground that the holding of the *samid* above has not been taught elsewhere. Similarly, here also it should be assumed that an injunction is given, for the reason that the stages have not been taught elsewhere.

2. Hitherto the opponent's statement was accepted; and the question was discussed; but there is express injunction in the *upanishad* of the *Jābālas*:

Let one, completing the student's life, become a house-holder; from the house let him become a forest dweller; and then renounce the world; or also otherwise; he may renounce from the student's stage, or from the house or from the forest. One the very day, on which he becomes disgusted with the world, let him renounce it.

It being thus established that there are stages other than the house-holder's, the texts describing one's indebtedness, and his life-long performance of *agnihōtra*, and the text prohibiting the abandonment of the fires should be understood as applying only to those that are not disgusted with the world. There are other texts that teach that those meditating on *Brahma* should perform *karmas* to the end of life. They pertain to the duties of their own *āśramās*.

SUB - SECTION 2

This sub-section and the next come in only incidentally. The *chāndogya* has this text:

This *udgītha*, the eighth, is the best of essences; it is the highest; it deserves the place of the highest *Ātmā* (I-1-3).

Is this description intended merely to praise the *udgītha*, or is it to be meditated on as the best of essences ? (1) The latter view will be shown to be the correct one. Taking that view it was pointed out in subsection 17 and 26 of the preceding section that the meditation was for the benefit of the *yajamāna*, and that it doing was therefore optional.

First view. The description is mere praise. For, referring to the *udgītha*, which is an adjunct of a *kratu*, it is said to be the best of essences. In the text "This (earth) is the *juhū*; the heaven-world is the *āhavanīya* fire", the earth is said to be the *juhū*, and the intention is merely to praise it. Similarly in this case also. This view is stated in the first part of the *sūtra*, and then follows its refutation.

21. स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् ।

If it be said "Mere praise, because reference has been made to it", the reply is - No, because it is new.

Final decision. It is not mere praise. Praise is given in one of three ways: (i) by stating a quality known already from some authority; (ii) by stating a quality not previous known; (iii) or by adopting a secondary meaning, when the quality brought up by the primary meaning is unsuitable. Not one of these ways is applicable here. It is not known from any other authority that *udgītha* is the best of essences. If it were, reference might be made to the fact, and an idea of its importance created. The second way will not do either; for *udgītha* is not really the best of essences; this quality is not suitable to the *udgītha*; and it cannot therefore be stated in regard to it; and such statement will not constitute praise. Nor will the third way apply as in the text quoted in the *first view*. It occurs where *karmas* are prescribed, and it is possible to connect it with the *juhū* and say that it conveys praise. But here there is no injunction in the context in regard to the singing of *udgītha*, with which the text in question may be connected. It is not legitimate to take out this text, carry it to where the *udgītha* is prescribed, and connect it with the injunction. Without doing this it is possible to explain the text as prescribing a meditation on the *udgītha* as the best of essences. The fruit of such meditation will be that the *karma* will become most efficacious.

(1) Though the question is considered with reference to the *uagitha*, the decision applies to all texts, that are similar, and deal with adjuncts of *kratus*.

In the preceding *sūtra* it was stated that there was no injunction near at hand to sing the *udgītha*. In the next *sūtra* it is shown that there is an injunction to mediate on it; and this is an argument in support of the *final decision*:

22. भावशब्दाच्च ।

And because there is a term which denotes action

In the term *upasita* (meditate) the termination giving the injunction is joined to the root, which denotes an action; and an injunction to mediate is therefore given.

SUB-SECTION 3

Most *vidyās* are introduced by a narrative. The description of meditation on the highest *Ātmā* in the form of *Indra* begins with the words "*Pratardāna Daivodāsi* went to the abode dear to *Indra*"; the *sad vidyā* with the words 'There was one named *ṣvetaketu*, the son of *Aruni*' and so on. the question for consideration is: What purpose do the narratives serve? Are they to be recited by the *hotā*, one of the helpers, just before a particular offering is made in a horse-sacrifice, or are they intended to help in the teaching of particular *vidyās*

First view The former alternative is the correct one. The injunction to recite the narratives is thus given:

Recite narratives in the *pāriplava śāstra* (1).

The time for recitation is next stated.

When the king has been anointed, and when wearing clothing made of gold and silk, he has taken his seat to the south of the *āhavanīya* fire with his sons and ministers, the *hotā* should recite *pāriplava*.

The term narrative (*ākhyāna*), being general, includes the narratives in the *upanishads* also. *Objection*: The second text is thus continued.

On the first day recite the narrative beginning with '*Manu*, the son of *Vivasvan*, the king'; on the second day that beginning with *yama*, *vaivasvata*; on the third day that with the words *varuṇa*, *aditya*.

Hence the narratives should be those mentioned in the remainder of the text. *Reply*. No. A statement made at the beginning should not be restricted

1. *Pāriplava* is the name of particular *śāstra* recited by the *hotā* in the *aśvamedha*. *śāstra* is the name given to verses of the *rik veda* recited by the *hotā* or one of his assistants before certain offerings of the *soma* juice are made.

with reference to the remainder of a text. The narratives being thus connected with the horse-sacrifice, they cannot serve *vidyās* also; for this would be opposed to the principle laid down in chapter III-3-10.

This view is stated in the *sūtra* and is then refuted:

23. पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् ।

If it be said "They are for *pāriplava*, the reply is "No, because they are particularised".

It is not possible to recite all the narratives; and the word 'all' at the beginning has to be restricted (1).

In determining how this should be done, help is obtained from the remainder of the sentence. The narrative to be recited will then be only those mentioned in it (2); and the narratives in the *upanishads* will be left alone.

24. तथाचैकवाक्योपबन्धात् ।

And similarly because they are connected (with injunctions) so as to form a whole.

This is an additional reason for the *final decision*. The narratives and the injunctions, which follow, are connected and form a whole. In the *yajur veda* (I-5-1) the story is stated that *agni* cried, and that his tears became silver. Being impure for this reason, the placing of silver on the *barhis* and its being given as reward are prohibited. This story is connected with the prohibition, and explains why it is given. Similarly, the narratives in the *upanishads* are connected with injunctions to meditate. Hence, they are for the purpose of helping in the teaching of the *vidyās* concerned.

SUB-SECTION 4

To return from this digression, which sub-sections 2 and 3 are to the subject of the stages of those, that have taken the vow of life-long celibacy, and do *brahmavidyā*. As they cannot maintain the sacrificial fires, do the

(1) At the close of a *soma yāga* the *soma* juice that remains is poured into the *drona* pot, and is offered into the *āhavaniya* fire. This is known as *hāriyojana graha*. After the offering, what remains is drunk. Regarding this a text states "Now (*atha*) in regard to this *hāriyojana* all (*sarva*) to be sure desire to get it." The term *sarva* means every one; but as it is not possible for every one present at the place to drink the juice, the text will admit limitation of some kind; and it is decided that all the helpers in the *soma yāga* partake of the juice (*pūrva mīmāṃsā* - III-5-9 and *śāstra dīpikā*, page 288).

(1) The need of the injunction is satisfied by the narratives mentioned in the remainder of the sentence; it is not legitimate to assume that the narratives stated in the *upanishads* are needed in addition for the injunction (*adhi.*, 403).

daily *agnihōtra* and make the bimonthly offerings known as *darṣa* and *purnamasa* how is it possible for them to do meditation, of which these are necessary adjuncts? The *sūtra* replies that they may.

25. अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा ।

And for this very reason there is no need to do *adhāna* and the rest.

The *upanishads* have stated (1) their connection with *vidyā*. Therefore they need not do the *agnihōtra* and the rest. The mere duties of their stage will suffice.

SUB-SECTION 5

In the preceding sub-section it was decided that meditation on *Brahma* may yield immortality without the adjuncts of *yajna* and the rest. If so, why should it be needed in the case of the house-holder? The *vedic* text on this subject does not make *karmas* a necessary adjunct of *brahma vidyā*; it should be construed merely as creating the desire to do the *vidyā*. The *sūtra* replies.

26. सर्वापेक्षाचयज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् ।

And all are needed, because the text states *yajna* and the rest, as in the case of the horse.

The house-holder being eminently a man of action, there is need for him to do *agnihōtra* and all other *karmas*. This is stated:

Him (the highest *Ātmā* described in the preceding part of the verse) *brāhmaṇas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yajnās*, by giving, by *tapas* in the form of absence of desire (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22).

The *karmas* enumerated here are stated to be helps to meditation; for the text means - they desire to attain meditation with *yajna* and the rest. It is only when *yajna* and the rest. are helps to meditation, that the statement made will be appropriate. In the term *vividishanti* (they desire to meditate), which occurs in the original, the root *vid* means to meditate (a point, which will be explained under *sūtra* IV-1-1), and the termination denotes desire. The general rule is that of the two-the root and the termination - the latter

(1) The statements are thus made: "Those that meditate on *Brahma* attain immortality (*chāndo.*, II-23-1); And these that in the jungle meditate on *Brahma* with eagerness (*chāndo.*, V-10-1); Desiring this same fruit they renounce the world' (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22); Desiring which they observe *brahmacharya* (*kaṭha.*, I-2-15). *Brahma-charya* means living in the house of the teacher abstention from sexual intercourse and the like.

is the more important; but where the termination expresses desire, the prominence is transferred to the root. In worldly discourse also the same rule is followed. In the statements "He wishes to kill with a knife" and "with a horse he desires to go" the knife is a help to killing, and the horse is a help to going. Similarly, here they wish to meditate, the helps to meditation being *yajna* and the rest. They help in this manner. Meditation must become vivid like sense perception; it must be marked with a high degree of love; it must grow every day; and it should be done throughout life. It is denoted by *dhyāna*, *upāsana* and other terms; and it is other than the mere knowledge of texts. If the *yajna* and the rest are done every day as the worship of the highest *Ātmā*, that Being is pleased, and helps meditation to grow, removing all obstacles.

2. The *sūtra* states an analogy. "As in the case of the horse". A horse, which is the means of locomotion for man, requires its own adjuncts - harness, etc. Similarly, meditation, which is the means of obtaining release, requires the help of the *karmas* that are attached to the house-holder's station.

3. There are other texts on this point:

Vidyā (meditation) and *avidyā* (what is other than *vidyā*) one, that knows both these, overcomes impediments (*mṛityu*) by *avidyā* and reaches *Brahma* by *vidyā* (*Isa.*, 11). Here *avidyā* refers to the *karmas* of the *varna* (caste) and *āśrama* (stage of life); hence 'by *avidyā* means 'by *karma*. The term *mṛityu* refers to existing *karma*, which impedes the springing up of *vidyā*. The *avidyā* stated to be the means to the removal of *mṛityu* is what is other than *vidyā*, i.e. *karmas* prescribed. See the following text: "Having knowledge of the *Ātmā*, and doing *brahma-vidyā*, he performed very many *yajñās*, in order to remove *mṛityu* by *avidyā* (*vishṇu.*, VI-6-12).

4. The *karma* that impedes *jñāna* (knowledge and meditation) is in the form of good and bad deeds. Both kinds are denoted by the word *pāpa*; for they impede the springing up of *jñāna* and lead to what is undesirable. *Karma* impedes *jñāna* by making the qualities *rajas* and *tamas* grow; and they will overcome the quality *satva*, which is the means to the springing of *jñāna*. That evil deeds prevent *jñāna* from springing up is thus stated; "It is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom he wishes to lead downwards' (*kaushitaki*). That *rajas* and *tamas* prevent one's knowing a thing as it is, and that *satva* enables him to see it as it is - is stated by *Bhagavān* Himself in the verses beginning with 'From *satva jñāna* comes' (*bhagavad gītā*, XIV-17). Hence, in order that *jñāna* may spring up, evil deeds should be got rid of; and this will be by doing prescribed *karmas* without desiring their fruits. This is stated in a *vedic* text. By *dharma* one gets rid of *pāpa* (*nāra.*, *anu.*,

50). Hence, the *Jnāna* that is the means to the reaching of *Brahma*, i.e., meditation, needs all the *karmas* prescribed for the stage of life.

5. See also the following *smṛiti* texts:

Yajna, making gifts, and *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) and similar *karmas* should never be abandoned, but must indeed be done. *Yajñās*, making gifts and *tapas* purify meditators (*bhagavad gītā*, XVIII-5). He reaches the goal, worshipping with his own *karma* that Being, from whom all beings come forth, and by whom all this world is pervaded (*Ibid.*, 46).

6. The author of the *vākya* also states that meditation as described comes only from *viveka* and the other qualifications; 'Its attainment is from *viveka vimoka*, *abhyāsa*, *kriyā*, *kalyāṇa*, *anavasāda*, and *anud-dharsha*; it is appropriate that it should do so; and it is so stated by *vedic* texts', He then explains what these are: (i) *Viveka* is discrimination in regard to one's food. It denotes here bodily purity to be attained from the taking of food not rendered impure by its nature, by the person to whom it belongs and by contact with impure objects. *Ganja* and other intoxicating articles are examples of the first kind of impure food; the food given by persons of evil deeds is an example of the second kind; and food touched by hair and the like is an example of the third kind; (ii) *Vimoka* is the absence of desire and anger; (iii) *Abhyāsa* is the dwelling of the mind on the object of meditation, when one is disengaged; (iv) *Kriyā* is the performance of the five great *yajñās* and similar *karmas* prescribed for the *varna* (caste) and *āśrama* (stage of life), so far as this may be possible; (v) *Kalyāṇa* is the following qualities: truth speaking, rectitude, mercy, willingness to part with one's possessions, abstention from injury of others and absence of undesirable thought. Of these, the first quality is not merely stating a thing as it took place; but it must also be beneficial to others. By rectitude' reference is made to perfect agreement of speech and action with one's thought and feeling. 'Mercy' is inability to see another in trouble, and willingness to help him without regard to his own advantage. Abstention from injury of others should be in every way by thought, speech and action. The undesirable thought, the absence of which constitutes the last quality, is regarding as one's own what belongs to another; or thought that leads to no fruit; or thought of the injury done by others; (vi) *Ānavasāda* is the absence of *avasāda*, which is depression of the mind caused by difficulty of place or time, or by thinking of past loss or of unwelcome something that is expected in the future; (vii) *Anuddharsha*, absence of undue elation. The conclusion is that if one observes these conditions, and performs the duties of his *āśrama*, meditation will succeed and only then.

7. These qualifications are enjoined by the following texts:

(i) If the food be pure, the mind will be pure; if the mind be pure, continuous meditation will come (*chāndo.*, VII-26-2); (ii) With a serene mind, i.e., not agitated by desire and anger, meditate (*Ibid.*, III-14-1); (iii) One that ever meditates on an object, etc. (*bhagavad gītā*, VIII-6). (iv) Be doing *karma* without desiring its fruit; one that does this is the best of those that meditate on *Brahma munda.*, III-1-4); Him *brāhmaṇas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yajna*, by giving and by *tapas* in the form of absence of desire (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22); (v) He can be reached by *satya* (*munda.*, III-1-4); That *Brahma* the fruit is for those only in whom *tapas*, *brahmacharya* and truth-speaking are established (*praśna.*, I-15); (vi) This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by weak persons (*munda.*, III-2-4); (vii) Controlling the mind, controlling the sense (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23).¹

8. The opponent may thus reply: In the sentence “with a horse he desires to go”, it is seen that the horse is a help to going, but not to the desire therefore. Hence there being no way of getting over this difficulty, it is accepted that the horse is a help to going. Here, how-ever, the statement, being made in a *vedic* text, must be accepted as it is made. *Reply.* the same difficulty is found here also. The desire to meditate springs from a knowledge of the Being to be meditated on; and it cannot be originated by *karma*. let the root (vid) in the term *vividishanit* be understood to mean merely to know, as you suggest. One that does *karma* must have an object. If it be to create the desire to know, then he has the desire already, and no *karma* is needed (*adhi*, 406) (1).

¹ Paras 3,4,6 and 7 above reproduce the portion of Sri *Bhashya* in Sub-section 1 of chapter I, Section 1, which was omitted (*vide* note on page 81).

(1) The opponent explains: The *karmas* enjoined the text are for the continuance of the desire. At first there is knowledge in general; this leads to desire to know; this is followed by *karma*; and this creates a particular variety of knowledge. *Reply.* If *karmas* were needed for the continuance of the desire, they must be ever done; and in order to know what they are, an enquiry into *karma* is needed; but this is opposed to your view (see page 77 to - 79). Assume that the text supports your view. There are many other texts that prescribe *karmas* as helps to meditation; and it is not possible to deny their existence. These are: “Be doing *karma* without desiring its fruit; one that does this is the best of those that meditate on *Brahma* (*munda*, III-1-4); When the agitation of the mind is removed by *karmas*, then *juana* springs up; *Janaka* and others reached their goal by *karma* alone (*bhagavad gītā* III-20); He performed very many *yagas* (*vishnu*, VI-6-12).

Question. Why is the termination expressing desire added to the root? *Reply.* The intention is to show that meditation on *Brahma* is itself a desirable object (*adhi.*, 407).

SUB-SECTION 6

27. शमदमाद्युपेतस्स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामप्यवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात् ।

The house-holder should in spite of this practise control of the sense, control of the mind, and the rest, because they have been enjoined as its adjuncts, and because they also should be necessarily practised.

The question for consideration here is whether a house-holder should practise these. The doing of *karma* means that the senses and the mind should be active; and their control means that they should cease to work. Hence, the control cannot be practised. This *first view* is refuted in the *sūtra*. The control of the mind, the control of the senses and the rest are necessary. Because they have been enjoined as helps to meditation in the following text:

Hence, one that knows this, controlling the mind controlling the senses, withdrawing from worldly pursuits, taking good and evil with serenity, and with the mind one pointed. should see the *Ātmā* in himself (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23).

A serene mind being necessary for making a beginning, and also for perfecting meditation, the points mentioned should be practised. The conflict pointed out between the two sets of helps does not exist; for they relate to separate matters. The senses and the mind should be engaged in actions that are enjoined; and their control is in matters that are not enjoined, and that are not in any way useful(1). It may be doubted whether the activity even in actions enjoined will not produce tendencies, which will make the control very difficult. But this doubt is misplaced. As the *karma* enjoined is done as the worship of the highest *Ātmā*, it will secure His grace, and through it will destroy all those tendencies (2).

(1) This question may be put to the opponent - Have not those in other stages to do the duties attached to them, and will not this interfere with the practice of control? He *replies*: They abandon desire for fruit, and do their duties as worship. We state that this attitude applies to the house holder too (*adhi.*, 408).

(2) The point under consideration may be illustrated by that happens in the world. One that knows that he has offended some great man, on whom he depends, has recourse to the means within his capacity to appease him; and in due course he re-enters on his service. Similarly, each one - the house-holder as well as the others essays to pacify his Maker by the duties of his own stage, and in due course reaches Him (*adhi.*, 409).

SUB-SECTION 7

In *bṛihad āraṇyaka* and *chāndogya* the following texts occurs:

By him, that thus meditates on the food of *prāṇa*, no impure food it eaten; no impure thing is accepted (*bṛihad.*, VIII-1-14); and in one that thus meditates nothing becomes improper food (*chāndo.*, V-2-1)

These texts indicate that one, that meditates on *prāṇa*, any take and food. Is this permission to be exercised by him at all times, or only when there is danger to lie? The *first view* is that the permission, being in no way limited, may be utilised at all times. The opponent contends that a general prohibition cannot affect a special injunction, and that it applies to cases not covered by that injunction. See the rule of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* stated in para (ii) of the *first view* under *sūtra* 25 of chapter III, section 1, page 366.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

28. सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणात्यये तद्दर्शनात् ।

Permission to eat any food is only, when there is danger to *prāṇa*. And this appears in *vedic*, texts.

The *veda* shows that even persons, that meditate on *Brahma*, utilise the permission only when life is in danger. See *Vedic Texts*. One *Ushasti*, foremost among those doing *brahma vidyā*, ate a portion of boiled gram, that was being eaten by an elephant-driver, but declined the drink, offered to him, saying.

I should not have lived, if I had not eaten these; (but when that danger has passed), to drink the impure water (offered by you) would be to yield to desire (*chāndo.*, I-10-4).

If this be the case in regard to one that does *brahma vidyā*, how much more careful should one be who meditates on *prāṇa* only, and whose capacity is very much less?

29. अबाधाच्च ।

And because other *vedic* texts should not be nullified.

Reference is made to a text of the *chāndogya*, which runs as follows:

If the food be pure, the mind will be pure; if the mind be pure, continuous meditation (on *Brahma*) will come (VII-26-2).

In order that this text may not be nullified, one should understand the texts in question as limited to cases of necessity.

30. अपिस्मर्यते ।

This is said in *smṛiti* also.

The text is

If one, being in danger of losing his life, eats food from anywhere, he is not stained by sin, as the lotus leaf is not affected by water.

This applies to those that meditate on *Brahma* as well as to others.

31. शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे ।

And hence texts prohibiting the yielding to desire.

Hence—for the reasons stated in the preceding *sūtras*.

Hence a *brāhmaṇa* does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking “I will not be stained with sin”.

SUB-SECTION 8

It was stated in sub-section 5 that *yajñās* and that rest should be performed by the house-holder as help to his meditation on *Brahma*. Should they be done by a house-holder, that does not aspire for release from *karma* or not? The *first view* is that they need not be. For, as subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*, *yajñās* and the rest should be done; hence one, that does not do it, need not do them; if they should be done as duties of his stage of life, he should do them throughout life. How can the same *karmas* be compulsory and optional at the same time?

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

32. विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि ।

And they (duties referred to in sub-section 5) are the duties of the *āśrama* also (stage of life); because they have been enjoined.

Yajñās and the rest should be performed even by the house-holder, that has no aspiration for release. For they have been enjoined by the text “He does *agnihōtra* throughout life”; and this includes the *karmas* known as *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa*.

33. सहकारित्वेन च ।

They should be done also as auxiliary to meditation.

Because they have been enjoined as decided in sub-section 5. The same *agnihōtra* is enjoined to a house-holders for life, and to one that desires the heaven-world, and the injunctions being contained in two different texts, it has been decided that there is no conflict. Similarly here also.

Nor are they different *karmas* in each case.

34. सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् ।

In both case the duties are the same, because in both the texts the same mark is found.

Whether the duties under consideration are viewed as auxiliary to meditation or as duties of the *āśrama*, they are the same *karmas* in both the cases. The reason is that in both the texts the injunction is conveyed using the term *yajna*. There is therefore no ground for thinking that the duties in both cases differ. The effect of this is that by doing them once, both the purposes will be served(1).

35. अनभिभवं च दर्शयति ।

And the *veda* shows prevention of obstructions in meditations

The text is "By *dharma* one removes evil *karma* (*nārā.*, *anu.*, 50). Evil *karma* obstructs the origination of *brahma vidyā*; and by the performance of *dharma*, i.e., the duties under consideration, the obstruction does not take place. By their daily performance, the mind becomes pure, the capacity to meditate is developed, and meditation grows.

SUB-SECTION 9

Those in the four *āśramas* (stages of life) have been dealt with. The question now considered is whether persons that are without them—those that have completed the student's life, and have not married, or that are widowers - are competent to do *Brahma vidyā*, and what are the helps to the *vidyā* in their case.

The *first view* is that they are not competent; for they do not perform the duties of any *āśrama*, which are the helps needed for the *vidyās*. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*:

36. अन्तराचापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ।

Also in those between the *āśramas* (qualification does exist), because this has been observed.

Because it is seen that *Raikva*, *Bhīshma*, *Samvarta* and others without *āśramas* did meditate on *Brahma*. No one can contend that only the duties of

(1) See the precedent in Introduction, para 37. Here the duties under consideration should be done but the same house-holder, and at the same place and time. As the *prayāgas*, though done but once, serve all the principal offerings, so the duties under consideration, though done by once, serve both the purposes.

an *āśrama* can help meditation. The text quoted under sub-section 5 mentions the making of gifts and other duties as helps to meditation; and these are found outside the *āśramas* also. Again, it was shown in sub-section 4 that those, that had taken the vow of life-long celibacy, meditated on *Brahma* with such helps as they could obtain from duties other than *agnihōtra* and connected duties. Similarly, persons outside the *āśramas* may practise meditation on *Brahma*, obtaining help from actions that do not pertain to any *āśrama*, as repetition of *mantras*, abstention from food on particular days, making gifts and worship of the highest *Ātmā*.

37. अपि स्मर्यते ।

Smṛiti also states this

What was last stated is confirmed by the following text of *Manu* (II-87).

One that meditates may without doubt reach his goal even by *japa* (repetition of *mantras*). He may do anything or may not do anything; but if he be the friend of all, he will do his meditation so well as to reach his goal.

38. विशेषानुग्रहश्च ।

And help by special acts (is declared).

One is not left to depend only upon argument and the *smṛiti*; there is also a *vedic* text, which runs as follows:

With *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), with abstention from sexual intercourse, with earnestness, and with realisation of their *Ātmā* they seek the *Ātmā*, etc. (*prasna*, I-10).

The *karmas* enumerated are not peculiar to the *āśramas*.

39. अतस्त्वितरज्यायो लिङ्गाच्च ।

Other than this is certainly better, because it is so declared by the *smṛiti*.

"Than this" - than being outside the *āśramas*; the 'other' is being in any one of the *āśramas*. The former is a case of necessity; but one, that can afford it, should hold some *āśrama*. Inside the *āśramas* there is scope for many *karmas*, and the help which they render is greater. Outside the *āśramas* there are not many *karmas*, and the help that they render is less. The two cases cannot be on a par. The *smṛiti* declaration, which is addressed, to one that can follow it, is "A *brāhmaṇa* should not remain even for one day outside one of the *āśramas*". A student, that has completed his study and a widower should not remain unmarried, unless they are disgusted with the world. It is a source of danger.

SUB-SECTION 10

40. तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्भावो जैमिनेरपि नियमात्तद्रूपाभावेभ्यः ।

But one that has become that (the holder of an *āśrama* other than the householder's) cannot cease to be that. This is the view of *Jaimini* also. Because the *veda* restrains him from throwing up the duties of his *āśrama*.

The question for consideration is whether even one that has elected to remain a bachelor all his life, or a forest-dweller, or one that has renounced the world, may do *brahma vidyā*, when he has fallen from his condition. The *first view* is that he may, like the widower and others dealt with in the preceding sub-section. The *sūtra* replies no. The *vedic* texts, which bear on the subject are:

The student, that lives in the house of his teacher, and uses up his body completely in his service is the third (*chāndo.*, II-23-1); Let him go to the jungle; but never return from it; Having renounced the world, let not one resume the sacred fire.

Hence like the widower these persons cannot remain outside the *āśramas*; and if they do, they will be disqualified for meditation on *Brahma*. By the reference to *Jaimini*, the author shows agreement by him, and confirms his own view.

The opponent disputes the conclusion reached. He considers that these persons may by some expiatory act purify themselves and become qualified again. Reference is made to an expiatory *yāga* in regard to such persons in chapter VI of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* dealing with qualifications (section 8, subsection 4). The next *sūtra* deals with this question.

41. न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात् ।

And not even the expiation referred to in the chapter on qualifications; because the *smṛitis* declare them to have fallen, and expiation is impossible for them.

The declaration is:

In the case of the twice-born, who having entered on life-long studentship falls from it, I do not see any expiation by which he, the slayer of himself, may be purified.

Hence the expiation mentioned in the *mīmāṃsa* applies to other students.

42. उपपूर्वमपीत्येके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् ।

Some hold that expiation exists (as the fall from the *āśrama* is) merely *upapātaka*; as in the case of eating, this has been declared.

Upapātaka is a minor sin, not included in the five great sins. Some teachers therefore hold the view that the fall may be atoned for by an expiatory ceremony. They point to an analogy. There is a prohibition against drinking spirituous liquor; and an expiatory ceremony is mentioned for disobedience; and this applies to the life-long student as well as to the ordinary student. And this is declared in the following *smṛiti* text:

What has been stated for the student living with teacher applies to the other *āśramas* also, in so far as it is not opposed to them.

Similarly, here also expiation is permitted, and when the fallen man is purified, the qualification re-appears.

This view is rejected in the next *sūtra*:

43. बहिस्तूभयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ।

But in either case such men remain outside (the group of persons that are qualified); because of the *smṛiti* and of the practice of good men.

'In either case' - whether the fall is treated as a great sin or as a minor one. The result is the same; and the fallen man remains disqualified. Because, as already pointed out, the *smṛiti* states that no expiation is possible for him. A few texts no doubt state that expiatory ceremonies may be resorted to remove the sin; but there is no expiation that can render the person so pure as to become qualified for meditation (1).

There is also the practice of good men, who avoid the fallen men, even though they do the expiatory ceremonies; and they do not teach them how to do the meditation. The conclusion therefore is that these persons remain disqualified (2).

(1) A *karma* has three-fold capacity; It yields unwelcome fruit; it obstructs the acquisition of a qualification for doing *karma* enjoined by the *veda*; and it creates a leaning to similar *karma*. Some expiations destroy all the three capacities; others some one of these, but not all. Here there is conflict between two texts - that which denies the existence of any expiatory ceremony, and that extending certain expiations. It is therefore decided that the latter text permits purification to the extent of destroying the first capacity, and that the former text preserves the second capacity intact.

(2) *Question by the opponent*. The following text states an expiatory act for those affected with the five great sins, and with minor ones known as *upapātaka*: "If one sees *Prurshottama* from the seat on which He stands up to His head, his great sins are quickly destroyed; " why should the destruction of *upapātaka* be specially stated. When meditation on *Brahma* has been established, if the meditator falls from inadvertence,

SUB-SECTION 11

This sub-section comes in only incidentally. Reference has already been made to meditation on the *udgītha*, the singing of which is part of a *kratu*. The question to be considered is by whom it should be done—by the *yajamāna* himself or by one of his helpers in the *kratu*.

Ātreya holds the *first view*, which is that it should be done by the *yajamāna*. For from *upanishads* it is observed that the same persons, that perform meditation, reap its fruit. Here it has been decided that the fruit of the meditation - viz., non-obstruction of the fruit of the *kratu* - is different from the fruit of the *kratu* itself, and that it is reaped by the *yajamāna*. Hence it is he that should do the meditation.

2. *Objection*. This case is analogous to that in which, when the *yajmāna* desires cows, water for *pranītā* should be carried in a milking vessel. *Reply*. Here though the fruit, which is separate from the fruit of the *yāga*, is reaped by the *yajamāna*, the filling in of the milking vessel must be done by the *adhvaryu*; for the operations of filling and filling in the milking vessel cannot be separated. In the case under consideration, there is no such difficulty; for while the *udgāta*, sings the *udgītha*, the *yajamāna* may do the meditation. This is stated in the *sūtra*.

44. स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः ।

(The meditation is the duty) of the *yajamāna*; because meditation and reaping the fruit are declared to be by the same person. So does *Ātreya* think.

The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra*:

45. आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिक्रीयते ।

It is the duty of the *ṛitvik* (helper in the *kratu*); so does *Audulomi* think; for he has been bought for doing the *kratu*.

According to *Audulomi* the meditation should be done by the *ṛitvik*. For, he has been engaged by the promise of a fee to do the *kratu* with all its parts. And this is stated in the following texts: "He requests the *ṛitviks*; and "He gives fees to the *ṛitviks*". Hence, whatever *karma*, whether of the body or

meditation on *Brahma* is stated to be the means for his purification. This is stated by *smṛiti*-writes. Why should there not be expiation similarly in regard to the fallen man under consideration? *Reply*. We have not right to question the *veda*. Following the *smṛiti* and the practice of good men, the author of the *sūtras* has shown what should be done in this case. We must accept what the *veda* and *smṛitis* teach; if once we begin to question why they prescribe this or that, the bound for the protection of *dharma*, which has been made, will disappear (*adhi.*, 414 and 415).

of the mind, pertains to the *kratu* should be done only by him. Capacity or the reverse is not the criterion in this case. It is true that the meditation on the *udgītha* is not a part of the *kratu*, but benefits the *yajamāna*; yet it pertains to him as *yajamāna*, and the *kratu* and all its parts should be done by the helpers. Also, the meditation serves a part of the *kratu* to be done by a helper. Hence, it should be done by him. In the *dahara* and other *vidyās*, there is no mention of anything to be done by a helper; and following the rule that the fruit belongs to the performer, they are done by those that wish to enjoy the fruits.

SUB-SECTION 12

Helps of two kinds have been prescribed in sub-sections 5 and 6; viz., the doing of *yajna* and other duties of one's stage of life, and the control of the mind and the senses, etc. In this sub-section help of a third kind is prescribed, viz., *mauna* (making the mind dwell on the object of meditation, when it is disengaged.) This is referred to in a text of the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*.

Hence, a *brāhmaṇa*, should attain *pāṇḍitya* and desire to remain with *bālyā*. Attaining *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā*, he then becomes a *muni* (V-5).

Here the question for consideration is whether like *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā* *mauna* also is enjoined, or whether the reference to becoming a *muni* is a repetition of what has been stated already.

First view. It is the latter. For both the terms *pāṇḍitya* and *mauna* denote knowledge. Hence the expression "becomes *muni*" is a statement of the injunction already conveyed in the expression "Should attain *pāṇḍitya*." This view is supported by the absence of the termination denoting injunction.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

46. सहकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् ।

Another help is prescribed to one doing *brahma vidyā*; like those enjoined and the rest. The third, as it is seen, as an alternative meaning, in those that do meditation fully.

'Like those enjoined' - in sub-section 5 and 6, viz., *yajna* and other duties of one's stage of life, and control of the mind, and the rest. By the words 'the rest' reference is made to hearing and constantly thinking on the instruction received. As the first set is prescribed by the texts considered in sub-sections 5 and 6 as helps, and as hearing and thinking, which will be resorted to without an injunction, are accepted as helps, here also a third kind of help is enjoined, consisting of *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā* and *mauna*. The *sūtra* states that *mauna* is a third thing in addition to *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā*; for the term *muni* is used to denote also persons like *Vyāsa*, who do meditation fully. The term therefore means to fix the mind on the object of meditation,

when it is disengaged. It therefore differs from *manana*, which is to think on the instruction received from a teacher, so that it may be firmly impressed on the mind. It is true that in the text there is no termination indicating injunction; but because it has not been enjoined already, it must be assumed that an injunction is conveyed. The expression 'becomes a *muni*' means he should become a *muni*.'

The meaning of the text is as follows: *Brāhmaṇa* is one that does *brahma vidyā*; he should obtain *pāṇḍitya*, i.e. he should know the nature of *Brahma*, to be meditated on, fully and without doubt or misconception; that is he should obtain a clear and full grasp of the subject, that cannot be attained by hearing and thinking alone. This must come from the predominance of the quality *satva*, which again must come from love of *Brahma* (1). The meaning of *bālyā* will be presently explained. Having attained *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā*, his mind must dwell on the nature of *Brahma* as it is, in order that he may attain *brahma vidyā*. It is only by the attainment of these three things in this manner one attains the *vidyā*. This is stated in what follows: 'Attaining *amauna* (what is other than *mauna*), and *mauna*, he becomes *brāhmaṇa*. By the expression 'other than *mauna*' reference is made to all the other helps; and 'becomes *brāhmaṇa*' means attains *vidyā* fully grown; and this is to be attained with such helps only. Then the question is put "with what does he become *brāhmaṇa*"; the meaning is whether any means exist other than that stated. The reply is 'by which he becomes, by that alone he becomes thus'. The meaning is: it was stated that one becomes *brāhmaṇa* by the helps ending with *mauna*; by this alone he becomes *brāhmaṇa*; but not by any other means. The conclusion is that for all stages of life *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā* and *mauna* are prescribed like the duties of those stages.

Question. In the *chāndogya* one is directed to complete his student's stage of life and live as a householder (See *Vedic Texts*); and the text closes with these words "Thus living all his life, he attains *Brahma* world and does not return" (VIII-15-1). How is one to reconcile this teaching with what has been stated? The next *sutra* replies:

47. कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः ।

(1) This point is stated in the following texts: I cannot be seen in this form as you have seen Me by recitation of the *veda*, by *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), by making gifts or by *yajna*. But by love, not looking forward to any other goal, it is possible for one to know Me (*bhagavad gītā*, XI-53 and 54). In whom there is superior love for the *Deva* (*śveta.*, VI-23); This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking etc. (*kaṭha*, II-23).

Because (meditation) is found in all (the stages), the teaching is wound up with the house-holder.

For the reason stated, meditation is found in the house-holder also; and the *upanishad* closes, making reference to him. The intention is that what is stated should apply to all stages.

Similarly, in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* the text under consideration is preceded by reference to the state of one that renounces the world thus:

Brāhmaṇa should rise from love of son, from love of money, and from love of the world, and live the life of a mendicant.

Though the third kind of help appears to be prescribed to one that thus renounces the world, it applies to all. This is declared in the next *sūtra*:

48. मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात् ।

Like *mauna*; because the reaching of *Brahma* by those in other stages also is stated.

In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text reference is made to one that rises from all desires, and lives as a mendicant; and then the helps ending with *mauna* are enjoined. This injunction applies to all stages. For all those in other stages also reach *Brahma* as taught in *chāndogya* Itself (II-23-1).

SUB-SECTION 13

The expression "Remaining with *bālya*" in the text considered in the preceding sub-section is explained here. The term *bālya* may mean the age of a child or his actions. As the former cannot be attained by one, the term must be taken to mean a child's actions. The question for consideration is whether the meditator may live like a child, following his desires, wherever they may lead him? or whether he should not parade his learning and worth. The *first view* is that the former alternative is what is intended; for there is nothing to limit the injunction to any particular thing; and a general prohibition is barred by the particular injunction. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

49. अनाविष्कुर्वन्नन्वयात् ।

Without parade; because this alone will fit in.

It is the nature of a child not to show off his powers; and this should be adopted by the meditator. For, this alone will fit with the injunction. Everything else is said to be opposed to *vidyā*.

Who does not desist from evil deeds, the force of whose desire and hate have not abated, whose mind is tossed about by numerous undertakings, and who for that reason cannot steadily maintain his mind on any object-by

him He cannot be reached by meditation (*kātha.*, II-24); If the food be pure, the mind will be pure (*chāndo.*, VII-26-2).

SUB-SECTION 14

50. ऐहिकमप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तद्दर्शनात् ।

The fruits of this world are reaped immediately, if there be no obstruction. This is seen.

Meditation is of two kinds - the fruit of one is well being in this world or in the next; and the fruit of the other is release from *karma*. The question considered in this sub-section is whether the former is reaped immediately after the good deeds are done, or at some other time. the *first view* is that as there is no cause for delay, it is reaped immediately; for the meditator is reborn with the good deeds previously done. This is stated by *Bhagavān*: 'Four classes of persons, that have done good deeds, meditate on Me (*bhagavad gītā*, VII-16). The *sūtra* states that the time for reaping the fruit is not definitely fixed. If the fruit of a stronger *karma* does not intervene, and cause obstruction, the fruit of the meditation is reaped immediately. Otherwise, it is delayed. This fact is admitted in the *veda*. It was shown that when the *udgītha* is sung with meditation, the *kratu*, of which the singing is a part, becomes most efficacious, i.e., that it prevents the coming of all obstructions. The possibility of there being obstructions is thus admitted.

SUB-SECTION 15

51. एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः ।

Similarly, in regard to fruit in the form of release from *karma*, the time of reaping is not definitely fixed. Because that condition is known.

The same condition exists in this case also. The same condition the absence of obstruction, or the ending of the obstruction. The reason for adding a new sub-section is that there is a further doubt in the matter, *viz.*, the actions that help meditation being more powerful, there can be no obstruction. The *reply* is that it is possible that offence previously given to persons doing meditation may cause obstruction (1).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) It may be thought that the last sub-section alone is useful, as it points out that it is possible for meditation to be obstructed in the yielding of its fruit, so that steps may be taken to remove the cause of obstruction. Why is reference made to meditation for worldly fruit? The *reply* is that the intention is to point out the possibility of obstructions there also, and to create a disgust for such fruits; for persons may seek them under the impression that there is no difficulty in the matter (*adhi.*, 423).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER IV

SECTION 1

In the third chapter meditation was considered along with the helps thereto. In this chapter the nature of meditation is first examined (1), and then the fruits to be reaped are stated.

SUB-SECTION 1

The following texts teach *vedana* "One that meditates (*vid*) on *Brahma* reaches the highest (*āna.*, 1-1); Meditating (*viditva*) on Him alone, one attains immortality (*ṣveta.*, 3-8). If one meditated (*veda*) on *Brahma*, he becomes *Brahma* indeed; (*muṇḍa.*, III-2-9); When the seer sees the Being with a bright figure' (*Ibid.*, III-1-3). This text contains the term *vidvān*. These texts prescribe *vedana* as the means to reach *Brahma*. The question for consideration is whether it should be done but once, and whether the injunction is fully complied with thereby, or whether it should be repeated many times?

first view. The *vedana* should be done but once. For, the injunctions mention only *vedana*; and there is no authority for its repetition. The case cannot be likened to the husking of paddy (*avahanana*); see note (5) on page 34. There the effect is actually seen; and till the husk is completely removed, the operation should be repeated. But *vedana* does not produce an effect that can be seen; and it need not be repeated. Further, *karmas* like *jyotishtoma*, and the *vedana* prescribed in the *vedānta* form the worship of the highest *Ātmā*; and thus worshipped, He bestows on the worshipper the four kinds of fruits. This was settled in chapter III, section 2, sub-section 8. Hence *jyotishtoma*, *vedana* also should be done but once; and this will be a full compliance with the injunctions.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

1. आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात् ।

Repetition more than once, because it is so taught.

Because the word *vedana* is used as synonymous with the terms *dhyāna* and *upāsana*. This is known from the fact that in texts teaching

(1) It may be thought that the nature of meditation should have been dealt with in the third section of chapter III. True; its inclusion in the chapter on fruits of meditation is to show the following points: (i) Release cannot be attained by any other means; (ii) meditation is indissolubly connected with release; (iii) The attainment of the goal is near at hand' and (iv) The pleasure of meditation is as great as that to be attained in release (*adhi.*, 433).

vedana the three terms are used to denote the same thing. The *chāndogya*, III-18 begins with the words “mediate (*upāsita*) on the mind as *Brahma*” (verse 1), and closes with the sentence “He that thus meditates (*veda*) shines through his fame as a giver; warms through his repute as a powerful person, and shines through the lustre born of *vedic* learning” (verse 3). Here the teaching begins with the term *upāsana* and ends with the term *vedana*. In the next example this is reversed. In the same *upanishad* the first section of chapter IV describes *Raikvas* learning thus “What he knows (*veda*), that alone any other knows (*veda*); such a person was stated by me “(verse 4). Further on, there is this sentence “Teach me, revered sir, the Being on whom you meditate” (*upāsse*) (Ibid., IV-2-4). Other texts similarly connect *vedana* and *dhyāna*. The teaching conveyed by the text “One that meditates (*vid*) on *Brahma* reaches the highest” (*āna*, 1-1) is given by other texts thus: “The *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on and should be mediated on (*nididhyāsita*) (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-5); and “Then meditating (*dhyāyamāna*) on Him without parts, he sees Him” (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-8). Now, *dhyāna* is thinking continuously, and is not merely a single act of recalling something to the mind. *Upāsana* too has the same meaning; for the term is used to denote the fixing of the mind on one thing to the exclusion of every thing else. It may, therefore, be concluded that the term *vedana* means continuous dwelling of the mind, the subject of meditation being revolved many times.

2. लिङ्गाच्च ।

This is learnt from the *smṛitis* also.

This text is:

A continuous stream of thought without interruption by any other thought is *dhyāna*; and it is brought about by the first six helps (*vishṇu*, VI-7-91).

2. The means to release (*moksha*) is thus shown to be meditation. It should also be continuous without a break, like a stream of oil poured from a cup. This is stated.

If food be pure, the mind will be pure; if the mind be pure, unbroken (*dhruvā*) meditation will come; when unbroken meditation is attained, all knots are cut (1) (*chāndo.*, VIII-26-2).

Next, it must become vivid like sense perception. This appears from the following text:

(1) Knots are *avidyā*, desire and the like, so called from the difficulty in getting rid of them.

The knots in the heart are cut; all doubts are solved; his *karmas* are destroyed, when He is seen, as compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior beings (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-9).

This being so, in the text 'The *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, etc., the term *drashtavya* shows that meditation denoted by *nididhyāsana* should be vivid like sense perception (1). A thought recalled and revolved in the mind continuously becomes vivid like sense perception.

3. And this is explained by the author of the *vākya*. '*Vedana* is *upāsana*, as it is used to denote the subject of *upāsana*'. He considers the following as the *first view*. 'Think but once; for the intention of the injunction is thus carried out; like the *prayāja* offerings, which are made but once for all the principal offerings, (see Intro., Para 37). He then states the *final decision* thus: 'It is decided (that the thought should be repeated); for the term *upāsana* is used as synonymous with *Vedana*. Next, *upāsana* should be unbroken meditation; for it is seen, and is stated in a *vedic text*'.

4. It has been stated that the means to release (*moksha*) is continuous, vivid meditation. It should be loving meditation also. This is stated:

This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking by mere meditation, or by mere hearing many times; He is reached by him, whom alone He chooses. To him this *Ātmā* shows Himself (*muṇḍa.*, III-2-3).

He chooses him only, who is dearest to Himself. He is dearest to Him, who loves Him beyond measure. *Bhagavān* Himself makes efforts in such a manner, that one that is dearest to Him may reach Him. This is stated by Himself: "to those, that wishing ever to be with Me, meditate on Me, I give with love that *buddhi*, with which they will reach Me" (*bhagavad gītā*, X-10; 'I am immeasurably dear to him; he is immeasurably dear to Me' (*Ibid.*, VII-17). This means that the continuous, vivid meditation must become immeasurably dear, as the object meditated on is immeasurably dear. It is then that the highest *Ātmā* will choose the meditator, and can be reached by him. This continuous, vivid, loving meditation and this alone is denoted by the term *bhakti*; for it is synonymous with the term *upasana*. Hence, the *veda* and *smṛiti* state:

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(2) In the text '*Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, should be heard, about, should be thought on, should be meditated on,' the hearing about is not an injunction; for one that has learnt the *veda*, will perceive that it points out the means to desirable ends; and in order to find out all about them, he will himself go to a teacher to receive instruction. This need not be enjoined. Nor should *manana*, (thinking on) be enjoined, as its purpose is to impress the teaching on the mind. Hence, what is enjoined is only *dhyāna* (meditation), and this should be as vivid as sense perception is.

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By meditating on Him alone, one overcomes death (*ṣveta.*, III-8); One that thus meditates on Him here becomes immortal; no other path to the goal exists (*puru*); I cannot be seen in this form, as you have seen Me, either by reciting the *veda*, by *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), by making gifts, or by *yajnas*. But by love, not looking forward to any other fruit, it is possible for one to know Me, to see Me as I am, and to enter into Me (*bhagavad gītā*, XI-53 and 54); That highest *Purusha* can be reached with love, that spends itself wholly upon Him (*Ibid.*, VIII-22).

5. *Criticism.* *Śankara* holds the view that the destruction of *avidyā* alone is release (*moksha*), and that it comes about by knowing *Brahma*. This we accept. Let us now consider what this knowing is which *upanishads* intend to enjoin as the means of destroying *avidyā*. Is it the mere knowledge conveyed by *vedic* texts, or is it meditation following on that knowledge.

Śankara. It is the former.

Reply. The knowledge conveyed by *vedic* texts need not be enjoined; it will come to one, that hears the texts. Nor is it perceived that by this alone *avidyā* is destroyed.

Śankara. Such knowledge as will destroy *avidyā* does come on hearing the texts; but the perception of differences, which is, the effect of *vāsanā* (unfavourable tendency) does not disappear at once; it continues for some time, like the perception of the moon as double by one with a cataract in the eye, even though he learns that there is but one moon. Though it continues, as its root has been cut, it does not bind.

Reply. We cannot admit that perception of differences can continue; for its cause also, *viz.*, *vāsanā*, being unreal, has been destroyed by knowledge. The case of the perception of the double moon is not analogous; for the cause of such perception is a real cataract in the eye; and it cannot be removed by knowledge. Hence the perception continues; but as it is known to be misperception on good authority, it will lead to no undesirable result. If you say that the *vāsanā* continues, even after knowledge comes, as there is no other means of destroying it, it can never disappear.

Śankara. There is a *vāsanā* engendered and developed by perception of differences; and until this is removed, *vedic* texts will not produce such knowledge as will destroy *avidyā*.

Reply. Sentences must convey their meaning, when the necessary conditions exist: it is not correct to state that they will not. We also see that even though an unfavourable tendency exists, such knowledge, as will remove misconception, comes from the statements of reliable persons or from inference. further, as you consider that knowledge should come through the

destruction of the *vāsanā*, this result can never happen; the *vāsanā* has been developed during long ages: and is immeasurably strong; while the meditation, that should destroy it, being practised for only a short time, is weak; and it cannot destroy the *vāsanā*.

6. Hence the means to the destruction of *avidyā*, which *upanishads* intend to teach, is something other than the knowledge conveyed by texts. It is what is denoted by words like *dhyāna* and *upāsana*. Here is the authority—

Knowing (*viñāya*), do meditation (*prajñā*) (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-21); Knowing (*anuvidyā*), one meditates (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-6); meditate on the *Ātmā* thus I am for thee only (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-6); meditating on Him, one is released from the jaws of death (*kaṭha.*, III-15); meditate only on the *Ātmā*, the fruit (*bṛihad.*, III-4-15). *Ātmā* dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on, should be meditated on (*Ibid.*, VI-5-6); He should be sought; He should be meditated on (*chāndo.*, VIII-7-1).

As the knowledge to be gathered from *vedic* texts serves meditation, in the first two texts reference is made to this knowledge by the participles, 'knowing', and then meditation is enjoined by the other words in the texts.¹

SUB-SECTION 2

The question to be considered now is whether the highest *Ātmā*, the object of meditation, should be meditated on as different from the meditator, or as 'his *ātmā*'.

First view. He should be meditated on as different from the meditator; for He is other than the *jeeva* that meditates. This point has been decided in *sūtras* I-1-17, II-1-22, and III-4-8. One should meditate on Him as He is; if the meditation be on Him, as He is not, He will not be reached as He is. For the rule is what one thinks that he becomes (*chāndo.*, III-14-1).

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

3. आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।

(The meditation should be) only as *ātmā*. So have persons meditated in the past, and the *upanishads* convey the same teaching.

As the person that meditates is the *Ātmā* of his own body, so is the highest *Ātmā* the *Ātmā* of himself, and meditation should be done in this aspect. For it was in this manner that men of olden times meditated "I am thou indeed, revered *devatā*; thou art I indeed". *Question.* The highest *Ātmā*

¹ Paras 2 to 6 reproduce the portion of the Sri Bhashya omitted from sub-section I of chapter I, section 1, as stated in a footnote on page 44.

being other than the meditator, how did they regard Him as themselves? The last part of the *sūtra* replies:

The *veda* makes the meditators understand this point without conflicting with other texts: "Who stands in the *Ātmā*, who is within the *Ātmā*, whom the *Ātmā* does not know, whose body the *Ātmā* is, who rules the *Ātmā* from within, He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-22). All these beings, dear, have their root in *Sat*; they rest in *Sat*; they will be dissolved in *Sat*; all this is identical with that (*Sat*) (*chāndo.*, VI-8-4 and 7); All this is indeed *Brahma*; for it has come forth from Him; it will be dissolved in Him; it lives by Him (*Ibid.*, III-14-1).

For the reasons stated in these texts, *Brahma* is the *Ātmā* of all things intelligent and non-intelligent. He is therefore the *Ātmā* of the meditator.

As each person is the *Ātmā* of his own body, and thinks "I am deva, I am man"; so the highest *Ātmā* is the *Ātmā* of himself, and it is appropriate that he should regard Him as himself. It has been pointed out how every thought of everything extends to the highest *Ātmā* also, and how every word therefore denote Him directly. Men of olden times, accepting this teaching of the *veda*, made the statement quoted above. Hence also prohibition of meditation on Him as another contained in the following texts:

One that meditates on another *devatā* with the thought 'He is another; I am another' does not meditate (*bṛihad.*, III-4-10); He does not know the whole truth; meditate on Him only as *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7). All things will overcome him, who sees all things else where than in the *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-6).

2. The injunctions and prohibitions do not conflict with the direction to think of the highest *Ātmā* as different from the *jeeva* contained in the text "Meditating on the *Ātmā* and on the Being who controls him as different" (*śveta.*, I-6). For, one meditates on Him as I, on the ground that He is his *Ātmā*; and he regards Him as superior to himself, as he is superior to his own body.

SUB-SECTION 3

4. न प्रतीके न हि सः ।

Meditation as *Ātmā* does not apply to meditation on *pratika*; for it is not *Ātmā*.

Meditation on mind, on name and on similar objects is enjoined in the following texts: "Meditate on mind as *Brahma* (*chāndo.*, III-18-1); He that

meditates on name as *Brahma*" (*Ibid.*, VI-1-5). In these cases is the meditation to be as directed in the preceding sub-section i.e, as the *Ātmā* of the meditator, or no?

First view. As directed in the preceding sub-section; for the meditation is on the highest *Ātmā* as in the other case; and He is the *Ātmā* of the meditator. The *final decision* is - No. This is stated in the *sūtra*: For mind or name is not the *Ātmā* of the meditator. In cases like these the meditation is only on the *pratīka*, but not on the highest *Ātmā*. He enters into the meditation merely as a qualifying attribute (*viseshāna*). By meditation on *pratīka* is meant meditation on what is not the highest *Ātmā* as the highest *Ātmā*. In this meditation, as the *pratīka* is not the *Ātmā* of the meditator, it is not to be meditated on as such.

Objection. Even here the highest *Ātmā* alone is the object of meditation. When this is possible it is inappropriate to meditate on mind and on other non-intelligent objects, which possess but little power. Hence, the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as mind, as name and the like. The *sūtra* replies:

5. ब्रह्मदृष्टिरुत्कर्षात् ।

Meditation as *Brahma* should be (on objects); because of His superiority.

Because *Brahma* is superior to mind, name and the rest; while they are the reverse as compared with Him. To look upon a king as a servant will be attended with unpleasant consequences, while the reverse will do good.

SUB - SECTION 4

6. आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्गउपपत्तेः ।

Meditation on parts of a *kratu* should be only as the sun and other *devatās*; because to do so is appropriate.

There is this text: "This being, who warms, meditate on *udgītha* as that being" (*chāndo.*, I-3-1). In cases like this, when meditation on parts of a *kratu* is enjoined, the question arises - Should one meditate on the *udgītha* as the sun, or on the sun as the *udgītha*?

First view. The latter is the correct form; for, the rule laid down in the preceding sub-section is that meditation should be on an inferior object as

being a superior being. *Udgītha*, being part of a *kratu* which is the means to a fruit, is superior to the sun, who has no connection with the fruit (1).

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*. It is on the *udgītha* that one should meditate as the sun. Because it is appropriate to regard the sun as the superior of the two. For, *karma* yields its fruit, only as being the worship of the sun and similar *devatās*.

SUB-SECTION 5

7. आसीनस्सम्भवात् ।

Meditation should be done in the sitting posture, because it is only then (that concentration of mind) will be possible.

One may do meditation, sitting, lying down, standing or walking; for there is nothing to restrict the choice to one of these postures. In this predicament the *sūtra* intervenes, and throws its weight on the side of the sitting posture. In standing or walking some effort is required; and lying down may induce sleep. Hence the sitting posture should be adopted. And in order that no effort may be required for holding up the body, some support to the back should also be provided.

8. ध्यानाच्च ।

And because what has to be done is *dhyāna* (meditation).

Dhyāna has been stated to be the dwelling of the mind on one thing, without the intervention of the thought of anything else. And for this concentration of mind is necessary.

9. अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य ।

And having regard to immobility.

Having regard to immobility, earth, sky and other things are appropriately stated to meditate.

Earth seems to meditate; the intermediate world seems to meditate; heaven seems to meditate; water seems to meditate; the hills seem to meditate (*chāndo.*, VII-6-1).

In order to concentrate his mind the meditator should be immobile like the earth and hills; and this is possible only to him that sits down.

(1) This is based on the *mīmāṃsaka*'s view that *karma* yields fruit, through *apūrva*, but not the *devata*. See the discussions in paras 5 and 6 of the *final decision* in sub-section I-3-7.

10. स्मरन्ति च ।

And this is stated in the *smṛitis*

It is stated that meditation should be done sitting.

Placing on a pure spot a firm seat for himself, neither much raised, nor very low, and covered over with a cloth, deerskin, and *kuṣa* grass; sitting on the seat, making the mind one-pointed, controlling the functions of the mind and the senses, let him practise *yoga* to reach purity of the *Ātmā* (*bhagavad gītā*, VI-11 and 12).

11. यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् ।

(The meditation should be done) where concentration of mind is possible, because (the time and place) have not been specified.

No particular place or time has been stated as suitable for the meditation, and there is mention only of concentration of mind. Whatever place or time suitable for this purpose, that alone should be selected. The text "On a level place, pure, and free from pebbles fire and sand, etc.,". (*śveta.*, II-10) refers to a place where alone concentration of mind may be attained but it does not restrict the choice to particular places; for further on it is said "suitable to the mind", i.e., to concentration of mind.

SUB-SECTION 6

12. आप्रयाणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् ।

(The meditation should be done) till one departs from the world. For there also it is seen.

The question for consideration is whether meditation may be completed in one day, or whether it should be continued every day till death. The *first view* is that as the injunction will be carried out by doing it for one day only, it should be completed on one day (1). The *sūtra* says - 'No'. It is seen that meditation is done from its commencement up to departure from

(1) *Objection*. As this text contains no word to indicate an injunction, it merely sums up the teaching with a statement of the fruit. *Reply*. As the injunction has not been given anywhere else, it should be treated as an injunction. *Objection* again. In this text reference is made to goods deeds only, but not to meditation. *Reply*. As the good deeds are referred to as the means of reaching the *Brahma*- world, and as they are calculated to make meditation grow, the mention of goods deeds implies the continuance of meditation also throughout.

this world, and throughout this period - "Thus living all his life, he reaches the *Brahma* - world" (*chāndo.*, - III-15-1).

SUB-SECTION 7

In the remainder of this chapter the fruits of meditation are described. In this section such fruits, as come to the mediator while he remains in his gross body, are dealt with.

The *veda* states that when one has attained meditation, his previous evil *karma* is destroyed, and that subsequent evil *karma* does not attach itself to him. The following are the texts :

As water does not stick to a lotus leaf, so no evil *karma* will stick to one, that thus meditates (*chāndo.*, IV-14-3). The *Ātmā* that knows the nature of *Brahma*, on knowing Him is not polluted with evil deed (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23).

These texts describe non-attachment of subsequent evil deed.

When one knows this and makes offerings, all his evil deeds are burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up (*chāndo.*, V-24-3); His *karmas* are destroyed, when he is seen, as compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior beings (*munda.*, II-2-9).

These texts describe the destruction of past *karma*. the question to be considered is whether it is right to regard these two results as the fruit of *vidyā* or no.

First view. They cannot be the fruit of *vidyā*; for it is said:

karma, the fruit of which has not been experienced, is not destroyed even by the lapse of a thousand millions of *kalpas* (world-age).

As the *vedic* texts conflict with this verse, and as they follow the teaching of meditations on the highest *Ātmā*, they must be regarded as mere praise (*arthavada*). Nor can they be regarded as enjoining meditation in expiation of evil *karma*; for they teach the reaching of *Brahma* as the fruit "One that meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest" (*āna.*, I-1). "If one meditates on *Brahma*, he becomes *Brahma* indeed" (*muṇḍa.*, III-2-9).

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

13. तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् ।

On the attainment of this (meditation) there result the destruction of previous evil *karma*, and the non-attachment of subsequent evil *karma*; because this is declared.

By the expression "attainment of meditation" is meant the reaching of the stage, in which meditation becomes as *vivid* as sense perception; for the text is "When He is seen". It is appropriate that these results should flow from *vidyā*; for it possesses great efficacy; and this efficacy is referred to in the expressions "No evil *karma* will stick to one that thus meditates"; and "all his evil deeds are burnt up". There is no conflict as stated in the *first view*, for the texts relate to different matters. The verse confirms the efficacy of *karma* to produce its fruit; while the *upanishad* texts quoted declare that meditation on the highest *Ātmā*, when attained, destroys the capacity of past evil deeds to yield their fruits, and that it obstructs the accrual of similar capacity in regard to subsequent evil deeds. There is no more conflict between them than there is between the capacity of fire to produce heat, and the power of water to allay it.

2. The opponent's view that meditation is not expiation is not correct. It is enjoined merely to destroy *karma*; and when it is destroyed, and the obstruction is removed, the attribute *jnāna* expands of itself; and other fruits come to the meditator in the same way (*adhi.*, 460).

3. What is meant by the non-sticking of evil deeds? Evil deeds produce in a person a tendency to do evil deeds of the same kind, made him unfit to perform the duties imposed upon him by the *veda*, and lead to unwelcome fruit. Obstructing the accrual of this capacity is non-sticking of evil deeds. The destruction of evil deeds is the destruction of this capacity, when it has already accrued. This capacity is the displeasure of the highest *Ātmā*. The meditation is His worship, and removes His displeasure, when it has accrued, and obstructs its accrual, when it has not.

4. This declaration of the non-sticking of subsequent evil *karma* refers, it should be noted, to *karma* done unconsciously. The text "who does not desist from evil deeds, etc." (*kaṭha.*, II-24), indicates that complete withdrawal from evil doing is the means by which meditation may be perfected.

SUB-SECTION 8

14. इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु ।

In regard to the other also (i.e., good deeds) similar destruction of the previous and non-sticking of the subsequent one. But the destruction takes place, when the body falls away.

The *sūtra* extends to good deeds also the effects stated in the preceding *sūtra* in regard to evil deeds and for the same reason. Good deeds are on the same level as evil deeds as to their antagonism to the fruit of medita-

tion. There is also *vedic* declaration on the point. Referring to both good and evil deeds, it is said "All evil deeds depart from Him" (*chāndo.*, VIII-4-1); "Then he shakes off good and evil deeds" (*kaushitaki*, 1-37). Good deeds also are denoted by the term *pāpma*, as their fruits are unwelcome to one seeking release from *karma*

2. The need for a new sub-section arose from the fact that good deeds are allowed by the *veda*, and that their fruits are seen to be welcome to some persons. It might therefore be presumed that they are not antagonistic to meditation. This presumption had to be removed.

3. *Objection*: To the meditator rain, food and other helps are desirable, to enable him to complete his meditation, which, as stated, requires certain duties as helps. How can it be said that they are antagonistic to meditation, and that they are destroyed. The last portion of the *sūtra* replies. Such good deeds as yield fruits, that are helpful to the meditation, are destroyed only after death.

SUB-SECTION 9

The question is whether in this destruction of the past deeds, both good and evil, all deeds are included without distinction, or only those that have not begun to operate.

First view. The first alternative is the correct one; for the text quoted refers to 'all deeds' ; and no reservation is made. No *karma* is needed to account for the continuance of the body, as like the potter's wheel set in motion, it may remain from the impetus given to it when it was first made.

Final decision : This is stated in the *sutra* :

15. अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः ।

But the previous *karma*, which is destroyed, is only what has not begun to yield fruit ; because a limit (in the form of delay in the falling away of the body) is stated.

The statement is made in the text :

For him (that thus meditates) there is delay only so long as he is not released (from his body) ; then he is united (to Sat) (*chāndo*, VI-14-2).

Here a limit is fixed, beyond which the reaching of the goal will not be delayed ; and this limit is the continuance of the body, which was brought about by the *karma*, which has begun to yield fruit ; and this fruit must be experienced.

The opponent's analogy of the potter's wheel does not hold ; for nothing prolongs the life of the body other than the pleasure of displeasure of the

highest *Ātmā*, brought about by good or evil deeds ; and there is no authority for believing that anything else exists that will prolong its life.

SUB-SECTION 10

The question to be considered in this sub-section is whether *agnihotra* and other duties of one's stage of life should be done. Seeing that even good *karma* sub-sequently done does not stick to the meditator, and that the duties of the stage of life are included under that expression, if one does not wish to do them, may he cease to do them? The *sūtra* separates *agnihōtra* and other duties of the stage of life from other good deeds, and states that they should be performed.

16. अग्निहोत्रादितु तत्कार्ययैव तद्दर्शनात् ।

But *agnihotra* and the rest (should continue to be done) ; because they are required for its completion. This is seen.

The fact that the fruits do not attach to the meditator does not apply to these good deeds. They must therefore be done ; for they are done only because they are needed to help meditation. This is seen from the text "Him, students of the *veda* wish to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, etc.". (brihad., VI-4-22). Meditation becomes every day more and more powerful by practice; and in order that this may happen the duties of the stage of life should be daily performed. Otherwise, the mind will become impure, and meditation will become impossible.

Here a doubt arises : Of the good deeds of a meditator some help *vidyā* ; some have been expended by enjoyment; and what remains have to be experienced, and this is what has begun to yield fruit. In the text "His sons take his property; his friends his good deeds" to what good deeds is reference made ? The next *sūtra* replies :

17. अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषामुभयोः ।

Among good deeds previous and subsequent those other than these (considered under *sūtra* 16) indeed exist. This is referred to by the text of some.

There are endless good deeds, the fruits of which have been obstructed by more powerful *karmas* ; and the text under consideration refers to them; as also the text declaring destruction and non-sticking of *karma*.

The possibility of one *karma* obstructing another already mentioned, is recalled in the next *sūtra* :

18. यदेव विद्ययेति हि ।

"That alone done with meditation" (has been stated already).

The text referred to in the *sūtra* (*chāndo.*, I-1-10) states that meditation on *udgītha* removes obstruction in the way of reaping the fruit of a *kratu*. This indicates that the fruit of one *karma* may be obstructed by other *karma*.

SUB-SECTION 11

19. भोगेनत्वितरे क्षपयित्वाऽथ सम्पद्यते ।

But expending the rest by enjoyment, one then is united (to the highest *Ātmā*).

By the term "the rest" reference is made to the good and evil deeds, other than those that are destroyed by meditation, or that are said not to stick to the doer, *i.e.*, those that have begun to operate. Is one united to the highest *Ātmā*, when the body, in which meditation is attained, perishes, or after other bodies are taken up and thrown away.

First view. — The former alternative is the correct one; for it is stated to take place, when the meditator is released from the body. The *sūtra* states that these deeds should be expended by enjoyment. If this can be done while the meditator is in the body, in which meditation is attained, then the result follows, when that body falls. If not, he must take up as many bodies as may be needed to expend them fully. For the *karma* must be expended by enjoyment.

2. The opponent relies on the text "For him there is delay only so long as he is not released"; but this only shows that the *karma*, that has begun to operate, must be expended before one is released; but there is no mention of a limit coinciding with the perishing of the body (1).

3. The conclusion is : The endless *karmas*, good and evil, that were done in the beginningless past, before meditation was attained, and of which the fruit has not been experienced, are destroyed by the merit of *brahma vidyā*, excepting those that have begun to yield their fruits. The *karmas* done, after it is attained, do not attach themselves to the doer. Of these all good *karmas* go to the friends of the meditator ; and evil deeds to his enemies. The conclusion is therefore sound.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

(1) The opponent may also derive support from the text "This *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light and appears in his natural form (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2). But the term 'this body' does not state that release is attained when the particular body falls down at death. For *smṛitis* state that men doing *brahma vidyā* like *Vidura* are reborn. Hence release is attained, when meditation becomes perfect in the last body. The intention in referring to 'this body' is merely to compare it to a prison; this view is confirmed by the *bhagavad gītā* (IX-33), where *Sri Krishna* refers to 'the body and observes 'This world, perishable and full of misery; (*adhi.*, 471 and 472).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER IV

SECTION 2

IN this section the mode by which the meditating *jeeva* gets out of his body in death is examined. See Vedic Texts.

SUB-SECTION 1

The following text occurs in *chāndogya* :

The speech of the person, my deer, that departs (from this world) unites with the mind ; the mind with *prāṇa* ; *prāṇa* with the element fire ; fire with the highest *Devatā* (VI-8-6).

The first sentence is considered in this sub-section. The question is whether reference is made only to the function of the organ of speech, or to the organ of speech itself.

First view. Reference is made only to the function of speech. The term used in the original is *sampadyate*, which may mean either dissolution of a product in its cause on merely union ; but its usage in the former meaning is more common. Now speech, not being a product of mind, cannot be dissolved in it. Reference is therefore made to its function ; and as it depends upon mind, it may be said to be dissolved in it.

Final decision. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

1. वाङ्मानसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च ।

Speech (unites with) mind ; because this is seen, and is stated in the *veda*.

Speech - i.e., the organ of speech itself - unites with the mind ; for it is seen that when speech has ceased to function, the mind continues to work (1).

2. Objection. This fact may be explained with reference to the cessation of the function of speech. *Reply.* What is seen is supported by the text under consideration, which uses the term *vāk* (speech). If the term be understood to mean the function of speech, it will be resorting to a secondary meaning. This is one objection. Another is that if the organ of speech remains, but that its function only has ceased, it must be perceived ; but it

(1) It is appropriate that what has ceased to work should be merged in what is still active; as fire, as that is quiescent, is dormant within wood, which stage variously utilised.

is not. Hence it may be concluded that the organ itself is merged in the mind. The term *sampadyate* is used not in the sense of dissolution, but in the other sense of mere union (2).

2. अत एव सर्वाण्यनु ।

For the very same reason all the other organs follow it (speech).

Because speech unites with the mind, but is not dissolved in it, all the other organs - sensory and motor are appropriately stated to follow speech and to unite with the mind. The statement is thus made 'With the senses uniting with the mind without the possibility of their return from it'.

SUB-SECTION 2

3. तन्मनःप्राणउत्तरात् ।

That mind (unites) with prana ; this appears from what follows.

"That mind" the mind united to all the senses. The union is of the mind itself, and not merely of its function.

While the argument in the preceding sub-section applies to this case also, the reason for adding a sub-section is this. From the *chāndogya* text "The mind, my dear, is a product of earth" (VI-6-5), the mind appears to have evolved from earth; and the text "They (water) created earth" (*Ibid.*, VI-2-4) states that earth came from water. Hence one might presume that the mind has evolved indirectly from water. The text "*prana* is a product of water" (*Ibid.*, VI-6-5) connects water and *prana* as cause and effect, and it may be assumed that in the sentence "the mind unites with *prana*" the term *prana* stands for water ; and it may then mean that mind is dissolved in water. To show that this view is erroneous this sub-section has been added. The error will be evident, when it is remembered that the mind evolves from *ahamkāra*, and *prana* is a variety of air. And in understanding *prāṇa* to mean water, the primary meaning of the term is ignored for no sufficient reason. What then

(2) It may be thought that this is not the recognised usage. Be it so. But the *first view* is not free from objection. If the term *sampadyate* be taken to mean dissolution then it is not correct to say that the function of speech is dissolved in the mind; for its material cause is the organ of speech itself, while the mind is only the operative cause and dissolution of a product is in its material cause only. Hence, the term *sampadyate* will be used in a secondary sense, as also the term *vāk* (speech) as already stated. The *final decision* is open to criticism on one point only - viz., that a meaning is adopted for the term *sampadyate*, that is not the common one. Hence, the conclusion stated in the *sūtra* remains unshaken. The two reasons stated in it constitute but one reason; for they are interdependent.

is the meaning of the texts quoted? *Reply.* The meaning is that mind receives strength from food, which is a modification of earth, and *prana* from water.

SUB-SECTION 3

4. सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ।

It (*prāṇa*) unites with its lord, (this is seen) from its approaching him and the rest.

The third sentence of the text quoted under the first *sūtra* is now considered, viz., *āprāṇa* (unites) with the element fire". The *first view* is that as in the other two cases *prāṇa* unites only with the element fire and for the same reason; viz., the statement in the text. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*, which is that *prāṇa* first unites with its lord, i.e., the *jeeva*, and along with him it unites with fire. Here is an analogy. When it is said that the *Jamna* unites with the sea, it means that it first joins the Ganges, and then reaches the sea. That this is what takes place will be seen from the following texts:

In the very same way all *prāṇas* proceed towards this *Ātmā* (*jeeva*) at the time of death (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-38). By the expression 'the rest' in the *sūtra* reference is made to the departure of *prāṇa* with the *jeeva*:

Him, going out of the body, *prāṇa* follows out of the body (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2).

Reference is also made to its remaining with the *jeeva*:

What is it on the departure of which from the body I also depart, and on the staying of which I also stay (*praṣna.*, VI-3).

These are the words of a *jeeva*, and reference is made to *prāṇa*. From this intimate connection with the *jeeva*, *prāṇa* first goes to him, and with him it unites with the elements fire.

SUB-SECTION 4

5. भूतेषु तच्छुतेः ।

(It unites) with the elements, this is stated by the *veda*.

The union of *prāṇa* and *jeeva* with the element fire has been stated. Does this union take place with that element only, or with all the elements compounded?

The *first view* is that it is only with the element fire; for that only is mentioned. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*. For it is stated:

This *jeeva* is "full of earth, full of water, full of air, full of ether, full of fire" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-5).

This shows that the *jeeva* wanders connected with all the elements.

Does *prāṇa* unite with these in order with one of these at each step? The text quoted will permit of this view being taken. The next *sūtra* replies:

6. नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि ।

Not with one at each step, for the *veda* and *smṛitis* show this.

For, the elements were unable to do anything, each acting by itself, and they were therefore compounded. This is stated.

I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva* and make diverse names and forms. Of them I will make each triple (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2 and 3).

This states that the elements were compounded in order that they might become fit for the making of diverse names and forms. This is stated in a *smṛiti* also:

When the products, beginning with mahat and ending with the great elements, remained separate, they had different capacities. They were unable to create the products of evolution without mixing and combining with one another. Mixing and combining with one another, they formed the egg-shaped universe (*viṣṇu*, I-2-53 and 54).

Hence by the term "fire" reference is made to fire compounded with the other elements.

SUB-SECTION 5

The question for consideration in this sub-section is whether the mode of departure herein described applies to all equally, or only to those that do not do meditation. The *first view* is that the latter alternative is the correct one. For the meditator is said to attain immortality even while he is here; there is therefore no need for him to depart. This is stated.

When all the desires, that were in his heart, are released, then the mortal becomes immortal; here he enjoys *Brahma* (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-7).

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

7. समानाचासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य ।

(The mode of departure) is common up to the beginning of the path. the immortality is merely what is to be attained without burning (the connection with the body).

Even the meditator departs from the body in the manner pointed, out until the path commences, i.e., until he enters the blood vessel. For, it is stated that he too gets out through a particular blood vessel:

There are one hundred and one blood vessels of the heart; of them one goes to the top of the head. he, that rises through it, attains immortality; the other blood vessels are for other ways of getting out (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-6).

As it is clear from this text that even the mediator passes along a particular blood vessel, he cannot avoid departure from the body. the mode of departure is the same, until this point is reached; for there is no mention of a difference. When the blood vessel is entered, the divergence begins as stated in the following text:

With that light this *Ātmā* gets out through the eye, through the top of the head or through other places of the body (*brihad.*, VI-4-2).

As this text has the same meaning as the *chāndogya* text, departure through the top of the head pertains to the meditator, and the other ways pertain to the others.

2. This being so, the text relied on in the *first view* must be explained in another way; and this is done by the second part of the *sūtra*. The immortality referred to is only such as can be attained before the connection with the body and the senses is burnt up; and this is the destruction of previous *karma* and the non-sticking of the subsequent one. And the enjoyment of *Brahma* here is the enjoyment, that one has during meditation.

In the next four *sūtras* the same conclusion is supported by other arguments:

8. तदापीतेस्संसारव्यपदेशात् ।

It (explanation offered) holds, because until *Brahma* is reached, *samsāra* is said to remain.

It will be explained that *Brahma* is reached by going to a particular place by the path known as *devayāna*. Until then there is *samsāra*, meaning connection with the body. See the following texts:

For him (who thus meditates) there is delay only as long as he is not released (from his body); and then he is united to *sat* (*chando.*, VI-14-2); Shaking off sin as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rahu* (in an eclipse), throwing off the body, I

will reach the eternal *Brahma* world, the purpose of my life having been attained (*chāndo.*, VIII-13-1).

9. सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धेः ।

A subtle body remains; because it is so seen from *vedic* texts.

A subtle body continues on the *devayāna*. For it is said that he enters into a colloquy (1) with the moon; and this implies that he has a body. Hence his bondage has not been burnt up.

10. नोपमर्दनातः ।

Hence immortality by the destruction of bondage is not meant.

'Meant' - by the text quoted by the opponent. This *sūtra* is intended to refute the view that one may be released, while he lives in a body here (2). This is opposed to numerous *vedic* texts, such as those enjoining meditation,

(1) The meditator has to go to the moon on the *devayana*; and he is asked by the moon "who art thou" He replies (*kaushitaki*, I-13).

(2) The view that one may be released while he remains in his body was held by *Sankara*: and it is refuted in sub-section 4 of chapter I, section 1, the refutation being put into the mouth of the second illusionist. The statement that one remaining in a body is released is as contradictory as to say 'my mother is barren'; for to be in a body is bondage; being without a body alone is release.

Sankara. While one appears to be in a body, if he knows the appearance to be unreal, he is released from the body, i.e., he is a *jeevan-mukta*.

Critic. No; if a person is released by the knowledge that the appearance of being in a body is unreal, how can the person be said to be *jeevan-mukta*? What is the difference between this release and the release of one that is without a body? From him too the unreal appearance of being in a body has been removed.

Sankara. The appearance of being in a body has been nullified; but it continues like the perception of the moon as double by one with a cataract in the eye. Such a person is *jeevan-mukta*.

Critic. You cannot allege that the appearance has been nullified; and that it yet continues. In the case of the double moon its appearance is due to a real defect in the eye; this is not removed by the assurance of a reliable person that there is but one moon; and the appearance therefore continues, even though the person's erroneous impression has been removed. But in the case under consideration the knowledge, that removes the misconception, covers everything other than *Brahma*. *Avidyā*, *karma* and the rest, which are the causes of the unreal appearance, have been removed along with that appearance by the knowledge. The view that one may be released while he remains in a body is opposed to *vedic* teaching. "For him there is delay only so long as he is not released (from his body); then he is united to *Sat*" (*chando.*, VI-14-2). This shows that the release of one doing *sad vidyā* awaits only the falling away of the body,

which continues to the close of one's life, and describing departure from the body, journey on the *devayāna*, and release from all bonds on reaching a particular place. It is also opposed to sense perception.

11. अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरूष्मा ।

The warmth (perceived in some parts of a dying man's body) belongs to the subtle body alone, and this is appropriate.

When the meditator is about to die, a warmth is perceived in a part of the gross body, which does not pertain to it. If it did, it would be perceived throughout as stated in the text "It heats its body from the foot to the head" (*nārā.*, 11-10). The warmth is therefore due to the subtle body, as it withdraws gradually from the gross body. The conclusion is that until the path is entered, the mode of departure of even the meditator is the same.

The opponent brings up two other texts as expressly denying departure of the meditator. This objection is stated in the next *sūtra*, and is then refuted.

12. प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शरीरात्स्पष्टोहोकेषाम् ।

If it be contended "Departure is denied" the reply is —"No, because departure from the *ātmā* is denied, and this is clear in the text of some.

See *Vedic Texts - brihad.*, VI, Sec. 4. The first verse states that the dying man takes his senses, and comes out of the heart. The second verse describes the mode of departure; the fourth verse shows how he attains a new body, and in verse 6 the subject of the departure of one that does not do meditation is brought to a close. Then this text relating to the meditator occurs:

Next, as to one that does not desire. Of him that is without desire, from whom desire has departed, that has no further desire, and whose desire is centered on the *Ātmā*, *prāṇas* do not depart. Being *Brahma* alone, he attains *Brahma* (*brihad.*, VI-4-6).

Similar denial of departure is contained in the texts which describe the colloquy between *Artabhāga* and *Yajnavalkya* (*brihad.*, V-2). Verse 10 refers to the overcoming of death (So the opponent understands the text);

and thus denies *jeevan-mukti*. It is also denied by *Āpastamba*. "Let one abandon the deeds leading to wordly fruits, this world and that world, and seek the *Ātmā*. The view that release comes from the knowledge of texts is refuted by texts dealing with release. If release did take place from mere knowledge of texts, one should not then experience pain even here".

and verse 11 runs as follows: "When this person dies, do the *prāṇas* depart from him or no?" To this question the following reply was given "No," said *Yajnavalkya*, "They are dissolved in him; he swells and inflated lies dead." The opponent concludes that the meditator attains immortality here alone.

The *sūtra* replies that what is denied is the departure of the *prāṇas* from the *jeeva*, not from the body. The term *tasya* (of him) in the first text refers to the *jeeva* described in it as without desire, but not to the body, of which no mention is made in the context. *Objection.* By its termination the term *tasya* indicates merely the connection of *prāṇas* with the *jeeva*, but not the place from which departure takes place. That from which the departure takes place is the body alone. *Reply* When it is said that the *prāṇas* do not depart, one will wish to know the place of departure; and he will naturally take hold of the *jeeva*, who is mentioned as connected with *prāṇas* and who is at hand, in preference to the body, to which no reference whatever is made. Again, there is no object in understanding the termination to indicate connection of *prāṇas* with the *jeeva*; for this connection already well-known. The connection in general, which is expressed by the termination, may be taken to refer to a particular form of connection, viz., the place of departure. There is an analogy in the sentence "He hears of the *nata* "(dancer), (*nataśya*), the meaning being 'he hears from him'. It is unnecessary to discuss the question further; for in the text of the *māndhyandinas* the *jeeva* himself is stated to be the place of departure, the term used being *tasmat* (from him) instead of *tasya* (of him).

2. *Objection again.* There was no question whether *prāṇas* depart from the *jeeva*; and its denial would therefore be inappropriate. *Reply.* When it is said "For him there is delay only so long as he is not released from the body" (*Chāndo.*, VI-14-2), one will carry away the impression that the meditator would reach *Brahma*, when he throws up his gross body, and that then *prāṇas* would leave him. If this were a fact, it would not be possible for him to proceed on the *devayāna* path, and reach *Brahma*. To remove this erroneous impression the *upanishad* declares that *prāṇas* do not depart from the *jeeva*. That is, they do not separate from him, until the journey is finished and the goal is reached.

3. The other text, on which the opponent relies, should be explained in the same manner, if it referred to the meditator. But it does not; for in the questions and answers preceding the text (See *Vedic Texts*) there is no reference to meditation on *Brahma*. The subjects discussed are the nature of the senses and of the corresponding sense objects referred to by the terms *graha* and *atigraha*, fire being the food of water, the non-separation of *prāṇas* from one about to die, the continuance of the departing *jeeva*'s good or evil repute, and his-reaching a goal suitable to his *karma*. The words in verse 10

“He overcomes death” states that one that knows water to be the death of fire overcomes fire, but not death. There is therefore no mention here of one doing *brahma vidyā*. The statement that *prāṇas* do not depart from the dying person means that they do not leave him as the gross body does, but that they cling to him as the subtle elements do and go with him.

13. स्मर्यते च ।

And it is stated in the *smṛitis* also.

The departure of the meditator through the blood vessel going to the head is thus stated;

There is one among them, which goes upward; one going by this pierces the orb of the sun, and passing beyond the world of *Brahma*, attains the highest goal (*yajna smṛiti*, III-167).

SUB - SECTION 6

It has been shown that the *jeeva* with the senses, the mind and *prāṇa* unites at the point of death with the elements in a subtle condition; and the view that departure from the body does not happen to the meditator has been refuted. It will not be considered whether the subtle elements go on to do the work suitable to the *jeeva's karma* or meditation, or whether they unite with the highest *Ātmā*. The *first view* is that they go on to do their work. For there is no object in going to the highest *Ātmā*, as no pleasure or pain has to be experienced by the *jeeva* by doing so. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*;

14. तानि परे तथाह्याह ।

They unite with the highest *Ātmā*; for so says the *veda*.

For it is said “Fire unites with the highest *devatā* (*Chāndo.*, VI-8-6). It should be assumed that a purpose exists in accordance with the *vedic* statement; and the purpose is to give the *jeeva* some rest after the fatigues of the departure. This is analogous to the rest taken every day in deep sleep, and in the dissolution of the universe.

SUB - SECTION 7

15. अविभागो वचनात् ।

By ‘uniting’ is meant a union in which the united things cannot be separated; because this is stated.

This union with the highest *Ātmā* - of what nature is it? Is it like the merging of a product in its cause as in final dissolution, or is it an intimate union as the union of speech with the mind? The *first view* is that it is the former, as the highest *Ātmā* is the material cause of everything. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*. In the text "Fire with the highest *devatā*" the word *sampadyate* (unites) is brought down from the beginning of the sentence and is added. In the other clauses one term denotes a particular kind of union; and there is no authority for taking it to denote anything else here. Nor is any purpose served at the time of departure by the body being dissolved in the cause. If this were the intention, there would be mention of creation following the dissolution as in other places; but this is not observed.

SUB-SECTION 8

The mode of departure from the body of the meditator and of others has been described; and it has been stated to be the same. Now begins the divergence. The further progress of the meditator is stated in the following text;

There are one hundred and one blood vessels of the heart; of them one goes to the top of the head. He, that rises through it, attains immortality; the other blood vessels are for other ways of getting out (*chāndo.*, VII-6-6).

The question for consideration is whether this text fixes that the medicator should go out through the blood vessels going to the top of the head, and that others should go out through others, or whether he may do so by any other. The *first view* is that the blood vessel is not fixed; for the blood vessels are numberless and very minute; and the departing *jeeva* cannot distinguish the particular blood vessel from the others, and enter it. The text merely states what may happen occasionally. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

16. तदोकोऽग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात्तच्छेषगत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च
हार्दानुगृहीतशशताधिकया ।

That place is lit up at the entrance into the blood vessel. Favoured by *Brahma* in the heart, he sees the entrance and goes out through the one hundred and first blood vessel. The favour is secured by the merit of the meditation and the daily thought of the path as a part of it.

The medicator gets out only by the blood vessel, which rises to the top of the head. For, his meditation, being the worship of the highest *Ātmā*, pleases Him; and being present in the heart, He enables him to see the entrance to the blood vessel, and to pass out through it.

SUB-SECTION 9

Getting out of the body, the medicator is said to go on to the sun, along with his rays:

When he gets out of this body, then he goes up only with these rays (of the sun) (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-5).

The question for consideration is whether this limitation is appropriate or not. The *first view* is that it is not; for when one dies at night, how is he to proceed, the sun's rays being then absent? The text quoted relates to the case in which such departure is possible. The *sūtra* disposes of this doubt.

17. रश्म्यनुसारी ।

He proceeds, following the sun's rays

The meditator goes on only along the sun's rays; for this is affirmed by the particle *eva* (only). If this were only one of several ways, then the particle would be meaningless. The difficulty pointed out in the *first view* does not exist; for even at night the sun's rays are available, as one may know from the experiencing of heat during summer. In winter the heat, being overpowered by cold, is not perceived as on a rainy day. The ever-present connection of blood-vessels with the sun's rays is declared in a *vedic* text:

As a long high road enters two villages, this and that, in the very same way these rays of the sun enter two worlds -this and that. They extend from that sun, and enter these blood vessels; they extend from these blood vessels and enter that sun (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-2).

SUB-SECTION 10

To proceed to consider whether the meditator dying at night reaches the highest *Ātmā* or no. The *first view* is 'No'; for dying at night is condemned, and dying by day is praised.

The day, the bright fortnight and the half-year of the sun's northward progress are praiseworthy to the dying; the contrary is condemned.

The praise and condemnation are based on the fact that death in the day leads one upward and death at night leads one downward. Death at night therefore leads one downward, and cannot lead him to the highest *Ātmā*.

The final decision is stated in the *sūtra*:

18. निशिनेति चेन्न सम्बन्धस्य यावदेहभावित्वाद्दर्शयति च ।

If it be contended "One dying at night (does not reach *Brahma*)" the reply is "No, because one's connection with *karma* lasts only as long as the body remains, and this is shown".

The meditator is released from all *karma* at death. That portion of the previous *karma*, that had not begun to yield fruit, perished when meditation was attained. The remainder lasted only till the last body was thrown away. And any *karma*, that might be done unconsciously since the attainment of meditation, does not stick to him. Thus, there being no *karma*, that can lead one downward, the reaching of the highest *Ātmā* is certain. That this is the case is shown by the following text: "For him there is delay, only so long as he is not released (from the body); then he is united to *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-14-2). The opponent's text applies to those that do not do *Brahma vidyā*."

SUB-SECTION 11

19. अतश्चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे ।

And for the same reason even in the case of death in the half-year of the sun's southward progress.

The reason urged in the case of death at night applies with equal force to the case of death in the half-year of the sun's southward progress. *Question.* why then is a new sub-section added? *Reply.* Because there is a further doubt in this latter case. Here is a text which states that one dying in the half-year of the sun's southward progress reaches the moon:

Next one, that dies in the half-year of the sun's southward progress, attains the greatness of the *pitris* and becomes like the moon (*nārā.*, *anu.*, 52).

Another text states that those, that go to the moon, return to the earth, when that (karma) of those ends; then they return by the very same path (*chāndo.*, V-10-5). there is also the example of *Bhīshma*, who was a meditator, and who waited for the half-year of the sun's northward progress to die. The conclusion is that one that dies in the half-year under consideration does not reach the highest *Ātmā*.

This doubt is thus removed. One going to the moon returns to earth, only if he did not do *brahma vidyā*. In the case of the meditator the going to the moon is merely for the purpose of taking rest on his way to the highest heaven. For a sentence that follows the text states:

The *brāhmaṇa*, that meditates, overcomes both the greatness of the sun and of the moon, and after that he attains the greatness of *Brahma*.

Even without this text the reaching of *Brahma* is certain; for, as already stated, there is no more *karma* to bind him. As to the case of *Bhīshma* cited, it should be remembered that owing to the practice of *yoga* he was able to select the moment of death, and that he waited for the half-year of the sun's northward progress in order to show its superiority to the world.

The opponent now refers to certain verses of the *bhagavad gītā*, which in his opinion refer to particular times, dying at which the meditator returns to earth. The verses are:

I will declare that path (*kāla*), proceeding along which *yogis* will not return, and that path also from which they will return. The light -fire, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northward progress persons meditating on *Brahma* go along this path and reach *Brahma*. Smoke, the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the sun's southward progress - the man of good deeds goes along this path, reaches the light of the moon, and returns. These paths- the bright path and the dark path-followed by the world are considered to be eternal. By one path one does not return; by the other he returns (VIII-23 to 26).

20. योगिनः प्रतिस्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते ।

And those two paths to be meditation on are taught to meditators.

The, verses were not intended to say when persons should die. The object was to tell those that meditate on *Brahma* to include the two paths in their daily meditation. So the subject is concluded :

Knowing those paths, no *yogi* (meditator) is deluded. Therefore at all times meditate on them (*gita*, VIII-27). The references to the light-fire, and to smoke are to the two paths-the *devayāna* and the *pitriyāna*. Hence, the reference to time in the opening verse is to the *dēvatās* in charge of time, who are among those that carry the meditator to his goal. If the term *Kāla* (time) were understood in its primary sense, it would be inapplicable to fire.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER IV

SECTION 3

It has been shown how the meditator gets out of the body at death, and how through the grace of the highest *Ātmā* in his heart he enters on the path to the goal by passing through at particular blood vessel. This path is examined in this section.

SUB-SECTION 1

The descriptions given of this path in the various *upanishads* differ. See *Vedic Texts*. Two texts of the *Chāndogya* describe the path thus: Light, day, half-month, half-year, year, the sun, the moon and lightning. The *purusha* in the last takes the *jeeva* to *Brahma*. *Bṛihad āraṇyaka*, Chapter VIII, section 2, gives the following items: light, day, half-month, half-year, devaloka, the sun, and lightning; the *purusha* in lightning carries the *jeeva* to *Brahma*-world. Chapter VII, section 10 of the same *upanishad* mentions the following - *Vāyu*, the sun, and the moon. The *kaushitaki* has *agni loka* and the worlds of *Vāyu*, *Varuṇa*, the sun, *Indra* and *Prajāpati*. The *jeeva* then goes to the world of *Brahma*. Hence the doubt arises whether the path beginning with light is the only one prescribed by all the texts, along which the meditator reaches *Brahma* or whether there are other paths with option to the *jeeva* to proceed along any one of them. The *first view* is that there are many paths, as their descriptions differ, and as they are independent of one another. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

1. अर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः ।

Along the path beginning with light, because this is well-known.

This one path alone is described in all the texts; and the meditator goes by that alone; for this alone is recalled, when the various descriptions are perused. This being so, it is concluded that the same is described in all the texts with additions or deductions. In the case of meditations, where the intention is ascertained to be to teach but one meditation, the attributes mentioned in one place are taken into account in another. Similarly, in the case of the path the items mentioned in one place should be taken into consideration in others (1).

(1) There is this difference between the two cases. In meditations, though the subject is one, as the attributes are endless, it is not possible to meditate on all of them; and it was settled that meditations are different, when the attributes differ. But in the case of the path, as the items do not exceed twelve at the most, they can be meditated on; and in accordance with the recognition of the path as one it is decided to be one.

In the *chāndogya* the description in the *upakosala* and five-fires *vidyās* is the same. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, chapter VIII, section 2, the same is repeated with two variations. In the other two texts the items fire and the sun indicate that the path is one.

SUB-SECTION 2

The variations are reconciled in this and the next sub-sections.

2. वायुमब्दादविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् ।

Vāyu after the year. This is known from the general term and the particular term.

Comparing the *chāndogya* texts with the first *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text, it will be observed that the year intervenes between the half-year and the sun in the former, and *devaloka* (world of the *devas*) in the latter (1). The path being one, both the year and the world of the *devas* should be included in it. The question is which should come first. The order is indicated by the case termination of the term *māsa* (masebhyas) in the two texts and this is *śruti*, and both *śrutis* are of equal validity. But as the terms denoting periods of time are so arranged, that periods of shorter duration are followed by periods of longer duration, one's mind goes to the year from the half-year. The year should therefore be placed after the half-year. Then will come the world of the *devas*. This is stated in the first half of the *sūtra*.

2. In the second *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text *Vāyu* is mentioned before the sun; while the *kaushitaki* text places him after *Agni*. The order in the latter is the order of enumeration in the text; while in the former the order is expressly stated by the word *ūrdhva* (above). This is order stated by *śruti*, and being of greater validity, it cancels the other order, and *Vāyu* is given a place immediately before the sun. See Introduction, para 26.

3. Thus after the year and before the sun, there are the two items - the world of the *devas* and *vāyu*; and it has now to be considered whether they indicate different things, or one thing only. The *first view* is that they are different. As by the term *ūrdhva* and the termination of the fifth case both are stated to be between the year and the sun, as the order is indicated by *śruti* in each case, and as there is no reason to make a difference, the meditator may go to either. The second half of the *sūtra* states that they are one, and that the meditator after leaving the year should go to *Vāyu*. For, the expression 'the world of the *devas*' refers to *Vāyu* in general terms; as it

(1) The original quotes portions of the four texts at each step; but as they are shown in one place in the *Vedic Texts*, the quotations are omitted here. The items of the path being stated here in the order in which they are enumerated, the discussions may be followed easily.

is stated elsewhere "That which blows is the house of the *devas*". The other term *vāyu* is a particular term, and both indicate but one *devatā*. The term *vāyuloka* in the *kaushitaki* text should be understood like the expression *agniloka* to mean *Vāyu*, who is a world.

SUB- SECTION 3

Take the *kaushitaki* text. The first item is *agniloka*; and this is synonymous with *archis* (light) in the *chāndogya* text. It therefore comes first. *Vāyu* is placed after the year. The *sun* though mentioned after *Varuṇa*, the order is cancelled by the order indicated by *śruti* in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text, and he is placed after *Vāyu*; thus nine items on the path and their order have been settled. The position of *Varuṇa*, *Indra* and *Prajāpati* mentioned in the *kaushitaki* text has to be determined. Are they to be placed after *Vāyu* following the order of enumeration in that text, or whether they come in after lightning.

The *first view* is as follows: To bring them in anywhere would conflict with the order expressly stated in the texts; and to place them after lightning would be objectimable, as the *chandogya* text states that the person in lightning leads the *jivas* to *Brahma*. There is therefore no room for them anywhere; but as the teaching should not become meaningless, it is necessary to break the order somewhere. Following the order of enumeration, *Varuṇa* should be placed after *Vāyu*. The order between *Vāyu* and the sun being thus broken, *Indra* and *prajāpati* may as well go in only there.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

3. तदितोऽधिवरुणस्सम्बन्धात् ।

Above lightning *Varuṇa*; because of the connection between them.

Varuṇa is connected with lightning. He is the lord of waters and controls clouds; and lightning appear in clouds. This connection of lightning with *Varuṇa* is well known in the world and in the *veda*. This is the order suggested by appropriateness, and should cancel the order of enumeration. The function of the super-human personage to carry meditators to *Brahma* should be accepted as subject to intervention by others. *Indra* and *Prajāpati*, having been also mentioned, should find a place; and should come after *Varuṇa*, on the principle that new comers should come at the end (Introduction, para 27).

SUB-SECTION 4

Who are these - light, day, and the rest up to *Prajāpati* mentioned in connection with the path - are they landmarks on the path, or places of enjoyment, or carriers deputed by the highest *Ātmā*? The *first view* is that they are landmarks; for so they appear. When one has to go to a village, directions are given to him as follows: Starting from this go to that tree; then to that stream; then to the side of that hill; and then you will reach the village. Or they are places of enjoyment. For, four of the items are well-known to denote periods of time and cannot appropriately indicate marks on the road; and the other items do not denote periods of time. On the other hand they are stated to be places of enjoyment in the following text: "They alone are worlds-viz., day and night, half-months, months, seasons and years. This fits in with the description of the path by the *kaushitaki* text, using the term *loka* (world).

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

4. आतिवाहिकास्तल्लिङ्गात् ।

They are persons deputed to take meditators to *Brahma*; because there is indication of this.

There is a mark of their being carriers in the text "That person, not human, leads them to *Brahma*" (*chāndo.*, IV-15-5 and 6). This is found at the end of the context; and as there is no difference in this respect between lightning and those mentioned before, it is concluded that this description applies to all of them. The terms light, day and the rest denote certain devatas, who control what is ordinarily denoted by them. This usage is similar to "Earth said to him".

Question. If this be so, how can *Varuṇa* and the other two, who come after him, be reckoned as carriers?

The next *sūtra* replies:

5. वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः ।

After that the carrying is only by the person in lightning, because it is so stated.

"After that" means after lightning. The text quoted refers only to him. *Varuṇa* and the other two assist him; and for that reason they also are reckoned as carriers.

SUB-SECTION 5

It has now to be considered who are the meditators that are carried.

6. कार्य बादरिस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ।

One meditating on *Brahma*, the product, so *Badari*, thinks. In him progress on the path is appropriate.

This *sūtra* states one view. This being, the four faced one, abides in a limited place, and to reach him, going along a path is appropriate enough. But the highest *Ātmā*, the final cause, the all-knowing, the inner ruler of all, is omnipresent; and the meditator need not go anywhere to reach him. For He is ever present with him. What meditation has to do is merely to remove his *avidyā* or ignorance in regard to the highest *Ātmā*. Hence the carriers carry the meditators only to the four-faced one.

7. विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

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And because the goal is particularised.

The *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text refers to the worlds of *Brahma* as the place to which the meditator is carried. The world "word" and the plural should be noted; and they refer to a being living in a particular world. There is another text, which is clearer still - "I will go to the house in the form of the hall of *Prajāpati*" (chando., VIII-14-1). So does one think, that has travelled on the path and approaches the four-faced one.

The holder of this view anticipates two objections: The first objection is that in the *Chāndogya* text the expression used is *brahma*, but not *brāhmaṇam*, which would be the proper form, if reference were made to the four-faced one. This objection is replied to in the next *sūtra*:

8. सामीप्यात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः ।

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But that expression has been used, because to his nearness of *Brahma*.

Because the four-faced one was the first to come forth, he is near to the highest *Ātmā*, and is denoted by the term *brahma*. That this is the proper view is decided for the reasons stated in the two preceding *sūtras*.

The second objection is that the person, that goes on the path, attains immortality, and does not return to *samsāra*. This could not happen, if the four-faced one were the goal. For he is a product of evolution and his life being two *parardhas*, he must perish at the end. This is stated.

All the worlds, including the world of *Brahma* are perishable; and one that goes to them must return (*bhāgavad gītā*, VIII-16).

One that goes to him must return. The next *sūtra* replies:

9. कार्यात्यये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात् ।

When the evolved world perishes, along with its lord the meditator goes from thence to the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated.

The evolved world, the world of *Brahma*, the four-faced one. 'Along with its lord' - with the four-faced one, an officer in the economy of nature. He goes when the term of his office expires. He too meditates on *Brahma* in the midst of his duties; and if the *jeeva* too, that goes to him, meditates, they both reach the highest *Ātmā*. Hence the attainment of immortality and non-return to this world, stated as the results to be reaped by going along the path, are appropriate enough. This is known from the following text also: 'All of them, when the last body falls away, reach the highest Being free from mortality in His world and are released' (*nārā*, 10-22).

10. स्मृतेऽथ ।

And this is stated in the *smṛiti*.

When the time for dissolution comes, all of them along with *Brahma* enter the highest goal, attaining their true nature (*kurma purāṇa*).

Badari's view is that the carriers take only one that meditates on the four-faced one.

In opposition to *Badari's* view *Jaimini* comes forward with his own view:

11. परं जैमिनिर्मुख्यत्वात् ।

The goal is the highest *Ātmā*; this is the view of *Jaimini*; because this is the primary meaning of the term *brahma*.

In the text "He takes them to *Brahma*" (*Chāndo*, IV-15-6) the term *brahma* denotes only the highest *Ātmā* primarily. It is only when it has been decided on sufficient authority that it denotes the evolved being known as *Hiranyagarbha*, that the adoption of a secondary meaning is permissible. What has been urged - that to reach *Brahma* progress along the path is inappropriate - is no authority. Though the highest *Ātmā* is everywhere, the meditator should go to a particular place, before his *avidyā* can disappear. As one attains meditation with the help of the duties of his caste and stage of life, and as he needs also purity (*śauca*), right conduct (*āchāra*) and particular place and time, so the perfection of meditation down to the entire disappearance of *avidyā* requires that the meditator should go to a particular

place. This is known from the texts describing the path. The objections to the departure of the meditator from the body have been already disposed of. See chapter IV, section 2, sub-section 5.

2. The other argument that the term 'world' and the plural termination point to a being living in a particular world may be easily disposed of. By a rule of *mīmāṃsā* (See Introduction, para 29-iii) the term *brahmaloka* means *Brahma*, who is the world. When oneness of the thing has been ascertained, the plural should be ignored as stated in Introduction, para 34. Further, there are many worlds, which have been created by the will of the highest *Ātmā*, which pertain only to Him, and which are made of a substance other than matter. That such worlds exist may be seen from the *veda*, the *smṛitis*, *itihasas* and *purāṇas*.

12. दर्शनाच्च ।

And because this is stated.

The *upanishad* shows that one, that gets out of the body through the blood vessel going to the top of the head, and proceeds along the path, reaches the highest *Ātmā*-

This *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest *Light* and appears in his own form (*Chāndo.*, VIII-12-2).

13. न च कार्ये प्रत्यभिसन्धिः ।

And the thought of the meditator is not of what has evolved.

In the text "I will go to the house in the form of the hall of *Prajāpati* (*chāndo.*, VIII-14-1), the thought is not of the four-faced one, but of the highest *Ātmā* alone. For, the remainder of the text runs as follows:

I am the *Ātmā* of *brāhmaṇas*, the *Ātmā* of *kshattriyas*, the *Ātmā* of *vaisyas*, etc.

This shows that the meditator thinks that he would be released from all *avidyā*, and that he would be identified with the inner ruler of all. Immediately before this is the following text:

Shaking off *karma*, as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rahu* (in an eclipse), and throwing off body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma-world*, the purpose my life having been attained (*chāndo.*, VIII-13-1)

This shows that the world to be reached has not been made. This is the literal meaning of the term *akṛitam* (not made) in the original and release from all bondage is expressly stated. Hence, the meditator is carried by the carrying *devatās* to *Brahma*, the highest *Ātmā* alone.

Bādarāyaṇa accepts *Jaimini's* view and supplements it in the next *sūtra*:

14. अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथा च दोषात्तत्क्रतुध ।

(The devatas) carry all except those that meditate on *pratika*; this is *Bādarāyaṇa's* view. Both the other views stated are erroneous; and there is the rule that one becomes what he thinks on.

The view that those that meditate on the four-faced one are carried along the path is not sound; nor is the limitation to only those that meditate on the highest *Ātmā* correct. Those that are not carried are those that meditate on *pratikas*, i.e., on things other than *Brahma*. Meditation on the four-faced one would be of this class. Under this description come all those that meditate on any product of evolution either in itself or as being the highest *Ātmā*, like one that meditates on *devadatta* as lion. Only two classes of meditators are carried along the path - those that meditate on the highest *Ātmā* as stated by *Jaimini*, and also those that meditate on themselves as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest *Ātmā*, their inner ruler.

2. The views of both *Badari* and *Jaimini* are faulty. The view of the former conflicts with the text "This *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light" (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2); and the other view is inconsistent with the text which states that one that does the five fires *vidyā* is carried on the path. The text is:

Those that thus meditate on it (the nature of the *jeeva*), and those that in a jungle meditate on *Brahma* (*tapas*) with eagerness, etc. (*Chāndo.*, V-10-1).

What is stated in this text is justified on the principle "as one meditates, so he becomes". Those that do the five-fires *vidyā* are said to go on the path; and those that go on the path reach the highest *Ātmā* and never return. Hence, meditation on the *jeeva* as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest *Ātmā* must be recognised. As to those that meditate on names and other products of evolution, they are without either of the meditations mentioned in the *chāndogya* text; they cannot proceed on the path or reach *Brahma*. Their meditation is on something blended with matter, and the principle referred to applies.

This difference of treatment is shown by the *upanishad* itself:

15. विशेषश्च दर्शयति ।

And the *veda* shows difference.

The text is "As far as names go, so far is he able to wander at pleasure" (*chāndo.*, VII-1-5). There are similar statements in the same chapter of the upanished regarding those that immediate on other pratikas up to *prāṇa*. All o them reap fruits of a limited nature, which do not require their going on the path. The conclusion is: The carriers do not carry those that mediate on an unintelligent object or on a *jeeva connected with it, either as Brahma* or in itself; they carry those that meditate on *Brahma*, and those that meditate on *Brahma*, and those that meditate on themselves as divested of material vehicles and as forming a body of *Brahma*.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

CHAPTER IV

SECTION - 4

In the first three sections of this chapter the abandonment by the *jeeva* successively of *karma*, of the gross body and of the subtle body was described. In this last section his bliss without limit and non-dependence on any accidental cause are examined. The first three-sub-sections deal with his appearance in his natural form, and the remaining three sub-sections with his power to do what he pleases. Both of them come of themselves, subject only to the control of the highest *Ātmā* (*adhi.*, 518).

SUB-SECTION 1

Here is a text:

In the very same way this *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches that highest Light, and appears in his own form (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2).

Does this text mean that the person described is again connected with a body to be made like the body of a *deva*, or that his own form appears.

The *first view* is that the freed *jeeva* is united to a newly-made body. Otherwise the teaching as to release would point to something undesirable. For, one's natural form in itself is seen to be undesirable. When a person sleeps, and the activities of his body and senses cease for the time being, his natural form by itself does not seem to be what one will desire.

2. At this point two views of one's goal are put forward, which the opponent demolishes. The first view is that the mere removal of grief is the goal reached. This is objectionable. Man desires not only removal of grief, but also the attainment of happiness. The goal stated being devoid of happiness, release would not differ from *samsāra*. And *vedic* texts state that the freed *jeeva* attains imperishable bliss.

It is one unit of the bliss of *Brahma*; and of one that know the *veda* and was not affected by desires, i.e., of a freed *jeeva*; Attaining *rasa* (*Brahma*), this *jeeva* becomes blissful.

3. The second view is that own's nature is mere perception, which is bliss without limit, that it was prevented from appearing by *avidyā* during the life of *samsāra*, and that it emerges when the highest Light is reached. This also is objectionable. The nature, which is perception, cannot be prevented from appearing; and perception being of the nature of light, its being prevented from appearing, if it were possible, would be its annihilation.

Further, mere perception cannot be bliss. What is bliss must be agreeable to one; it must be bliss. What is bliss must be agreeable to one; it must be bliss to one that can experience it; but mere perception without a perceiver cannot experience it.

4. In the view that one's natural form is attained, the *vedic* text would become meaningless; for it has ever been with the freed *jeeva*. Hence, he is united to a new body made for him. Then the term *abhinishpadyate* in the original will have its primary meaning; as also the term *svena* (his own); for the *jeeva* will attain a body which will be his own.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

1. सम्पद्याविर्भावस्त्वेन शब्दात् ।

On reaching (the highest Light) own form appears; because the term *svena* is used.

The state, to which one comes on reaching the highest Light, is own form, that then appears. No new form comes into existence. This is indicated by the words 'In his own form' in the *vedic* text. If the freed *jeeva* were to take on a form, that did not exist before, and that is newly made, the expression 'In his own form' would become meaningless. For even without this expression the freed *jeeva* would according to the *first view* get a body, which would be his own; for he would not be given a body that belonged to another.

The view stated in para 4 of the *first view*, that one's; natural form has been ever present, and that the *vedic* text would be without meaning, it refuted in the next *sūtra*.

2. मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् ।

The freed *jeeva* (is referred to in the text); because it was this that it was proposed to describe.

By the expression 'Appears in his own form' reference is made to one whose connection with *karma* has ceased, who is released from bodies brought about by it, and who appears in his natural form. Hence, though this natural form has been ever present, it was prevented from appearing by *avidyā* in the form of *karma*; and this obstruction is now removed. This is what is meant by the appearance of the natural form. How is this known. In section 7, chapter VIII of the *chāndogya* the teacher proposed to give instruction as to the nature of the *java*, released from the waking, dreaming and deep sleep conditions, and released also from bodies made by *karma* and

leading to pleasure and pain. Again and again he offered to explain this and concluded with the text under consideration. The word *nishpadyate* is also used in the sense of appearing after some obstruction or difficulty is removed (1) Compare with the sentence 'This point appears from argument'.

Next, the argument in para 1 of the *first view* - that one's natural form is not a desirable thing, as might be seen in the deep sleep condition - is refuted.

3. आत्माप्रकरणात् ।

The *jeeva* (has a natural form worth striving for); this is soon from the context.

In his natural form the *jeeva* is known from the context to be the seat of qualities beginning with freedom from *karma*, and ending with omnipotence. This is the text:

The *Ātmā*, who is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, who has unchanging objects or desire and who has an unfrustrated will, should be sought.

It was explained under *sūtra* I-3-18 that this context relates to the *jeeva* and not to the highest *Ātmā*. This natural form was during the stages of *samsāra* prevented by *avidyā* in the form of *karma* from appearing, and when the highest Light is reached, it appears by the destruction of *avidyā*.

This is stated by *bhagavan Saunaka*:

As by washing a precious stone from dirt, its lustre is not made, so the *juāna* of the *ātmā* is not made by the abandonment of *karma*. By digging a pond, water is not made; only what existed before is made to appear; how can a thing appear, that does not exist? similarly, by the destruction of undesirable elements, *juāna* and other qualities appear, but are not made; for they are permanent qualities of the *ātmā*.

Hence *jñāna*, bliss and qualities, that had contracted owing to the influence of *karma*, fully expand on reaching the highest Light, and on the consequent appearance of the natural form; and it is not inappropriate. Hence the statement made in the *sūtra* is sound.

(1) Even if the terms be understood as the opponent does, the attainment of a new form may be explained. The *jeeva's* natural form was under the influence of *avidyā*, and owing to its destruction the same in a pure condition emerges. Another explanation is that his attribute *jñāna* fully expands - a condition that did not previously exist. A still another explanation is that he now fully realise his natural form, which is a new thing (adhi., 523).

SUB-SECTION-2

Does the freed *jeeva* see himself as separate from the highest *Ātmā* or as not separate, as being His aspected. The *first view* is that he sees himself as separate from him. For *vedic* texts and *smṛiti* describe their being together, their being alike, and their possessing like attributes:

He enjoys all divine qualities along with *Brahma*, the all-knowing (ana., I-1 and 2); When the mediator sees the *Purusha*, shining like gold, the world-cause and the ruler of all, he throws off good and bad deeds, and free from all touch of matter, he attains the highest likeness to Him (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-3); Resting on this wisdom, they have reached My likeness; they do not become the objects of either creation or destruction (*bhagavad gita*, XIV-2).

The *sūtra* states the final decision:

4. अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् ।

As not separated, because his true nature has been seen.

Owing to the destruction of *avidyā*, the freed *Jeeva* sees his natural form, in which the highest *Ātmā* is his inner ruler, and he himself is His body and an inseparable attribute (1). This was explained in *sūtra I-4-22*. The freed *jeeva* enjoys Him without separating himself thus - I am *Brahma*. The texts referred to by the opponent state that while remaining an inseparable attribute of the highest *Ātmā*, the freed *jeeva*'s nature is similar to His nature; and that abandoning material vehicles, whether *deva* or human, he becomes as pure as He is. The text about being together refers to his enjoying Him. Whose attribute he is, and His qualities. There is therefore no conflict. Because the freed *jeeva* is an inseparable attribute of the highest *Ātmā*, the statement that he is not separate from Him, and the remark in *sūtra 8 infra* that he can do anything by mere will do not conflict; not with *sūtras II -1-22* and *III-4-8*.

SUB-SECTION 3

In sub-section 1 it was decided that the freed *jeeva*, appears in his own form. What this is has now to be considered; owing to different descriptions in the *upanishads* on this point. The first two *sūtras* put forward divergent views. The first is the view of *Jaimini*, which the *sūtra* states:

(1) This is stated in the following texts: "That thou art; This *Ātmā* is *Brahma*; All this is identical with that (*Sat*); All this is indeed *Brahma*; Who stands in the *Ātmā* who is within the *ātmā*, whom the *Ātmā* does not know, whose body the *Ātmā* is, who rules the *ātmā* from within He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *Ātmā*; He has entered into men and controls them; he is the *Ātmā* of all."

5. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः ।

(The freed *jeeva* appears) with the qualities pertaining to *Brahma*; this is the view of *Jaimini*; because of the description and the rest.

These qualities are freedom from *karma*, and the rest up to omnipotence; and they are stated as pertaining to *Brahma* in *chāndogya* (VIII-1-5). And these are described as the natural qualities of a *jeeva* also in the teaching of *Prajāpati* (*Ibid.* VIII-7-1). By the expression 'and the rest' reference is made to certain actions, which flow from the possession of omnipotence, and which are also enumerated in section 12, verse 3, of the same chapter of the *upanishad*. It follows from this that *Jaimini* rejects the view stated in the next *sūtra*, that the freed *jeeva* is mere perception.

6. चिति तन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

As mere perception; this is the view of *Audulomi*; because that alone is his own form.

The authority for this view is the text:

As a piece of salt has no inner parts, no outer parts; all its parts are salt only; so dear, this *ātmā* has no inner parts; no outer parts; the whole is *prajnāna-ghāna* only (*bṛihad.*, VI-5-13); He is *vijnāna-ghāna* only (*Ibid.*, IX-4-12).

The affirmation of this by the term only (*eva*) shows that nothing else is his natural form. Hence, as he cannot have any attributes, the terms 'free from *karma*, etc.,' indicate that the *jeeva* is devoid of change, pleasure, pain and other effects of *avidyā*.

Bādarāyaṇa now states his own view and closes the discussion.

7. एवमप्युपन्यसात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः ।

Even so, there is no conflict. So *Bādarāyaṇa* thinks; because of the statement that the attributes first mentioned do exist.

'Even so' - assuming that the text states the *jeeva* to be mere perception as pointed out by *Audulomi*. He may also be free from *karma* and the like stated before; for the attributes, being stated by a *vedic* text, do exist. When two texts are of equal authority, it is not justifiable to regard one as cancelling the other. *Opponent*. As the attributes conflict with the natural form, they should be regarded as produced by *avidyā*. Reply. We ask - there being no difference in the validity of the texts, why should not the reverse be the case? Hence we reject your view. As the particle only- (*eva*) cannot be explained without regarding either text as cancelling the other, some other explanation must be found. By the expression 'even so' in the *sūtra* the

author expresses his dissent from *Audulomi's* view, that his texts should be understood as he does. *Question.* What then is implied by the particle only (*eva*)? *Reply.* It means that the whole of the *jeeva* is self-proved, and that no portion of his *svarūpa*, however small, depends upon anything else for its appearance. This is clear from the text itself. One text refers to the *jeeva's* *svarūpa*, the seat of attributes, and states it to be self-proved; while the other text states that he possesses certain attributes. There is therefore no conflict between the two. A piece of salt has the same taste throughout, as shown by taste; but this fact does not conflict with its possessing a form, colour, and hardness perceived by other senses. In a juicy fruit like the mango there is difference of taste in different parts of it; but in a piece of salt the taste is the same throughout. Similarly, the *jeeva's svarūpa* is self-proved throughout. This is the meaning of *Audulomi's* texts.

SUB - SECTION 4

Regarding the freed *jeeva* the following text describes certain actions as following from his omnipotences.

There he enjoys Him all round; he eats; he enjoys (as he pleases); he amuses himself with women, carriages or cousins (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-3).

The question for consideration is whether in reaching cousins the freed *jeeva* has to make any effort other than willing, or whether they come to him by merely willing it, as they come to the highest *Ātmā*. The *first view* is that in the world those, that are reputed to possess an unfrustrated will like kings, are yet seen to make some further effort; and that the freed *jeeva* is like them? The *sūtra* states the *final* decision:

8. संकल्पादेव तच्छ्रुतेः ।

By mere will, because this is stated.

. This is stated thus:

If he desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his will alone the fathers come up (*chāndo.*, VIII-2-1).

And there is no text that states that some other effort on his part is needed. If it did exist, it might be necessary to understand the particle alone (*eva*) in the expression 'by his will alone', as it was understood in the expression '*vijnāna-ghāna* only'. But there is nothing to obstruct his will (1).

(1) It cannot be *karma*, as in the *jeeva's* bound condition; for he has no more *karma*. It cannot be the highest *Ātmā*; for it is only what He desires that will be attempted (*adhi.*, 530).

And for this very reason he is not subject to any ruler.

‘For this very reason’ - because he is capable of doing that he decides on. The freed *jeeva* was subject to control, when he was bound, by having to obey commands and prohibitions of the *veda*; and in that condition exercise of his will except accordance with those commands and prohibitions was liable to be opposed at every turn. Hence, the text, that teaches that he can now do what he pleases, states that he is freed from this limitation. Hence it is stated ‘He becomes his own master’ (*chāndo.*, VII-25-2). This affirms his freedom only in regard to others than the highest *Ātmā*; but subjection to Him remains unaffected (*adhi.*, 533).

SUB SECTION 5

The next question regarding the freed *jeeva* is whether he has a body and senses, or whether he is without them, or whether their possession or non-possession depends upon his will. One view is stated in the next *sūtra*:

10. अभावं बादरिराहयेवम् ।

Non-possession (of body and senses). This is *Badari*’s opinion; for so states the *veda*.

The text is:

One, that is in a body, is caught by welcome and unwelcome things; from one in a body welcome and un-welcome things do not depart; and one that is without a body they do not touch (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-1).

Stating thus that so long as one is connected with a body, it is impossible for him to avoid pain, the text adds “This *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light, and appears in his own form” (*Ibid.*, VIII-12-2). Thus the *veda* states that the freed *jeeva* is without a body.

The opposite view is stated in the next *sūtra*:

11. भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात् ।

Jaimini thinks that he possesses them; because the *veda* declares manifoldness.

The text is,

He appears as one; appears as three; as five; as seven (*chundo.*, VII-26-2).

As the *jeeva* is one and indivisible, he cannot appear as many. This must therefore happen through the possession of bodies. The text as to his

being without a body refers to the absence of a body brought about by *karma*; for that alone leads to pleasure and pain.

Bādarāyaṇa now states his own view, and closes the discussion on this point.

12. द्वादशाहबुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः ।

In both ways in the opinions of *Bādarāyaṇa*; for the same reason, as in the case of the twelve days' *kratu*.

The expression 'for the same reason' refers to 'by mere will'.

The freed *jeeva* is without a body, and with a body also. On this view both the texts will be reconciled; for the reason is that he has an unfrustrated will. In regard to the twelve-days' *kratu*, here are two texts "Those that desire prosperity should do the twelve-days' *kratu*" and "If one desires offspring, he should be made to perform the twelve-days' *kratu*". Here the two injunctions point to difference of resolve, according to which the same *kratu* belongs to the class of *satra* or of *ahīna* (1), as the case may be.

The next question is whether when he has a body and senses, they are made only by himself. The next two *sūtras* reply:

13. तन्वभावे सन्ध्यबुपपत्तेः ।

(Because enjoyment is possible) in the absence of a body made by himself, as in the dream state.

In this case, i.e., when he has no body and senses made by himself, it is possible for him to obtain enjoyment with things made by the highest *Ātmā*; though omnipotent, he does not make them. As the bound *jeeva* enjoys pleasure or pain in the dream state with things made for him by the highest *Ātmā* (see sub-section III-2-1), so the freed *jeeva* utilises what things are made by Him and obtains enjoyment.

14. भावे जाग्रद्वत् ।

As enjoyment is possible in the existence (of a body) as in the waking condition.

Sometimes he makes bodies, senses and other means of enjoyment for himself. In this case he obtains enjoyment with them, as the bound *jeeva* in the waking condition does. The highest *Ātmā* makes for Himself fathers like

(1) In a *satra kratu* the *soma* offerings are made on twelve days or more; in an *ahīna* on days from two to twelve. In the former the *yajamānas* are many, the number ranging from seventeen to twenty-four, in the latter there is but one *yajamāna*.

Daśaratha and *Vasudeva*, acts like a mortal and obtains amusement. Similarly, and for the same purpose, He sometimes makes fathers for the freed *jeevas*. Sometimes they themselves, being omnipotent, make fathers for themselves; who continue to be part of the instruments of amusement of the highest *Ātmā*.

Question. How can a *jeeva*, who is of the size of an atom, regard any bodies as his own. The next *sūtra* explains:

15. प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।

He enters them like a lamp, for so does the *veda* show.

As a single lamp remaining in one place pervades other places with its light, so the *jeeva* remaining in one body may pervade all other bodies with his attribute *jñāna*. Even in the same body the bound *jeeva* remains in one place, *viz.*, the heart; but with his attribute *jñāna* he pervades the whole body and regards every part of it as his own. There is this difference. The bound *jeeva*'s attribute being limited by *karma*, he cannot pervade other bodies in such a manner as to regard them as his own; but when he is freed, there being no such limitation, he may at pleasure enter into all bodies so as to perceive them as his own, and such entrance is not inappropriate. For this is stated:

If a hundredth part of the end of a hair be divided into hundred parts, the *jeeva* should be known as one such part; yet he is capable of infinity (*śveta.*, V-9).

Karma determines in regard to the bound *jeeva*; only his own will in the case of the freed on (1).

Objection. It is stated that one that has reached the highest *Ātmā* loses all knowledge of what is within or without. Here is the text:

This *jeeva* embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside, does not know what is inside (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-21).

How can it be said that the freed jiva is all-knowing. The last *sutra* replies:

16. स्वाप्ययसम्पत्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि ।

It has reference to one of the two-deep sleep or death. For this is explained in the context itself.

This text does not refer to the freed *jeeva*. It states what happens in deep sleep or death. In both of them the jiva goes to the highest *Atma*, and falls into unconsciousness. That this result follows in these cases and that the freed jiva becomes all-knowing is explained by the *veda* itself. Regarding

deep sleep it states:

He does not then know himself thus-‘I am this’-nor these beings. He has surely reached annihilation. I do not see anything to like in this (*chando.*, VIII-11-3).

In the same context referring to the freed *jeeva* it states:

He sees with this divine eye - *viz.*, the mind - those divine qualities that are in the *Brahma*-world and rejoices (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-5).

Compare with the following also:

The seer sees everything; he attains everything everywhere (*chāndo.*, VII-26-2).

Which is clearer still. In regard to loss of consciousness in death it is stated “When they (these elements) dissolve, he perishes with them “ (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-12). The term ‘perishes’ (*vinasyati*) means ‘does not see’.

SUB-SECTION 6

The last question for consideration regarding the freed *jeeva* is whether among his attainments should be included the activities concerned with the evolution and dissolution of the universe and with the control of everything, which have been understood as relating to the highest *Ātmā* alone. The *first view* is that they are included. For it is stated “Free from all touch of matter, he attains the highest likeness to Him” (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-3). He is also said to have an unfrustrated will; and these will not be appropriate, unless the freed *jeeva* has also the control of the world, that is the peculiar function of the all-Controller. Hence he has a share in such control. The *find decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

17. जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसन्निहितत्वाच्च ।

Without the world-activities, this is seen from the context, and from absence of reference to him.

By the ‘world-activities’ reference is made to the control of the coming

(1) The text quoted raised a doubt; The reference to capable of infinity’ shows that when the *jeeva* is freed, he economies omnipresent also; he may therefore control every body that he may take up. This view is supported by the fact that when a *jeeva* withdraws from a branch of a tree, that branch withers. This view is erroneous. It is the view held by the *jaina*, as pointed out and refuted in chapter II, section 2, sub-section 6. Further, an explanation available in the example of *Saubhari*, who took up as many bodies, as he had wives. This explanation being available. any should be theory of expansion at the moment be assumed? The withering of the branch may be explained by the withdrawal of the *jeeva*’s notion that the branch was own. This is seen in the case

into existence as objects, of the continued existence and of the movements of all intelligent beings and non-intelligent objects. They do not accrue to the freed *jeeva*; but he enjoys the highest *Ātmā* without any limitation. The world - activities have been stated as pertaining to Him. See *bhṛiguvalli*, which enumerates them as constituting a definition of *Brahma*.

If He has to share them with freed *jeevas*, it would cease to be a definition. For, a defining mark is found only in that which is defined. See also the texts quoted at the foot of the page (1). In the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* the control of the whole world is described as connected with the highest *Atma* only. Nor is there any mention made of the freed *jeeva* in these places.

The next *sūtra* states an objection, and then refutes it.

18. प्रत्यक्षोपदेशान्नेति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः ।

If it be contended "No, because states it", the reply is "No, because reference is made to enjoyments in the worlds of officers in the economy of nature".

The opponent refers to the following texts:

He becomes his own master; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds comes to him (*chāndo.*, VII-25-2);

Taking any form that is liked he wanders in these worlds enjoying whatever enjoyment occurs to the mind (*bhṛigu.*, 10-5), and observes that they clearly teach world-activities as pertaining to the freed *jeeva*. The *sūtra* replies; No, for, these texts teach that when the *jeeva* is freed, and his *jñāna* is no longer obstructed by *karma*, he enjoys according to his pleasure the worlds that are subject to change and are under the control of the four-faced one, and other officers in the economy of nature, and that he obtains enjoyment. They do not refer to world-activities.

of a piece of land, which takes or abandons at will; but he does not himself end to it (*adhi.*, 538 and 539).

(1) Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only; without a second. He willed 'I become many, and to that end I will evolve'. He created fire (*Chanda.*, VI-2-1 to 3); Before creation this was *Brahma*; one only. Bring single, He had no greatness. He created superior bodies now as *Kshātra*, excelling everything, i.e., those that are *kshātrīyas* amount *devas*, *Indra*, *Varuna*, *Soma*, *Rudra*, *Parjanya*, *Yama*, *Mṛityu*, *Isana* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-11); Before creation this was *Ātmā*; one only; nothing else existed. He will 'I willed create the worlds'; He created these worlds (*aitareya.*, I-1); *Nārāyaṇa* alone was; *brahma* was not; *Isana* was not; these - heaven and earth - were not; no stars, no water, no fire, no moon, no sun. Being single, He found no pleasure. He meditated, and from Him came forth a *grīṣ*, and the ten senses (*mahopanishad*).

Objection again. If like the bound *jeeva* even the freed one needs the enjoyments to be found in the worlds of change, then his enjoyment, like that of the other, is petty and perishable. To this the next *sūtra* replies;

19. विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह ।

And what is not subject to change, for the *veda* so teaches his being.

The freed *jeeva* enjoys the highest *Ātmā*, who is not touched by any form of change, who is free from all imperfections, and who is the seat of all good qualities and of bliss without limit. This enjoyment extends to all the things controlled by Him and to all His good qualities. As included in this, i.e., the things controlled by Him, the worlds of change become objects of enjoyment to him. That the freed *jeeva* enjoys the highest *Ātmā* as thus described is stated:

When in order to attain freedom from fear, he dwells steadily with his mind on this (the highest *Ātmā*) unseen, unembodied, unnamed and unsupported, he will attain freedom from fear (*āna.*, 7-2); He is bliss; for on reaching bliss, one becomes blissful (*Ibid.*, 7-1);

The universe, which is controlled by him, remains in Him alone:

All the worlds rest on Him; no one excels Him (*kāṭha*, II-5-8).

Hence the freed *jeeva*, enjoying *Brahma* along with what He controls, enjoys also what is to be found in the worlds of change in charge of His officers. And no reference is made in the texts to world-activities.

20. दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ।

The *veda* and *smṛitis* show this.

'This' - that the world - activities pertain only to the highest *Ātmā*.

From fear of Him the wind blows; from fear the sun rises; from fear of Him fire and *Indra* (go about their business); death, the fifth, runs about (*āna.*, VIII-1); By the unobstructed command of that *Akshara*, *Gargi*, the sun and the moon stand supported (*bṛihad*, V-8-8); He is the ruler of all; He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of beings; He is the protective bound, that keeps these worlds from being confounded (*Ibid.*, VI-4-22). With Me to direct, *prakṛiti* sends forth from itself the world with the moving and unmoving things. From this cause the world goes round (*bhagavad gītā*, IX-10); I remain holding all this world with a fragment of My power (*Ibid.*, X-42).

2. The freed *jeeva*, even though he becomes omnipotent, gets his bliss as a gift from the highest *Ātmā*.

He alone cause bliss (*āna.*, 7-1). By adoring Me with unswerving *bhakti-yoga* one surmounts these *guṇas*, and becomes fit to be *brahma*. For I am the principal cause of one's becoming *brahma*, immortal and imperishable,

of the attainment of never-ending power and of the bliss reached with single-minded' devotion (*bhagavad gītā*, XIV-26 and 27).

3. The qualities beginning with freedom from *karma* and ending with omnipotence no doubt belong to the *jeeva* by nature; and they appear, when the obstruction that prevented them from appear goes; never theless the fact that they do so depends on the highest *Ātmā*; as also his eternal existence. That the *jeeva* should be eternal is His eternal wish. There is therefore no conflict between their being bestowed by the highest *Ātmā* and their being eternal. Similarly the means of His enjoyment in the worlds of change as well as in the worlds not subject to change, is eternal, as one may learn from the *veda*; because such is His eternal wish. Hence the freed *jeeva*'s omnipotence and likeness to the highest *Ātmā* do not extend to the world-activities.

The next *sūtra* explains the scope of the utmost likeness reached by the free *jeeva*

21. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ।

And because of the mark indicating likeness in enjoyment only.

The mark is the statement made in the text:

He enjoys all good qualities with *Brahma*, the all knowing (*āna.*, 1-2).

The likeness of the freed *jeeva* to the highest *Ātmā* is stated in general terms; and here is a particular case of likeness in the matter of enjoyment. Hence, the general statement should be limited to the particular case, following the rule explained in note (1) on page 51. The freed *jeeva*'s likeness to the highest *Ātmā* and the possession of an unfrustrated a will should be explained so as to fit in with the control of the world, that pertained to Him alone.

Question. If the attainments of the free *jeeva* are the gifts of the highest *Ātmā*, will He send him back; for He is His own Master, and may will the *jeeva*'s return. The last *Sūtra* replies:

22. अनावृत्तिशब्दादनावृत्तिशब्दात् ।

There is no return ; it being so stated.

The *veda* shows that the highest *Ātmā* exists, who an enemy to all imperfections, and the one seat for all good qualities, who is the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the world, who stands apart from all, who is all-knowing, who has an unfailing will, who is full of love for those that come to Him, who is full of mercy, who is without an equal or superior, and who is known as the highest *Brahma*. The same authority states also that He is pleased with the worship of Himself in the form of

meditation; that He removes the meditator's *avidyā* in the form of *karmas* done in the beginningless past, endless, and incapable of being got rid of; that He gives him bliss without limit in the form of enjoyment of Himself; and that He will not make him return. The text is:

Thus passing all his life, he attains *Brahma*-world, and does not return (*chāndo.*, VIII-15-1).

This is also stated by *Bhagavān* Himself:

Those great minds after reaching Me do not come again to birth, and take up a body that is perishable and full of misery. For they have reached the highest goal. The worlds, including the abode of *Brahma* are perishable; and one that goes to them must return to rebirth. But for one that comes to Me, there is no re-birth (*bhargavad gita*, VIII-15 and 16)

2. And there is no room to suspect that the freed *jeeva* will ever return. First, he will not himself desire it; for his bondage to *karma* has been broken; his attribute *jñāna* has fully expanded; his nature is to enjoy the highest *Ātmā* alone; that alone is dear to him; and he is enjoying *Brahma* who is bliss without limit. How can he desire anything else, and make efforts to procure it? Next, the highest *Ātmā*, will never send him back, after having taken immense trouble to get him to Himself; for the *jeeva* is immeasurably dear to Him. This is stated by Himself:

To the *jnani* (one that loves Me for Myself) I am immeasurably dear; and he is immeasurably dear to Me. All these are liberal indeed; but the *jnani* is in reality My *Ātmā*; that is My opinion; for he regards Me only as the highest goal; and his mind wishes to enter upon My *yoga*. One becomes a *jnani* at the end of many lives (of good deeds), and then comes to Me, with the thought that *Vasudeva* is everything to him. A great mind of this description is very rare (*bhagavad gītā*, VIII-17, 18 and 19).

And there is no one that can oppose Him, when he wishes to keep the *jeeva*; for His will is never frustrated.

The repetition of the *sūtra* is to show that the work has been completed. All is well.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

श्रीमते वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकाय नमः ।

GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT WORDS USED IN THE WORK

- Abhāva.* Non-existence (page 268, note 1 and page 291).
- Abhivyakti.* Manifestation (Page 261).
- Adhṛishṭa.* The capacity generated in a person that does *yāga* (page 59, para 2, see also page 288).
- Adhikaraṇa.* Sub-section, containing the *sūtra* or *sūtras* dealing with one topic (page 17).
- Adhavaryu.* One of the helpers in a *yāga*. He does all the *Manual* work, including the preparation of the materials, the handling of the instruments, and the making of the offerings (page 2, note).
- Adhyayana.* Learning the text of the *Veda* (page 35,36).
- Adhyāhāra.* The addition of a new word (a word not appearing in the previous sentence) to complete the sentence (page 8, para 17).
- Adhyāsa.* The perception by an intelligent person of the attribute of one object in a different object (page 286).
- Agnihotra.* The name for the daily offerings made by a house-holder at about sunrise and sunset (page 246).
- Agnishtoma.* The name of a soma *yāga* (page 226).
- Ahamkāra.* A produce of matter formed from the product known as *mahat* (page 243).
- Aihika.* Fruits to be enjoyed here and now (page 1, para 3).
- Akshara.* A product formed from matter in the subtlest condition known as *tamas* (page 243, note 1).
- Amṣa.* Part of a whole; one element in an aggregate of several elements (page 338, para 2).
- Anga & Angi.* What renders a service to another is *anga*; that which receives the services is *angi*. They are also known as *śeṣha* and *śeṣhi* (page 8, para 18).
- Aṇu.* An atom (page 328).
- Anushanga.* The addition of a word appearing in a previous sentence to complete the sentence (page 8, para 17).
- Anūchāna.* One that has learnt the whole of a branch of the *veda* and the six *angas* (page 36, note 2).
- Anyathā siddha.* What may be explained otherwise (page 338, para 3).

- Apaccheda.* The break, which may occur in the procession in a *soma yaya* of the *yajamāna* and five of his helpers starting from the *havirdhāna* to the north-east corner of the sacrificial grounds (page 13, para 30).
- Apūrva.* This is the name given to *adṛishṭa* by the *mīmāṃsāka* See under that term (page 7, para 14).
- Arthavāda.* Texts of the *veda*, that praise the *karmas* prescribed by injunction -texts (page 2, note).
- Atharvan.* The portion of the *veda* (page 2, note).
- Atideṣa.* The application of the ritual of *prakṛili yayas* to those known as *vikṛiti yayas* (page 14, para 31).
- Avidyā.* In the view of *Śankara* a positive substance that prevents *Brahma* from appearing as He is.
- Avyakta.* A product formed from matter in the condition known as *akshara* (page 243, note 1).
- Avyakṛita.* Matter which in the subtlest condition is with out diverse names and forms (page 324, para 4).
- Achamāna.* Sipping water these with *mantras* - a ceremony that is a preliminary to all *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* and *smṛitis*.
- Āchāra.* The practice of great *ṛishis*, who knew the *veda* fully (page 5, para 10).
- Ādhāna.* The establishing of the three fires by a house holder, which are prescribed by the *veda* (page 13, para 29-1).
- Āhavanīya.* One of the three fires maintained by a house-holder under *vedic* injunction (page 11 , para 25).
- Ākṛiti.* The form that is common to all the members of a class (page 6, para 12).
- Ākshepa.* The reasoning on which the meaning of a word like 'go' is extended to an animal possessing the *ākṛiti* (page 6, para 12).
- Āmushmika.* Fruits to be enjoyed there, i.e., in *svarga* (page 1).
- Ānanda.* Bliss.
- Āśrama.* A stage of life, as the stage of the student, of the house-holder, of the forest-dweller or of the mendicant (page 40 para 11).
- Brahmavidyā.* Continuous, vivid, loving meditation on *Brahma*.

- Brāhmaṇa.* (1) The portion of the *veda*, consisting of commands and prohibitions (page, 2 note).
 (2) One that has learnt a little of the *veda* (page 36, note 2).
- Bhāvnā.* The common element in all finite verbs; it consists of an action, that serves to bring about what is desired (page 6, para 13).
- Bhāvya.* What is produced by the *bhavāna* (page 6, para 13).
- Bhoga.* Experiencing - either enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain (page 253, para 3).
- Bhrūṇa.* One that has learnt the whole of the *veda*, is six angas and the *kalpa sūtras*, and teaches the last to others (page 36, note 2).
- Brahma.* A thing which has the attribute of being immeasurably great in its substances, and in its attributes. The Being who answers this description is *Purushottama*, the ruler of all (page 32, para 2).
- Brahmacharya.* Leading a student's life (page 450, sutra 19). It also means abstention from sexual intercourse.
- Chamasa.* A four-sided wooden basin with a handle (page 11, para 25).
- Chit .* Light: A thing that shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about (page 57, para 6).
- Darṣa.* The name for three offering made on the first day after the new moon (page 8, para 16).
- Devatā.* A being superior to man, who receives the offering made by him, and gives what he desires.
- Devayāna.* The path by which the freed *jeevas* journey to the highest heaven.
- Dharma.* Karma prescribed in the *veda* as the means to a fruit- like *yayas*, gifts, meditation (page 389, sutra 39).
- Gārhapatya.* One of the three fires maintained by a house-holder (page 9, para 20).
- Graha.* A wooden vessel, in which the juice of the *soma* creeper is received and offered to various *devatās* (page 10, para 22).
- Guṇa.* A quality. When the term is used in the plural, it often denotes the qualities *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.
- Hetu.* A thing, by connection with which another thing is known in an inference (page 59, note 1).
- Hotā.* One of the helpers in a *yaya*, whose function is to recite verses of the *veda*, when offering are made (page 2, note).

- Itikartavyatā.* Offerings, that help the principal offerings in yielding their fruits (page 6, para 13).
- Īśvara.* One that controls. As this feature is found in the highest degree in the highest *Ātmā*, it denotes Him (page 173, para 4).
- Jada.* What does not show itself of other things, and make them fit to be spoken about (page 57, para 6)
- Japa.* Repetition of *mantras* and thinking of their meaning as they are recited (page 464, sutra 37).
- Jāti.* The peculiar feature of a species (page 93, para 7).
- Jeeva.* An intelligent being, who is the 'I' in every person.
- Jeevaghana.* A bound *jeeva* (page 176, para 2).
- Jeevan-mukta.* One that is released from bondage, while he remains in a body (page 491, note 2).
- Jnāna.* A thing that shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about. Both the *jeeva* and his attribute possess this character, the *jeeva* showing himself, and his attribute showing other things (page 330, note 1).
- Juhū.* An instrument for making offerings to *devatās*.
- Kāmya.* A karma, that is done as the means to some fruit (page 40, note 1).
- Kapāla.* Small, flat, circular pieces made of earth and burnt (page 436, sutra 55).
- Karaṇa.* The principal offerings, that yield the fruit through an *apūrva* (page 6, para 13), It is known as *vishaya*, when it particularises an *apūrva* (page 70, note 1).
- Karma.* Good and bad deeds done by a *jeeva*.
- Kāraka.* The object of an action, the means with which it is done, or the place in which it takes place (page 46, para 2).
- Kārya.* Something to be attained by *kṛiti* (mental effort). It is a *yaya*; but in the opinion of *prābhākara* it is the a *purva* by the *yaya* (page 46, para 2).
- Kṛiti.* Mental effort in the form of willing (page 49, para 5).
- Kratu.* A *karma*, in which many offerings are made to many *devatās*, like a *soma yāga* (page 428, note 1).
- Lakṣhaṇā.* The extension of the meaning of a word to somethings connected with it (page 6, para 12).

- Linga.* The capacity of a word to denote something (page 8, para 18-ii).
- Mahat.* A product formed from matter in the condition of *avyakta* (page 243, note 1).
- Mantra.* Texts of the *veda*, recited when a *karma* prescribed in the *veda* is performed (page 2, note).
- Mīmāṃsaka.* One that has commented on *Jaimini's sūtras* (page 3, paras 5).
- Mīmāṃsā.* The examination of the teaching of the *veda* as a whole (page 3).
- Mṛityu.* Matter known as *tamas*; it is so called, as it is the means of the contraction of the *jñāna* of all *jeevas*, and as this is an unwelcome thing (page 243, note 3).
- Moksha.* Release from bondage to matter (page 29, note 2).
- Naimittika.* A *karma*, that is to be done on the occurrence of a contingency (*nimitta*) (page 40, note 1).
- Nimitta.* A contingency, on the occurrence of which an action should be done (page 70, note 2).
- Nir-viśeṣa.* An object that alone exists, and that is then fore without difference (page 57, note 2).
- Niḥśreyasa.* The highest good-a superior kind of fruit, that will endure for ever (page 1, para 3).
- Nitya.* A *karma* that is compulsory (page 40, note 1).
- Paryudāsa.* Exclusion of a thing from something, that is mentioned, by connecting the particle *na* with a word in the sentence other than the verb (page 16, para 36).
- Paśu.* A four - footed animal, that is offered to a *devatā* (page 98, note 4).
- Pitṛiyāna.* The path by which men of meritorious deeds go to the moon.
- Pradhāna.* The cause, from which the universe evolves, which according to the *sāṅkya* consists of the three substances *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* in equipoise (page 282, para 4).
- Purodāṣa.* A ball fried rice flour to be offered to a *devatā* (page 14, para 31-iii).
- Purushārtha.* A fruit sought by an intelligent person (page 1, para 3).
- Pūrṇamāsa.* The name for three offerings made on the first day after the full moon (page 8, para 16).

- Pūrva-pakshu.* The first or superficial view per forward on a subject (page 17).
- Prakarana.* Two or more sentences connected by mutual need, which makes them a context (page 8, para 8-IV).
- Prakāra.* The aspect, in which an object appears (page 97, note 2).
- Prakṛiti.* A *yaya* for which the ritual is explained in the *veda* in full detail, and from which the ritual for *vikṛiti yāgas* is adopted (page 14, para 31).
- Pralaya.* Complete cosmic rest (page 240, note 2).
- Pramāṇa.* An authority on which statements are accepted, or injunctions are obeyed (page 5, para 10).
- Prasanga.* The receipt of service rendered to principal offerings by an offering of minor importance, that is connected with them (page 16, para 38).
- Pratishedha.* Prohibition conveyed by connecting the particle *na* with the verb in a sentence (page 16 para 36)
- Pratika.* Part of thing: meditation on *pratika* is meditation on what is not *Brahma* (Page 506).
- Prārabdha.* Karma that has begun to yield fruit (page 24, para 54).
- Rūḍhi.* Conveying the meaning of words established by usage (page 6, para 11).
- Ṛik.* A portion of the *Veda* (page 2, note 1).
- Ṛishi.* (1) A seer. (2) One that has learnt the whole of the *Veda*, its six *angas* and *kalpa* (page 2, para 4).
- Ritu.* A group of two months (page 243, note 2).
- Ritvik.* A helper in a *yāga* (page 2, note 1).
- Śāstra* A number of verses from the *ṛik Veda* recited by the *hotā* before certain offerings of the *soma* juice are made (page 411, note 1).
- Śākhā.* A branch of the *veda* (page 434, note 3).
- Śesha* and *Śeshi.* See under *Anga*.
- Śruti.* The sound of a word (page 8, para 18-1).
- Śrotriya.* One that has learnt the whole of a branch of the *Veda* (page 36, note 2).
- Samashṭi* evolution. Evolution of the great elements and of the *jeeva's* instruments - the senses and the mind (page 351).

jeevas. *Jeevas* without name and form in the condition of cosmic rest, as opposed to *vyasti jeevas*, which they subsequently became by assuming asses and forms (page 175, note 1).

Samavāya. The relation of the whole to its parts, of a substance to its attributed or actions, of an individual of a class to the genetic character (page 291 note).

Samavāyi. Cause That of which a thing is made page 267, para 3).

Samākhyā. The meaning of words by *yoga* or derivation (page 9, para 18-vi).

Sumsāra. Cycle of births and deaths (page 29 note 4).

Samskāra. Giving of a fitness for some work (page 35, para 6).

Saviśesha. A thing that exists along with another thing, or has an attributive, and that is therefore with difference (59, note 2) .

Sādhya. What is to be proved in an inference (page 59 note 1).

Sāman. A portion of the *veda* (page 2 note).

Siddhānta. The final decision in a topic under discussion (page 17 para 40).

Smṛiti A work written by a great rishi, who knew the *Veda* fully (page 8 para 18)

Stotra. Certain *mantras* in verse, that are sung by the *udgāta* and his two assistants before certain offerings of the *soma* juice are made (page 411, note 3).

Sthāna. Two places in the *veda* connected by mutual need.

Sūtra. A short, condensed, yet clear statement in prose (page 2).

Svara. The variation in tone in the recitation of vedic texts (page 434, note 2).

Svarūpa. The substance of a thing, which is the seat of attributes.

Svaryā. A place of unalloyed enjoyment.

Svādhyāya. The text of the *veda* (page 34 para 5).

Tamas. Matter in the subtlest condition (page 243 note 1).

Tanmātra. An intermediate stage, through which one great element passes before it becomes the next element (page 242, note 1).

Tantra. The serving of several principal offerings by doing an *anga* once only (page 16, para 37).

Tapas. Diminution of sense enjoyment.

- Tarka.* A help to a source of knowledge; it determines that it shows particular thing by discussing either its nature, or the materials from which that thing is known (page 249, note).
- Tatva.* A substance, like the twenty-five *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya*, or like the three *tatvas*, matter, *jeevas* and *Īśvara*.
- Uddeśya.* The subject in regard to which an injunction is given (page 10, para 22).
- Udgātā.* A helper in a *yajna*, whose function it is to sing *vedic mantras* before certain offerings are made (page, 2 note).
- Udgītha.* The second part out of five parts, into which every *saman* is divided.
- Upanishad.* The later portion of the *veda* (page 1).
- Upādhi.* (1) A condition that must co-operate with the *hetu* in producing an effect, when it is present in the examples, but is absent from the subject under consideration (page 59, note 2).
(2) Matter in an atonic form contacting *Brahma* and bringing about the *jeeva* condition (page 266).
- Varṇa.* Caste, as the caste of *brāhmaṇa*, *kshatriya*, *vaiśya* or *śūdra* (page 40 para 11).
- Vāsanā.* Tendency created in a person by thinking or by doing an action.
- Veda.* A book not made by anyone, and regarded as the highest authority among the Hindus (page 1, para 2).
- Vidyā.* Continuous, vivid meditation.
- Vikalpa.* Option to do only one thing out of two or more things enjoined (page 16, para 36).
- Vikṛiti.* A *yāga*, for which the ritual has to be adopted from a *prakṛiti yāga* (page 14 para 31)).
- Viśeshana. Viśeshya.* A word, that connotes an attribute, and through it separates an object that has the attribute, but from other objects. The object separated is *viśeshya* (page 55, note 1).
- Vishaya.* See under *karāṇa*
- Vyashṭi.* Evolution. Evolution of products with diverse names and forms (page 351).
- Yajamāna.* One that does a *yāga* (page 8 para 17).
- Yajus.* A portion of the *veda* (page 2, note).

- Yāga.* An offering made to a *devatā*.
- Yoga.* (1) Denoting the meaning of a word by its etymology (page 6, para 11).
(2) Meditation
- Yūpa.* A post for tying a goat, that is to be offered to a decata (page 10, para 23).
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VEDIC TEXTS

CHAPTER I — IV

VEDIC TEXTS

FOREWORD

In the following pages the *Vedic* texts, that are considered in the several Sub-sections of the *Brahma sutras of Badarayana* are translated for convenience of reference. The context in which the texts occur in the Upanishads, is stated, and an abstract thereof is given, where this will suffice, and an abstract thereof is given, same context should be known, they are fully translated as they are.

2. Foot-notes have been added in explanation of the texts, based on the commentary of Ranga Ramanuja, a great teacher of Sri Ramanuja's school.

3. As some texts are frequently cited as authority in the course of the discussions, it becomes necessary to know in what place they occur. As the texts are arranged here in the order of the sub-sections of the *sutras* an index is needed for ready reference. This had therefore been prepared, and is appended hereto.

CHAPTER I

SECTION 1 - SUB-SECTION 1

Mundaka - (Who¹) on learning the *Veda* critically examines the fruits to be attained by *karma*, and is filled with disgust, seeing "The eternal (*Purusha*²) is not be attained by *karma*", the should approach a teacher only³, who knows the *vedanta* and who sees *Brahma* in meditation, taking⁴ fuel in his hands. To the student, who has approached him properly, and who has controlled⁵ his mind and the senses, that learned man should impart knowledge of *Brahma*, by which he will clearly know the *Purusha*, who is unchanging⁶ in His nature and in His attributes. (I-2-12 and 13.)

SUB-SECTION 2

Bhrigu went to his father *Varuna* with these words - "Revered Sir, think of *Brahma* in order to teach me". The father said this to him "Food, *prāṇa*, the eye, the ear, the mind, speech". He added ⁷ "From whom these beings⁸ are born,

¹ The world has been inserted to correspond with the world 'he', which occurs later.

² The adjective 'eternal' needs a noun, which is supplied with reference to the word *Purusha* in the second sentence, and with reference to the masculine gender of the adjective.

³ This indicates that only from a teacher should knowledge be obtained, and not by any other means.

⁴ This direction is in compliance with the rule that no one should approach his teacher with empty hands. The fuel will be needed by the teacher, if he be a householder, to maintain his sacred fire.

⁵ Such a control is meant as is needed for attentive hearing; but not that complete control necessary for meditation.

⁶ These two phrases differentiate *Brahma* from matter. which changes in its nature, and from the *jeeva*, who changes in his attribute *jnānam*.

⁷ The father intended that the son should first purify his mind by *tapas*, and spoke in this enigmatical manner. The words mean "Food is *Brahma*; *prāṇa* is *Brahma*; etc". This confused the son, who did not know whether they all were *Brahma*, or whether only one of them, and then which. The father, seeing his confusion, gave him this definition, and left him to himself.

⁸ These beings. The terms 'beings' refers to the products of evolution; and the term 'these' to their form as seen; and this form is diversity. By drawing attention to this it is intended to indicate the greatness of *Brahma* who made this wonderful world. The term 'beings (*bhutani*)' connotes whatever has come into existence, and it denotes both the *jeevas* and matter. There is diversity in each element; among the *jeevas* by their division in to *devas*, men, beasts and vegetables; besides by further sub-divisions.

by whom (as supporter¹ from within) they live when born, and returning² to whom they enter becoming one, know³ Him, He is *Brahma*".⁴ (*Anuvaka* 1.)

The son made *tapas* and thought that food was *Brahma*, as it satisfied the definition. He then went to his father as before apparently for confirmation. The father replied "By *tapas* know *Brahma*; for *tapes* is *Brahma*". The same process was repeated, and the son successively thought that *prāṇa*, the mind and the *jeeva* (*vijnāna*) were *Brahma*. Finally, he came to *ānanda* (bliss, i.e. one full of bliss) as *Brahma*. (*Anuvākas*, 2 to 6.)

SECTION 1 - SUB - SECTION 5

One named *Śvetaketu* was sent by his father to a teacher to learn the *veda*. He returned after twelve years in a conceited frame of mind, feeling that he had learnt everything. His father said to him "Did you enquire about

There is also a limitation of this kind. This fruit should be enjoyed by this person in this place and for this period of time; and each person has his own limitations. The *jeevas* therefore differ from one another in this respect also.

¹ The words within brackets have been added to show that the beings live with this support from within: other-wise they can never exist as what they are.

² This is one interpretation of the word *prayanti*; another rendering is "To whom they go in release from bondage". Then the pronoun "who" should be repeated in the text, as is done here. Or reference being made here to *pralaya* - i.e., becoming one with *Brahma*, it may be taken to include complete *pralaya*, i.e., becoming one without any return into world or matter.

³ The word in the original might also mean 'enquire' or 'meditate' but the former does not need an injunction; and the latter has been enjoined in the opening verse of the *Ānandavalli*. The son asked for information on *tatva*; but not about meditation. It therefore means 'know', and requires the student to pay attention to the words.

⁴ The pronoun 'He' occurs but once, while the corresponding pronoun 'who' is found in each of the three sentences. Each sentence does not therefore furnish a definition; and if it did, all but the first would be superfluous. For the definition that *Brahma* is He from whom all beings are born is sufficient to separate Him from everything else. All the three sentences together form one definition; and it will serve a purpose. If the verse stopped with the first sentence, a doubt would arise whether there were other beings concerned with the sustenance and dissolution of the universe, and thus detract from the greatness of the creative Being. Hence being the cause of all the operation - evolution, sustenance and dissolution- is the definition.

Here the father might refer to the peculiar attributes of *Brahma* regarded by Himself and repeat the definition given elsewhere - "unchanging, shining and without limitation is *Brahma*" (*Ananda*, I-I); but the intention is to include in meditations on *Brahma*, the two elements - matter and the *jeevas* - whom He controls.

The cause referred to here is both the material and operative causes. For the text merely repeats what is stated in creation texts, and they refer to both.

that *Ādeṣa*¹, hearing² about whom everything not heard before is heard; thinking on whom everything not thought on before is thought on; meditating on whom everything not meditated on before is meditated on". The son asked³ "How is that *Ādeṣa*, revered sir" (verses 1 to 3).

The father replied "My dear, by knowing one ⁴ lump of earth all that is made of it is known. For⁵ facility of speech (and handling) the lump of earth assumes⁶ different forms and receives different names; but the truth is only that all this is earth" (verse 4).

¹ The term means. he who supports by His power of control; see appendix 1, in which the derivation of the word and the various objections urged against it are examined.

² The words "hearing about whom", "thinking on whom", and "meditation on whom" have been added on a comparison of the parallel passages in the *mundaka* (I-1-3) and *bṛihad uranyaka* (IV-4-5 and VI-5-6). Without these the verse would be "by whom everything not heard before is heard; but the mere existence of this Being cannot impart the knowledge. The original has only the words not heard; not thought on and 'not meditated on'; but they refer to everything in the parallel passages. The term 'everything' includes the *jeevas* also.

³ The son, not grasping what was in his father's mind, and thinking that one thing could not be known by knowing another thing, asked 'How can an *ādeṣa* of this kind exist?

⁴ The lump of each becomes articles of various sizes, and is known as the material cause; and the cause and the products are one, as being the same substance. Similarly, the one *ādeṣa* evolves as the universe, made up of innumerable objects with diverse forms and names; He is the cause, and they are the products, and the All soul and the universe are one. It must be noted here that each of them is an aggregate consisting of the All soul and His two inseparable elements—a *jeeva* and matter. The All-soul is the aggregate in a subtle condition, and the universe is the same aggregate in the evolved condition. The father's question therefore means—Did you enquire about the All-soul who is the material cause of the world?

⁵ The original has the words 'by speech' (*vacha*), the case-ending in which means instrument or cause; but here it means purpose. The translation makes this clear. The words 'and handling' are added, as the word 'speech' is representative of all similar uses.

⁶ The original has the word *arambhana*, the root of which means to touch, and the termination expresses the objects touched. Literally the meaning would be 'By the lump of earth, products, and names are touched for the purpose of speech, etc.' The word qualifies one word in the masculine gender and the other word in the neuter gender. There should be really two adjectives of the same gender and number as the words which they qualify; but by a rule of grammar one of them is dropped, and the other takes the form of a neuter singular (*Panini*, I-2-64.)

The follow two verses exactly similar in wording except that in the place of the lump of each they have a gold piece and a bit of iron; and then the father added "So my dear, is that *Ādeṣa* (verses 5 and 6). The son asked for instruction on the subject, and the father assented (verse 7).

Section - 2

"Before (creation)¹, my dear! this was *sat* only; one only; without a second".

Some say 'Before creation this was only *asat* (non-existent); one only ; without a second. From that *sat* came forth' (verse 1).

'But, my dear! how could it be so' (the father said), "How can *sat* come forth from *asat* ?" But this was *Sat* alone, my dear, before creation; one only: without a second (verse 2). It willed "I will become many,² and to that end I will evolve".

¹ This is supplied from the context, which in sections 2 and 3 describes creation.

The word 'this' denotes the universe, which the father shows to the son, consisting of diverse objects in different formes and with different names, and characterised by plurality and diversity.

The term *sat*, meaning what exists, and is capable of perception by one source of knowledge, denotes *Brhama* here. As already stated (note 2 on page 9) it includes also the two subordinate elements. The term 'only' shows that the universe was not *asat* - non-existent, as stated by the vaiseshika, in whose thory the cause and products are different. This view receives support from the verse which follows.

That the All-soul evolved as the universe may be expressed, taking the latter and stating that it was so and so before the evolution, as the making of earthen articles may be described, saying "all these articles were a lump of earth in the fore-noon". This form of expression is adopted here.

The first sentence shows that the world-cause previously existed. The second sentence shows what it was then. He was one, as opposed to many. As the 'many' is brought about, as will be shown later, by the making of diverse names and forms, the 'one' indicates that the universe was then without them. It was one undifferentiated mass.

The preceding sentence showed *sat* to be the material cause; and this brings to the mind the image of a maker, other than the material, as in the familiar example of the potter, and his lump of earth. The existence of a maker other than *sat* is denied.

² The refers to the universe characterised by diversity and plurality; and the word 'evolve' to the formation of the elements. The words 'To that end' have been added to show this difference between the two expressions.

It¹ created fire. That fire - willed "I will become many, and to that end I will evolve". It created water. Hence, wherever and whenever a person is heated , or sweats, then water comes forth from fire alone (verse 3).

The water willed "I will become many and to that end I will evolve". It created *annam*³. Hence, wherever and whenever it rains, there alone food is produced in abundance. Hence from water alone food and other products of earth come forth (verse 4).

Section 3

Of these beings - those sprung from eggs, those sprung from living beings and those sprung from shoots, three⁴ alone are the causes (verse 1). That same *devatā*⁵ willed "I will enter these three *devatās*⁶ as the⁷ inner ruler of this *jeeva*⁸ and make⁹ diverse names and forms "(verse 2).

"I will make each of them a triple compound". The same *devatā* entered these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva* and made diverse names and forms (verse 3).

Of then He made¹⁰ each triple. He these three *devatās*, my dear, became each a triple object learn from me (verse 4).

¹ The word 'created' does not mean the bringing of a new thing into existence out of nothing, or from one other than that thing. The proper rendering would be 'It became fire'. Here the terms fire and water are used for want of more suitable words.

² This word refers to *Sat* in the form of fire. This will be explained in chapter II, section 3, sub-section 1 of the *sūtras*.

³ This means earth, as will be explained in chapter II section 3, *sūtra* 13.

⁴ Fire, water and earth.

⁵ The being referred to in the previous verses as *sat*.

⁶ The three elements fire, water and earth - so called as they were energised by Himself.

⁷ See appendix 2 for a full explanation of this expression.

⁸ The *jeevas* taken collectively.

⁹ The parallel passage in the *ānandavalli* (VI-2 and 3). "Entering into them He became *sat* (*jeevas*) and *tyad* (material products)" shows that the names and forms were for Himself. In other words He Himself appeared in those forms and bore those names.

¹⁰ This composition was to make the elements fit to form products, which they could not do in their uncompounded condition. The composition should come first, and then the making of names and forms. Hence, the order of enumeration in the text should be held as superseded by the order determined by the nature of things. (Para 26, iii, of Introduction to Sri Bhashya).

Sub-Section 4-7

The father referred in sub-section 4 to fire, the sun, the moon and lightning, and in sub-section 5 to food, water, and fire (in the shape of oil and ghee) taken by men with their food, and explained how they consisted of three elements. in the last verse of the latter section he stated how the mind, *prana* and speech were nourished respectively by the finest elements in earth, water and fire . At the son's request he gave further instruction on this point in the next two sub-sections.

Sub-section 8

*Uddālaka*¹ the son of *Aruṇa*, said to his son *Svetaketu* 'Learn from me, my dear, about deep sleep. When the statement "A person sleeps" is made, he is then, my dear, united to *Sat*; he is dissolved in himself².

Hence they say "he sleeps"; for he is *sva*³ *pita*'. (verse 1.)

As a bird tied with a string flits in every direction, and finding no resting place elsewhere, returns to what it is bound to, in the same manner,

¹ In the preceding sub-section the evolution of the matter-element was described; and the father goes on to explain how the *jiva*-element also evolved. In the former case the matter element energised by *Brahma* successively evolves into the various elements; these are then compounded; and from the compounded elements all the products are formed. In the case of the *jeeva* the evolution consists in his entering into a body, also energised by *Brahma*, and in his regarding himself as *deva*, man beast or vegetable. This is facilitated by the narrowing of his attribute *jñānam*. His dissolution is the abandonment of this notion, the getting out of the body and being united with his cause - *Brahma*. As it was obviously impossible to refer to the evolution that took place immediately after the cosmic rest, or to the dissolution which will happen at the end of this period of activity, the father referred to one's going to sleep, which is analogous to dissolution.

² This and the previous sentence state the same fact; and the thing, to which the *jeeva* is united, should, on the place (*sthana*) authority, be the same (Intro., para 18-v). Hence the word 'himself' refers to *Sat*. Both the terms -person and he-denote *Sat* ruling him from within. (Note 2 on page 13). Then the meaning is *Sat* as the inner ruler of the person is united to *Sat*, i.e. He is dissolved in himself. What this dissolution is was explained in note above. *Sat* ruling the person in the waking condition has changed his state, and now rules him in the sleeping condition.

³ This sentence is mere *arthavada*. The sanskrit word for sleeps is *svapiti*; and though it is one word, not a compound, it is split up into two words-*sva**piti* meaning in himself is dissolved; this is to support the statement that the sleeper is dissolved in his cause.-

my dear, the mind flies in every direction, and finding no resting place elsewhere, returns to *prāṇa*; for the mind is bound to *prāṇa*. (verse 2.)

Then follow four verses, which deal with hunger and thirst. The food taken by one is converted into water - i.e. it is dissolved in its cause. From this each product is traced through its cause finally to *Sat*. Similarly with the water drunk; and the conclusion is this - "these beings¹, my dear, have their root in *Sat* ; they rest in *Sat* ; they are dissolved in *Sat*. "The union of the *jeeva* with *Sat* shown at the outset as taking place in sleep is shown as occurring in death also; and the section closes with these words " He (the *Sat*) is very subtle (verse 3 to 6) "All² this is pervaded by that (*sat*); This is true; He is *Ātmā*: *Svetaketu*"- That thou art' (verse 7).

Section 9-11

The son had doubts why one does not remember his going to *Sat* in sleep, or his returning from Him on waking. The father explains this on the analogy of drops of honey carried by the bee from flowers to the bee-hive and of rivers flowing to the sea. (section 9 and 10.) The son again wished to know why one reborn does not remember anything of his past life, while one going to sleep remembers on waking what he was before. Does the *jeeva* disappear altogether in death? The Question is answered in section 11.

Section 12 and 13

The description of evolution is now complete. In section 12 the father explains, on the analogy of a huge banyan tree springing from a tiny seed, how the vast universe could come forth from a subtle thing. "On the analogy of a bit of salt thrown into a cup of water and dissolved in it, he showed

¹ In the first and third sentence the words-*sat* and being-refer to the aggregate the three elements; for it is the aggregate that evolves and dissolves. In the second sentence *sat* refers to the principal element and 'beings' to the other two elements; for the aggregate cannot support or control itself. The universe remains what it is, as *Sat* controls it; and the control is exercised by His entry into it, Hence these three things always go together-the entry of *sat*, His control and support of the universe. One who enters, controls and supports is *Ātmā*.

² This follows from the statement "They rest in *Sat*, " As *svetaketu* also is included in the expression all this, it is clear that *Sat* is his *Ātmā* also. Hence the statement 'That thou art' means 'He who is your *Ātmā* is He the *sat* described in the preceding verses, This is therefore equivalent to a command to *svetaketu* to meditate on *Sat* as his inner ruler. The father attaches so much importance to this injunction, that he repeats the sentences beginning with 'He is very subtle' at the end of every section of this chapter, beginning with the eighth. Hence the *vidyā* taught here is known as *Sat-vidyā*.

how the presence of *sat* everywhere could be perceived from the *veda*, though the senses are powerless in this matter, as the presence of the salt in the water can be perceived by taste, if not by the eye.

Section 14

How is one to be dissolved in *Sat* without the need for return as in the daily waking or in re-birth. The father replies by an analogy. When a person is blindfolded, carried from home and left in a jungle, if some kind person takes away the bandage and shows him the way, he will reach home by that way.- Similarly, one should meet a teacher, who will teach him to meditate on *Sat* as his inner ruler "For him, (who thus meditate) there is delay only so long as he is not released (from his body)¹; he will then be united (to *Brahma*). (verse 2).

SUB-SECTION 6

Ānandavalli - Section 1

One who meditates on *Brahma*² attains the highest. Regarding this the following verse is stated (in explanation)³. Unchanging⁴, shining, and without

¹ These words are supplied with reference to *chāndogya* VIII-12-2, "This *jeeva* raises from this body and reaches the highest Light".

² The term means a Being, who is the seat of greatness of the highest degree.

³ There are four things mentioned - *Brahma*, meditation on Him, attainment, and the object to be attained. They are explained in order in the next verse.

⁴ All the three words denote *Brahma* as possessing the attributes connoted by them. The first word connotes unchangeability and differentiates *Brahma* from matter, which continually undergoes changes in its substance, and from the bound *jeevas* who undergo changes in their attribute *jnanam*. The second term covers both the substance and attribute *jnanam* of *Brahma*, as both are self-revealed; and the possession of *Jnānam*, that has never suffered any change, differentiates Him from the freed *jeevas* whose attribute *jnānam* had contracted before. The third word denies regarding *Brahma* limitations in place and time and limitations in objects. This last expression means that He may be identified with every object; and this is possible, because He is present in everything as its *Ātmā* or inner ruler. (note 2 on page 13.) The absence of the last limitation may be understood also as denying the existence of any object. Which excels Him in any good quality that He possesses; and this would be to deny that there is any being equal to or superior to Him. The word *ananta* (without limitations) shows also this *Brahma* to be the particular Being otherwise known as *Narayana*; for the word by recognised usage brings Him up before the mind, when it is uttered. The word is in the masculine gender, and has the ending of the second case here, as it denotes the object of meditation. If it were not so, the word 'Him' should be inserted to denote the object, which would not be proper, when the meaning can be made out without the insertion. This word differentiates *Brahma* from *jeevas*, who were never bound. Thus *Brahma* is stated to be a unique Being.

limitations is *Brahma*. Who meditates on Him as seated in the cavity of his heart, he will in the highest heaven enjoy all good¹ qualities² with *Brahma* the all-knowing³. From that *Ātmā*⁴ came forth ether; air from ether;⁵ fire from air; water from fire; earth from water; plants from earth; food from plants; *purusha*⁶ from food (verse 1 and 2). This *purusha* is a modification of food and water. This is his head; this is his right wing; this is his left wing; this is his trunk; this is the tail that supports. Regarding him there is this verse (ver 3).

Section 2

All *jeevas* on earth, whoever they may be, are born from food (*anna*) ; having been born, they live with food alone; in the end they are dissolved in

¹ The term *kaman* in the original cannot refer to any other object; for it is the freed *jeeva*, that is considered here; and from him all other desires have departed. The word *kama* is used as denoting the good qualities of *Brahma*, in the text 'In Him *kamas* (i.e., as divine qualities) are well placed (*chando.*) VIII-1-5).

² The preposition 'with' indicates according to the grammarian that the word, to which it is added, refers to something occupying a subordinate place; and it is added here to the word *Brahma*. If the meaning were that the freed *jeeva* and *Brahma* together enjoy, a subordinate place would be assigned to *Brahma*, which would not be proper. The correct interpretation is that the freed *jeeva* enjoys *brahma* and His good qualities together, as in the analogous sentence "He eats food with milk". Then *Brahma* will occupy a subordinate place as compared with His own divine qualities. This is, however, no defect; by stating, his good qualities to be capable of giving greater pleasure, His own greatness is affirmed. There is no objection to connecting the word 'with' (*saha*) with the word *Brahma*, though they are in different feet of the verse the former being in the third foot, and the latter in the fourth foot. The division of a verse into feet depends not only on the meaning; it is also governed by the exigencies of the metre. *Jaimini's* rule, which refers only to dependence on the meaning should be and has been, understood as covering similar needs.

³ The term in the original connotes that the knowledge extends to everything ; that it has never contracted; that it is not conferred by any one ; and that its appearance does not depend upon any condition. This term also differentiates *Brahma* from the *jeevas*, who have been freed and from those who were never bound.

⁴ The idea that *Brahma* is the *Ātmā* of all is explained on the following sections. The word 'that' refers to the *brahmana* , which gives the injunction to meditate, and the word 'this' (in the original) to the *mantra* which follows and explains the *brahmana*. The original has two words 'From this and from that' to show this.

⁵ The terms ether, air, fire, water and earth and the rest denote *Brahma* in those forms. (Vide notes 2 and 2 on pages 12 and 13.)

⁶ The body.

it. Food is indeed the greatest among all beings;¹ hence it is said to be the medicine of all. They obtain all food (as much as they require), who meditate on food as *Brahma*. Food is indeed the greatest among all beings; hence it is said to be the medicine of all (verse 1.).

From food beings are born; those that are born grow with food; it is eaten; and it eats beings; it is therefore said to be *annam*.

There is a thing named *prāṇamaya*, which is other than this modification of food and water, and which is within it, It is the *Ātmā*² By it the latter is filled.

It is in the form of man; following the human form of *annarasamaya*, it is in the form of man (verse 2) *prāṇa* is its head; *vyāna* is its right wing; *apāna* is its left wing; ether (*ākāśa*) is its trunk; the earth is the tail that supports. Regarding it, there is this verse (verse 3.)

Devas, men and beasts live with the help of *prāṇa*: *prāṇa* is indeed the life of beings : it is therefore said to be the life of all. They attain a full life, who meditate on *prāṇa* as *Brahma*: for *prāṇa* is indeed the life of all; hence it is said to be the life of all.

Who is the *atma* of the previous one, the very³ same is the *Ātmā* in the body⁴ of this also (verse 1).

There is a thing known as *manomaya*⁵, which is other than this *prāṇamaya*, and which is within it. It is the *Ātmā*. By it the latter is filled.

¹ As it serves all beings. It is medicine as it removes illness in the form of hunger.

² From the sentence From that *Ātmā* came forth ether it is clear that *Brahma* is the *Ātmā* of ether; and it is clear also that he is the *Ātmā* of others also up to the body : for the word *Ātmā* should be read into each of the following sentences. To indicate who this *Ātmā* is, the *upanishad* proceeds on what is known as the *sthula-arundhati* analogy. *Arundhati* is a minute star in the sky. One, who has undertaken to show it to a person, first draws his attention to a bright star by its side, and says 'This is *arundhati*', when the person has grasped the star, his guide then shows the real *arundhati* and says 'This is *arundhati*; This plan is followed here and reference is made to the *prāṇamaya* as the *Ātmā*. here *prāṇamaya* is *prāṇa* itself. It is so called, as the *prana* or breathing activity is the most important of its activities.

³ The impression created that *prāṇamaya* was the *Ātmā* is here removed; and it is stated that another is the *Ātmā* of both the body and *prāṇa*

⁴ This expression indicates that the term *Ātmā* is used as correlated to the body to prevent misconception.

⁵ Who is the *Ātmā* of both? The question is answered in this verse. *Manomaya* is *manas* or mind itself. It is so called, as the thinking activity is the most important of its activities.

It is in the form of man; following the human form of the preceding one, it is in the form of man. *Yajur* is its head: *rik* is its right wing; *sāmam* is its left wing; injunction (*Ādeṣa*) is its trunk (verse 2.)

Atharvāṅgiras is the tail that supports. Regarding it there is this verse (verse 3).

Section 4

From which speech returns with mind, not reaching (the higher limit), one who knows the bliss of *Brahma* has not cause for fear at any time.

Who is the *Ātmā* of the previous one, the very same is the *atama* in the body of this also (verse 1). There is a thing known as *vijnānamaya*,¹ who is other than this *manomaya*, and who is within it. He is the *Ātmā*. By it the latter is filled (verse 1).

It is in the form of man (verse 2). Following the human form of the preceding one, He is in the form of man. *Sraddha*² is his head: *ritam* is his right wing; *satyam* is his left wing; *yoya* is his trunk; *mahas* is the tail that supports, Regarding him there is this verse (verse 3).

Section 5

The knower (*vijnānam*) does the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* and also worldly deeds. All *devas* meditate on the nature of the knower, who is greater than *brahma* (unintelligent matter). If one meditates on the knower as *Brahma*, and does not swerve from it till the end, he abandons all sins, even while he remains in the body, and enjoys all desirable ends. Who is the *Ātmā* of the previous one, they very³ same is the *Ātmā* in the body of this also (verse 1).

There is a being known as *ānandamaya*, who is other than this *vijnānamaya*, and who is within it He is the *Ātmā*. By him the latter is filled. He has the form of man; following the human form of *vijnānamaya*, he has a human form. Pleasure⁴ (*priya*) is his head; *moda* is his right wing; *pramoda* is his left wing: *ānanda* is his trunk (verse 2).

¹ This second impression is again removed ; and *vijnānamaya* is stated to be the *Ātmā* of both *prāṇa* and mind. *Vijnānamaya* is *jeeva*.

² The terms *śraddhā*, *rita*, *satya*- all denote varieties of *jñānam*; *yoga* is continuous, *vivid*, loving meditation; *mahas* is the capacity to overcome all obstacles to this meditation.

³ This third impression is again removed; and *ānandamaya* is shown to be the *Ātmā* of both the mind and the *jeeva* He is thus the *Ātmā* of all the preceding ones- the body, *prāṇa*, mind and *jeeva*.

⁴ *Priya* is the pleasure in seeing a desirable object; *mada* is the pleasure in owning it; *pramoda* is the pleasure in using it; a high degree of the last is *ānanda*.

Brahma is the¹ tail that supports them all. Regarding Him there is this verse.

Section 6

He is indeed non-existent, if the fact 'He knows *Brahma*' does not exist. If the fact 'He knows *Brahma* exists, he is known to exist for that reason. Who is the *Ātmā* of the previous one, the very² same is the *Ātmā* in the body of this also (verse 2). He desired "I will become many³; and to that end I will evolve". He considered; considering, He created all this, whatever exists. Having created it, He entered⁴ into the very same; having entered into them (verse 2).

He became *Saṭ*⁵ and *tyad*.

Section 7

He is bliss; for on reaching this bliss one becomes blissful; for who will attain worldly pleasure, who will attain the bliss of release, if this limitless (*ākāṣa*) bliss (*ananda*) does not exist? He alone makes one blissful (verse 1).

Section 8

From fear⁶ of Him the wind blows: from fear the sun rises; from fear of him fire and *Indra* (go about their business); death the fifth, runs about.

Here a description of bliss is given, taking as the unit the happiness of one in every way well-placed in this world, and showing that the happiness of each grade of beings is one hundred times the happiness of the next lower

¹ The very same object is described as the trunk in His aspect as *anada* and as the tail in His aspect as *Brahma*. He is *ānanda* or bliss in His substance, and possesses also bliss as His attribute. This description of the parts of *Brahma* appears in this section, but not in the four preceding sections. It shows that instruction as to *Brahma* begun in the first section is completed here. Hence, *ānandamaya* is Himself *Brahma*.

² This shows that the *Ātmā* of *vijñānamaya*, i.e., Himself is His *Ātmā* also. That is He has no *Ātmā* or inner ruler. He himself is the inner ruler of all. This follows from the non-mention of an *Ātmā* as in other cases.-

³ Compare with the parallel passage in the *chāndogya*, VI, section 2 and see note 1 thereon page 11.-

⁴ *Brahma* being everywhere at all times, what does this entry mean? It refers to a particular condition, in which He can be fully realised in each object, as a calf in the body of the cow before it comes forth.

⁵ See *chāndogya*, VI, note 2 on page 13.

⁶ These leaders among the *devas* attend to their work lest they incur His displeasure by failure in any respect.

grade. These grades are beginning with man-(i) human beings, who have become *gandharvas* remaining men; (ii) *gandharvas* living in the intermediate world; (iii) departed men living in a world continuing for a considerable period of time; (iv) *devas* born in the heaven world; (v) those who have become *devas* by *karma*, i.e., *yaga*; (vi) *devas* - *vasus*, *rudras*, and the rest - thirty-three, who receive the offerings in *yāgas*; (vii) *Indra*; (viii) *Brihaspati* ; and (ix) *Prajāpati* or the creative agent *Brahma*. One hundred times the happiness of the last is the bliss of *Brahma*. The object of this disquisition is merely to show that the bliss of *Brahma* excels the happiness of every one else; and it is immediately added "One who meditates on the bliss of *Brahma*, from which speech returns with the mind, without reaching (its higher limit), etc," (section IX).

SUB-SECTION 7

Chāndogya I-Sections 6 and 7

In the first of these section a meditation is prescribed on *rik*¹ as earth, intermediate world, heaven world, stars and the white light of the sun, and on *sāman* as *agni*, *vayu* the sun, the moon, and the blue light of the sun. Then follow these verses;

Now, that golden¹ *Purusha*, who is seen² within the sun, with golden beard, with golden hair, and golden in every part of the body up to the tip of His nails (verse 6). His eyes are like the lotus³ flower newly⁴ opened to the sun's rays .His name is *ut*; *He has risen*⁵ from all evil⁶. He will rise from

¹ *Rik* is a *vedic* text in verse; *sāman* is the same set to music.

¹ This does not mean made of gold; for elsewhere He is said to be of blue colour. The term merely means shining like gold.

² By the *yogi*, i.e., by one who meditates.

³ Reference is made to the red lotus. This statement is made on the authority of *sabara* the commentator of *Jaimini's sūtras*, though the *amarakosa* explains the word *pundarika* as white lotus.

⁴ The term *kapyasa*, of which the clause is the translation, is explained in three ways: (i) *kapi* is the sun, who drinks water-i.e. evaporates it; *kapyusa* is what is opened by him: (ii) *kapi* is the stalk for the same reason and the flower stands thereon. (iii) The whole word means standing in water. All these derivations are accepted, as the lotus flower standing in deep water on its stalk and newly opened to the sun's rays is very pretty.

⁵ The primary meaning of the word is to rise, as a bird rises from its nest; but evil does not form a cage. Hence a secondary meaning should be adopted. He is not touched by evil.

⁶ The term *pupa* (evil) includes good deeds also Compare with the text - "Him night and day do not touch; no old age; no death; no grief; no good deeds; no evil

all evil who thus meditates on Him (versse 7). *Rik* and *sāman* are his songs.¹ Hence the term *udgītha* ²; for the very same reason the term *udgāta*; for he sings about Him. This being controls the worlds which are above the sun; also the enjoyments of the *devas*, Thus (meditation) on the *devatā* (has been taught).

Section 7

In this a meditation is prescribed on *rik* as speech, the eye, the ear and the white light of the eye, and on *sāman* as *prāṇa*, the shadow of man, the mind and the blue light of the eye. Then follow these verses:

Now, that *Purusha*, who is seen within the eye, He is indeed *rik*³; He is *saman* ; He is *uktha*; He is *yajur* ; He is *Brahma*. That which is the form of that *Purusha* the very same is the form of this *Purusha*; the songs of that *Purusha* the same are the songs of this *Purusha*; that which is the name of that *Purusha* the same is the name of this *Purusha* (verse 5).

This Being controls the worlds, which are below the eye; also the enjoyments of men (verse 6).

The section closes with the following statements, One, that meditates on *udgītha* as the *Purusha* within the sun or as the *Purusha* within the eye and sings *sāman*, sings about both. By this meditation he reaches the worlds and attains the enjoyments referred to. An *udgāta*, who can do this, should ask the sacrificer what enjoyments should be procured for him by sining *sāman*.

SUB-SECTION 8

Chāndogya I-Section 8 and 9

Three persons well-versed in the *udgītha* sat down and held a discussion in the form of questions and answers. The result may be stated as follows;

deeds. All evil withdraws form Him" (*chundogya*, VIII-1-1). Even good deeds produce undesirable fruit from the point of view of one who seeks release. Being untouched by evil of every kind means being untouched by bondage to *karma*. This is his peculiar nature as the world-ruler. To Him actions done are unable to yield their fruits.

¹ *Rik* and *sāman* praise *agani*, *vāyu*, and other *devatās*. As they are said to sing about this *Purusha*, it follows that it is He who appears in those forms. he is therefore the *Ātmā* of all.

² *Udgitha* is *ud+githa* (Song) or song of this *Purusha*, *Udgata* is *ud+gata* or singer of this *Purusha*.

³ He controls *rik*, *sāman*, *yajur* and *uktha* and is *Brahma* . The first three are the three *vedas*: and *uktha*, though as part of them, is separately mentioned here on the *go-balivarda* rule.

sāman depends upon *svara* (sound); *svara* depends upon *prāṇa*; *prāṇa* depends upon food; food depends upon water ; water depends upon that world (heaven world). Beyond this the first could not proceed. the second added- 'that world depends upon earth'; and he could not go further. The third offered to state: 'what it is that this world should attain?' '*ākāṣa*' replied he, 'All¹ these beings come forth from *ākāṣa* alone; they disappear in *ākāṣa*; for *ākāṣa* alone is greater² than all these; *ākāṣa* is the highest goal (verse 1).

This *ākāṣa* is *udgītha*³ the greatest among the great. He is without limitations. Who knowing this as described meditates upon *udgītha*, the greatest among the great, he lives as the greatest among the great, and reaches the world, which are the greatest among the great (verse 2).

SUB-SECTION 9

Chāndogya I - Section 10 and 11

A seer named king *Ushasti*, suffering from hunger owing to a famine, went to the place where a king was performing a *yāga*. He approached the *udgatri* helpers, and addressing the first, whose business it was to chant the first part of the *sāman*, said "Who is the Being connected with the *prastava* (the first part)? If without knowing Him you chant the *prastava*, your head will fall off". He addressed the other two similarly. Being unable to reply, they sat down in silence. This attracted the attention of sacrificer, who requested the new comer to perform the duties of the helpers. he replied that he would instruct them, and that they might themselves proceed with their work; only the kind should give him the same reward that he gave to the others. The kindly assented, and the seer instructed the first in these words;

Prāṇa, said he, "All these⁴ beings are dissolved in *Prāṇa* ; They come forth from *Prāṇa*. This *devatā*⁵ is connected with the *prastava*.

¹ The original has the words *ha,va*, which indicate that what is stated here is a repetition of what is stated elsewhere. The term 'beings' denotes the objects made up of the *jeeva* and matter elements in the world as seen all round.

² Greater by His good qualities.

³ The meaning is that *Udgītha*, the greatest among the great, should be meditated upon as *Brahma* and as without limitations.

⁴ The original has the words *ha,va* , which indicate that what is stated here is a repetition of what is stated elsewhere. The word 'beings' has the same meaning as in the text relating to *ākāṣa*.

⁵ The meaning is that the *prastava* should be meditated upon as *prāṇa*.

SUB-SECTION 10

Chāndogya III - Section 12 and 13

In the first of these sections meditation on *Brahma* as being similar to the *gayatri* metre is prescribed. The metre is of four feet, and *Brahma* has four feet or parts - (i) all the *jeevas* ; (ii) the earth, which serves as the place of enjoyment of the fruits earned by *karma*; (iii) the body, which is the instrument for enjoyment; and (iv) the heart, fit to be the seat of the *jeevas*. There is similarity in another point, which is not relevant to the present purpose. In support of this statement the following verse is quoted from the *purusha* sukta;

“Such are the things controlled by Him; He, the *Purusha* is greater than them all; all beings¹ form one of His feet; the immortal three² feet are in heaven” (verse 6).

In section 13 a subsidiary meditation is prescribed on five *devatās*, who are the door-keepers of the heart at the five entrances into it; They are as follows:

Entrance	Devata	The bodily organ helped by the <i>devatā</i>	Activity of <i>prāṇa</i> nourishing the organ	Qualities to be meditated on
East	The sun	the eye	<i>prāṇa</i>	Brightness and food
South	The moon	the ear	<i>vyāṇa</i>	Wealth and fame.
West	fire (<i>agni</i>)	speech	<i>apāna</i>	Brightness attending on learning and food.
North	<i>parjanya</i>	mind	<i>sāmana</i>	Fame and bodily lustre
Top	<i>ākāśa</i>	wind	<i>udāna</i>	Strength and greatness.

By meditation on each door-keeper the qualities meditated on are acquired; and the principal fruit is stated thus;

“He attains the *svaraga* world, who thus meditates on the five servants³ of *Brahma*, the door-keepers of the *svarga*⁴ world” (verse 6).-

¹ The *jeevas* bound with material vehicles found in the evolved universe.

² The three feet are those made of the substance other than matter, and are objects of enjoyment. Places of enjoyment, and instruments therefore. The term ‘heaven’ refers to the world beyond matter (*prakṛiti*.)

³ The deputed by *Brahma* to bring freed *jeevas* to Himself.

⁴ The world of *Brahma*, known as the highest heaven.

Then follows another subsidiary meditation:

“Now, that fire¹, which shines beyond this heaven, above this universe², in worlds without a superior world. He is the fire³ within man. This is the way to see Him (verse 7).

When one feels warmth by touch in this body, He⁴ is seen. This is the way to hear Him. When one closing the ear hears a sound like the rolling of a carriage, the bellowing of an ox, the crackling of a burning fire, He is heard. Meditate on Him as thus seen and heard. he who thus meditates will become beautiful and famous (verse 8).

SUB-SECTION 11

Kaushitaki -Chapter II

At the request of *Pratardana* that *Indra* should choose a boon for him, which he (*Indra*) considered most beneficial to man, *Indra* said “meditate on me only⁵.

This alone I consider to be the most beneficial to man - “that he should meditate on me” (8). He then enumerated⁶ several of his own doings, which might be regarded as likely to pollute him, and then added:

“By these deeds not a hair of mine has been hurt. If one meditates on me, the prospect of his reaching the other world will not be affected by any deed-be it the murder of his mother, the murder of his father, a theft, or the murder of *bhrūṇa* (*brāhmaṇa* learned in the *veda* and its *angas* and a teacher of *kalpasutra*). By the doing of evil deed his face will not become⁷ blue (9 to 13).

He said again “I, a knower-*Ātmā*, am *prāṇa*⁸. Meditate on me thus described as life, as immortality. (14).

¹ *Brahma* so called, as He makes the sun, moon and stars shine.

² Universe, consisting of the world of diversity and of the elements which surround it on all sides.

³ The heat in the stomach of man. It should be regarded as controlled by the fire that shines above this world.

⁴ The fire within man being regarded as the fire above this world, seeing and hearing it is seeing and hearing Him.

⁵ Meditate on me, giving up everything else.-

⁶ The object was to indicate that one who meditated on him (*Indra*) would not be polluted by sin; for he himself was not polluted by the deeds enumerated.

⁷ By repenting ‘I have done this evil deed;.

⁸ I am an *Ātmā* and a knower, that is a *jeeva*. i, the inner ruler of *jeeva* am the controller of *prāṇa*. Meditate on me in this latter form, as the giver of life and immortality.

Life is *prāṇa*; *prāṇa* is indeed life. *prāṇa* is verily immortality. For as long as *prāṇa* abides in this body so long is life; and with the help of *prana*¹ alone one attains immortality in the other world" (15). By meditation on the knower² the capacity to compass anything at will is attained (16). "He, who meditates on me as life, as immortality, attains a full life in this world, attains immortality, and residence³ for a long period in the *svarga* world" (17).

3. The pre-eminence of *prāṇa* is questioned by some on the ground that no one is able to speak, to see, to hear and to think in the same moment, that each organ performs its function in turn, the others joining it and co-operating with it, and that in this respect *prāṇa* does not differ from the senses and motor organs. *Indra*, accepting it as correct, observed that nevertheless *prāṇa* was pre-eminent, as a person lives, divested of speech, eye, ear or hand; for who has not seen the dumb, the blind, the deaf, and the maimed. But *prāṇa* alone, as is well-known, with the help of the *jeeva* take hold of the body and raises it (18-27).

"Hence, reject the others, and meditate on that alone as the raiser of the body. *Prāṇa* is *jeeva* : *jeeva* is *prāṇa* ; for they dwell⁴ together in this body, and they get out of it together (28).

4. The dependence of the other instruments of the *jeeva* upon *prāṇa* is pointed out in two ways: (i) when the *jeeva* sleeps without dreams, when from illness he becomes weak, when he falls into a trance, or when he departs from the body, they become one with it ; and in the last case, each gives up its function ; (ii) when the *jeeva* awakes, they go forth each to its place, as sparks from a fire (29 to 45).

5. The dependence of the same instruments upon the *jeeva* is next explained. (i) The *jeeva* has as it were married them, and each is correlated to a *bhuta matra* (an effect produced by it) thus;

Speech	name;	Hands	actions
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¹ With the help of *prāṇa* one may carry out the means, by which immortality is attained.

² This capacity is one of the eight attributes of *Brahma*, which are reached by a *jeeva*, on his going to the highest heaven. This attribute is mentioned here as representative of the others.

³ This shows that the fruit of this meditation is of three kinds—long life here ; long residence in *svarga* ; and the reaching of *Brahma* in the end. The case is analogous to *madhu vidyā* (chapter I, section 3, sub-section 8 of the *sūtras*).

⁴ *Prāṇa* and *jeeva* are spoken of as one, as both together do every act.

Nose	smell;	Body.....	pleasure and pain
Eye	colour;	Sex organ.....	pleasure and procreation
Ear	sound;	Feet	going about
Tongue	teste of food;	Mind.....	thoughts and desires

(ii) Through the mind the *jeeva* comes into touch with each instrument and experiences its effects. Without this intermediary, the instrument are unable to make the *jeeva* experience them.

(iii) The instruments and their effects are interdependent; for without the one set the other is non existent.

The injunction is therefore given that one should not dwell on these effects, and that he should turn his mind to the *jeeva*, i.e., to Him who rules him from within (46 to 60).

6. The *upanishad* concludes as follows:

“As on the spokes of a wheel the felly rests, and the spokes on the have, so the *bhutas*¹ (including the organs) rest on the *jeevas*, and the *jeevas* on *prāṇa* (61). This *Prāṇa* is all-knowing; He is bliss; untouched by old age or death. (62). He does not become great by a good deed, nor small by an evil deed (63); for it is He alone that makes one do a good deed, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds² (64), it is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom He wishes to lead³ downwards (65). He is the protector of all the worlds: He is the lord⁴ of all the worlds; He is controller of all (66). Let one⁵ meditate on Him ‘He is my *Ātmā* (inner ruler)’. (67).

¹ The term *prajna matra* here denotes the *jeevas*, this being the primary meaning. It is not applicable to the non-intelligent instruments of the *jeevas*; where their dependence upon their effects was stated, a secondary meaning could not be avoided. In the same context the term *prāṇa* has been used to denote *prāṇa* itself, *jeeva* and *Brahma*; and the term *prajna* to denote *jeeva*, mind and the senses. In each case the sense depends on its appropriateness in the context.

² The worlds within the egg-shaped universe.

³ Good deeds help in perfecting meditation on *Brahma*, and thus lead to a higher world; evil deeds obstruct meditation and thus keep one down.

⁴ The term *adhipati* (lord) comes from a root, which means to protect; but usage has determined its meaning as lord or master. It is not an invariable rule that the sense by derivation should be that accepted by usage.

⁵ Two meditations have been enjoined-(i) One as the ruler of a *jeeva* not affected by the deeds enumerated; and (ii) the other as the controller of *prāṇa* as helping long life, as pre-eminent among the *jeeva*'s instruments, and as raising the body. These have to be combined with a direct meditation on *Brahma* as bliss and immortal, and the whole should be as the meditator's inner ruler.

CHAPTER I

SECTION 2 - SUB - SECTION 1

Chāndogya III - 14

All this indeed is *Brhma* ; for it has¹ come forth from Him; it will be dissolved in Him ; it lives by Him. With² a serene mind meditate (on *Brahma*). Now, this *Purusha*³ is full of meditations. What he meditates on in this world, that he beomces when he departs form hence. Let⁴ a person do meditation (on *Brahma*) (verse 1).

He can be perceived with a pure⁵ mind only ; He supports and controls the *prāṇas* of all ; He has a brilliant figure; his will is never obstructed. He

¹ The original has *tad jalan iti*; this is broken up thus; *tad ja la an iti*. *Ja* is what has come forth; *la* is what is dissolved; *an* is what lives; the three words are first compounded to form *jalan*, and this is then compunded with *tad*, which refers to *Brahma*. The particle *iti* shows reason. the meaning is then as shown in the translation. The words 'this' and *Brahma* refer to the aggregate formed of *Brahma* and His two inseparable elements- matter and *jeevas*; for it is the aggregate that evolves into the universe and that will be dissolved ultimately to reach the original condition. In the matter of sustenance, the word 'this' refers only to the *jeeva* and matter elements, and the term *Brahma* to the principal element; for the aggregate cannot live by itself. Compare with the *chāndogya* text (VI-8-7) and note 2 thereon on page 15.

² The serenity of mind is to be brouhgt about by the absence of desire and hate; and this will happen, when one realises that whatever he sees is *Brahma* in that form. The first sentence is meant to bring about this reuslt. The first sentence is unconnected with the injunction 'meditate', If it were so connected, the attribute of being the world-soul being mentioned in the injunction, its requirement would be satisfied, and the attributes enumerated in the second verse would be purposeless. Again, the word 'indeed' (*khalu*) indicates that the sentence is a repetition of a well-known statement made elsewhere ; and the sentence cannot therefore fit in with the injunction. If with a serene mind 'meditate' be a separate sentence, it needs an object to meditate on ; and this is supplied by the term *Brahma* is the first sentence; for this is present before the mind, and can be added withtout much effort, which will be necessary, if another word has to be found. This has the support of the *mimamsaka*. If it be preferred to connect the first sentence with the second, so that this difficulty may be avoided, then the connection will be with the word *sunta* (with a serene mind) in preference ot its connection with the sentence. This also follows the *mimamsakaâs* rule. The result is that the attribute mentioned in the first sentence does not form part of the meditation.

³ The meditation enjoined is praised.-

⁴ The injunction is repeated in order to prescribe the necessary elements.

⁵ A mind rendered pure by meditation.-

is subtle and unpolluted¹ as the ether ; all this world is His² work ; He commands every object of desire ; all desirable smells and tastes are found in Him ; He has taken up all these attributes ; He is silent³, not being interested in anything (verse 2).-

This *Ātmā* is present⁴ within my heart in a form smaller than a grain of rice, a grain of yava, a mustard seed, a *syamaka* seed (a kind of grain), or the same without the husk. But this *Ātmā* who is present within my heart (is to be reached) in a form larger than the earth, larger than the intermediate world, larger than heaven larger than all these worlds (verse 3).-

All this world is His work ; He commands every object of desire ; all desirable smells and tastes are found in Him ; he has taken up all these attributes ; He is silent ; not being interested in anything.

This *Ātmā*⁵ is present with my heart ; He is *Brahma*. Departing from here, i shall reach Him⁶. One who has this faith, need have no doubt. Thus said Sandilya (verse 4).

SUB-SECTION 2

Kathavalli, I and II

The father of one *Nachiketas* performed a *kratu*, in which all his property was to be given as reward to those that helped him ; but the reward given at the end was not satisfactory. *Nachiketas* was afraid that the efficacy of the *kratu* itself might suffer by this; and being the foremost among those that have faith in the *veda* and its teaching, he desired that the defect

¹ The word in the original may also mean the supporter of *ākāśa*, the cause of all other modifications of matter; or He shines Himself and makes other shine.

² The meaning may also be that every action of man is His work.

³ Having every desirable object, he has no interest in any thing ; hence He does not mind anyone from the creating agent *Brahma* downwards, and sits still.

⁴ To serve as an object for meditation. This is to be an element in the meditation ; as also the form in which *Brahma* is to be reached.-

⁵ Great though He be, He is present within the heart from His infinite mercy.

⁶ Here ends the enumeration of the elements to be included in the meditation, which was begun in the sentence at the end of the first verse. The enjoining of more than one point would need more than one sentence; a defect which the *mīmāṃsaka* dreads. Two explanations are offered;

(a) It is only the order of the elements that is enjoined; the elements will come in as without them there will be no order to be followed. (b) The elements are not independent of one another ; they together form in this order one whole, which is enjoined.

should be remedied at least by the giving away of himself. he asked "To whom will you give me". This question being repeated, the father became angry, and said 'I give you to death' (the *devatā* in charge of death). *Nachiketas* went cheerfully on, and finding death away from home, waited three nights for his return. Death was sorry that the *brāhmaṇa* had to wait so long, and offered to give him three boons. *Nachiketas* accepted the offer, and asked for the following. First, he desired that his father's anger might pass away, and that he might be well-disposed towards the son. Next, he asked for instruction on an *agni-vidyā*, which is the means to a fruit to be enjoyed after departing from the body. The third boon was expressed as follows : "In regard to man who departs¹ from here there is this doubt among men-some saying that he exists, and others that he does not. I wish to know this taught by you. This is the third of the boons (1-20). Death pointed out that this was a difficult question, regarding which there were doubts even among the *devas*, and requested him to name another boon. He offered him long life, long-lived offspring, wealth of every kind and every variety of enjoyment. But *Nachiketas* refused them all, and would have no other boon. Death was pleased and instructed him as follows:

"The wise man first meditates on himself, and realising his nature, he meditates on *Deva* and abandons joy² and grief-the *Deva* who is difficult to see, concealed from man by his *avidyā*; who has entered into all beings; who is present in the cavity of the heart, and stands in the *jeeva* ; and who has had no beginning (verse 12).

The mortal, who hears this, dwells on it with his mind, and separates himself from his body and other fruits of *karmka* , will reach that subtle *Being*, attain his own nature - a source of joy to himself - and become blissful. I regard the door to *Brahma* open to *Nachiketas* (verse 13.)

¹ This does not mean merely separation from the body; for *Nachiketas* knew that the *jeeva* could survive death, that he was capable of doing *karma* yielding fruit in another world; and that he acted and enjoyed. This is clear from the first two questions, which would not be appropriate, if he did not know that he *Ātmā* is other than the body. The reference is therefore to one who is released from all bondage; and there were doubts as to his ultimate destiny. These views were current: (i) The *jeeva* was merely preception, and this disappeared altogether; (ii) This perception *Ātmā* exists, and release is only the setting of *avidyā*; (iii) The *jeeva* becomes like a stone by the disappearance of *jñānam* and every other attribute; (iv) The *jeeva* is *Brahma* contracted by something, and He re-attains His own nature ; and (v) the *jeeva* exists, released from bondage, attains his own nature and becomes blissful. It is to clear these doubts that the question was put.

² Arising from the attainment or non-attachement of worldly objects.

In regard¹ to the means other than *dharma*, good or bad, and in regard also to the goal other than that limited by time, whatever you see, that tell me (verse 14).

Death replies: Referring to the greatness of the goal, first briefly and then in detail:

That goal, which all² the *vedas* teach, which all the *upanishads*³ describe and desiring which the student's life is led, I will tell you by one word⁴. It is *om* (verse 15).

In the next two verses this word is praised. Then follow two verses regarding the *jeeva*:

The *jeeva* who⁵ is fit to become all-knowing, is not born ; nor does he die. He does not spring from anything and was never anything else ; for he

¹ In this *Nachiketas* asks for fuller information in regard to the means, the goal to be attained, and the person that attains it. That he had these things in his mind is clear from the reply given by death. In the translation only two points are mentioned, but the third-the person that attains-is included in the second question, as both he and the goal to be attained as unlimited by time. The verse may be interpreted so as to show the three points clearly-Thus. The words 'other than *dharma*' mean this unique means; the words 'other than *adharma*' mean the unique goal; as *adharma* is other than *dharma* or means; and the words ; the words 'other than this' mean the unique person that attains the unique goal. But then the words 'other than the present' and 'other than the past or future' should qualify all the three items mentioned. These two expressions taken together mean other than what is limited in time. In that case the fourth word 'other than' would be superfluous ; also the qualifying epithet other than what is limited in time, will not apply to the means. For thses reasons the first interpretation is preferred.

² This shows that this *upanishuad* deals with *Brahma*, and not with the *jeeva* ; for the portions of the *veda*, which clearly describe the nature of *Brahma*, cannot refer to the *jeeva*; while the portions, which clearly describe the pure nature of the *jeeva*, will apply to *Brahma* also as the inner ruler of the *jeeva*.

³ The term *tapas* in the original refers to the later portion of the *veda*, in which *tapas* or self-discipline is much insisted on.

⁴ The word, as a whole, denotes *Brahma*; and by its component letters it refers to *Brahma*, the *jeeva* and their relationship.

⁴ The term 'all-knowing' does not apply to the *jeeva* in his present condition. He will become all-knowing in due course. Even in his present condition he is without the liability to birth or death in his nature.

⁵ The four words in this sentence furnish reasons for the four statements made in the first sentence.-

is unborn¹, undying, ever-existing and ancient. he is not² killed, when the body is killed (verse 18).

If the killer³ thinks 'I will kill him', and if the killed thinks 'I am killed', neither of them knows (the nature of the *jeeva*). This one does not kill; nor is that one killed (verse 19).

He (*Brahma*) is subtler⁴ than the subtle (*jeeva*), and is greater⁵ than the great. He is the inner ruler of this *jeeva*⁶, and is placed in the cavity of his heart. When he gives up fruit-yielding *karma*, and when with the grace of the *Supporter*, he sees Him and His being the cause of his own greatness, his grief will disappear (verse 20).

Sitting, He⁷ walks far; lying down, He goes every-where. Who other than, myself can know that *Deva*, who is midway between rejoicing and not rejoicing? (verse 21.)

Without a body, He dwells in bodies; enduring, He is present in perishable things. Meditating on this *Ātmā*, omnipresent and infinitely great, the wise man is freed from grief (verse 22).

This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, by mere hearing many times. Whomsoever He chooses² by him alone is He reached; to him He reveals Himself (verse 23).

¹ This explains in what sense the *jeeva* is said to be undying. Does he not die with the body, within which he abides?

² This verse explains the last remark. The word 'killer' refers to one who hurts another with intent to kill, and the word 'killed' to one who is hurt. these two verse deal with the *jeeva*. The second verse removes the misconception among worldly men that the *jeeva* may be killed. There is no similar misconception in regard to *Brahma*, who is known only from the *veda*, but not from sense perception. As this verse explains the last sentence of the preceding verse, both the verses relate only to the *jeeva*.

³ He can therefore enter into the *jeeva*.

⁴ There is no object which He does not pervade.

⁵ The one described in the two preceding verse. The term *jantu* in the original means an intelligent person.

⁶ Being the *Ātmā* of all, operations, which in others would be regarded as opposed to one another, are possible through the *jeevas* whom He rules.

⁷ One that is chosen by *Brahma* is he who is dearest to Him; and he who is dearest to Him is one that loves Him most. Hence, the love which the meditator has for *Brahma* creates a love in *Brahma* for the meditator, and becomes the means of his reaching Him.

Who¹ does not desist from evil deeds, the force of whose desire and hate has not abated, whose mind is tossed about by numerous undertakings, and who for that reason cannot steadily maintain his mind on any object, by him He cannot be reached by meditation (verse 24).

To whom *Brāhmaṇa*² and *kshatriya* both become food³, and to whom death is a condiment, who can know how He is (verse 25).

Kathavalli III

By those⁴ that meditate on *Brahma* and serve the five fires, or recite a particular portion of the *veda*, two persons⁵ are said to be drinking *ritam* (the

¹ In this verse certain conditions are enjoined as subsidiary to meditation, Though these things are desirable in themselves, they may also be subsidiary to meditation, as truth-speaking, though desirable in itself, is yet subsidiary to a *kratu*. Hence, if one desires to commence meditation on *Brahma*, without these conditions, meditation, owing to the absence of these conditions, cannot be perfected.

² The primary meaning of the word 'food' is obviously inapplicable here. A secondary meaning should be resorted to-either an object of enjoyment or an object of destruction; but there is no one to whom the two classes of persons only are objects of enjoyment or objects to be destroyed, be he a *jeeva* or *Brahma*. If this context dealt with meditation, then following the precedent in *chāndogya* I-6-8 a limitation of this kind might be accepted; but this context does not deal with meditation. Hence, the words *brāhmaṇa* and *kshatriya* should be understood as representing all objects, moving and unmoving.

³ In resorting to a secondary meaning an aspect which is peculiar to food should no doubt be adopted; and this meaning is an object of enjoyment-the meaning being 'To whom these beings are objects which they might enjoy'. But the reference to death in the second clause makes this impossible. The term in the original- *upasechana*-means what helps the taking of food; while it is itself eaten up with the food. There is a connection between the food and this help. If the peculiar aspect of food be taken, this connection cannot be brought about, whatever meaning is attached to the word *upasechana*. Hence an aspect common to food and other objects must be taken; and this is the object that is destroyed. In this sense death will be connected with the two classes of beings. It is no doubt true that the word 'food' first heard is more important than the word *upasechana* heard later, and that the latter should be interpreted so as to fit in with the meaning assigned to the former; but this is not possible, if the connection between the objects denoted by them should be maintained. Hence the meaning of the sentence is who destroys all objects - moving and not moving'.

⁴ The statement in the last verse of section II that no one could know *Brahma* might frighten away most persons. It is therefore added in these two verses that He is present in the heart of men, so that they may meditate on Him, and that He is ready to help those that apply to Him.

⁵ The dual number of the word *pibantan* (drinking) shows that there are two persons, and one of them is, as is accepted on all hands, a *jeeva*. Who is the other?

fruit of *karma*), remaining in this world reached by good deeds, entering the cavity of the heart and dwelling in the excellent ether within it. They are also said to be shade and light¹ (verse 1).

WE are able to meditate on Him, who gives the fruits of *yāgas*, who is the unchanging highest *Brahma*, who is the firm shore to those that wish to cross the ocean of *samsara*, and who is accessible to the worshipper of the *nachiketa* fire (verse 2).

For the continuation see under chapter I, Sec. 4, sub-sec.1.

SUB-SECTION 3

Chandogya IV- Sections 10 to 15

Section 10

Upakosala lived as a student with a teacher for twelve years, tending his three fires; while other students came and departed, he alone remained without instruction. He became impatient. The teacher's wife remonstrated with her husband; but he went abroad without speaking a word. *Upakosala* made up his mind to starve. Then the fires appeared to him in human form and together they said:

"*Prāṇa* is *Brahma* ; bliss (*kam*) is *Brahma* ; ether (*kham*) is *Brahma*"; *Upakosala* said 'I know the meaning of the statement that *prāṇa* is *Brahma*; but I do not understand (what you mean by) bliss and ether'. They replied "What is bliss² that is ether ; what is ether, that is bliss". Thus, they taught

The mind knowing the generic character of the *jeeva*, looks for one who possesses the same character, and this is *Brahma*. The 'mind' or *antah karana* cannot be the second, as it belongs to a separate class, and in its case the mind should think of its character and the individual. This will require a greater effort and will occupy more time. Hence, the mind or *antah karana* is out of the question. *Brahma*, though not directly drinking *ritam*, is yet an agent, as making the *jeeva* drink it; and being present everywhere, He may be in the heart of man also. So no objection can be taken to this inference on these grounds.

¹ The reason for mentioning that the *jeeva* and *Brahma* are shade and light is this. Later on it will be stated that in the search for *Brahma*, the *jeeva's* body will serve as his chariot, his *buddhi* or resolution as driver, his mind as the reins and the senses as horses. If *Brahma* is in the heart, i.e., in the chariot itself, no search is needed. It is therefore necessary to state that owing to his ignorance the *jeeva* is not aware of His presence. The words shade and light indicate that the *jeeva* has but limited knowledge, while *Brahma* is all-knowing.

² Bliss is ether -i.e., is as unlimited as ether. The second sentence may be understood as confirming the first statement or as meaning that He who is bliss is unlimited in other ways also.

him that the same Being who was *prāṇa*-i.e. who made the universe breathe, and who was bliss, was ether, i.e. was unlimited (verse 5).

Section 11

Then¹ one of the fires taught him as follows:

'Earth², fire, food, the sun; that *purursha* who is seen in the sun, I am he; I am³ he only' (verse 1). One that knows this as stated here and meditates, abandons evil⁴ deeds, becomes a dweller in the world⁵, attains a full⁶ life, and lives bright⁷, and his descendants will not perish⁸. We will in this world and in the other guard⁹ him, who knows this as stated and meditates (verse 2).

Section 12

Then another fire taught him as follows: "Water the quarters. the stars, the moon. The *Purusha* who is seen in the moon I am he : I am he only" (verse 1).

The second verse is similar to the second verse in section 11.

Section 13

Then the third fire taught him as follows; "*Prāṇa* ether, the sky, lightning. That *purusha* who is seen in the lightning, I am he; I am he only" (verse 1).

¹ The term 'then' indicates that while the subject is continued another point is taken up, which is a meditation subsidiary to the principal meditation. This is indicated also by the term *enam* (him), which according to the grammarian. refers to one that was mentioned before.

² These are the forms in which this fire appears.

³ There is a similarity between fire and the sun, as both are shining objects, and as one makes things fit for consumption by cooking and the other by ripening them

⁴ Such deeds as obstruct the reaching of *Brahma*.

⁵ The world of *Brahma*.

⁶ So much as is needed for completing the meditation.

⁷ Without suffering from any kind of illness, until this object is gained.

⁸ By the term descendants reference is made to sons, grandsons and their children, and also to students, their students and so on. By the term 'will not perish' is meant that they will meditate on *Brahma*. Giving up meditation is to perish.

⁹ Guard him from all obstructions to meditation.

The second verse is similar to the second verse in section 11.

Section 14

They all said "Upàkosala, dear, thus have been taught you our meditation and meditation on *Brahma*. Your teacher will teach you the path."¹ Then the teacher returned (verse 1).

He learnt what had happened (verse 2).

He said "They have told you, dear, about the worlds, But I will tell you that² by meditating on whom no evil deed will stick³ to one, as water does not stick to a lotus leaf." The student said "Tell me, revered sir." He taught him as follows (verse 3).

Section 15

"This *Purusha* who is seen⁴ in the eye, He is *Ātmā*".⁵ said he, "He is *amritam*;⁶ He is freedom⁷ from grief; He is *Brahma*⁸. Hence, if molten⁹ butter or water is dropped on it, it runs away to the sides (verse 1).

They say 'He is *samyadvana*; for all good qualities come together in Him. All good qualities come together in him who thus meditates (verse 2).

The very same is *vamani*; for He leads all good¹⁰ qualities to those ("who come to Him). He also leads all good qualities, who thus meditates (verse 3).

¹ This must be understood as representing whatever remained to be taught; for the student had to know the qualities to be meditated on and the place on which *Brahma* was to be located, as will appear later.

² *Brahma*.

³ This means that when a deed is done, which in ordinary cases will be evil, it will become capable of obstructing the generation of any evil result. This should be understood as limited to deeds done unintentionally.

⁴ By the *yogi*, i.e., by one who meditates on Him.

⁵ Inner ruler.

⁶ Giving the greatest enjoyment to one, who enjoys Him.

⁷ That is, when He is enjoyed, there will be no admixture in the enjoyment of any pain, grief or misery of any kind.

⁸ Immeasurably great.-

⁹ Owing to the influence of the Being present in the eye. Whom no evil can touch. This is mere *arthavada* or praise.

¹⁰ This should be restricted to good *buddhi* or good thoughts, feelings and the like.

The very same is *Bhamani*; for He shines¹ in all worlds. he also shines in all worlds, who thus meditates (verse 4).-

The last two verses deal with the *devayana* or the path by which the freed *jeeva* goes to *Brahma*, and will be explained in connection with chapter III, section 3, Sub-section 13.

SUB-SECTION 4

Bṛihad āraṇyaka V-Section 7

In the court of king *Janaka* a number of learned men met together, and being jealous of the seer *yajnavalkya*, they pelted him with questions. One of them was *Uddālaka*, and his questions were:

(i) Do you know that thread on which this world, the other world and all beings are strung together: (ii) do you know that inner ruler, who rules from within this world, the other world, and all beings (verse 2 and 3).

yajnavalkya replied; To the first question

“*Vayu* (“wind), *Gautama*, is that thread; for by the string *vayu*, *Gautama*, this world, the other world, and all beings are held together. Hence, in regard to a person, *Gautama*, who has departed, people say “His parts have been loosened”; for by the string *vayu*, *gautama*, they were held together” (verse 6).

To the second question—

“Who stands in earth, who is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is; and who rules the earth from within, this inner ruler is your² immortal (perfect) *Ātmā*” (“verse 7).

¹ This shining is through a shining body. The meditator also attains a shining figure, should he desire it. In mentioning the fruit in these cases the intention is that the three qualities mentioned in verse 2 to 4 should enter into the meditation. It is not mere praise.

² The *Ātmā* possessing immortality unconditioned in any way. By the word ‘your’ He is differentiated from the *jeeva*; also by the epithet ‘immortal’ added to the word *Ātmā*; for the *jeeva*’s immortality depends upon the grace of *Brahma*; and is not therefore unconditioned. The immortality of *Brahma* is taken to be unconditioned, as no condition is mentioned.

The question arises why, instead of replying in the same form in which the question was put, each item is taken, and its inner ruler is said to be the immortal *Ātmā* of the questioner. The intention is to show that *Brahma* fills each item and rules it; and this fulness means that He possesses His principal six attributes to the fullest degree.

Then follow verses exactly similar dealing with

- (i) The other elements - water, fire, air and ether;
- (ii) The intermediate world, heaven, and the quarters;
- (iii) The sun, the moon and stars, darkness and light;
- (iv) All embodies *jeevas*;
- (v) The *jeeva*'s instruments-*prāṇa*, speech, eye, ear, mind, and skin; also seed or semen;
- (vi) *jeeva* (by the term *viñāna*) verses 8 to 27.

He then added:

“Unseen He sees”¹ unheard, He hears; unthought of, He thinks; unmeditated on He meditates. There is no seer other than this;² no hearer other than this; no thinker other than this; no meditator other than this. This inner ruler is your immortal *Ātmā*; other than this is misery” (verse 27).

The above is the *kanva* reading. In the *mandhyandina* reading the following variations occur:

- (i) Three additional items appear-all worlds, all *vedas*³, all *yāgas*; (ii) In the place of *viñāna* the term *Ātmā* is used ; (iii) In the place of the term *eshah* at the end of each verse the term *sah* is used. Both have the same meaning.

SUB-SECTION 5

Mundaka-Chapter I-Section 1

The first two verses describe how the *upanishad* came down from the creative agent *Brahma* step by step to *Angiras. Saunaka*, a great householder,

¹ This seeing is merely perception of colour, not necessarily by the eye; similar with regard to the other terms. As seeing ; hearing and the rest belong also to the *jeeva*, the words are qualified by the words unseen, unheard, etc.

² The word ‘other’ being a pronoun, refers to something similar to the one referred to before. Hence, what is denied here is another being who sees, without being seen etc.

³ The terms *veda* refer to the *devatās* who are in charge of the *vedas* and *yāgas*, for not being substances, they cannot be bodies of the inner ruler. It is not legitimate to assume on the strength of the *vedic* statement that even things other than substances may be bodies; this course is resorted to only, when no other way is open. But here it is not so ; for reference may be made to the *devatās* in charge.

approached him (*Angiras*) in the prescribed manner, and asked-Revered sir, by knowing what all¹ this becomes known (verse 3).

He replied to him-It is that (to reach²) which those learned in the *veda* state that two *vidyās* have to be acquired. They are the higher and the lower (verse 4).

Of them the lower is *rik*³, *veda*, *yajur veda*, *sama veda*, *atharava veda*, *siksha* (vedic phonetics), *kalpa* (ritual), grammar, vocabulary, metre and astronomy. Next the higher is that by which that⁴ *Akshara* is vividly perceived⁵ (verse 5).

¹ Here the expression "all this" refers to the matter and *jeeva* elements only; not to the aggregate made up of these and of *Brahma* also. For the questioner did not yet know that *Brahma* and these elements are inseparable, and that the relationship between them is that of the *Ātmā* and body. He had merely heard that there was a thing by knowing which everything was known, and he wished to know what that thing was. In reply the teacher wished to correct his impression, and to show that though the question appeared to refer merely to the elements, which are the attributes of *Brahma*, yet it covered *Brahma* also. He proceeded to show that the aggregate in a subtle condition is the cause and in a gross condition is the product. There are precedents for understanding the teacher's intention to have been as stated. In the *vishnupurana*, *Adi Bharata* when asked who he was, though the question related to the *jeeva* in a body, replied with reference to the *jeeva* only. In the *Atharva siras*, *Rudra* asked who he was by the *Devas*, wished to make them understand that the word denoted not merely himself, but also *Brahma*; and he went on to describe *Brahma*.

² These words are supplied to make the meaning clear.

³ This and the following words in the sentence should be understood in a secondary sense to mean the knowledge, which the texts of these works impart. If they were taken in their primary sense to mean the texts of those works, then the higher *vidyā* should be taken to denote the *upanishads*; for the word *vidyā* used only once in the text cannot denote both-the text in one case and knowledge in the other. If the term higher *vidyā* denoted the *upanishads*, then they would be differentiated from the *veda*, and would be likely to be regarded with disrespect, like the *sankhyasmṛiti*. Hence, *vidyā* means knowledge; the lower *vidyā* the knowledge imparted by the four *vedas* and their adjuncts; and the higher *vidyā* is the variety of knowledge known as meditation.

⁴ This is correlated to the word 'which' in verse 4.

⁵ In meditation. The term, of which this is the translation, cannot mean 'is seen' or 'is reached'. If by the higher *vidyā* *Akshara* is seen or reached the lower *vidyā* would not serve either purpose. Hence, the meaning is as in the translation. In the *vishnu purana* this verse is quoted and explained; and the meaning 'is reached' is adopted; if it be desired that this should be followed, the word 'directly' should be supplied thus 'is directly reached'.

That well-known Being, who cannot be seen nor seized, who has no name and no colour, who has no eyes and ears, nor hands and feet and who is eternal, omnipresent and all-pervading, because of his highly subtle nature. He is without imperfections, and the wise perceive Him to be the material cause of all the exists (verse 6).

There¹ is no other² superior to Him; nothing is subtler³ than He: nothing is larger⁴ than He. He stands in heaven unbending⁵, prominent and like a tree. By this *Purusha* all this is filled⁶ (verse 7).

As⁷ the spider sends forth and draws in its thread: as plants appear on earth; as from man, who remains a man, hair comes forth, so from *Akshara* the universe comes forth here (verse 8)

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¹ The last sentence in verse 6 raises a doubt. In regard to an earthen jar the material cause is seen to be lump of earth. Does *Akshara* similarly evolve as the universe? This verse removes the doubt. *Akshara* pervading everything as its inner ruler, it is He that evolves. In the case of the jar also, it is *Akshara* in the form of the lump of earth that evolves into the jar.

² The term *apara* in the original means 'other'. If it were meant to deny that there is a superior or inferior the negative particle *na* would have been repeated; it is used here once only and cannot be repeated.

³ He can therefore enter into everything.

⁴ *Larger* is used in the sense of controller of all.

⁵ There being no one to whom He has to bend.

⁶ For the purpose of control. Hence, as He is present in the lump of earth also. He evolves into a jar; and there is no inappropriateness in His being the material cause.

⁷ Further doubts are removed in this verse. They are ; (i) A material cause needs an operator other than itself; (ii) *Akshara*, who is one, cannot be the material cause of numerous unlike things, which form the universe ; (iii) In the lump of earth its previous condition is destroyed, when it is made into a jar; and (iv) when a wall is built of bricks, their form is concealed. But *Akshara* is unchanging; and His previous condition remains, nor is His form concealed. The first example shows that a separate operator is not needed; for the spider does not require any help from any one. The second example shows that from one earth numerous unlike things in the shape of plants come forth; its previous condition remains; and it is not concealed ; so it may be with *akshara* .The third example shows how from an intelligent person unintelligent things can come forth.

By¹ *tapas* *Brahma* evolves; from Him *annam*² comes forth ; from *annam* come forth *prāṇa*, mind, the imperishable *jeevas*, the worlds³, and among *karmas* that leading to immortality (verse 9)

He⁴ knows everything and knows every (attribute) of everything. His *tapas* is thought. From⁵ Him come forth this *brahma*, name, from and *annam* (verse 10).

Section 2

The first verse directs the performance of *agnihotra* and other *karmas* needing the three fires in these words:

“Do them as subsidiary to meditation on *Brahma*, desiring only the unchanging (*Brahma*). That will be your path (i.e. what leads to the goal), when the fruit of well-performed meditation is to be reaped.” The second verse states how the offerings should be made. The third verse points out how the *agnihotra* injures, when it is not combined with other prescribed duties. Verse 4 to 10 describe how fruit-yielding *karma* carries the *yajamanas* to worlds up to the abode of the creative agent *Brahma*; how the *yajamanas* return to this world, when their enjoyment is over; and how they are reborn to suffer in due course old age and death. They also condemn in severe terms those, that pin their faith on the unsound boats in the form of *yāgas* for enduring enjoyment. The eleventh verse runs as follows; “Those, that obtaining instruction and grasping its import by constant examination, live in the jungle on food obtained by begging, and that controlling their senses and

¹ This verse shows the *modus operandi*. The next verse explains *tapas* to be thought. *Akshara* wills ‘I will become many’. This condition immediately preceding evolution is referred to.

² The term means the aggregate made of the *jeevas*, who eat, i.e., enjoy, and material objects, which are eaten, i.e. enjoyed. By both the derivations both the classes are denoted by the same term.

³ *Svarga* and other worlds.

⁴ This verse shows the possession by *Akshara* of the instrument needed for evolution in the form of knowledge; for this has not been stated yet. The second sentence explains the term *tapas* ; and shows also that *Akshara* does not need any instrument other than His own will.

⁵ This is a repetition of what has been stated in verse 9. *Annam* is described as *brahma* and it possesses name and form-the material products directly and the *jeevas* indirectly through them. The sentence means that from *Akshara* ready to evolve comes forth the aggregate known as *annam* and *brahma* and bearing names and forms either directly or indirectly.

mind meditate and *tapas*¹ with love, they become purified and go through the sun to the place where that *Purusha* free from all imperfections abides in an unchanging body."

The last two verses will be found unde chapter I, section 1, Sub-section 1.

Chapter II - section 1

This *Akshara* is imperishable. As from a blazing fire sparks similar to it go forth by thousands, so from *Akshara* come forth, dear, various beings; and they are dissolved in the very same (verse 1).

That *Purusha*, who was described² as a dweller in heaven, as without a body, as the inner ruler of everything without and within, as unborn, as without *prāṇa* and mind, and as being pure, is superior to the *jeevas*, who are themselves superior to *akshara*³ (verse 2).

From this come forth *prāṇa*, mind, all the senses, ether, air, fire, water and the all-supporting earth (verse 3).

His head is heaven (*agni*)⁴; His eyes are the sun and the moon ; His ears are the quarters ; His speech is the *vedas* ; His *prāṇa* is the air ; His heart is the universe ; His feet are the earth. He is the inner ruler of all beings (verse 4.)

From Him comes *agni*⁵ (heaven), the fuel of which is the sun; from *soma* (evolved from heaven) comes forth rain-cloud; from rain-cloud plants

Verse 9 and 10 refer to the same Being; and He who is ready to evolve by *tapas* is He who knows everything. Hence the term *sarvajña* does not denote *Rudra*.

¹ *Brahma* Compare with the parallel passages - "and who in a jungle meditate on *tapas* (*Brahma*) with *śraddha* (eagerness) (*chando*, V-10-1); and "those that in a jungle meditate on *Satya* with *śraddhā*" (*Brihad.*, VIII-2-15).

Here the term *Satya* is used in the place of *tapas* ; and *satya* means *Brahma*. (*ana.*, I-1).

² In verses 6 and 7 of chapter I, section 1 of this *upanishad*.

³ This term denotes *prakṛiti* (matter) as being indestructible in its nature, and as being other than its products, which are fit to receive new names. That the term *akshara* means this is established in chapter I, section 2, subsection 5 of the *sūtras*.

⁴ Compare, with the text "That world is indeed *agni* (*Chando.*, V-4-1).

⁵ This verse states briefly what is known as the five fire *vidyā* (*Chando.*, V, Sections 3 to 10). The *jeeva* who goes to *svarga* (the heaven world) appears in a fine body known as *soma*. When his enjoyment is over, he returns as a raincloud to the ether; coming to the earth as rain, he appears as a plant; this being eaten by a man

come forth on earth; man emits semen into the womb of woman. thus, many beings come forth from the *purusha* (verse 5).

From Him come forth the *vedas-rik*, *sāman* and *yajur*, *diskshas*, *agnihotra* and all other *yāgas*; all *kratus* connected with the *soma* juice, the rewards given to helpers in them, the year and other portions of time, *yajamana*, and the worlds which are purified by the rays of the sun and moon (verse 6).

And from Him come forth the various classes¹ of *devas*, *sadhyas*, men, beasts, birds, *prāṇa* and² *apāna*, rice and *yava* (a kind of grain), penance, faith in the existence of *Brahma*, truth-specking, abstience from sexual intercourse and the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* (verse 7).

From Him come forth the seven³ senses, the seven fire, their fuel and their seven flames; also these seven worlds, in which the seven senses move about, being located in the eye and other parts of the body, and coming during sleep to the cavity of the heart (verse 8).

From Him come forth oceans, all the hills; from Him flow rivers of many kinds; and from Him come forth all plants, and their juices; for He⁴ stands as the inner ruler surrounded by all beings (verse 9).

The *Purusha* only is all this⁵; His action⁶ is *tapas* (thought). He is an object of enjoyment like nectar to the *jeeva*, when freed from *brahma* or matter. He, who meditates on Him as located in the heart, my dear, cuts the knot⁷ of ignorance here (verse 10).

becomes his semen; and this dropped into the womb of a woman becomes a foetus. Heaven, air (*parjanya*), earth, man and woman are the five fires; the *jeeva* in his subtle body is offered into them, and emerges successively as soma (the possessor of a fine body), a rain-cloud, a food - giving plant, man's semen, and a foetus.

¹ See *ānandavalli*, section 8 under chapter I, section 1, sub-section 6.

² The Out-going and in-coming breaths.

³ Doing work in the two eyes, the two ears, the two nostrils, and the mouth

⁴ This is added to remove the doubt whether plants do not come forth from the earth, and the juices from the plants. The reply is that they come forth from *Akshara* appearing in those forms.

⁵ Because they come forth from the *Purusha*, they also are the *Purusha*. Hence, by knowing him everything is known.

⁶ His action in the evolution of the universe is mere thought of what had to be evolved.

⁷ Being difficult to remove, as a knot is difficult to loosen (*Chando*).

SUB-SECTION 6

Chândogya V, sections 11 to 24

Five great house-holders well-versed in the *veda* met together and held a discussion on the subject "Who is¹ our *Ātmā*; what is *Brahma*". They could not arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, and resolved to go to *Uddālaka*, who according to repute knew *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*; and they went to him accordingly. Having only imperfect knowledge, *Uddālaka* indicated *Aṣvapati* as the person to whom they should all apply; and he himself went with them. *Aṣvapati* received them with due respect, and requested them to stay for a *kratu*, which he was about to commence, promising to give them the same reward as he would give his helpers in the *kratu*. They replied that they had come for instruction, and not for presents. He said that he would speak to them next morning. All the six appeared before him, bearing fuel in their hands for the sacred fire. *Aṣvapati* was pleased with their humility for they were *Brāhmaṇas* and he was a *kshattriya*), and did not make them pass through the *upanayana* ceremony. He spoke as follows:

Section 12

"*Aupamanyava*² what *Ātmā* do you meditate on." He replied "Heaven only, revered king!" "The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā, vaiṣvānara*, known as³ *sutejas*. Hence the operations known *suta*⁴, *prasuta* and *asuta* are seen in your family (verse 1).

"You eat⁵ food, and see dear ones; He who thus meditates on *Ātmā Vaisvanuara* eats food, and sees dear things, and a son comes into his family with the brightness born of meditation. But this is the head of the *Ātmā*". said he, "your head would have fallen off, if you had not come to me" (verse 2).

¹ Though the subject appears in the form of two questions, the meaning is "What is *Brahma*, who is our inner ruler".

² *Asvapati* thought that there was something which they knew, and something which they did not know. He therefore asked each what he knew on the subject.

³ The term means what has good light, and heaven answers this description, owing to the presence in it of the sun and the moon. As *Vaiṣvānara* is mediated on as heaven, He is known by that name.

⁴ These terms refer to the crushing of the *soma* creeper in some *yāgas*, that occupy one day only, those that continue from two to eleven days and those that continue for more than eleven days.

⁵ This represents wordly enjoyment.

Section 13

Then he addressed the second "*Prachinayogya* ! What *Ātmā* do you meditate on?" He replied "The sun only, reverd king". The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, known as *visvarupa*¹. Hence, a bright son will come into your family (verse 1).

A car drawn by mules, and servants with neck ornaments attend on you² But this is the eye of the *Ātmā*! , "Said he", You would have beome blind, if you had not come to me" (verse 2).

Section 14

Then he addressed the third "*Vaiyaghrapadya*! What *Ātmā* to you meditate on?" He replied " The air only, revered king." "The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, known as *prithakvartma*³. Hence, presents come to you from various quarters, and rows of cars follow you in various ways (verse 1.)

But this is the *prāṇa* of the *Ātmā*, "said he" Your *prāṇa* would have risen from you, if you had not come to me" (verse 2).

Section 15

Then he addressed the fourth "*Sarkarakshya*! what *Ātmā* do you meditate on". He replied "The ether only, revered king." "The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate , is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara* known as *bahula*.⁴ Hence, you are great with offspring and with wealth (verse 1).

.... But this is the waist⁵ of the *Ātmā*, "said he, "Your waist would have perished, if you had not come to me (verse 2).

Then he addressed the fifth, "*Vaiyaghrapadya*! What *Ātmā* do you meditate on". He replied "Water only, revered king. "The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, known as *rayi*⁶. Hence, you are wealthy and

¹ One who reveals all; for the sun has this capacity;

² Here the sentences beginning with 'You eat food', and ending with 'born of meditation', which occur in the second verse of section 12 are repeated. Similarly in sections 14 to 17.

³ As *prāṇa* moves in different ways.

⁴ Great; for the ether is larger and of greater extent than the other elements.

⁵ The original has the word *sandeha*, meaning what is an object of doubt; and there is doubt as to what the waist pertains to the upper or lower part of the body.

⁶ Possessing wealth

flourishing (verse 1). But this is the bladder of the *Ātmā*," said he, "your bladder would have burst, if you had not come to me" (verse 2).

Section 17

Then he addressed the last "*Gautama!* what *Ātmā* do you meditate on". He replied "The earth only, revered king". "The *Ātmā*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, known as *pratishta*¹. Hence, you are established with offspring and cattle (verse 1).

"But it is the feet of then *Ātmā*," said he, "Your feet would have dried up, if you had not come to me " (verse 2).

Section 18

Addressing them all, he said, "You have meditated on this *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, as if He were different; and (as the fruit of this) you eat² food. Though *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara* surrounds everything and is really without limitation, yet one, that meditates on Him as thus limited by places, eats the³ food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *Ātmās* (verse 1.)

The head of⁴ this *Ātmā* (meditator) is the head - *Sutejas*-of that *Vaiṣvānara*; his eyes are *visvarupa*; his *prana* is *prithakvartman*; his waist is *bahula*; his bladder is *rayi*; his feet are earth. His breast is the *vedi*; his hair on it is the *kusa* grass thereon; his heart is the *garhapatya* fire; his mind is the *anvaharya pachana* fire; his mouth is the *ahavaniya* fire (verse 2).

Section 19

The food that first comes to him (at meal-time) is for offering. The first offering that he makes should be made with the words *prāṇaya svaha*. *Prāṇa* is satisfied (verse 1).

¹ Support; as the earth is the support of all beings.

² This is a repetition of the statement made in regard to each of them in sections 12 to 17 and it may be understood as representing the other fruits also that are referred to therein.

³ This food is *Brahma*, who is everywhere, and who is by nature limitless bliss. The food eaten by those, that are bound by *Karma*, each by himself and not in common with others, is fit to be rejected by those that desire release. The mediator enjoys *Brahma*, The fruit of meditation on *Vaisvanara* is the reaching of *Brahma*.

⁴ Here a meditation subsidiary to the principal meditation is prescribed. The mediator has to identity himself with *Ātmā Vaisvanara* in the manner described; he should regard the first five morsels of food that he takes as offered to *Vaisvanara*. For this purpose the parts of his body named should be treated as the requistes for offerings the three fires, three fires, the altar and the *kusa* grass. Here the words of this *Ātmā* refer to the mediator mentioned in the preceding verse, and the word of that qualify *vaiṣvānara*.

When *prāṇa*¹ is satisfied, the eye is satisfied: when the eye is satisfied, the sun is satisfied; when the sun is satisfied, heaven is satisfied; when heaven is satisfied, whatever heaven and the sun control is satisfied. Following such satisfaction the offerer is satisfied with offering, cattle, food, brightness and the brightness born of meditation (verse 2).

Sections 20-23

These are similar to the preceding. The variations are as follows :

Section 20. Offering made to *vyana*; *vyana*, the ear, the moon, quarters are satisfied.

Section 21. Offering made to *apana*; *apana*, speech, fire, earth are satisfied.

Section 22. Offering made to *samana*; *samana* mind, parjanya lightning are satisfied.

Section 23. Offering made to *udana*; *udana*, *vayu*, ether are satisfied.

Section 24

If without knowing this² one makes offerings to *prāṇa*, it would be as if one removed live coal from the fire and made the offering on ashes (verse 1).

Next, if he thus know it, and makes offerings, his offering will be made to all³ words,, all beings , all *Ātmās* (verse 2). When one thus knows it, and makes offerings, all his *karmas*⁴ are burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up (verse 3).

Hence, even if one meditating thus gives to a *chandala* (outcaste) the remains of his food⁵, it will be offered to *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara* On this point the following verse is heard (verse 4).

¹ *Prāṇa*, *Vyāna*, *apāna*, *sāmana* and *udāna* are the names given to *prāṇa* as it performs its various activities. The terms, which follow, indicate the *devatās*, who are in charge of the things denoted by them.

² That the offerings are made to *Vaiṣvānara* and that his breast, the hair thereon, his heart, mind and mouth are the requirements for the offerings.

³ Because by the offerings *Vaiṣvānara* is satisfied and he is the inner ruler of all.

⁴ This is the fruit of the principal meditation, and it is stated here for the purpose of praising the subsidiary meditation. This also shows that the offerings to *prāṇa* in the manner prescribed is subsidiary to the meditation on *Vaiṣvānara*.

⁵ What should not be given. Even then, if he give it as given to *Vaisvanara*, he commits no sin. This and the next verse praise meditation of *Vaiṣvānara*.

“As hungry children here sit round their mother, so all beings sit in expectation of the offerings to be made to *prāṇa* (verse 5)”.

This *vaiṣvānara vidyā* is taught in the fourth *Brāhmaṇa* of *agnirahasya*. The variations are as follows:

(i) The head of *Vaiṣvānara* is described as *atishta* instead of *sutejas*(section 12).

(ii) The eye of *Vaiṣvānara* is described as *sutejas* instead of *visvarupa* (section 13).

(iii) In prescribing a meditation on the meditator as *Vaiṣvānara* the following are points of difference:

ACCORDING TO *Chāndogya*

Head - *Sutejas*

Eyes - *visvarupa*

Prana - *prithakvartman*

Waist - *Bahula*

Bladder - *rayi*

Feet - Earth (*pratishta*)

ACCORDING TO *agnirahasya*

Head - *atishta*

Eyes - *prithakvartman*

Ether in the face - *bahula*

Water in the fact - *rayi*

Chin - *pratishta*

The commentator states that these variations do not constitute difference of *vidyā*, and that each meditator may follow the description in his own *veda*. Precedent. The *purodasa* to be offered to the *devatā agni cum soma* may be baked on eleven *kapālas*, accordint to some, and on twelve *kapālas* according to others. It has been held that the offering of the *puroḍāṣa* is the same *karma*, anud that the sacrificer may follow the direction in his own branch of the *veda*.

CHAPTER I

SECTION 3 - SUB-SECTION 1

Mundaka - II section 2

KNOW HIm to be *Akshara*, who is seen by the *yogi*, who is near, being present in the cavity of the heart, who is well-known as being difficult of perception, who is the highest goal, in whom all that is awake, dreaming or sleeping rests, who is the support of all in the subtle or gross condition. Who is greater than the *jeeva* and who is most fit to be desired (as the goal and the means) (verse 1).

That *Akshara*, bright, subtler than the subtle, and the support of the worlds and of those that live in them, know Him, dear, to be *Brahma*. He is *prāṇa*, speech and mind; he is unchanging, immortal. He is¹ to be seen by an (one-pointed) mind (verse 2).

Taking the bow² well-known in the *upanishad* string³ it with the mind directed towards *Brahma*, and fix on it as the arrow the great⁴ weapon sharpened by meditation. That same *Akshara* know to be the mark (verse 3).

Prāṇava is said to be the bow ; the *jeeva* to be the arrow; *Brahma* to be that mark. The shooting⁵ should be done without attending to anything else. Let the shooter become like the arrow one⁶ with Him (verse 4).

In whom (*akshara*) heaven, earth and the intermediate world are woven; also the mind with all the senses (*prāṇas*), know him alone as *Ātmā* (the inner ruler of all). Leave off words relating to other things. he is the bridge to immortality (verse 5).

Within the heart, on which the blood-vessels meet, as the spokes of a wheel on the nave, He dwells, being born⁷ in many forms. Meditate on this

¹ Place your one-pointed mind on him.

² The syllable known as *prāṇava*

³ The original has the term (*ayamya*); The stringing in the case of the particular arrow is to think of it as showing the relationship of the *jeeva* and *Brahma* as master and servant.

⁴ The weapon is the *jeeva*, and he is sharpened by being separated in thought from his gross and subtle bodies.

⁵ The shooting here is to think that the *jeeva* exists only for Him.

⁶ As the arrow, piercing the mark, cannot be distinguished from it, so should one become merged in Him, losing his character as *deva* or man, which distinguished one from another.

⁷ In forms similar to the bodies of these to whom He comes, in order that they may resort to Him for help.

inner ruler. pronouncing the syllable known as *prāṇava*, in order that you may reach the farther shore beyond this world of matter. May you meet with no impediments (verse 6).

Who knows everything and every attribute of everything, and to whom pertains this great rule on earth. He abides in the highest heaven in what is known as, the city of *Brahma* (verse 7.)

Who abides in the body, is perceptible by a pure mind, and rules *prāṇa*, and who shines as bliss, untouched by *samsara* on Him the wise fix their mind and see Him in meditation (verse 8).

Thue¹ knot² in the heart is cut; all doubts³ are solved; and all his *karmas* are⁴ destroyed, when He, the greatest among the great, is seen (verse 9).

What, those knowing the *Ātmā* meditate on is *Brahma*, a dweller in that great, golden treasure⁵- receptacle, free from the three qualities of matter, without parts, without imperfections and the light of lights (verse 10).

The⁶ sun does not shine there, i.e., (by His side); nor the moon and the stars; nor yet the lightning; how can this fire shine? When He shines, everything shines after Him. With His light all these shine (verse 11.).

This immortal *Brahma* alone is before; *Brahma* alone is behind; *Brahma* alone is on the right, and on the left; *Brahma* alone extends above and below. *Brahma* alone, the best, is all this (verse 12).

Chapter III- Section 1

Two⁷ birds, inseparable, and possessing similar⁸ qualities, cling to the same tree⁹. Of them one¹⁰ eats the ripe fruit¹¹; the other¹² does not eat, but shines on all sides (verse 1).

¹ This verse describes the fruit flowing from this seeing.

² Desire and hate difficult to be dislodged, as a knote is difficult to unravel.

³ Because he becomes all-knowing.

⁴ This destruction is the resolve of *Brahma*, pleased with the *vivid* meditation of the devotee, that his sins will be forgiven. The seeing is *vivid* meditation.

⁵ *Brahma* - city holds, Him as a treasure chest holds treasure. Golden shining or pleasing like gold.

⁶ This verse explains what is meant by the 'light of lights'.

⁷ This removes the doubt that by His entry into all bodies. He may become liable to the experiencing of pleasure and pain.

⁸ Freedom from *karma*, etc.

⁹ The body, which is fit to be cut down like a tree.

¹⁰ The *jeeva*.

¹¹ Fruit of *karma*.

On the same tree man, immersed, grieves, he wildered with the attraction of worldly objects, When he sees the other, the ruler of all, pleased with his actions, and sees His greatness to be such and such, his grief passes away (verse 2).

When the meditator sees the brilliant maker and ruler, who is *purusha* pre-eminently, and the world cause, he shakes off good and evil deeds, and free from all touch of matter, attains the highest likeness to Him (verse 3).

SUB-SECTION 2

Chāndogya - VII - Section 1 to 14

Narada went to *Sanat kumara* in the prescribed manner with the words "Teach me, revered Sir". He said "Tell me what you know. I will then teach you what you do not know." *Narada* enumerated all that he had learnt, and added "I know only the *mantra*, revered sir, but not the *Ātmā*. I have heard from persons like yourself that one that knows *Ātmā* sees the end of grief. I am, revered sir, in grief. Please help me over this grief of mine." *Sanat kumara* replied "What you have learnt, *Viz*, name this alone is that (*Ātmā*)." He directed him to meditate on name as *Brahma*. *narada* was not satisfied, and asked "Is there anything, revered sir, greater than name". Receiving a reply in the affirmative, he said "Please tell me that." In this manner by questions and answers *Narada* was led successively through speech, mind, will, thought, meditation, knowledge, strength, food, water, fire, ether, memory, and desire to *prāṇa*. It is sufficient to show how each step was considered to be greater than the preceding one. It is speech that makes one know the *veda* and everything else. Without it, there would be no learning from a teacher and no knowledge of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, and the like. *Speech* is therefore greater than name - i.e., words. *Mind* is greater than speech; for only when one has a mind he recites *mantrams* or does *karma*. Will is greater than mind; for only when one wills, he puts his mind into it, recites *mantrams* or does *karma*. *Thought* is greater than will; for will is influenced by thinking on the past, on the object to be attained in the future and the like. *Meditation* is greater than thought; for it is continuance of the same thought on a subject without the intervention of a dissimilar thought, and this is more powerful, as an instrument, than mere thought. *Knowledge* is greater than meditation; for it leads to concentrated thought. *Strength* is greater than knowledge; for without strength to approach a teacher, to receive instruction, to think on it, and to meditate will be impossible. It depends on food, which in its turn depends upon *water*. *Fire* is the cause of water; and through air it is produced by *ether*. This brings to mind its effect sound, and leads the mind from it to hearing; hearing from a teacher will be

useless, unless the student has *memory*, and this is said to be greater than *ether*. And *desire* (for fruit) is greater than memory: for it prompts one to remember what he has learnt and put it to practice.

Section 15

*Prāṇa*¹ is a greater than desire. As the spokes of a wheel rest on the nave, so does everything² rest on this *prāṇa*. *Prāṇa*³ goes forth with the help of *prāṇa*; *prāṇa* gives *prāṇa*; *prāṇa* gives to *prāṇa* ; *prāṇa* is father; *prāṇa* is mother; *prāṇa* is brother; *prāṇa* is sister; *prāṇa* is teacher; *prāṇa* is *brahmana* (verse 1).

If one speaks⁴ a little beyond the usual mode to his father, mother, brother, sister or teacher or to a *brahmana* saying "burn you" people say, "you have killed your father' you have killed your mother; you have killed your brother; you have killed your sister; you have killed your teacher; you have killed a *brāhmaṇa*" (verse 2).

But if after *prāṇa* has gone out of them, he should shove them with a poker into a fire, and burn them well, no one would say "You kill your father; you kill your mother; you kill your brother; you kill your sister; you kill your teacher; you kill a *brahmanA*" (verse 3).

For *prāṇa* is all this. He who so thinks⁵ on *prāṇa*, so mediates on it, and so realises, it, praises it as above everything else. If people say to him "you praise beyond limit, "he will reply " I do praise beyond limit"; and will not deny it (verse 4).

¹ The term *prāṇa* denotes a *jeeva*, who dwells in the body with *prāṇa* and goes out of it with *prāṇa*.

² Every non-intelligent object

³ One who goes, the animal for locomotion the giver the object given and the receipient *jeevas* also the relations mentioned.

⁴ This and the next verse show that *prāṇa* should not be identified with the body reference is celary made to one to whom pain can be caused. For this reason the term does not denote either *Brahma* or the *jeeva*'s instrument *prāṇa*. The analogy of the spokes and nave is applicable to the *jeeva* also; for non - intelligent objects of enjoyment, and the instruments enjoyment all depend on him. Though the *jeevas* cannot be pained in his true nature, yet when he dwells in a body, he is liable to it.

⁵ The termination of the world in the original, which have been rendered as thinks, mediates and realise, indicates reason. The meaning is that as he sees, himself in this manner, he praises it.

Section 16

"But he praises¹ beyond limit, who praises in regard to Satya", Let me, revered sir, praise in regard to *Satya*." You must then meditate on *Satya*." "I will meditate on *Satya*".

Section 17 to 22

The teacher was of opinion that the student would praise *Satya*, if he had realisation; that this should be preceded by meditation; that again by hearing and thinking that this implies eagerness to know *Satya* (*Sraddha*) that eagerness comes from the conviction that *Satya* alone should be known (*nishta*); that this conviction should be coupled with the turning of the mind away from all other things (*Kriti*); and that both will happen if *Satya* be known to be bliss. He accordingly turned the student's attention through thinking *sraddha*, *nishta* and *kriti* to bliss.

Section 23

"What is *Bhuma*², that is bliss; there is no bliss³ in a small thing. *Bhuma* alone is bliss. *Bhuma* alone should be sought", I will seek *Bhuma*, revered Sir".

Section 24

That is *Bhuma*⁴ which being experienced, one does not see anything else, does not hear about anything else does not meditate on anything else.

¹ Reference being made here for the first time to praise of the object as being superior to everything else, *Nārada*, thought that the teaching as to *Ātmā* ended here; and he did not ask whether there was anything greater than *prāṇa*. Seeking his error, the teacher himself mentioned *Satyam* (i.e., *Brahma*) as being superior to *prāṇa*. The term *Satyam* denotes *Brahma*. Compare with the text - The name of this - *Brahma* is *satyam* (*chando.*, VIII 3-4). For *brahma* is ever the same, the undergoes no change of substance or of attributes. The particle 'but' (*tu*) distinguishes one that praises *Satyam* from him that praise *prāṇa*; and as he praises *Satyam* as being greater than everything else, *Satyam* is greater than *prāṇa*.

² This term comes from the word *bahu*, which refers to greatness in number or in other respects. Being correlated to *alpam* (a small thing), it does not refer to number and for the same reason it refers to an object, and not to a quality. The term therefore denotes an object that is great unlimited in attributes; for *Brahma* is said to be bliss. and bliss is not great in size; but is great degree. The meaning is therefore "What is infinitely great is most pleasing or gives the greatest degree of bliss".

³ "Bliss" here is the attribute of being most pleasing. The 'small' thing is the *jeeva*. The sentence by denying the possession of this attribute, merely indicates that the attribute of being pleasing exists only in a small degree. Compare with the sentence. "Others than the cow and the horse are not beasts", which means that sheep and other excepted beasts are not as important as those mentioned.

⁴ This verse indicates the object which the teacher had in view, when he used the words '*bruma*' and *alpa* (small thing). The term 'Experienced' includes seen, heard

That is a small thing, which being experienced, one sees another thing, hears about another thing, meditates on another thing.

“What is *Bhuma*, that is immortal : what is limited. that is mortal.” On what, revered sir, does *Bhuma* rest” “on his own¹ *mahima* (greatness) on not on *mahima*” (verse 1).

In this world people say “cow and horse, elephant, and gold, servant and wife, fields and houses and the like are *mahima*” “I do not speak as they do, `said he, `For one rests on another (if they be different)”.

Section 25

He² alone is below; He is above; he is behind; He is before; he is on the right; He is on the left; He alone is all this. Next,³ the teaching regarding meditation on *Bhuma* as ‘I’ alone am below; I am above. I am behind; I am before; I am on the right; I am on the left; I alone am all this’ (verse 1).

Next, the teaching regarding meditation on *Bhuma* as *Ātmā* thus⁴ – “The *Ātmā* alone is below; the *Ātmā* is above ; the *Ātmā* is behind; the *Ātmā* is

about and meditated on. This word is supplied to bring out the meaning. Or the word seeing may be supplied, and the meaning will then be on seeing which object no other thing is seen’, Other things are not seen, heard about or meditated on, as they do not exist. For all things are inseparable parts of *Brahma*, and when He is seen, there is nothing else to be seen. Another interpretation in this. The word else (*anya*) being a pronoun refers to objects similar to that already mentioned and the meaning is that when He is seen, another similar thing is not seen for such a thing does not exist.

¹ The teacher used the word *mahima* in the sense of greatness and he intended to say that He required no support. But the word being used in another sense in the world, he corrected himself. This will be clear from verse 2. The error, from which he wished to guard the student, was that *Bhūmā* depends on what he controls.

² This verse explains how there is nothing other than *Bhūmā*. Standing to everything in the relation of *Ātmā* and body, he may be identified with everything and there is nothing with which he cannot be identified.

³ This enjoins that in meditating on *Bhūmā*, the meditation should be that He is *Ātmā* of the mediator. Meditation on the nature of the *jeeva* is not intended; for then the wording would be ‘*aham ādeṣa*’ and not *ahamkāra adesa*, *Ahamkāra* means the idea that *Bhūmā* is myself. The form of meditation will be “*Bhūmā*, who is everywhere and who is the *Ātmā* of all, is myself only”.

⁴ This verse shows that the world ‘I’ and the cognition ‘I’ extend to *Brahma* and concludes the teaching commenced with the statement one that know *Ātmā* sees the end of grief’. The *Bhūmā* taught to be the *Ātmā* of all is the *Ātmā* of the mediator also. This follows from the statement “He alone is all this, but it is desired to state it explicitly.

before; the *Ātmā* is on the right; the *Ātmā* is on the left; the *Ātmā* alone is all this:. One thus seeing, thus thinking, thus meditating, finds every variety¹ of pleasure in the *Ātmā*, and becomes His own² master; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds comes to him. Next, those that meditate differently from this are subject to another; their worlds are perishable; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds does not come to them (verse 2).

Section 26

From the *Ātmā* of him, who thus sees, who thus thinks, who thus meditates, *prāṇa*³ comes; desire from the; memory from the *Ātmā*; ether from the *Ātmā*; fire from the *Ātmā*; water from the *Ātmā*; appearance and disappearance (of the world) from the *Ātmā*; food from the *Ātmā*; strength from the *Ātmā*; knowledge from the *Ātmā*; will from the *Ātmā*; the mind from the *Ātmā*; speech from the *Ātmā*; the name from the *Ātmā*; the mantrams from the atma; actions from the *Ātmā*; all this from the atma alone (verse 1).

On this subject the following verses are recited: One that sees (*Brahma*) does not see death; nor disease; nor anything in the world to be disagreeable. he sees everything; he attains everything everywhere. He⁴ appears as one; appears as three; as five; as seven; and as nine; and again as eleven; as one hundred and eleven; as thousand and twenty.

The purity of food being secured, the purity of the mind results; the purity of the mind being secured, continuous, unbroken meditation comes; continuous, unbroken meditation being secured, release from all knots⁵ follows.

To him, from whose⁶ mind agitation had gone, the revered, *Sanat Kumara* showed the farther shore of *samsara*. They say 'he is *Skanda*'.

¹ The original has four terms - *rati*, the pleasure derived from sandal paste, flowers and the like; *krida*, the pleasure from pleasure grounds; *mithuna*, the pleasure from the company of a women; and *ānanda* the pleasure from command over servants. All these varieties are included in the pleasure found only in the *Ātmā*.

² No longer 'subject to *karma* and no longer governed by commands and prohibitions'.

³ The *Ātmā* referred to is the inner rule of the mediator.

⁴ Being without parts, he cannot become three or five he appears in as many bodies as he wills.

⁵ *Avidyā*, desire hate and the like.

⁶ This is shown by *Nāradas* refusing to accept as *Brahma* name and the rest up to desire.

SUB SECTION 3

Brihad aranyaka - V - Section 8

See the texts translated under chapter I, Section 2, sub-section 4. The next person to question *Yajnavalkya* was *Gargi*, and her questions were as follows:

“*Yajnavalkya* ! what is above heaven, what is below the earth, what is between these, heaven and earth, what people describe as the past, the present and the future, in what is all this woven like warp and woof” (verse 3). He replied - “*Gargi* ! what is above heaven, what is below the earth, what is between them, heaven and earth, what people describe as the past, the present and the future, all this is woven in *ākāṣa* like warp and woof” (Verse 4).

. . . The *ākāṣa* mentioned by you, in what is it woven like warp and woof” (verse 6).

He replied - ‘it is that well-known *Akshara Gargi* ! whom those knowing *Brahma* describe as neither gross nor subtle, as neither short nor long, as neither red (like fire) nor cohesive (like water), as being without shadow and without darkness, as being neither air nor ether, as being without attachment, without taste, or smell, without eyes or ears, without speech or, mind without light, without *prāṇa* , without a mouth, without limitations, and without a place within or without not pervaded by Him. He¹ eats nothing; no one eats Him (verse 7). By the unobstructed² command of that *Akshara. Gargi* ! the sun and the moon stand supported; by the unobstructed command of that *Akshara, Gargi*, heaven and earth stand supported; by the unobstructed command of the *Akshara, Gargi*, moments hours, days and nights, half-months, months, seasons, years and other periods of time stand supported; by the unobstructed command of that *Akshara, Gargi*, rivers flowing eastward flow from white mountains; those flowing westward, and those flowing in other directions flow in their proper directions; those who give³ under the unobstructed command of that *Akshara, Gargi* men praise, the sacrificer the *devas* praise, and the instrument for offering the *pitris* praise, all of them being dependent upon the gives (verse 8).

¹ Being possessed of all that may be desired, he requires nothing.

² The meaning of the prefix in the term *prasasana* in the original. Hence this command extends to everything.

³ Gifts to men offerings to the *devas* and offering to the *pitris* are all made under His command.

When one without a knowledge of that *Akshara, Gargi* makes *homa* offerings in this world, performs *yāgas*, undergoes penances for many thousands of years, all that work of his will have an end.¹ He, who without knowing that *Akshara, Gargi*, departs from this world, will be miserable. Next, one that knowing that *Akshara, Gargi*, departs from this world, is fit to enjoy *Brahma* (verse 9).

SUB SECTION 4

Prasna - Chapter V

Six persons in search of the highest *Brahma* went to a teacher named *Pippalada* for instruction. He told them to wait for a year and to practise *tapas* (abstinence from sense enjoyment) and abstinence from all thought of woman. They might then question him as they wished, and he would reply, so far as he knew (chapter I, verses 1 and 2). When the ordeal was over, they went to him one by one and received instruction. The fifth person was *Satyakāma*, and this was his question- "Revered sir, if one among men meditates on the syllable known as *prāṇava* till departure from this world, what world does he thereby win (verse 1).

He replied - "*Satuakama* ! This syllable indicates² the lower and the higher *Brahma*. Hence, one that meditates on Him, reaches by this same way (The syllable) one or the other (verse 2). If he meditates on the syllable as a short vowel³ then obtaining his⁴ existence by that alone, he quickly arrives. On earth and is regarded⁵ as a great man. The *rik* verses bring him to the world of men, where if he practices *tapas* abstains from all thought of woman and cultivates faith, he enjoys greatness⁶ (verse 3).

Next, if with the syllable as a long vowel meditation on the lower *Brahma* is established in his mind, he is carried above by the *yajur* verses to the world of the moon in the intermediate world, where he enjoys greatness and returns (verse 4).

¹ Will produce only perishable fruit.

² The original identifies the syllable with *Brahma*, as this word denotes the object. Where this relationship exists, it is usual to regard the word and the object as one.

³ Which indicates the *lower Brahma* that is, if he meditates on the lower *Brahma* with this short syllable.

⁴ The meaning is that until he begins the meditation, he did not really exist.

⁵ The meaning of the prefix *abhi* in the verb *abhi sampadyate*.

⁶ This is interpreted as referring to meditation on *brahma*, the means of attaining real greatness.

If again he meditates on the higher *purusha* (*Brahma*) with that same¹ syllable with the vowel elongated, he reaches the orb of the sub full of light. As the snake is released from its (Worn-out) skin, so is he released from his sins, and is carried above to *brahma-loka*² with *sama*³ verses. He sees the *Purusha*⁴ (*Brahma*) who dwells⁵ in men's hearts, and who is superior to the freed *jeeva*, who is again superior to the bound⁶ *jeeva*. On this subject these two verses are recited (Verse 5).

The three *matras* (short, long and elongated), if pronounced either very fast or very slowly, yield death⁷. If they are properly pronounced in actions, which are outward⁸, inward or both, the mediator is not shaken (From the fruit) (verse 6).

The mediator is led by *rik* verses to this world, by *yajur* verses to the intermediate world, by *sama* verses to that world, which the *seers*⁹ perceive. He who meditates (on the higher *Brahma*) by that syllable enjoys the highest Being, who is free from the six evils free from old age, free death, and free from feat (verse 7).

¹ With the syllable, which serves as the means of attaining lower fruits, when pronounced as a short or long vowel.

² The interpretation of this word is discussed in sub section 4 of the *sūtras*. It may mean the world of *Brahma* of *brahma* who is the fruit sought.

³ This word means *sāma* songs. it is also interpreted thus, The words *sa* and *sāmabhis*, which occur together in the verse are taken as a compound term; the meaning will then be "by the servants of *Brahma* singing *sāman*'.

⁴ This word, like the word *bhagavān*, used by itself, denotes *Vasudeva*, ie., the Being appears in brilliant figure in the highest heaven.

⁵ As their inner ruler.

⁶ The word in the original is *jeeva ghana*; the term *ghana* connotes a hard limited thing, and this description can apply to a *jeeva*, only when he abides in a *karma* made body.

⁷ Any unwelcome result.

⁸ Outward actions are *yāgas* and the like; inward actions are meditation and the like the uttering of *mantrams* along with meditation on their meaning constitutes the third variety.

⁹ The seers are the dwellers in the highest heaven; and the word which they see is therefore the highest heaven. This shows that the term *Brahma-loka* cannot refer to the world of the creative agent *Brahma*. Compare with That highest place of *Vishnu* the seers always see (*taittiriya, ka., iv, p-2; p.38 and 39*).

SUB SECTION 5

Chāndogya - VIII Sections 1 to 4

There is in this city¹ of *Brahma* a dwelling place in the form of a small lotus². The small ether³ within it and what is within it - both⁴ should be sought and meditated on (verse 1).

If they (students) say to him (the teacher) - "You refer to a dwelling place in the form of a small lotus in the city of *Brahma*, and (to) the small ether within it, What⁵ is in it, which should be sought and meditated on (Verse 2).

The teacher will reply "As large⁶ as this ether is, so is the ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are wholly contained within it; both fire and air, both the sun and the moon; lighting and the stars; whatever one has here and whatever he has not, all this is contained with it" (Verse 3).

If they say to him "If in this city of *Brahma* all this is contained, all beings and every variety of enjoyment, when old age seizes it, or when it falls to pieces what² then is left of them (verse 4).

¹ The human body. It is called a city, as *Brahma* is within it, and as it has nine gates.

² The heart

³ In the sub-section of the *sūtras* noted at the head, this will be shown to be *Brahma* (I3-13).

⁴ This word has been supplied with reference to verse 6, which refers to both as objects of meditation. The injunction to meditate is conveyed in the first verse by the termination *tavya* (the term in the original is *anveshtavya*); and the beginning is more important than the end. It should therefore refer to both as objects of meditation. For this purpose the words *yah* (which) and *cha* (and) are supplied; or the single word *yad* may be regarded as consisting of two words-the masculine *yah* and the neuter *yad*. One of them is dropped by a rule of grammar, and what remains takes the form of the neuter singular. The word *tad* (that) will similarly represent *sah* (that) in the masculine gender, and *tad* (that) in the neuter gender; and by the same rule of grammar only one of them remains, and it takes the form of a neuter singular.

⁵ The students thought that the ether should be very small, being within the heart, which is itself of small size, and had doubts as to what could be within it. Hence the question.

⁶ This verse states (i) that the small ether is in Himself extremely large; (ii) that He is the support of the world; and (ii) that He will the greatest amount of enjoyment to one, who goes to Him. Thus He is shown to be entirely different from the well-known ether and the questioners doubt is cleared. By the expression "whatever he has and whatever he has not" is meant enjoyment only, and not objects of enjoyment; for the freed *jeeva* will not care for any other than *Brahma* Himself.

He will reply "By the old age of the body, He (the small ether) does not age; by the killing of that body He is not killed. This city¹ like *brahma* is not subject to change². In him³ all divine qualities are well - placed. He⁴ is *Ātmā*; He is free from *karma*⁵ old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst; He has unchanging objects of desire, and His will is never frustrated. As people here follow their king in accordance with his commands, and enjoy whatever they desire, he is it a country or a piece of land, so do they depend upon *Brahma* in the other world and enjoy the fruits they had worked for (verse 5).

As⁶ here the fruits earned by *karma*⁷ perish, in the very same manner, the fruits earned by good deeds perish in the other world. Hence, those that without meditating here on the *Ātmā*, and on these unchanging divine qualities depart, cannot wander at pleasure in all the worlds. But those, that meditate here on the *Ātmā*, and on these unchanging divine qualities, and depart, can wander at will in all the worlds (verse 6).

Section 2

If he⁸ desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his mere⁹ will the fathers come up, and joining them, he is respected (verse 1).

¹ All this was stated to rest on the small ether, but the students thought that, as curd rests on the air contained in a cup, all this rests on the small ether contained in the body; that the cup is the real support of the curd; that the ether merely gives it room; that similarly all this rested on the body; and that the small ether merely helps, as the air helps the curd.

² The small ether, i.e., *Brahma*, is compared to a city, as He contains everything as a city does. He does not give His support as the ether in the cup gives support to the curd; but He is himself the support directly, as a city is the support of what it contains.

³ Another doubt may arise. Being within the body, He may be affected by old age and death, like the heart. This doubt is removed.

⁴ Removing the doubts that arose in this connection, the teacher replies to the question "what exists in Him".

⁵ Then the questions arise "who is the small ether; and what are the divine qualities? To these a reply is furnished.

⁶ This includes good-deeds. See note 6 to *chāndogya*, I sections 6 and 7 (page 27, Vedic Texts).

⁷ The proceeding verses referred to dependence upon another for enjoyment. This verse shows that the enjoyment does not endure.

⁸ *Karma* means the service of the king.

⁹ On being freed.

¹⁰ This term excludes every other effort. When it is added to an epithet, it affirms that the attribute is always found in the object denoted by the word, to which it is added. When it is added to a verb, it conveys the same meaning in an intensive sense.

Then follow similar verses for mothers, brothers sisters, and friends, and perfumes and garlands, food and drink, song and music, and women (Verses 2 to 9).

Whatever fruit he desires, and whatever he wishes to have, by his mere, will, come up and in possession of them he is respected (verse 10).

Section 3

These unchanging divine qualities are hidden by *anrita* (one's¹ *karma* covers them, though they exist and do not change. For whoever belonging to one departs from hence, it is not possible for him to see him her (verse 1).

Next, those that belong to him, and that live here or have gone from hence, and whatever² he desires and does not get, he attains all this on going to (the small ether). For it is here that these unchanging divine qualities are hidden from him by *antira* (his *karma*). As people, not knowing the gold treasure buried below, constantly go over the place, and do not get at it, in the same way all these people every³ day go to that *Brahma* goal and do not reach Him; for by their *karma* thier nature has been changed (verse 2).

This *Ātmā* is in⁴ the heart. This is the etymological⁵ explanation of the word *hridayam* (heart), that "He is in the heart - *Hridi* and *ayam*". Hence the term *hridayam* (heart). One who daily so meditates reaches *svarga*⁶ the fruit (verse 3).

¹ *Ritam* is good deeds (see *katha* - III-1) and in the case of those aspiring for release it denotes a deed done as the worship of *brahma* and without any thought of its fruit. *Anrita*, the term used in the original, means something other than *rita*. hence the term means the *karma* of wordly men.

² This clause has the same meaning as the parallel clause in section 1, verse 3 It refers to the highest degree of enjoyment.

³ They go in their deep sleep (compare with *chāndogya*, VI-1) In this case there is no going over *Brahma* as in the example for the sleeper is united to Him. Another interpretation is that they go over *Brahma* who is within as their inner ruler. In this case the illustration will not prove the small ether to be *Brahma* for the small ether dwells in the mediators heart in order to help him, while the inner ruler is his support. Though the two forms thus differ, the point is the same. Both interpretations are therefore acceptable.

⁴ The presence of *brahma* in the heart, already stated is recalled to memory.

⁵ This fact also appears from the derivation of the term *hridayam*

⁶ This means the fruit which gives enjoyment and not the *svarga* presided over by the *Indra*. For one that meditates on *Brahma* should go to Him only.

“This¹ *jeeva*² rises from this body, and reaching the highest Light, appears in his true form. He (the highest³ Light) is *Ātmā*”, said he, “He is freedom from death; freedom from fear. He is *brahma*. The name of this *Brahma* is *satyam*” (verse 4).

(For it consists of) three letters :- *sat ti yam*” Sat is immortal:⁴ *ti* is perishable; *yam* controls both that are perceived to be immortal and perishable. Because He controls both so perceived, He is *yam*. One who daily mediates thus reaches *svarga*, the fruit (verse 5).

Section 4

This *Ātmā* is a protective bund (*setu*), to prevent these worlds from being confounded⁵. Him night and day do not touch;⁶ no old age; no death; no grief; no good deeds; no evil deeds; all depart from Him. For this *Brahma* fruit is free from all evil (verse 1).

Hence, on reaching this bund the blind ceases to be blind; the wounded ceases to be wounded; the fever-stricken ceases to be fever-stricken. Hence also on reaching this bund, night becomes day indeed’ for this *Brahma*-world is lighted up once for all (verse 2).

To those alone, that know this *Brahma*-world, practising abstinence from all thought of women, belongs this *Brahma*-world; and they can wander at pleasure in all the worlds (verse 3).

Section 5

Abstinence from all thought of women is praised as being the means to the attainment of *Brahma-loka*.

¹ This explains how *Brahma* is reached and what happens to one on reaching Him.

² The term *samprasada* in the original denotes the place of deep sleep; by his connection with it the *jeeva* is referred to here. For it is the *jeeva* that was referred to in the last sentence of the preceding verse.

³ The three terms ‘he’ refer to the highest Light, as being nearest, and as being the more prominent as the object to be attained.

⁴ This and the word perishable refer to the *jeeva* and matter.

⁵ Earth has the property smell water coldness; and fire heat. They are the peculiar characters of these substances. If *Brahma* did not keep each in its place by His will, this arrangement would cease, and there would be confusion.

⁶ In order to limit Him in any way.

SUB SECTION 6

Katha - Chapter IV

Purusha, the controller of the¹ past and the future, dwells in the middle of the mediator's body in a form of the size of the thumb. Hence He does not shrink (from the faults of the body (verse 12).

Purusha the controller of the past and the future, and of the size of the thumb, is like a fire² without smoke. He alone is what exists to-day; He alone is what will exist to-morrow (verse 13).

Chapter V

The sun does not shine there (*i.e.*, by His side); nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings. How can this fire shine? When He shines, everything shines after Him. By His light all³ this shines (verse 15).

Chapter VI

Whatever stands⁴ in and comes forth from *Prāṇa* (*Brahma*) *i.e.*, all this world, shakes from great⁵ fear of Him⁶ as from the raised *vajra*. Those that meditate on this become immortal (verse 2).

Agni (fire) heats from fear of Him; the sun heats from fear; from fear *Indra* and *vayu* (do their duties); death, the fifth, runs (on his errand) (verse 3);

SUB SECTION 8

Chāndogya III - Section I

The sun is the honey of the *devas*; heaven is the cross beam; the intermediate world is the honey - comb (hanging from it); watery vapours are the eggs of the bees (verse 1).

1 The controller of all existing in the past, in the present or in the future, including both the *jeeva* and material products.

2 Shines like a fire kindled with dry fuel.

3 All this is controlled by Him.

4 This is supplied with reference to the term *prāṇa*, which has the ending of the seventh case.

5 These two words have the endings of the first case in the place of the fifth case. This remark applies also to the words raised and *vajra*. This is the principal weapon of *Indra*..

6 The question arises - fear of whom *Reply* - Reference is made to what is stated here - *prāṇa*.

The eastern rays of the sun are the honey - cells on the east; *rik* verses are the bees' the *rik veda* is the flower; the essence of the offerings is the honey drop (Verse 2).

The *rik* verses warmed the *rik veda*; from it thus warmed came forth honey in the form of fame, bright countenance, vigour of the senses, strength of body and food (verse 3).

The honey flowed forth, and going to the sun settled round him. That is the red colour of the sun (verse 4).

Section 2 to 5

These are similar to section 1, with the following variations:

In section 2 read *yajur* for *rik*; south for east; white colour for red colour.

In section 3 read *sāman* for *rik*; west for east dark colour for red colour.

In section 4 read *atharva angiras* for *rik* verses; north for east; very dark colour for red colour. Also *itihasa* and *purana* are the flowers.

In section 5 read secret doctrines for *rik* verses; upward for east; what appears to move in the middle; for red colour. Also *Brahma* is the flower.

At the end of section - 5 'These honeys are the honey of honey; for the *vedas* are honey and these are the essence of them. These are the nectars of nectars;' for the *vedas* are the nectar, and these are the essence of them (Verse 4).

Section 6

What is the first nectar, the *vasus*² live by it with *agni* (fire) as their mouth. The *devas* do not eat or drink; they see this nectar and are satisfied (verse 1).

They enjoy that (red) colour, and sit still; (when the time for enjoyment comes round), they rise eagerly to enjoy it (verse 2).

Whoever thus meditates on this nectar becomes one of the *vasus*; and seeing this nectar with *agni*, as the mouth, he is satisfied. He enjoys that (red) colour and sits still; when the time for enjoyment comes round; he rises eagerly to enjoy it (verse 3).

As long as the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, so long will he enjoy supremacy among the *vasus*, and his will not be frustrated (verse 4).

¹ The offerings enjoined by the *rik veda*

² The term *vasus*, *rudras*, *adityas*, *maruts* and *sādhyas* indicate groups of *devas* with prescribed functions.

Section 7 to 10

These are similar to section 6, with the following variations;

In section 7 read *rudras* for *vasus*; *Indra* for *agni*. The period of enjoyment will be twice the time mentioned in section 6, assuming the sun to rise in the south and set in the north.

In section 8 read *adityas* for *vasus*; *varuṇa* for *agni*. The period of enjoyment will be twice the time mentioned in section 7 assuming the sun to rise in the west and set in the east.

In section 9 read *maruts* for *vasus*; *soma* for *agni*. The period of enjoyment will be twice the time mentioned in section 8, assuming the sun to rise in the north and set in the south.

In Section 10 read *sadhyas* for *vasus*; *Brahma* for *agni*. The period of enjoyment will be twice the time mentioned in section 9, assuming the sun to rise above and set below.

Section 11

After that (end of the *kalpa* or day of the four faced being) the sun, having risen, will neither rise nor set. He will ever be of the same nature, and will remain unconcerned. On this there is this verse (verse 1).

Then he neither rises nor sets at any time. *Ye Devas*, may I never quarrel with that unchanging *Brahma* (verse 2).

When one thus meditates (i.e., practises) on this *brahma*, *vidyā*, for him the sun does not rise or set; for him there is day once and for all (verse 3).

SUB SECTION 9*Chāndogya IV - Section 1*

There lived a prince named *janasruti* the son of *Pautra*; he gave with love, and gave freely and fed many people in his house. He built places of shelter everywhere, so that people might come from all places and eat his food. One night some swans flew over his place, of which one said to another¹ Hey ! large eyed friend. Janasruthi's light (fame) has spread like day light; do not touch it, lest it should burn you² (verses 1 and 2).

¹ The swans were two great men, who were pleased with the liberality of *Jansruti*, and who desired to create in him a longing to know *Brahma*.

² Thus one of them praised *Jānaśruti*.

The other replied 'Friend, what is the greatness of this man, who is this, that you praise him, ¹ as if he were *Raikva* with the cart'. The first asked "How is that *Raikva* with the cart, whom you mention' (verse 3).

The other replied ".....whatever good deeds people do are included among his good deeds; whatever he knows, that only others know. Such a person was mentioned by me" (verse)

The moment he left his bed in the morning, *Janasruti*, who had overheard the conversation,² sent the palace guard to find out where *Raikva* was (verses 5 to 8).

He then went to him with presents, and said "Revered sir, teach me the *devatā* on whom you mediate" (verses 1 and 2). *Raikva* replied ;" The necklace and carriage O, *sudra* he with you along with the cow's." ³ *Janasruthi* returned with larger presents and with his daughter a marriageable girl (verse 3).

He said "*Raikva*, here are a thousand cows, a necklace, and a carriage with mules; here is a wife for you; this village, where you are. Revered sir! teach me" (verse 4).

Raikva accepting is presents, said "You have brought these things O *sudra*, and with this means you will make me speak" ⁴ . . . (verse 5).

Section 3

"*Vayu* (air) is *samvarga*⁵. When fire goes out, it goes into *vayu*; when the sun sets, it goes into *vayu*; when the moon sets, it goes into *vayu* (verse 1).

¹ The meaning is - "Why do you praise him, as if he were *Raikva*, who has knowledge of *Brahma*? *Raikva* alone who has knowledge of *brahma* is greater than others in the world, *Jānaśruti* is very liberal no doubt; but he does not know *Brahma*. What is his merit, the light from which will burn me like the *tejas* (light) of *Raikva*?

² This contained condemnation of himself for want of the knowledge of *brahma* and praise of *Raikva* for possession of this knowledge.

³ The reason why *Raikva* did not accept the presents was this. Knowledge of *brahma* should be imparted by a teacher to a disciple only after long service. Only then will the disciple know its value and retain it in full. *Janasruti* could not brook delay, and wished to make up for long service by making presents. *Raikva* was of opinion that if *Jansruti* gave as much as he could, the instruction would be firmly retained. He accordingly did not accept what was brought to him, as it did not answer this description.

⁴ You have brought me these things so far so you are able to do; with this means, and without rendering long service you will make me speak to you on the subject that is in your heart, viz to teach you about *Brahma*.

⁵ The meaning is that *vāyu* should be meditated on as possessing the attribute - taking everything into himself so as to become one with him. *Vayu* refers to *Brahma*

When water dries up, it goes into *vayu*; for *vayu* alone takes all these things into himself. This is the *samvarga* among the *devas* (Vese 2).

Next, as to the *samvarga* ; among the instruments of the body. *Prāṇa* is *samvarga*. When a person sleeps, speech goes into *prāṇa*; the mind goes into *prāṇa* for *prana* alone takes all these things into itself (verself 3).

Both these are *samvarga* *vayu* among the *devas* *prāṇa* among the senses (verses 4)".

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As *Saunaka Kapeya* and *Abhipratārin Kakshaseni* were being served with food, a student begged of them. They did not give him (verse 5)".

The student said "One *deva* - *Brahma* (the four faced one) and the guardian of the world, swallowed four¹ great ones. Oh, *Kāpeya*, Oh *Abhipratārin*, mortals don't see him, who appears in various forms. To him, whose food this is, it has not been given" (verse 6).

Then *Kapeya* pondered over this speech, and going up to him said "He (the being that swallowed the four) is the ruler of the *devas*, and the creator of beings, and has beautiful teeth. He destroys (the *asuras*) and is omniscient. His greatness is said to be of a high order, in that without being eaten, he eats things other than food. Student, we do not meditate on the being you mention. Give him food (addressing the servants)" (verse 7).

They gave him (food) Those² five, these other five form ten. That is *Kṛita*³ Hence being marked by the number ten, it becomes the food found in all directions. it is *virat*,⁴ and the eater of food. With ⁵ this all this (in the the directions) is seen. By one, that meditates in this manner, all this is seen, he becomes an eater of food (verse 8).

in the form of *vāyu* for *brahma-vidyā* was praised at the outset, and the marks to be mentioned will not apply to anything else.

¹ The same remark apply to this also.

² These are the four swallowed by *vāyu* and the four swallowed by *prāṇa*. The *deva* appearing as *vāyu* and as *prāṇa* swallowed them.

³ *Vāyu* and the four swallowed by him. These five are *prāṇa* and the four swallowed by it.

⁴ The ten should be meditated on as *Kṛita Kṛita* is a term used in the game of dice, and denotes four things marked by the numbers one two three and four - all of which make up ten.

⁵ It should be meditated on in these two points; *virat* is a metre containing ten syllables in each foot.

⁶ By this meditation

Section 4

One *satyakāma Jābāla* went to a teacher, and said that he would be his disciple. The teacher asked him what his *gotra*¹ was. He replied that he had put the same question to his mother; and he then repeated her reply "In my husband I was wholly engrossed in the service of his parents and of his guests without knowing the *gotra*. You were born, when I was young. My name is *Jābāla* and your name is *satyakāma*" (verse 1 to 4). The teacher said "These words one other than a *brāhmaṇa* is not fit to state explicitly. Bring me fuel for the sacred fire, my dear; I will do the *upanyana* ceremony for you; you haven't deviated from the truth". He did the ceremony; and selecting four hundred from among his cows, that were very lean and very weak, he asked the disciple to take them to a jungle. He added that he should not return till the number had risen to a thousand. The disciple remained there many years till this condition was fulfilled.

Section 5

Then a bull addressed him and said "We have become a thousand; take us to the teacher's house (verse 1).

The bull offered to teach him the feet of *brahma* and he agreed. The bull said "The east is one part; the west is one part; the south is one part thenorth is one part. This, my dear, is a foot² of *Brahma* of four parts; its name is *prākāśavam* - one that has light (verse 2).

He, that thus knows the foot of *Brahma* of four parts, and meditates on it as the possessor of light, shines in this world, and wins shining worlds (verse 3).

Section 6 to 8

These are exactly similar, the variations being as follows.

In section 6 the teacher was his sacred fire;³ the four parts of the second foot were - earth, intermediate world, heaven and ocean, name *anantavan* - without an end; fruit to be reaped by the meditation - becoming

¹ The name of a seer from whom one is descended.

² Each foot of a cow of bull has four parts - the cloven hoof in front are two parts, and two parts are behind them. Similarly *Brahma* has four feet, each foot consisting of four parts. Meditation should be that the four directions form one foot of *Brahma* and that it bears the name described.

³ These teachers - the bull, the fire the swan, the water bird- were four *devatās* who appeared in those forms to teach him; for they were pleased with the care that he bestowed on his teacher's cattle.

one without end, i.e., unconquerable in this world and winning imperishable worlds.

In *section 7* the teacher was a swan; the four parts of the third foot, were fire, the sun, the moon and lightening; name *jyotishman* - the possessor of light; fruit to be reaped by the meditation - becoming bright in this world. and winning bright worlds.

In *section 8* the teacher was a water-bird; the four parts of the fourth foot were - *prāṇa* eye ear and mind; name *ayatanavan-* having a support; the fruit to be reaped by meditation -having a support in this world and winning worlds giving room to all.

Satyakāma returned to his teacher, who said "You shines as if you meditate on *Brahma*. Who taught you?" He stated what had happened, and requested the teacher to teach him, if he pleased; for the *vidyā* known from a teacher alone is the best. The teacher complied with his request and taught him the very same thing.

SUB SECTION 10

Chāndogya VIII - Section 7

The following statement was current as having been made by *Prajāpati* - "The *Ātmā* who is free from *Karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, who has unchanging objects of desire and whose will is never frustrated, should be sought and should be meditated on. he, that knows him and meditates on him attains all the worlds, and all objects of desire" (verse 1).

This was heard by both the *devas* and the *asuras*; and *Indra* among the former and *Virochana* among the later went to *Prajāpati* for instruction without mutual arrangement. The teacher asked them to live the life of a student for thirty-two years, at the end of which he spoke to them thus; "This *purusha*¹ that is seen in the eye, is the *Ātmā*; he is unlimited bliss; he is free from every touch of grief; he is great through his attribute *jnāna*"

¹ This does not refer to *Brahma* for further on the teacher states that he would again teach the very same, and refers to the *jeeva* in the dream deep sleep conditions. Nor does it refer to a reflection; for the students had come for instruction in regard to *Ātmā* and the three marks mentioned would be inapplicable to reflection. Hence, reference was made to the *jeeva* alone. The intention was not to affirm that the *jeeva* is in the eye. The eye was referred to as indicating the existence or the non-existence of the *jeeva* in the body by its appearance. As a person who dwells in a house and goes out of it is different from the house, so the *jiva* who is within the body, and goes out of it, is different from the body.

They thought that he referred to the reflection on the eye-ball, when one stands before the eye, and asked "Revered sir! What¹ is it, that is seen in water or in a mirror" (verses 2 to 4).

Section 8

To remove their misconception, the teacher asked them to look into a jar of water, first as they then were, and next after shaving (for they had allowed their hair and nails to grow during their life of discipline) and after putting on new clothing, and adorning themselves with sandal paste and flowers. They did so, but learnt nothing from this, Being of opinion that their minds were not ripe yet, he let the misconception remain. They departed and *Virochana* told the *asuras* that the body was the *Ātmā*, and that it should be adorned and served. it is owing to this that up to this day the *asuras* regard the body as the *Ātmā*.

Section 9

Indra on the way meditated on the reflection on the eye-ball and saw that it was not free from grief — the mark mentioned by the teacher; for the reflection appeared to be blind, if the body was blind; it appeared to have a running nose, or to be maimed; and it perished along with the body. He therefore returned and asked for instruction. The teacher asked him to lead a student's life for another thirty-two years, promising to describe the same *Ātmā* without the blemishes perceived by him.

Section 10

He said "He, who during dreams wanders, being respected, is the *Ātmā*; he is unlimited bliss; he is free from every touch of grief; he is great through his attribute *jñāna*". *Indra* departed; but again reflecting on this dreamer. he perceived that though the blemishes previously seen were absent, he appeared to be killed, to be driven by another, to see unwelcome things as the death of relations, or to weep. He thought that there was no good in the dreamer, and again returned. The teacher agreed with him and asked him to remain a student for yet another thirty-two years.

Section 11

He said "He is the *Ātmā*, who sleeps with all the senses withdrawn, without being agitated by contact with outside objects, and without seeing

¹ Being under the impression stated, they wished to obtain confirmation, and to know whether the reflection in water or in a mirror was the same as the reflection on the eye-ball or different from it.

dreams; he is unlimited bliss; he is free from every touch of grief; he is great through his attribute *jñāna*” *Indra* departed; but again reflecting on the sleeper, he saw that the sleeper did not then know himself, nor these beings; and that he appeared to have perished. he saw no good in the sleeper, and again returned. The teacher agreed with him, and asked him to remain a student for five years only.

Section 12

He then taught him as follows: “This body alone is perishable; it is surrounded by death. It is supported by this *Ātmā*, who does not die, and who has no body.² One, that is in a body, is caught by welcome and unwelcome things; from one in a body welcome and unwelcome things do not depart; and one that is without a body they do not touch (verse 1).

The air is without a body;³ these - cloud, lightning, thunder cloud - are without bodies. As they rise from⁴ that ether, reach the highest light, and appear in their natural forms in the very same way this *jeeva* rises from this body, reaches the⁵ highest Light, and appears in his natural form (Verse 2).

He⁶ is the best of all persons. The⁷ *jeeva* (on going thither) enjoys. Him all round; he eats, enjoys (as he please;) he amuses himself with women, carriages or cousins. He does not think⁸ of this body, lying by the side of

¹ Its nature is such that it is ever liable to die. This point is mentioned in order that it may be meditated on as an object fit to be abandoned.

² This means that in his true nature he is without a body made for him by *karma*. It has been taken by the *Ātmā* for enjoyment. The getting rid of a body of this kind is his release.

³ A body consisting of a head, hands and the like. They are without bodies and do not meet with welcome or unwelcome things.

⁴ The rising in the case of these is to go to the higher regions; the highest light is the condition from which their present conditions evolved; and it is referred to as light, as it led to the present conditions and made them perceptible. In other words, they abandon their present conditions, resume their previous conditions, and appear in those forms.

⁵ The *jeeva* goes up by a particular path to a particular place known as the highest heaven, reaches *Brahma* and appears in a form similar to His form.

⁶ The highest Light to be reached. The term cannot refer to the *jeeva* who reaches Him as this attribute will be inapplicable, and as the following clauses cannot then convey their natural meaning.

⁷ The *jeeva* who reaches Him.

⁸ Being all knowing he cannot but recall the body to his mind, but while he regarded it as an entity not depending upon *Brahma* and as an unpleasant object, he does not do so now.

(weeping) relatives. As a¹ bull or horse is yoked to a cart, in the very same way this *jeeva* ² (*prāṇa*) is yoked to this body (verse 3).

Next the eye³ connected with whom as his instrument, shows the colour of objects, he the owner of the instrument - eye- is the *Ātmā*, the eye is for seeing. Next he who perceives I smell this, is the *Ātmā*; the nose is for smelling. Next he who perceives I eat this, is the *Ātmā* the tongue is for eating, next he who perceives "I hear this is the *Ātmā* ;" the ear is for hearing (verse 4).

Next, he who perceives "I think of this" is the *Ātmā*; the mind is his divine⁴ eye. He sees with this divine eye.viz the mind⁵ - these divine qualities,⁶ which are in the *Brahma* - world and rejoices (Verse 5).

This *Ātmā* the *devas* ⁷ meditate on; therefore are attained by them all the worlds, and all divine qualities. He attains all the worlds and all the divine qualities. who knows this *Ātmā* and meditates on him. Thus⁸ did *Prajāpati* teach (verse 6).

Section 13

After meditating⁹ on *Brahma* as possessing a blue form I meditate on Him as appearing in the form of the *jeeva* or of matter. After meditating on

¹ If the *Ātmā* be without a body, how was his previous condition brought about? The verse replies: The bull or horse is yoked to the cart with cords; the *Ātmā* is yoked to the body with *karma*. This illustration also shows that the *jeevas* is other than the body.

² The *jeeva* is referred to as *prāṇa* as it was associated with him till he quitted the last material body.

³ The eye, the colour, and the *Ātmā* are respectively the instrument, the object known, and the knower. The *Ātmā* is therefore other than the eye.

⁴ So called as the mind is the means of the *jeeva*'s thinking of the objects of all the senses.

⁵ Here reference is made to the *jeeva* attribute *jnāna*. which belongs to him by nature.

⁶ The qualities of *brahma* the small ether, as taught in section 1 to 5.

⁷ For *indra*, receiving instruction from *Prajāpati* taught the *devas*.

⁸ This *vidyā* taught by *prajāpati* is known as *prajāpati vidyā* and as it is subsidiary to *dahara-vidyā* (meditation on the small ether) the fruit of the latter is stated here. The question whether this *vidyā* relates to the small *ethar-vidyā* only or to all *vidyās* is discussed in appendix 3.

⁹ The term *syamat* in the original refers to the blue figure of *Brahma*, which is His natural form. The ending of the fifth case does the work of a past participle. Hence the translation. This and the next verse are to be recited by mediators as part of the meditation.

Him as appearing in the form of the *jeeva* or of matter I meditate on Him as possessing a blue form. Shaking off *karma* as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rahu* (in an eclipse) throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma*-world, the purpose of my life having been attained (Verse 1).

Section 14

Ākāṣa (Ether), known as the maker of name and form, as being between¹ them, is *Brahma*; He is unlimited bliss; He is *Ātmā*. I will reach the hall of *Brahma*; I am the *Ātmā*² of *Brāhmaṇas*; the *Ātmā* of kings; the *Ātmā* of *vaisyas*; I have attained³ *yasas*, i.e., *Brahma* as my *Ātmā*; I am therefore the *Ātmā*; I am therefore the *Ātmā* of all *jeevas* May I not reach the sex organ of a woman, which swallows up the white⁴ semen of man (verse).

¹ As being untouched by them.

² The original has the word *yasas* which means fame. Here it denotes an *Ātmā*. The term 'I' denotes *Brahma* the inner ruler of the 'i'.

³ This explains the previous statements. Attained i.e., perceived vividly in meditation. He has therefore identified himself with *Brahma*, being His inseparable attribute, standing to Him in the relation of body to an *Ātmā*.

⁴ The original has "the white thing which eats up the white thing". The second white thing is the *satva guna* and its effect - clear perception. This is swallowed up by the first white thing, which is the semen of man; as sexual intercourse is opposed to the *satva* quality and is effect-clear perception.

CHAPTER I

SECTION 4 SUB SECTION 1

Kathavalli - 3

Verse 3 and those that follow describe the help needed by meditation in reaching the highest place, which forms the father end of the path of *samsara*.

Know the *Ātmā* as owner and ruler of the chariot; the body as the chariot; *buddhi* ¹ as the charioteer; and the mind as the reins (verse 3).

The senses are said to be horses; the objects which appeal to them to be roads. When united to the body, the senses and the mind,² the *Ātmā* is said by the wise to be enjoyer³ (verse 4).

When⁴ one has not a good conviction and his mind is never controlled, his senses are unmanageable, like vicious horses of a charioteer (verse 5).

When⁵ he has a good conviction and his mind is ever under control, his senses are manageable, like good horses of a charioteer (Verse 6).

When one has not a good conviction, his mind is never under control, and he is therefore ever impure;⁶ he does not reach that well-known goal; on the other hand he reaches *samsara* (verses 7).

But when one has a good conviction, his mind is ever under control, and he is therefore pure; he reaches the well-known goal, whence he is not born again (verse 8).

But⁷ the man who has control over *buddhi*, the charioteer, and who firmly holds the mind, the reins, reaches, that well-known end of the road - viz, *Vishnu*, the highest goal (Verse 9).

¹ This means conviction; it is compared to the charioteer, as the actions of the body are dependent on conviction.

² This should be taken to include *buddhi* also.

³ This means that left to himself, the *Ātmā*, neither acts nor enjoys.

⁴ This verse shows the purpose in making this comparison.

⁵ The effect of controlling the senses and of the reverse is stated in this and next verses.

⁶ Because he is ever thinking of other things; and not of what will lead him to the true goal.

⁷ This states what that well-known goal is

The¹ objects are ² more powerful than the senses; the mind³ is more powerful than the objects; more powerful than the mind is *buddhi* more powerful than *buddhi* is great⁴ *Ātmā* (verse 10).

More powerful than the great (*Ātmā*) is *avyakta*;⁵ more powerful than *avyakta* is *purusha*⁶. There is nothing more powerful than *Purusha*; he is the last;⁷ He is the highest goal (verse 11).

This *Purusha* who abides in all beings as their inner ruler, does not shine,⁸ being hidden.⁹ But He is seen by those capable of perceiving subtle things, with a mind, turned away from every other activity, and fixed upon one object only, which then acquires the capacity to perceive subtle things (verse 12).

A wise¹⁰ man should place speech¹¹ under the control¹² of the mind; that should be placed under the control of¹³ *buddhi* in regard to the *Ātmā*; *buddhi* should be placed under the control of the great¹⁴ *Ātmā*; he should be placed under the control of the *Ātmā*¹⁵ free from the six evils (verse 13).

¹ The next two verse state which among the things mentioned in the preceding verses need greater effort in control, and are therefore more powerful than the others.

² For, when they are present, the mind, previously subdued, gets out of control.

³ For, when the mind turns towards objects, their absence counts for nothing.

⁴ For, he is the actor; i.e., he knows desires and resolves. As all the others depend upon the desire of the *Ātmā* the epithet great is applied to him.

⁵ This will be shown in the sub section noted at the head to denote the body. It is more powerful than the *Ātmā* for all his activities depend upon the body.

⁶ *Parama Ātmā* or highest *Ātmā*; and He is more powerful than the body, as activities of all up to the *Ātmā* depend upon. His wil;. As inner ruler, it is He that helps in the perfection of meditation.

⁷ Among those to be controlled. His control is by appealing to Him for help.

⁸ To those that have not controlled their senses and mind.

⁹ Hidden by matter with its three gunas. By this the man of the world is blinded.

¹⁰ This verse shows how the mind can be turned away from every other activity.

¹¹ This should be taken to represent the other motor organs and all the senses.

¹² This means that they should be turned away from activities, which are not in consonance with the activity of the mind.

¹³ This means that the activity of the mind should be in consonance with conviction.

¹⁴ *Buddhi* is the conviction that sense objects are things to be neglected and abandoned. Placing it under the control of the *Ātmā* means the adding to this conviction the further conviction that the *Ātmā* alone should be sought, and seen.

¹⁵ Placing the *Ātmā* under the control of *Ātmā* means to revolve in the mind the relationship of the *jeeva* to *Brahma* as master and servant.

Rise;¹ awake;² reaching good teachers,³ learn Seers describe the *Ātmā* to be a difficult road, for He is the sharp edge of a razor difficult to walk on (verse 14).

Meditating⁴ on Him one is released from the jaws of death, Him who is ever without sound, ever without touch, ever without colour, and therefore ever without decay; who similarly is ever without taste, every without smell, who is ever without beginning or end; who is greater than the great *Ātmā* and is unchangeable (Verse 15).

The last two verses praise the instruction imparted⁵ by Death to *Nachiketas*

SUB SECTION 2

Svetasvatara - Chapter IV

This *upanishad* establishes the conclusion that *Brahma* is other than all others - the *jeevas* and matter; and in the fourth chapter it describes in some detail that he is every kind of cause of the universe. It begins with the following prayer; "May that⁶ one sound, which denoting *Brahma*, becomes many,⁷ which in the beginning creates all other sounds, and which the end destroys the whole of the universe, may that *Deva*⁸ unite us with pure knowledge of Himself: (verse 1). The next three verses state Him to be the inner ruler of all - "He alone is *agni* (fire); He is the sun; He is *vayu*; he alone is the moon; He alone is the starry sphere; He is *Brahma*; he is water; he is *Prajāpati* (Verse 2).

¹ This verse draws attention to the subject of persons who are fit for the path. The first injunction means turn towards the knowledge of the *Ātmā*.

² Destroy the sleep of ignorance.

³ This may also mean obtaining boons either from *Brahma* or from those that meditate on Him, as the seer *Parasara* is said to have done.

⁴ The subject is brought to a close in this verse.

⁵ The original has the word *proktam*, which means that Death merely repeated what previously existed, and that it was not a thing, which he taught of his own motion. For the instruction is eternal, being handed down from teacher to student in an unbroken stream.

⁶ The second 'a' in the *sanskrit* alphabet. It denotes *Brahma*.

⁷ By contract with the throat, the palate, the tongue and the lips, it evolves other sounds.

⁸ The sound is a here identified with what it denotes from its relationship to Him as the denoter and the denoted.

“You are women you are man; you are boy; you are girl; being old,. you go about with a stick; you alone are born in many forms (verse 3)

“You are the insects, blue green and red-eyed; you are the cloud with lightning in its womb; you are the seasons; you are the oceans; you have had no beginning you pervade everything as its inner ruler; from you all the worlds have come forth” (verse 4). Then comes the verses, which is for consideration in this sub-section; “One¹ unborn, red, dark, and white, and producing numerous progeny like herself, one² unborn attends on her and following her, he remains, another, unborn, having enjoyed her, abandons her³ (verse 5).

The next two verses are repetitions of verses 1 and 2 of *mundaka* chapter III, Section I, “That indestructible Being, to describe whom is the real intention of *rik* verses and other parts of the *veda* and by whom all the *devas* stand supported, what is one going to do with the *rik*, *Veda*, who does not know Him. Those that know him, live happy (verse 8).

“The⁴ *vedas* and what they describe - *yajnas*, *Kratus*, *vratas*, those that existed and those that will come into being - all this the owner of *maya* creates from, this and one other than He is confined within it (verse 9).

“Know *maya* to be *prakriti*, and Him who has the *maya* to be the great Ruler. By what are the parts of Him all this world is pervaded” (verse 10).

¹ This verse repeats the distinction already made in the previous chapters between the *jeeva* and matter. One unborn is matter; its three colours represent its three qualities, which become manifest in its products; the progeny is its products.

² This is about *jeeva*; the “another” is also a *jeeva*, who has become fit for release.

³ This objection may be raised to this interpretation; The verse, as it is refers to a she-goat which was followed by two he – goats one of which remains with it, and the other leaves it. If it be considered that this statement would be unsuitable to the context, then the words *aja* and *aja* may be understood secondary sense to denote matter and the *jeevas*. Reply Owing to its unsuitability the meaning by recognised usage should give place to the meaning by etymology; and while a primary meaning is available, (which the meaning by derivation is), resort to a secondary meaning is not warranted. Further if the term *aja* be taken to denote a she-goat the clause “producing numerous progeny etc..”, should have a limited scope for she-goat does not, like matter, produce all beings.

⁴ These verses show that though there is no difference between the *jeevas* and *Brahma* in the matter of being connected with matter, the experiencing of the fruit of *karma* pertains to the former, and not to the latter.

Bṛihad āraṇyaka IV - Section 2

The object of this section is to show that the *jeeva* is often denoted by the term *prāṇa* as he is never without *prāṇa*. It begins with the following parable; "He who meditates on the young one along with the womb which contained it, with the place of its birth, with the post to which, and the rope with which, it is tied, subdues seven generations of enemies". The *upanishad* proceeds to explain the meaning; "The young one is *prāṇa*, which is in the middle of the body; its womb is the heart; the place of its birth is the body; the¹ post is the *jeeva*; the rope is food (verse 1).

The second verse states that seven imperishable *devatās* attend upon *prāṇa*, which is mounted on the eye; "Of them *Rudra* through the red streaks on the eye; *Parjanaya* through the tears; the sun through the capacity to see in the form of light; *agni* (fire) through the dark colour; *Indra* through the white colour heaven through the upper eye-lashes; earth through the lower eye-lashes. To one that thus meditates food does not diminish (verse 2).

"On this there is this verse -"There is a cup with its mouth below, and its bottom above, in it is placed *yasaḥ* of many forms; near it seven seers are seated; the tongue is the eighth conversing with *Brahma*. The sentence "There is a cup . . . above" refers to the head; for it is a drinking vessel (*chamasa*) with the mouth below, and with the bottom above. The sentence "In it . . . forms" refers to *prāṇa* for *prāṇa* is *yasas* of many² forms. The sentence "near it . . . seers" refers to the senses; for they are the seers. The sentence "the tongue . . . *Brahma*" refers to the tongue³ conversing with *brahma* as the eighth (verse 3).

This verse shows who are the seven seers. They are *Gautama*, *Bharadvaja*, *Visvamitra*, *Jamadagni*, *Vasishta*, *Kasyapa* and *Atri*; and are connected with the two ears, the two eyes, the two nostrils and the tongue. One takes his food with the tongue, it is therefore called *Atri* for it⁴ eats. He that thus meditates eats everything; forms his food (verse 4).

¹ As, a calf, when yeaned, is tied to a post with a rope so *prāṇa* has the heart as its place of origin; it pervades the whole of the body; and it is united to *ajeeva* with the food that he consumes.

² For *Prāṇa* has five activities; and as *yasas* i.e., fame-spreads all round, *prāṇa* placed in the face pervades the whole of the body.

³ Here *Brahma* is either the creative agent or the *veda*. The tongue is the seventh in the form as eater; it has another form also as the reciter of the *veda* and in this form it is the eighth.

⁴ The term *Atri* is understood as meaning one that eats *ad* (eating) *plus tri* (the agent).

SUB SECTION 3

Bṛihad āraṇyaka VI - Sections 3 and 4

Yajnavalkya went to king *Janaka* with the resolution that he would not teach him anything about the *Ātmā*. he conversed with *Janaka* on the subject of *agnihotra* - the daily offering to *agni* (fire) - and was so pleased with his knowledge that he gave him boon. *Janaka* said that he would ask what he wished to know, and the other agreed. The king asked by what light one was guided. *Yajnavalkya* replied thus; by the sun in its absence - i.e, at night - by the moon; on a dark night by a lamp; and when even this was not available, by speech, for when one says 'I am here' another hearing him, approaches him. The king asked how one was guided when speech was silent, and this introduced the question of dreaming and sleeping. The remaining verses may be grouped as follows:

(i) Section 3, verses 6 to 18 deal with the dreaming condition of the *jeeva*;

(ii) Ibid - verse 19 to 34 with the deep sleep condition.

(iii) Ibid - verses 35 to 38 Section 4, verses 1 to 15 with the *jeevas* departure from the body, and the difference between bound *jeevas* and one on the road to liberation.

(iv) Ibid - verses 16 to 22 with meditation on *brahma*

(v) Ibid- Verses 22 to the end with the helps to meditation.

The verses dealing with the fourth subject are translated here:

That below whom the year with its days limits life, on that Being, who is the light of lights, who is life, who is immortality, the *devas* ¹ meditate (verse 16).

That on whom the five *pancha-janas*² and *ether*³ rest, another⁴ that thus meditates on this *Ātmā* as *Brahma*, as immortality, becomes immortal (verse 17).

¹ This means that the *devas* meditate on Him alone. It cannot mean that the *devas* alone meditate on Him; for men also meditate on Him.

² This term will be explained in this sub-section to mean the senses. Verse 16 mentions the light of lights, and we wish to know what the term 'lights' means. The next verse has five *pancha-janas*, and we wish to know what is meant by the term *pancha jana*. We connect the two verses, and learn that the lights are five; and that the lights numbering five must be the senses; for no other lights are known to number five. And *Pancha-janas* are the senses.

³ This includes the other elements.

⁴ Other than the *devas* mentioned in the preceding verse. Reference is therefore made to men.

Those that¹ know the *Ātmā* to be the *prāṇa* of *prāṇa*² the eye, of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind,³ have known in truth the ancient highest *Brahma* (verse 18).

After (hearing⁴ and thinking) meditation⁵ should be acquired by a (pure) mind alone. In this (*Brahma*) there is no difference⁶ whatever, one that suspects even a small⁷ difference in Him attains *Samsara*⁸ after *samsara* (verse 19).

This unlimited, unmoving *brahma* (the *Ātmā* of all beings) should be meditated on as possessing oneness. This great *Ātmā* is free from all blemishes; greater than matter; without birth; without death (verse 20).

One, that has learnt the *veda* and knows the truth, should after hearing the thinking meditate on Him alone. He should not think of many words;⁹ that only dries¹⁰ up the tongue (Verse 21).

He that was described as the great, unborn, *Ātmā* (in verse 20) remains in the *jeeva*, who was referred to (in a previous verse)¹¹ as self-proved, as possessing¹² the attribute *vijnāna* (the capacity to see), and as dwelling

¹ This verse explains which are the five *pancha-janas*.

² By this term reference is made to the sense of touch; for *prāṇa*, the vital principle, is not reckoned as one of the senses. The sense of touch being nourished by *vāyu* (air) is referred to as *prāṇa* which is a modification of *vāyu*.

³ In the *mandhyandina* reading the words "the *anna* of *anna*" occur and they are inserted here. The term *anna* covers the sense of smell and the sense of taste; for *anna* food-nourishes the former sense; and the latter sense consumes food and is thus connected with it. These sense reveal the presence of objects. Similarly, *Brahma* reveals the senses by making them capable of revealing each its own objects. Hence He is denoted by the word light (see verse 16).

⁴ The meaning of the particle *anu* (after)

⁵ The original has the word 'see' (*drashtavya*) to show that the meditation should become as vivid as sense perception.

⁶ This removes the doubt how one *Ātmā* can support all the senses and all the elements ?

⁷ The meaning of the term *iva* in the original.

⁸ This means that he will be immersed in *samsāra*.

⁹ Words that do not describe the qualities of *Brahma*.

¹⁰ The only effect is to make one tired.

¹¹ Verse 7 of section 3.

¹² This shows that the *jeeva* is different from *vijnāna*, a point that is denied by the school of *Śankara*.

within the heart¹ among the senses. He has everyone² in His grip ; He controls everyone ; He is the lord of every one. He does not become great by a good deed ; He never becomes small by a bad deed ; He is the ruler of all ; He is the lord of beings ; He is the protector of beings ; He is the protector of beings ; He is the protective bund, that keeps these³ worlds from being confounded⁴ (verse 22).

SUB-SECTION 4

Bṛihad āraṇyaka III-Section 4

In this section *visrishti* - i.e., the evolution of heterogenous objects, and *atisrishti* i.e., the generation of *Sanaka* and other yogis are described, along with certain meditations on *Brahma*. It contains also evidence that the world-cause is also *Nārāyaṇa*.

"Before creation this was *Ātmā* only, who was in the form⁴ of a *puruṣa*. Looking round, He did not see⁵ anything other than Himself. He uttered the words 'I am' (*aham asmi*); from this the four-faced one with the name⁶ *aham* came forth . . . He (the *Ātmā*) is *Puruṣa*. For⁷ He was before all this, and He has burnt all evil . . . (verse 1).

The four-faced one grew to the size of a couple in embrace, and this he divided into two, of whom one was man, and the other was woman, the man being *Manu* and the woman *Satarupa*. They came together, men were formed. They then assumed the forms of cow, horse, sheep and goat, and created these beasts. In this manner they created every animal upto ants (verses 3 and 4).

¹ This shows that he is different also from the body and the senses.

² Including *Brahma* and *Rudra*. This refers to the support of the world by His will - one of the elements in the meaning of the term *Ātmā*. These qualities are particular varieties of the quality mentioned in the *chāndogya* (VIII-1-5), viz., possessing an unobstructed will. It may therefore be taken to represent the other qualities mentioned in the same place.

³ See note 5 to *chāndogya* VIII-4-1 on page 95.

⁴ This reminds one of the *ānandavalli*, in which this expression occurs.

⁵ Anything separated from Himself; for the *jeeva* and matter elements had become one with Him.

⁶ Being the first among the *vysahti jeevas*, who identify themselves with their bodies. *Vyashti jeevas* are embodied *jeevas*, who differ from one another by their names and forms.

⁷ *Puruṣa* - *Puruṣa*, meaning before and one that has burnt.

Then the four-faced one rubbed his face with his hands, and fire evolved. Through fire he evolved the *devas*, and this is known as *visrishti* evolution of individuals differing from one another. From his semen all liquids were formed; this liquid became the *soma juice*. Fire and *soma* are connected; for soma is offered into fire in *yāgas*. He then evolved superior *devas*, who never married, and who were full of knowledge and disgust for worldly objects. Their evolution is known as *atisrishti* i.e., superior evolution (verse 6).

Then follows the verse¹ which is for consideration in this sub-section. "Then this was *avyakrita*; the same² by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms, thus "It has this name and is of this form". Even at present³ objects appear possessing diverse names and forms, thus : 'It has this name ; it is of this form.' He has ⁴ entered into this (the universe) to the very tips of the finger nails, as a razor is put into a razor-case; as fire remains concealed in wood. He, that does not see this, is indeed imperfect.⁵

He⁶ breathes, and receives the name *prāṇa*⁷. He speaks and receives the name speech; He sees and receives the name eye; He hears and receives the name ear. He thinks and receives the name mind. These are His names indicative of his actions.

¹ The purpose of this verse is to remove the doubt, that one might entertain, that the *Ātmā*, who is one, could not have been the numerous objects indicated by the term 'this' It shows that this and other terms denote the *Ātmā*, who is present in those objects as their inner ruler. the term *Ātmā* shows the same Being as the inner ruler. The same objects in their undifferentiated condition. in which names and forms were absent. Hence *Ātmā* may be the universe. They are one in substance, and only differ in their conditions.

² The words 'by itself' is the rendering of the particle *eva* (only) which is connected with the word 'same' (*tad*), though in the text it is separated from it by the expression 'by name and form' for there being only one, there was no separate maker. Hence the verb 'was made' indicates both the agent and object known in grammar as *karma karatari*.

³ This is added to give an idea of the process, which took place long ages ago at the commencement of evolution.

⁴ This is to explain how *Ātmā* can be denoted by all names. He has entered as the inner ruler.

⁵ He is as, it were, non-existent.

⁶ This sentence shows the propriety in the *Ātmā* being denoted by all names.

⁷ The terms in the original are *prāṇa*, *vak*, *chakshus* *sotra* and *manas*; and they respectively by their etymology mean-one that breathes, one that speaks, one that sees, one that hears and one that thinks.

Hence,¹ he who meditates on one, that has one name and one form, does not mediate properly. For, he² is not full; he has one name and one form only. Meditate only in this manner - *Ātmā*,³ for in Him all these become one.⁴ This is His mark, that He is the *Ātmā* of all these; for by Him one known all this, as one finds (lost property) by the footsteps (of the thief). One that thus meditates attains fame and repute as a good man (verse 7).

The next verse states that *Ātmā* is dearer than son, friend, property or other thing; for He is nearer than all others. Hence, the injunction "Mediate only on *Ātmā*, the dearest. He, that meditates only on *Ātmā*, the dearest, does not lose his dear things" (verse 8).

The next verse asks - "Men know Him in order to become all⁵ with the help of *brahma-vidyā*. What being did He know,⁶ with whose grace He become all this (verse 9).

The reply is "Before creation this was *Brahma* alone. He knew⁷ only Himself thus - 'I am *Brahma*'. Hence He became everything." The fruit of knowing *Brahma* to be without another to be meditated on is this - whoever, among *devas*, seers, or men knew' this, realised *Brahma* as the inner ruler of himself and of everything else. An instance is given "the seer *Vamadeva* meditating on this realised "I was *Manu* ; also the sun". It is added that this result will happen even now; and that the *devas* will not be able to obstruct him; for he is their *Ātmā*.

¹ Because the *Ātmā* has all names and forms to abandon Him and meditate on another is not proper meditation.

² The person meditated on.

³ Do not meditate as the *Ātmā* of A or as the *Ātmā* of B. Meditates as *Ātmā* merely. By this means meditation on the *Ātmā* of all is secured.

⁴ As the bodies of the *Ātmā* not that they and the *Ātmā* are one substance; for what are non-intelligent cannot be the intelligent *Ātmā*. In regard to the *Ātmā* and body, as they do not exist separately, they are spoken of as one.

⁵ The word 'all refers to *Brahma*. The meaning is in order tht they may realise *brahma* as everything including themselves.

⁶ In other words the question is 'is there another other than *brahma* on whom he should meditate.

⁷ He did not know another as a subject for meditation. The intention is to deny meditation on another as the means; but not to affirm that meditation on Himself was the means, Compare with the next "There is not another who is His maker", which means that He is the highest cause. Similarly, by denying another as a subject for His meditation, His being the highest object of meditation is affirmed.

It is next shown that by not adopting this course one has to serve the *devas*, as a beast serves man; that there is this difference - many beasts serve one; while he serves many *devas*; and that they are jealous of men being taken away from their service by turning their attention to *Brahma*. If one beast is taken away from a person, he regards it as a loss; what would be his feeling, if many beasts be taken away. So with the *devas* in regard to men (verse 10).

Verse 11 to 15 describe the evolution of the four primary castes. It is sufficient to note that among the *devas* the following eight *devas* are *khattriyas* - *Indra*, *Varuṇa*, *Soma*, *Rudra*, *Parjanya*, *Yama*, *Mrityu* and *Isana*; and the following groups are *vaisyas* - *vasus*, *rudras*, *adityas*, *visve devas* and *maruts*.

The closing portion of verse 15 points to the need for meditating on *Brahma* as described. If one without meditating on his inner ruler departs from this world, He does not protect him, though He is his inner ruler; for He was not meditated on. The *veda* which has not been learnt, does not help, though it exists to help all, nor does *agnihotra* which has not been done. Similarly here. Even if he does a great good deed, it perishes indeed in the end. Hence the injunction "Let, one meditate on *Ātmā* alone, the *loka*". He is both the means and the goal. If one carries out this injunction, his meditation or the *karma* which helps it yields imperishable fruit. From this meditation he becomes able to create whatever he desires for himself (verse 15).

In the injunction the word *loka* was used in the sense of fruit or goal; it also means a place of enjoyment. The question arises how the *Ātmā* can be referred to as the place of enjoyment, and verse 16 explains how a person, if he be a householder, is the place to which all resort, and that the *Ātmā* may also be a *loka*. The person is resorted to by the *devas* when he makes offerings into the fire; by the seers, when he recites the *veda*; by the *pitris* when he offers them food or drink, or begets children; by men when he lodges guests and feeds them; by all animals, when they live on what he gives them or on what they get in his house (verse 16).

The *upanishad* closes, offering consolation to one that is wanting in anyone of the elements which everyone desires - wife, children, wealth, and good actions. His mind is himself; speech is his wife; *prāṇa* is his children; eye is human wealth, and ear is divine wealth; his body is action (verse 17).

SUB-SECTION 5

Kawshitaki .-Chapter, III

There was a well-read and well-known person named *Bālāki* who went to king *Ajatasatru* of *Kasi* and said "I will speak to you about *Brahma*. The

king agreed, and *Bālāki* said "That *purusha*¹ in the sun I meditate on." *Ajatasatru* interrupted him, saying that the mediated on the same, and that they need not waste their time on this point. *Bālāki* referred successively to the *purushas* in the moon, lightning, and thunder-cloud; to the *purushas* in the elements - ether, air, fire and water; to the *purusha* in the mirror, echo, sound and the shadow of man; to an embodied being in the waking condition; to the same in the dream condition; and to the *purushas* in the right and left eyes. He then became silent. *Ajatasatru* enquired whether he knew only so far; he replied 'only so far'. *Ajatasatru* rejoined "*Bālāki*, He who made these *purushas* whose this *karma* is should be meditated on". Then *Bālāki* returned to him with fuel in his hands, saying "I approach as a student". *Ajatasatru* dispensed with the *upanayana* ceremony and taught him as follows:

Ajatasatru went with him to a sleeper, whom he addressed thus 'Great² one, white-robed, soma, king'. He slept on without reply. He then pushed him with a stick, and he got³ up. *Ajatasatru* asked - "Where⁴ did this person sleep; then, *Bālāki*, where was he then; whence did he come forth". *Bālāki* did not know; *Ajatasatru* explained: "The blood vessels of the heart, known as *hitā* go from the heart to the *puritat*;⁵ as minute as a thousandth part of a hair, and filled with a minute quantity of a fluid of various colours - brown, white, dark, yellow, and red; in these the person was then (in dream).

¹He is *devatā* interested in the sun; and not *Brahma*. In the following verses reference is made to the persons in the moon etc., who are not *Brahma* and *Balaki*, is rebuked for wasting time by referring to what were not *Brahma*.

²Names applicable to *prāṇa*
³The object was to show that the *jeeva* is other than *prāṇa* if they were one, the person should have got up, when *prāṇa* was addressed; and *prāṇa* was not asleep, its activities not having been then suspended. It was assumed that *Balaki* was aware of the distinction between the *jeeva* and his body with its instruments, the mind, and the sensory and motor organs. For their activities are all suspended during sleep, while the *jeevas* is not asleep; for when he awakes, he says "I slept pleasantly" and this shows that he was awake, and that he experienced pleasure.

⁴The object of these questions was to show that as the *jeeva* was other than the body and its accessories, so *Brahma* was other than the *jeeva*. The three questions refer to the place of dreams, the place of deep sleep and the place from which the *jeeva* returned on rising from sleep.

⁵A lump of flesh in the middle of the heart.

When he sleeps, and sees no dream of any kind, he is then one with this *Prāṇa*.¹ Then speech becomes one with the sleeper with all its activities, the sense of sight with all its activities; the sense of hearing with all its activities; the mind with all its activities.

When he awakes, then as from a burning fire sparks go forth in all directions, so from that *Ātmā* the *jeevas* go forth, each to his place; from the *jeevas* the senses; from the senses their activities.

As a razor is put into a razor-case, or as fire lies concealed in wood, in the very same way that all knowing *Ātmā* has entered this body, which is mistaken for the *Ātmā* up to the very hair and nails.

That *Ātmā* these *jeevas* follow, as his people follow a great man. As the great man obtains enjoyment with his people as instruments, and as his people profit by the great man, so that all-knowing, *Ātmā* obtains amusement with these *jeevas* these *jeevas* enjoy Him and become happy.

As long as *Indra* did not meditate on that *Ātmā* so long did the *asuras* overcome him; when he meditated on Him, he killed the *asuras*, became a victor and attained pre-eminence among all the *devas*. One that thus meditates attains pre-eminence among bound *jeevas* - i.e., an unfrustrated will and likeness to *Brahma*.

Bṛihad āraṇyaka IV - Section 1

This teaching or *Bālāki* by *Ajatasatru* appears in the *Bṛihad āraṇyaka* as chapter IV - section 1. There are small variations in the narrative portion, to which no reference need be made. In the main teaching there are several variations; and the whole of it is therefore reproduced here:

“When this knower-person experienced that sleep, he gathered together along with the mind the activities of the sense and lay on this ether² within the heart. When he gathers the sense to himself, the person is then said to sleep. Then the sense of smell is drawn in by him; speech is drawn in; the sense of sight is drawn in; the sense of hearing is drawn in; the mind is drawn in.

² In *Brahma* in the form of *prāṇa* or *Brahma* directly by adopting the etymological meaning. That this is the meaning will be clear on a comparison with texts in other *upanishads*, describing the place of deep sleep. To be one with *prāṇa* is to remain free from the agitation of the mind in the form of desire and hate caused during the waking condition by one's identification with his body.

¹ This ether (*ākāśa*) is *brahma*; see note 6. supra To lie to become one with Him - i.e., to be without the character which differentiate *jeevas* as *deva* man etc. In deep sleep the *jeeva* abandons his evolved condition, in which his attribute *jñāna* worked in consonance with the impression of what he was and remains in *Brahma*.

When this *jeeva* with a mind in the dreaming condition wanders in the dream-world, then these worlds are open to the dreamer; he appears like a great king; he appears like a great *Brāhmaṇa*; he appears as having attained high and low bodies. As a great king takes objects obtainable in his country and goes about at his pleasure in his capital, in the very same way the dreamer then draws to himself his senses, and goes about in this body¹ at his pleasure.

Next, when the sleeps, and does not know anything, he returns through one of the seventy-two thousand blood vessels, known as *hita* which go from the heart to the *puritat*, and sleeps on the *puritat*. He sleeps on it, as a prince, a great king, or a great *Brāhmaṇa* attains a high degree of bliss and sleeps.

As a ² spider goes forth from the middle of its web, as from a fire sparks go forth, in the very same way, from this *Ātmā* all ³ *jeevas*, all sense preceptions, all the senses, all being go forth in different directions. His secret name is unchanging among the unchanging; *prānas* (*jeevas*) are unchanging; among them he is still more unchanging.

SUB SECTION 6

Bṛihad āraṇyaka IV - Section 4

Yajnavalkya told his wife *Maitreyi* that he would retire from the householder's life, and that he would divide his property between her and *Katyayani*, his other wife. She enquired whether she could attain immortality, if she had at her disposal the whole earth filled with wealth. He replied in the negative, and said "there is no hope of immortality with wealth". *Maitreyi* then declined to take any portion of his property, and requested him to tell her the means to immortality, which he knew (verses 1 to 4). *Yajnavalkya* taught her as follows:

"A husband does not become dear, because the husband wishes it in order to obtain what he desires; but to carry out the wish of the *Ātmā* the husband becomes dear."

¹ The body made for him for the dream condition.

² The first illustration to show how *Brahma* can be the sleeping place of all; and the second to show how all come out at the same time, or as the one spider goes forth to amuse itself with numerous different threads, so *brahma* goes forth in the forms of numerous different beings.

³ The question referred to one, this portion of the reply applies to many; the object is to show that to the *Ātmā*, who can support all, the support of one is no burden.

Then follow similar verses for wife, sons, wealth, *Brāhmaṇa*, *kshatriya*, *svarga* and similar worlds, *devas*, beings, and all things. Then he added: *Ātmā*¹ dear, should be seen², be heard about, be thought about, be meditated on. *Maitreyi* dear, by the seeing,³ the hearing about, the thinking about and the meditating on of the *Ātmā* all this becomes known (verse 5).

Brāhmaṇa will overcome him, who sees the *Brāhmaṇa*, elsewhere⁵ than in the *Ātmā*. Then follow similar sentences for *kshatriya*, worlds, *devas* beings,⁶ and all things. Then it is added, "He who is stated to be *Ātmā*" is *Brāhmaṇa*? He is *kshatriya*; He is the worlds; He is the *devas*; He is the beings; He is everything (verse 6).

When a drum is beaten, it is not possible to arrest the sounds that have gone forth. But by holding the drum,⁹ or the person that beats it, (and preventing contact), the sounds can be arrested (verse 7).

Verses 8 and 9 are two other illustrations with the conch-shell and the fute.

¹ *Ātmā* being by His will the cause of husbands, wives, and others becoming dear to others, to secure His grace He should be meditated on.

² Hearing and thinking being resorted to by men of their own motion, when they know an object to be desirable, it is unnecessary to enjoin them. The verse therefore prescribes meditation, as meditation is the immediate cause of release, the term 'seen; states that meditation should become as vivid as perception by the eye is.

³ See note 2 on *chāndogya*, VI.1, to 3 (page 9).

⁴ This explains how by knowing *Ātmā* everything can be known.

⁵ But not as being in *Ātmā* as being supported by *Ātmā* by His presence within. What is condemned here is the view that a person has an independent existence apart from *Ātmā* (which he knew).

⁶ Embodied *jeevas*, the worlds are *svarga* and other places of enjoyment, which they seek; the *devas* are the beings, who receive their offerings, and carry them to the worlds, when they die.

⁷ The doubt may arise that even then, as these beings are the bodies of *Ātmā* they are different from Him. The verse therefore adds that *Ātmā* and His bodies being inseparable, the words which ordinarily indicate them denote *Ātmā*. It is stated therefore "He is *brāhmaṇa*".

⁸ Having enjoined meditation on *Ātmā* as the world cause, a help to meditation - the control of the mind and senses - is described by three illustrations.

⁹ Similarly by removing sense objects or by arresting the senses, contact between them should be prevented and the crowding into the mind of thoughts about outside objects, which is inimical to meditation, will then be obviated.

As from¹ a fire fed with undried fuel² and fanned various clouds of smoke go forth, so dear, this is the breathing out of this great Being - viz., *rik veda*, *yajur veda*, *sama veda*, *atharva angiras*, *itihasa*, *purana*, the sixty-four branches of learning, *upanishads*, *smṛiti* verses, *sutras*, commentaries, commentaries of commentaries. All these are His breathing³ out (verse 10).

As the⁴ sea receives all the waters, so the sense of touch receives all touches;⁵ so the sense of taste receives all tastes; so the sense of smell receives all smells; so the sense of sight receives all colours; so the sense of hearing receives all sounds; so the mind receives all resolves; so the heart receives all learning; so the hands receive all actions; so the sex organ receives all pleasures; so the excretory organ receives all excretions; so the feet receive all goings on roads; so the sense of speech receives all the *vedas* (verse 11).

A piece⁶ of salt thrown into water enters it and becomes one with it; no one is able to separate it from the water; but wherever the water is taken,

¹ This verse explains in detail the fact that *Ātmā* is the world-cause which was briefly stated at the end of verse 5.

² In the illustration given, the undried fuel is what becomes smoke and the fire is the operative cause. Similarly, the *jeeva* and matter elements, which correspond to the fire, is the operative cause. Fire with the undried fuel is also the material cause; so *Ātmā* with the *jeeva* and matter elements is also the material cause.

³ This word is used to show that they come out without any effort.

⁴ This verse explains in detail the control of the mind and sense described in verses 7 to 9.

⁵ The sea receives all waters from land, and never become full. Similarly the senses perceive their objects without number and in many ways, and are never satisfied. The motor organs are ever engaged in their work, and are never satisfied. The mind is full of resolves, and is never at rest. So the owner of these instruments is distracted in numberless ways, and can never concentrate his mind on any object. Their control taught in verse 7 is therefore of the utmost importance.

⁶ The object of this verse is to show that the *jeeva* is ever dependent on *Brahma* and that in no condition is he independent. With this view *Brahma* is referred to by word that ordinarily denotes a *jeeva*. The intention is also to point out that though the *jeeva* is by nature all knowing, yet owing to his *karma*, he dwells in a body compounded of the elements and perishes with it. When this point is grasped one will naturally desire to get rid of this *karma* and attain his true nature; and as he is unable to do this with his own puny efforts, he will resort to the prescribed means by which *Brahma* may be pleased and extend His grace to him.

it tastes salt only. So, dear, this great Being, unlimited in His nature and in His attributes, is¹ *vijnāna-ghana* only.

He² comes into being when these elements become the body; and when they dissolve, He perishes with them. When He departs from His last body, He no³ longer confounds Himself with the body. "Dear, I say⁴ this - so spoke *Yajnavalkya* (verse 12). *Maitreyi* said "Here alone you have confused me, revered sir! when you said "when he departs, there is no *samjna*"⁵ *Yajnavalkya* replied "I do not, dear, speak confusing words. This, dear, is able to perceive (verse 13). Released by Maran's Dog ,Toronto, Canada

When⁶ things appear to stand by themselves, and apart from *Ātmā* then one sees another; then one smells another; then one hears another; then one speaks to another; then one thinks of another; then one meditates on another. When everything appears to him to be *Ātmā* then with what and which will be smell; then with what and which will he see; then with what and which will be hear; then with what and to whom will he speak; then with what and of whom will be think; then with what and on whom will be

¹ This term denotes a *jeeva*, who is by nature all knowing. The identification of *Brahma* with the *jeevas* should be understood in the usual way - viz., that He is the inner ruler of the *jeeva*, perishing, etc., applies strictly to the *jeeva* and applies to *Brahma* only through him. The *jeevas* coming into being is to have his attribute *jñāna* expanded; and his perishing is to have a narrowed attribute *jñāna*.

² To come into a body with expanded consciousness and to go out of it with narrowed consciousness, and to go through these processes without intermission is *samsāra*.

³ With the grace of *Brahma* his *karma* is shaken off he attains his own nature; and becoming all-knowing he is no longer subject to misconception.

⁴ This is to make *Maitreyi* believe that what he said was truth.

⁵ The term *samjna*, which occurs in the original, was used by *Yājñavalkya* in the sense of confounding oneself with the body; but *Maitreyi* understood it in the sense of consciousness, and the denial of this was therefore inconsistent in her view with the affirmation that the *jeeva* was *vijnāna-ghana*, -i.e., a conscious being. *Yājñavalkya*'s reply was that the term should be understood so as not to conflict with this statement. Then her confusion would disappear.

⁶ Of the two errors into which men fall, the error that the *jeeva* is one with the body was removed; the other error that he is independent is here removed. When all things are seen to be *Ātmā*, the person or thing seen, and the instrument for seeing will be *Ātmā*; there will then be no one to be seen, and no instrument, which is not *Ātmā*.

meditate: By whose grace one knows all this, by what¹ means can he see that Being? By what means, my dear, can he see the all-knowers? (verse 14).

Bṛihad āraṇyaka VI - section 5

Yajnavalkya did not retire from the householder's life as he had proposed, but remained in the family for some time more. When he finally made up his mind, he renewed his instruction to *Maithreyi* in this section.

The variations are not of importance, except the following:

(i) Verse 12, which appears as verse 13, begins as follows: "As a piece of salt has no inner parts, no outer parts; all its parts are salt only, so dear this *Ātmā* has no inner parts, no outer parts, the whole is *prajnāna-ghana* (consciousness) only." Then follow "He comes into being, etc.," as in that verse.

(ii) The *upanishad* closes as follows: "By whose grace one knows all this, by what means can he see that Being? That Being is not so, is not so. *Ātmā* is not seized; He does not fall to pieces; He is not attached to anything; He does not feel pain; He is not injured. By what means, dear, can one see the all knower? Thus what has to be taught has been stated, *Maitreyi*. So much, dear is what one desiring immortality should know." Having said this, *Yajnavalkya* renounced the world, as he desired.

¹ The-reply is no means other than His grace; no means other than meditation. The first point is implied in the first question and the second point in the second question.

CHAPTER II

SECTION 4 - SUB-SECTION 8

Chandogya VI - Section 5

Food eaten separates into three parts; its grossest part is faces ; its middle part is flesh; its finest part is mind¹ (verse 1).

Water drunk separates into three parts; its grossest part is urine ; its middle part is blood; its finest part is *prāṇa*² (verse 2).

Fire³ eaten separates into three parts ; its grossest part is bone ; its middle part is marrow; its finest part is⁴ the sense of speech (verse 3).

For my dear, the mind is nourished by food; *prāṇa* is nourished by water; the sense of speech is nourished by fire (verse 4).

¹ Nourishes the mind ; for the mind comes from *ahamkāra*

² Nourishes *prāṇa*; for it comes from air.

³ In the form of oil or butter.

⁴ Nourishes the sense of speech; for it comes from *ahamkāra*.

CHAPTER III

SECTION 1 - SUB-SECTIONS 1 TO 6

Chandogya V - Section 3

Svetaketu went to the presence-hall of *Pravahana*, king of the *panchalas*, who asked five questions. Being unable to reply to any one of them, he returned to his father and complained that he had not been taught these questions and the replies thereto. The father, being equally ignorant, went to *Pravahana* and applied for instruction, which the king after some hesitation gave. The questions, arranged in the order in which they were replied to, were:

- (i) Do you know how in the fifth offering water receives the name man?
- (ii) Do you know the path known as *devayana* and the path known as *pitriyana* and how they are distinguished?
- (iii) Do you know where men go, when they go upwards from here?
- (iv) Do you know how they return? ; and
- (v) Do you know why that world is not filled.

Section 4

That¹ world, *Gautama*, is a fire; the sun is its fuel; his rays are smoke; the day is its light; the moon is the live coal the stars are the sparks (verse 1).

Into that fire the *devas*² offer *sraddha*; from that offering rises *Soma*³ king (verse 2).

¹ The word known as *svarga* (heaven-world)

² The senses of the departing *jeeva*. The term *sraddha* denotes water, which is referred to in the first question. The term ordinarily means eagerness, an attribute of a *jeeva*, but it is not fit for offering. Water represents the other four elements also in a subtle condition; and the *jeeva* goes up invested in these five elements. The offering is said to be made by the senses; for without them the five elements cannot carry the *jeeva* to heaven; and it is appropriate that the offering should be made by them. Also the *karmas* which are the means of the *jeeva*'s going to heaven, are dependent on the senses.

³ This means that the elements, which surround the *jeeva* becomes a fine body fit to serve as an instrument of enjoyment in heaven.

Sections 5 to 8

These are in the same form as section 4. The contents may be shown in a tabular form thus:

	SECOND FIRE	THIRD FIRE	FOURTH FIRE	FIFTH FIRE
Fire	<i>Parjanya</i> ¹	earth	man	woman
Fuel	<i>Vayu</i> (air)	year	speech	sex organ
Smoke	Cloud	sky	<i>prāṇa</i>	making a sign
Light	lightning	night	tongue	womb
Live Coal	thunderbolt	quarters	eye	sexual intercourse
Sparks	thunder	Intermediate quarters	ear	pleasure attending thereon
Offering	<i>soma</i> king	rain	Food	semen
What emerges from it	rain ²	Food ³	Semen ⁴	foetus

Section 9

Thus in the fifth offering water receives the name man. The foetus, enveloped by the amnion, remains within for ten months or thereabouts and then comes out as a *jeeva* (verse 1).

After birth, he lives whatever is the length of his life. When he departs, the *devas*, following his *karma*, carry him from here to the fires⁵ themselves, from which he came here, and from which he was born (verse 2).

¹ The *devatā*, that causes rainfall.

² This means that when the *karma*, that took the *jeeva* to heaven is expended, his fine body becomes fluidic and falls down with him into the place where the clouds appear.

³ This means that the fluidic body with the *jeeva* comes down in the form of rain and attaches itself to an article of food.

⁴ This means that the *jeeva's* body, in contact with an article, of food being eaten by man, is attached to his semen.

⁵ Thus, the *jeeva* passes through all the fires, and is reborn. This goes on for ever until he becomes disgusted and resorts to the prescribed means for getting out of the rounds of births and deaths.

Section 10

Verses 1 and 2, which deal with the path known as *devayana*, (reply to question ii) will be explained under chapter IV, section 3.

They, that remaining in the village perform *yāgas*, carry out works of public utility, give away from their possessions, and do similar things, go to smoke;¹ from smoke to night; from night to the dark fortnight; from the dark fortnight to the half-year of the sun's south-ward course. These do not go to the year (verse 3).

From the half-year to the world of the *pitris*; from the world of the *pitris* to ether ; from ether to the moon ; They become *soma* king; They are the food of the *devas*;² them the *devas* eat (verse 4).

There they dwell till all the *karma* to yield fruit there is expended. Then³ they return by the very same path, by which they went. They go to ether ; from ether to *vayu* (air); being⁴ *vayu*, they become watery vapour ; being watery vapour, they become cloud (verse 5).

Being cloud, they become rain-cloud; being rain-cloud, they come down as rain ; they are born here as paddy or *yava* (a kind of grain), herbs or trees, gingelly seed or blackgram, and the like. From them escape is more difficult. Whoever eats food or emits semen, they become⁴ those persons (verse 6).

Of them, those that return here, if they have good *karma* ⁵, reach good births - birth as a *Brāhmaṇa*, as a *kshattriya*, or as a *vaisya*. Those that return here, if they have bad *karma*, reach evil births - birth as a dog, as a hog, or as an outcaste (verse 7).

¹ The *devatā* in charge of *smoke*, who carries the *jeeva* on simialrly in the other cases. Here a reply to the third question is given.

² This should not be taken literally. Like food they become a means of enjoyment to the *devas* known as *ajana siddhas* they use them for their enjoyment, as men use beasts here.

³ This is the reply to question IV.

⁴ This mean merely that they become like *vāyu* and are in contact with it. This will be explained in the sub sections noted at the head. This remark applies to all other cases up to semen inclusive.

⁵ This also means that they are in contact with those persons.

⁶ The orignal has to word *charana*, which will be explained by the *sūtras* to mean *karma*

Those¹ petty creatures, that continually return, do not go on either² path ; they die only to be reborn immediately. This is the third place.³ Hence, that world is not filled. Let one be disgusted with *samsara*.⁴ On this point there is this verse (verse 8).

One⁵ that steals gold, one that drinks spirits, one that lies in his teacher's bed, and one that kills a *Brāhmaṇa* - these four fall. He that associates with them is the fifth (verse 9).

He that thus mediates on the five-fires, even though he associates with them, is not defiled by sin. One that knows it thus becomes pure, and clean and reaches the world to which good men go (verse 10).

This *vidyā* is taught in the *Bṛihad āraṇyaka* also in chapter VIII, section 2. The first eight verses form the narrative. Verses 9 to 13 correspond to sections 4 to 8 of the *chandogya*; and though the fires are the same, there are slight differences in the description of their adjuncts.

The remaining verses are as follows:

Then, when he dies (verse 13) ; Then they carry him to the fire ; the fire⁶ itself is fire; the fuel is fuel; the smoke is smoke; the light is light; the live coal is live coal; the sparks are sparks. Into this fire the *devas* offer the person; from this offering the person comes out in a⁷ shining colour (verse 14).

Verse 15 deals with the path known as *devayana*, and will be dealt with in Chapter IV, section 3.

¹ This is the reply to question V

² For, they are without good *karma* or *vidyā* to take them on either path.

³ The term 'this' refers to the petty creatures described in the preceding sentence; and the singular is used with reference to the word 'place'. Two places have been mentioned heaven to which the *jeevas* go and return and the world of *Brahma* by the path known as the *devayana*, from which there is no return. The place, where the petty creatures are generated and live, may be called the third place.

⁴ This word is supplied from the context.

⁵ The fruit of this - five fires *vidyā* is to attain release. To know what it is has its own fruit, and this is stated in this and next verses.

⁶ In this sixth fire, fire and its accessories are real and are not imagined, as in the other cases.

⁷ When the offering is made, the person appears in heaven in a shining body.

Next, those that win worlds by *yāgas*, making gifts and *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) go to smoke; from smoke to night ; from night to the dark fortnight; from the dark fortnight to the six months of the sun's southward course; from the six months to the world of the *pitris*; from the world of the *pitris* to the moon. Reaching it they become food¹ (to those that are there); there the *devas* eat them, as in a sacrifice the helpers drink the *soma* juice, saying "increase;² decay". When their *karma* is expended, they become fluidic³ like ether; from ether they go to *vayu*; from *vayu* to rain; from rain to earth; reaching earth they become food; they are again offered into the fire of man; thence into the fire of woman. Then they are born as man. They rise in order to reach the worlds. In the very same way they go round and round. Those, that do not know these paths, are worms, insects, mosquitoes, etc. (verse 16).

Bṛihad āraṇyaka VI-Section 4, verse 5.

This *jeeva*, self-proved and knower, though deserving to possess the attributes of *Brahma*, is the owner as his instruments of mind, *prāṇa*, eye, and ear, and as his abode of earth, water, fire, air, ether and other elements as *maha*⁴ and *ahamkara*. He is full of desire, and of what are other than desire; he is full of displeasure and pleasure; he is full of *dharma* and of the reverse; he is full of everything ; he is full of this world and of that world. As he does *karma*,⁵ as he does other duties, he becomes united to their fruits; that is, one, that does good deeds, becomes possessed of a good body; one, that does bad deeds, becomes possessed of a bad body; one does good deeds as the effect of previous good deeds; one does bad deeds as the effect of previous bad deeds.

Others say - "This *jeeva* is full of desire" ; what the desires, that he resolves to obtain; what he resolves he does; he attains its fruit (verse 5).

¹ This should be understood as explained in note 2 on page 148.

² The meaning is that the *devas* nourish them and use them as instruments of their own enjoyment; when they are tired, they nourish them again.

³ Like a piece of gold, melting on a fire, they become fluidic and subtle in their bodies.

⁴ These are the elements first evolved from matter; and all these seven make up his body; the instruments mentioned should be taken to represent the remaining instrument also.

⁵ *karma* is *agnihotra* i.e., daily offering into the sacred fire. The 'other duties' are other duties making one fit do *agnihotra*.

CHAPTER III

SECTION 2 - SUB - SECTION 1

Brihad aranyaka - Section 3

See the Introduction to this on page 591. Verses 7-18 dealing with the dream - condition of the *jeeva* are translated here :

In verse 6 it was stated that when no light was available, and when speech also was silent (*i.e.*, in sleep) the *jeeva* was guided by himself; he was himself a light. *janaka* enquired:

“What is the *Ātmā*”. He, who is a knower,¹ self-proved, and who abides within the heart in the midst of the² senses, is the *Ātmā*. Being possessed of the notion that he is independent, he goes about in two worlds, and thinks and moves about, as if he did not depend on *Brahma*. Being in the dream-condition, he does not see this world,³ and the miseries of *samsara* (verse 7).

When this person is born, *i.e.*, becomes possessed of a body, he is connected⁴ with *papa* (evil deed). When he dies, *i.e.*, gets out of the body,⁵ he abandons all evil deeds (verse 8).

To this *jeeva* there are only two⁶ places-*viz.*, this (world) and the other world. The world of dreams lies at the junction of those two, and is therefore a third place. One standing at the place of junction sees both⁷ these places, *viz.*, this and the other world. What fruit of *karma* he experiences in the other world, he has the same kind of *karma* (in the dream world) and experiences⁸ both kinds-desirable and undesirable fruits. When this *jeeva* sees

¹ This shows the *Ātmā*-*i.e.*, the *jeeva*- to be other than his attribute *jnāna*.

² This differentiates him from *prāṇa* and the senses.

³ This world which all see. 20.

⁴ This shows that connection with a body brings about connection with evil deed. This is put in a negative form in the next sentence.

⁵ This must be taken to refer to the last body; for it is then that all *karmas* are abandoned.

⁶ Two places for taking hold of body.

⁷ The departed sees the other world; the waking man sees the world; while the dreamer sometimes sees this world; sometimes the other world-the place of enjoyment or tribulation.

⁸ The fruits in the dream world are experienced in a body other than the body in the walking condition, and are created by *Brahma* to wipe off petty deeds. It may therefore be called the other world.

dreams, he takes with him and reduces to inactivity the senses relating to this world full of everything.¹ He himself² creates a body and senses for the dream-world, and sees dreams with his own light. He is then guided by himself³ (verse 9).

There are in that condition⁴ no chariots, no chariot-horses, no roads; but He creates chariots, chariot-horses, roads. There is in that condition no pleasure,⁵ no joy, no happiness; but He creates pleasure, joy, happiness. There are in that condition no ponds, no wells, no streams; but He creates ponds, wells, streams. For He is the maker (verse 10).

On this there are the following verses: The *jeeva* being in the dream-condition reduces his body to inactivity, and himself without sleep goes about among his sleeping senses. (At the end of the dream) he takes his senses, and returns to his place (in the waking condition) he, the knower, and wanderer alone (verse 11).

He leaves his inferior⁶ body in the keeping of *prāṇa*; gets out of it, undying, and goes where he finds objects of enjoyment - he, the knower and wanderer alone (verse 12).

In the middle of the dream he meets with the fruits of his *karma* - good and bad; and attaining many forms, he appears to be happy with women, to eat, or to see frightful objects (verse 13).

People see his pleasure-ground⁷; but no one⁸ sees him. Hence, (medical men) say 'Do not awake a sleeper abruptly.' If he does not recognise the seat of a sense and places it elsewhere, the defect will be beyond remedy.

¹ That is - objects and places of enjoyment.

² This creation by the *jeeva* is through his own *karma*. They are created by *Brahma* no doubt ; but the particular dreams which he sees are due to his *karma* with reference to which *Brahma* creates.

³ That is his attribute *jnāna* goes forth through his dream-senses; and he sees with it. What is intended is to deny that he is then dependent on outside lights as in the waking condition.

⁴ No chariots, horses and roads, fit to be seen in the waking condition, are then seen; but what is seen is such as the dreamer alone can experience and only then.

⁵ Pleasure is what comes from the sight of a desirable object; joy from its possession; and happiness from its use.

⁶ The gross body If *prāṇa* also should go out with the *jeeva* there would be immediate death. *Prāṇa* is left behind to take care of the body. Hence it is that he does not die.

⁷ This may be taken to include the body and the senses.

⁸ Sees him as other than the body and senses, and as going about both within and without. The *upanishad* laments that this is so. With this sentence the verses begun in verse 11 end.

Others say¹ This dreams of the *jeeva* takes place only in his place in the waking condition; for he sees in dreams only what he sees waking...' (verse 14).

Having in the waking condition amused himself, having eaten, and having experienced the fruits of good and bad deeds, when the time for dreaming comes, the *jeeva* goes to the dream-place, as he previously came out of it. Whatever he considered as his in that (waking condition), he is not followed² by the same. For this *jeeva* is not³ attached to them... (verse 15).

Verses 16 and 17 and in the same form; the former refers to the *jeeva's* return from the dream to the waking condition, and the latter to his going to the dream condition again.

As a large-sized fish goes about between two banks of a stream, this bank and the other bank, in the very same way the *jeeva* wanders in both the places⁴ - the place of dream, and the place of the waking moments (verse 18).

Katha Valli V

I will speak to you again, *Gauthama*, about this secret ever-existing *Brahma*, and explain what the *Ātmā* becomes on attaining release (verse 6).

Other⁵ *jeevas* go into women's womb in order to get bodies; others enter the vegetable kingdom; this is in accordance with their *karma*, as stated in the *veda* (verse 9).

That *Purusha*, who is awake, while those (all *jeevas*) sleep, and who creates as He wills, he alone is light; He is *Brahma*; He alone is said to be immortality; all the worlds rest on Him; no one excels Him (verse 8).

As fire, being one, entered the world,⁶ and being in every object, appears as that object, so being one, He is the inner ruler of all beings, and being in every object, appears as that object, and is also outside of it (verse 9).

¹ In mentioning another view the object is to show that it is incorrect. The senses, being asleep (for only then dreams occur), there is no room for the place of the waking condition.

² That is-he is not attached to it.

³ Not attached to them by nature. If attachment to anything was natural it should ever be found in him; but there is no attachment in the dream-condition to the objects of the waking moments. The attachments are therefore due to *karma* and to the ignorance generated by it.

⁴ The object is to show how a bound *jeeva* goes round and round in the daily life.

⁵ Other than the person addressed who desired release, who was not affected by desire and hate, and who was therefore fit to be instructed.

⁶ At the time that the elements were compounded, fire was one of these elements; also air (*vāyu*) mentioned in the next verse.

As air, being one, entered the world, and being in every object, appears as that object, so being one, He is the inner ruler of all beings, and being in every object, appears as that object, and is also outside of it (verse 10).

As the sun, eye¹ of all the world, is not touched by the blemishes that come out of the eye, so being one the inner ruler of all beings is not touched by the grief of the world; He is entirely different from all (verse 11).

Him, who is one, who has the universe in his grip, who is the inner ruler of all, and who makes a single² seed become many, those wise men, that perceive Him, as seated within themselves, attain enduring bliss; but not others (verse 12).

Him who being Himself eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired by those that are eternal, intelligent and many, to those wise men, that see Him as seated within themselves, comes enduring peace; not to others (verse 13).

That unique, highest Bliss, whom *yogis* are able to point to as³ this, how may I know? Does He shine, or is He shadowed by other lights? (verse 14).

The sun⁴ does not shine by His side; nor the moon and stars; nor do these lightnings shine. How can this fire shine? When⁵ He shines, everything shines after Him; by His light everything shines (verse 15).

SUB - SECTION 2

Bṛihad āraṇyaka - VI - Section 3

This is in continuation of verse 18 on page 157.

¹ It is said "The sun, becoming the eye, entered the eye". he is Present within through his rays; Reference is made to these attachment.

² Matter in the subtle condition, which is made into the universe.

³ As clearly as one sees a fruit on his palm. This question is put by the student.

⁴ The reply is that for the benefit of those that meditate. He has a brilliant body, and that in this body He shines, eclipsing all lights.

⁵ This means that he is the cause of the light of the others. "After Him" - these words indicate the relationship of cause and effect. The first half of the verse shows that when one can see His light, other lights are thrown into shade. The third foot shows that He is the operative causes in the sense that He causes the material out of which the light is made, to shine. The last foot points out that by His connection with them He gives them the capacity to perform their own duties.

As an eagle or kite soars here and there in this sky, and tired, draws in this wings and hastens to its nest, in the very same way this *jeeva* hastens towards that place, where the sleeper does not desire any object, sees no dreams (verse 19).

The *jeeva* has blood vessels, known as *hita*, as minute as a hair divided into a thousand parts, and filled (with a fluid) white, blue, yellow, green, red. Being in these he imagines that some one kills him; that another overcomes him; that an elephant makes him run; that he falls into a pit; whatever is an object of fear in the waking condition, that he fancies as existing there from his *karma*.¹

That place, in which he regards himself as a *deva*,² as a *king*, and thinks 'I alone am'³ all this' it is his highest place⁴ (verse 20).

That place exceeds the *jeeva*'s expectations; it is untouched by *karma*, and is free from fear; it alone is what he has to attain. As a person, embraced by a dear woman, does not know what passes outside, does not know what passes inside, in the very same way, this *jeeva*, embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside, does not know what is inside. That indeed is what has to be reached by him-in possession of every desirable object, pleased with the bliss of self-enjoyment, without any desire in consequence, and being outside grief (verse 21).

In that place father⁵ ceases to be father; mother ceases to be mother; world⁶ ceases to be world; *devas*⁷ cease to be *devas*; the *vedas*⁸ ceases to be *vedas*. In that place⁹ the thief ceases to be thief; the murderer ceases to be murderer; the outcaste¹⁰ ceases to be outcaste; the *paulkasa* ceases to be *paulkasa*; the *sramana* ceases to be *sramana*; the penance-doer ceases to be penance-doer. The *jeeva* is not followed by good deeds; not followed by bad deeds; for he has then transcended all griefs of the heart (verse 22).

¹ when the *jeeva* remains in the *hita* blood vessels. *Karma* exists, and he sees frightful things.

² He has enjoyment as a *deva* as a king.

³ He does not see anything other than himself, that is friendly or inimical.

⁴ This is *Brahma*. Being united to him, he sees no dreams.

⁵ Being then unconnected with *karma* and being therefore unconnected with a body, the relationship based on the possession of body cease to exist for the time being.

⁶ He does not depend upon any support

⁷ For, he does not then require anyone to look on him with helpful eyes.

⁸ For, he is not then subject to commands and prohibitions.

⁹ Being then pure, he cannot commit theft or murder.

¹⁰ These distinctions based on the body do not then exist, as he is unconnected with a body.

What he does not see, he does not see, though he possesses the attribute *jnāna* capable of perception; for there is no destruction of the *jnāna* of the knower; because it is not capable of destruction. But there is no second,¹ other than the all-knowing and separated from Him, that might be seen (verse 23).

Here follow verses similar in all respects for smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching, and meditating (verses 24 to 30).

“When another appears to exist, then one sees another ; one smells another; one tastes another ; one speaks to another ; one hears another one thinks of another ; one touches another ; one meditates on another (verse 31).

Like water dropped on water, the knower becomes one with *Brahma*, and inseparable. This place of sleep is the *Brahma* - world, great king,” said *Yajnavalkya*, “He is his highest goal; He is his highest wealth; He is his highest world; He is his highest bliss. Other beings live by a drop of this bliss (verse 32).

If one among men has attained his desires, is full of youth and other qualities, is the lord of all others, and has every kind of human enjoyment, his bliss is the highest among men.”

Then follows a description, taking this bliss as the unit, and showing that the bliss of each grade of beings is one hundred times the bliss of the next lower grade. These grades are beginning with man- (i) the *pitris*, who have attained the world of the *pitris* by pleasing them with *sraddhas* ; (ii) *gandharvas*; (iii) those that have become *devas* by *karma*, i.e., *yāgas* ; (iv) *Devas* born in heaven; (v) *Prajāpati*.

“One hundred times the bliss in the world of *Prajāpati* is one bliss in the world of *brahma*. This alone is the highest bliss; this is *Brahma*-world, great king”, said *Yajnavalkya* . . . (verse 33).

The next verse states that the *jeeva* then returns to the waking condition.

¹ This fact is true in all conditions - in the waking as in the deep sleep condition. But while in the former *karma* is operative, in the latter it is not. Hence the *jeeva* sees various things, waking, but sleeping he does not see them. Why does he not see objects as inseparable from *Brahma* ? Because his attribute *jnāna* is narrowed by *karma*. In other words, he sees no object either as distinct from *Brahma* or as a part of Him.

SUB - SECTION 3

Chāndogya VI, Section 9

See the abstract of sections 9 to 11 on page 16.

On waking they return and become whatever¹ they were before - a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat or fly (verse 3).

SUB - SECTION 5

Bṛihad āraṇyaka IV, Section 3

There are two forms of *Brahma*- solid and fluid, perishable and imperishable, non-pervading and pervading, manifest and non-manifest (verse 1).

That is solid, which is other² than air and ether. That is perishable, that is non-pervading; that is manifest. Of that which is solid, which is perishable, which is non-pervading, which is manifest, the essence is what warms³ (the world); for it is the essence of the manifest (verse 2).

Next, the fluid is air and ether. That is imperishable⁴; that is pervading; that is non-manifest. Of that which is fluid, which is imperishable, which is pervading, which is non-manifest, the essence is the *Purusha*⁵ that is in that orb; for he is the essence of the non-manifest. This is the mode of meditation on the *devas* (verse 3).

As to meditation on the body. That is solid, which is other than *prāṇa* and the ether within the body. That is perishable ; that is non-pervading ; that is manifest. Of that which is solid, which is perishable, which is non-pervading, which is manifest, the essence is the eye;⁶ for it is the essence of the manifest (verse 4).

Next, the fluid, is *prāṇa* and the ether within the body. That is imperishable ; that is pervading; that is non-manifest. Of that which is fluid, which is imperishable, which is pervading which is non-manifest, the essence is the *Purusha*⁷ in the right eye ; for He is the essence of the non-manifest (verse 5).

¹ The *jeeva* thought before going to sleep that he was such and such. On waking he has the same thought. That is, the tendencies that he had stick to him and reappear. Hence, union with *Brahma* in sleep is not opposed to his return.

² That is earth, water and fire.

³ The sun's orb. This enjoins a meditation on the sun's orb as made up of fire, water and earth, and possessing the four attributes indicated by the four epithets.

⁴ Relatively.

⁵ This enjoins a meditation on the *Purusha* as the essence of air and ether, possessing the four attributes indicated by the four epithets.

⁶ and ⁷ Here again meditation on the eye and on the *Purusha* in the eye is enjoined.

The appearance of that *Purusha* is like a saffron-coloured rainment, like white wool, like the worm cochineal, like the flame of fire, like the lotus, like many flashes of lightning flashing at the same time. To him who thus meditates, wealth of every kind comes like a flash of lightning.

Next, instruction is given: not merely this; for there is no other is no other higher than that described by the term not so ('not merely this'). His name is the unchanging among the unchanging. *Prāṇas* (*jeevas*) are unchanging;¹ and He is unchanging among them (verse 6).

¹ The *jeevas* do not change in their substance like matter; they are therefore *satya*-unchanging. *Brahma* is also unchanging like them; but while they undergo contraction and expansion in their attribute *jnāna*, *Brahma* is exempt from a change of this kind. He is therefore *satya* among to *satya*.

CHAPTER III

SECTION 3 - SUB-SECTION 2

Chandogya I - Section 2

The children of *Prajāpati* were of two classes-*devas* and *asuras*. When they were fighting with one another, the *devas* adopted the *udgītha* as the means, saying "We will overcome them with this" (verse 1).

They meditated on *udgītha* as the *prāṇa* in the nose (*i.e.*, as the sense of smell). The *asuras* polluted it with their own sin¹ ; hence a person smells with it both good and bad smells; for it is polluted with sin (verse 2).

Then they meditated on *udgītha* as speech. The *asuras* polluted it with their own sin; hence a person speaks with it both truth and falsehood; for it is polluted with sin (verse 3).

Then they meditated on *udgītha* as the eye. The *asuras* polluted it with their own sin; hence a person sees with it both pretty and ugly things; for it is polluted with sin (verse 4).

Then they meditated on *udgītha* as the ear. The *asuras* polluted it with their own sin; hence a person hears with it both good and evil words; for it is polluted with sin (verse 5).

Then they meditated on *udgītha* as the mind. The *asuras* polluted it with their own sin; hence a person thinks both good and bad thoughts; for it is polluted with sin (verse 6).

Then they meditated on *udgītha* as *prāṇa*. The *asuras*, on reaching it, were themselves destroyed; as a lump of earth is shattered to pieces on reaching a stone-similarly (verse 7).

As a lump of earth on reaching a stone is shattered to pieces, in the very same way one is destroyed, that wishes evil to one, that thus meditates; as also he that injures him. He is a lump of earth (thrown) on a stone (verse 8).

One never known with it (*prāṇa*) a good smell or evil smell; for it is free from sin. Hence,² with what it eats or drinks it nourishes the other *prāṇas* (senses). Not obtaining this nourishment in the end, the group of *prāṇas* departs from the body..... (verse 9).

¹ Action causing sin.

² Being pure, and not self-satisfied like the senses.

Bṛihad āraṇyaka III - 3

The children of *Prajāpati* were of two classes-*devas* and *asuras*. The *devas* were fewer in number; the *asuras* were more numerous. They fought with one another to secure the lordship of these worlds. The *devas* said 'Let us overcome the *asuras* in *yajna* with *udgītha*' (verse 1).

They said to speech - "Do you sing the *udgītha* for us". It agreed, and sang¹ the *udgītha* on their behalf. It procured for the *devas* by the song the enjoyment² that is in speech; and for itself the speaking of good words. They (the *asuras*) knew "By this singer of the *udgītha* they will overcome us". They ran to it and polluted it with³ sin. The sin is what evil it speaks (verse 2).

The *devas* applied successively to the sense of smell, the eye, the ear, and the mind with the same result (verses 3 to 6).

In this manner these *devatās*⁴ attained sins; in this manner they (the *asuras*) polluted them with sin (verse 6).

Then they said to *prāṇa*, which abides in the mouth "Do you sing the *udgītha* for us". It agreed, and *prāṇa* sang for them. They (*asuras*) knew "By this singer of the *udgītha* they will overcome us". They ran to it, and wished to pollute it. As a brickbat reaching a stone is shattered to pieces, so they were destroyed and scattered in all directions. Thus the *devas* won; the *asuras* were overcome. He that thus meditates succeeds; and an enemy that hates him is overcome (verse 7).

SUB - SECTION 3

Chāndogya - V-1

One, that meditates as the oldest and the best, becomes himself the oldest and the best. *Prāṇa* is the oldest⁵ and the best (verse 1).

¹ This means that the *devas* meditated on the singer of the *udgītha* as speech.

² Enjoyment in hearing songs.

³ By making it angry, the *asuras* made it speak harsh words, carry tales and the like.

⁴ The senses mentioned and those not mentioned.

⁵ The activity of *prāṇa* begins even when a person is a mere fetus in the mother's womb; while the activity of the senses comes later; hence *prāṇa* is the oldest. And it is the best, as the activities of the sense depend upon it.

One that meditates as the wealthiest, becomes himself the wealthiest among his cousins. Speech is the wealthiest¹ (verse 2).

One, that meditates on the well-established, becomes himself well-established in this world and in the other world. The eye is well²-established (verse 3).

To one, that meditates as possessing objects of desire, come objects desired by the *devas* and by men. The ear is objects³ of desire (verse 4).

One, that meditates as the seat of enjoyment, becomes the seat of enjoyment to his dependents. The mind is the seat of enjoyment (verse 5).

The *prāṇas* quarrelled among themselves as to who was the best, each saying 'I am the best'. They went to their parent, *Prajāpati*, and asked Revered sir, who among us is the best? (verse 6).

He replied 'He among you is the best, on whose departure the body appears as most despicable' (verse 7).

Speech departed, and being abroad for a year, returned and asked, how were you able to live without me.' They replied, as these live that are mute and that without speaking breathe with *prāṇa* see with the eye, hear with the ear, and meditate with the mind.' Speech re-entered (verse 8).

The next three verses describe in the same words the departure and return of the eye, the ear, and mind (verses 9 to 11).

Then *prāṇa* desired to depart, and made the others move from their places, as a spirited horse (beaten as a test) draws up the pegs to which it is tied. They went to *prāṇa* and said 'Revered sir, you have attained lordship over us; you are the best among us. Do not depart; (verse 12).

Then speech said to it "For what reason I am the wealthiest, for the same reason you are the wealthiest".⁴ Then the eye said to it 'For what reason I am well-established, for the same reason you are well established (verse 13).

¹ By its good activities it leads to the attainment of wealth.

² It shows the unevenness of the ground, and helps its owner to be well-established.

³ It hears the text of the *veda*, and its meaning and thus leads to the possession of objects of desire.

⁴ By what capacity in me I lead to the attainment of wealth by that same capacity you lead to the same result; for it depends upon yourself.

Then the ear said to it' For what reason I am possessed of objects of desire for that same reason you are possessed of them'. Then the mind said to it' For what reason I am the seat of enjoyment, for the same reason you are the seat of enjoyment' (verse 14).

People do not say 'speech' they do not say 'eyes'; they do not say 'ears' they do not say 'mind'. They only say *prāṇas* for *prāṇa* is all these (verse 15).

Section 2

It said "What will be my food ? They replied "Whatever is the food of living beings down to dogs and birds". That indeed is the food of *prāṇa* hence its well-known name *anna*.¹ In one that thus meditates, nothing becomes impure food (verse 1).

It said What will be my clothing. They replied water. Hence, when they take food, they cover it up with water² before and after eating. One, that thus meditates obtains clothing and is prevented from being naked (verse 2).

Bṛihad āraṇyaka - VII -1

This gives the same teaching with the following variations:-

(i) The first five verses describe the attributes of *prāṇa* speech, eye, ear, and mind as the *Chāndogya* does, and have the following addition in the first verse – One that thus meditates, becomes the oldest and the best among his cousins, and also among others, if he wishes it. There are similar additions in the other verses.

(ii) An additional sense - the organ of procreation is brought in verse 6, and verse 12 deals with its departure and return.

(iii) In verse 13 the following addition occurs: "We are not able to lie without you". It (*prāṇa*) said 'To me who am thus (i.e., the best) give tribute'. They agreed.

(iv) Verse 14 is more explicit than the *Chāndogya* verse 1 and 2 of section 2. 'By him that thus meditates on this food of *prāṇa*³ no impure food is eaten; no impure thing is accepted. Hence those learned in the veda and doing meditation do *achamana*, when they are about to take their food, and

¹ The term is derived from the root *ad* to eat.

² This refers to sipping water thrice, known as *achamana*.

³ He is not polluted by the eating of impure food or by the receiving of impure objects as gifts.

do this after taking food. Thus they think that by doing so they prevent *prāṇa* from being naked.

(v) This is the *kanva* reading. The *madhyandina* reading has this additional sentence: "Hence one that thus meditates should do *achamana*, when he is about to take his food; and after taking food, he is about to take his food; and after taking food, he should do *achamana*. Then he will make this *prana* clothed (non-naked)".

SUB-SECTIONS 6

Bṛihad āraṇyaka - VII - 6

This *purusha* is perceivable with a pure mind; He has a brilliant body; He is unchanging; He is within that heart, like a grain of paddy or of *yava* (a kind of grain). This same Being controls all; He is the lord of all; He supports all this whatever exists.

Agnirahasya

This begins with the sentence 'Let one meditate on Brahma as unchanging', and goes on thus.

Let him meditate on the *Atma*, perceivable with a pure mind, the inner ruler of *prāṇa*, possessed of a brilliant body, with an unfrustrated will, and subtle and unpolluted as the *ether*.

SUB-SECTION 7

Bṛihad āraṇyaka - VII - 5

He, who is unchanging, is that Sun, the *Purusha* seen in that orb, and is the *Purusha* seen in the right eye. They abide in each other; one is in this through¹ his rays; the other is in that through *prāṇa*. When one that thus meditates is about to depart from his body, he sees the sun's orb clearly and these rays do not obstruct him (verse 1).

Of Him, that is the *Purusha* in that orb, the head² is thus. The head is one³ and this syllable is one. The hands are *bhuvar*; the hands are two, and this consists of two syllables. The feet are *suvar*; the feet are two, and this

¹ They help each other - one helps the other with his *rays*: for in the absence of the rays the *Purusha* in the right eye cannot do His work. The *Purusha* in the right eye helps the *Purusha* in the sun's orb through *prāṇa*; for unless He breathes, He cannot light the world.

² The syllable *bhus* should be mediated on as the head of the *Purusha*; similarly in the other cases

³ On account of this likeness it should be mediated on as the head.

consists of two syllables. His secret name is 'ahar' He, that thus meditates, destroys¹ his sin and abandons it (verse 2).

Of Him, that is the *Purusha* in the right eye, the head is *bhus*; the head is one, and this syllable is one. The hands are *bhuvar*; the hands are two, and this consists of two syllables. The feet are *suvar*; the feet are two, and this consists of two syllables. His secret name is 'aham' He, that thus meditates, destroys his sin and abandons it (verse 3).

SUB-SECTION 9

Chāndogya - III - 16

A person is *yajna*.² His first twenty-four years of age is the morning *savana*.³ The gayatri metre consists of twenty-four syllables; and the morning savana is *gayatra*.⁴ connected⁵ with it are *vasus*; *pranas* are the *vasus*; for they make all this exist⁶ (verse 1).

If in this period any illness troubles him, he should repeat the following mantra - 'Ye *vasus* in the form of *prāṇas*! This is my morning *savana*; connect it with the midday *savana* without break. My I, *yajna*, not disappear from amongst you *vasu-prāṇas*. From this illness he rises, and becomes well (verse 2).

Next, the second portion of forty-four years is the midday *savana*. The *trishtup* meter consists of forty-four syllables; the midday *savana* is connected with this metre. Connected with it are *rudras*; *prāṇas* are the *rudras*; for they make all this cry⁷ (verse 3).

¹ The term *ahar* may be derived from the roots *han* to kill, and *ha* to abandon; and both being suitable, the effect is stated.

² He should regard himself as *yajna* (offering)

³ His likeness to *yajna* is shown by comparing the three portions of his life to the three portions of the day in which the principal *yāgas* in the *jyotishtoma* are performed. A *savana* is done in the morning, another at midday and the third in the evening, a *savana* being taking the juice of the soma creeper and making offerings with it. In the last four-offerings, the juice is taken in a vessel; certain songs are sung by the *udgata* known as *stotra*; verses are recited by the *hota* known as *sastra*; and then the offering is made.

⁴ The verses sung and recited are of this metre.

⁵ As the owner. In the morning *savana* of the *jyotish toma* the group of *devas* known as *vasus* exercise lordship.

⁶ They make the body exist without going to pieces.

⁷ As they form the best part of one's life, the senses (for *pranas* means senses also) cause him to be engrossed in objects of enjoyment and make him miserable. Hence, they are called *rudras*, those that make others cry.

If, in this period any illness troubles him, he should repeat the following *mantra* 'Ye rudras in the form of *prāṇas*! this is my midday *savana*; connect it with the third *savana* without break. May I, *yajna*, not disappear from amongst you- *rudra prāṇas*' From this illness he rises and becomes well (verse 4).

Next, the third portion of forty-eight years is the third *savana*. The *jagati* metre consists of forty-eight syllables; the third *savana* is connected with this metre. Connected with it are *adityas*; *prāṇas* are the *adityas*; for they receive¹ all this (verse 5).

It in this period any illness troubles him, he should repeat the following *mantra* 'Ye *adityas* in the form of *prāṇas*! This is my third *savana*; connect it with life, 'i.e. its end, without break. May I, *yajna*, not disappear from amongst you *aditya-prāṇas*! From this illness he rises and becomes well (verse 6.).

Mahidasa Aitareya, who did this meditation, said "Oh! illness! for what reason do you thus trouble me, who will not die of this? He lived for one hundred and sixteen years. One, that thus meditates, will live for one hundred and sixteen years (verse 7).

Section 17

'His hunger, thirst and abstinence from sexual intercourse are; his *diksha*² (verse 1).

When he takes food, drinks water, and has sexual intercourse, he attains likeness to *upasads*³ (verse 2).

When he laughs, eats, has sexual intercourse, he attains likeness to *stotra*⁴ and *seastra*⁵ (verse 3).

His *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), giving, rectitude, abstinence from injury of others, and truthspeakings are the rewards to be made (verse 4).

Hence, people say regarding his birth 'Yajna will be done'; after his birth 'yajna has been done', His death is *avabhrita*⁵ (verse 5).

¹ All-this all the objects of enjoyment. Hence the name *aditya*.

² *Diksha* is the undertaking of the sacrificer to do some observances during the progress of the *yāga* - to live only on milk prepared and offered to him by one of the helpers, to sit or lie down on a deer's skin, to carry a stick always, etc.

³ *Upasad* is a subsidiary *karma* done morning and evening on the second, third and fourth days of the *jyotishtoma yāga*.

⁴ See under note 5 on page 641.

⁵ *Avabhrita* is a *yāga* made at the end, when a bath is taken.

Taittirīya-Nārayaṇa-Anuvaka 52

Of the *yajna* of one, that thus meditates, the *Ātmā* is *yajamana* (sacrificer); his faith is the wife; his body is *idhma*¹; his breast is *vedi*²; the hair is *berhis*³; the tuft of hair on his head is *veda*⁴; his heart is the *yupa*⁵; his desire is ghee; anger is the sacrificial goat; his *tapas* (thought) is fire; the thought that everything is *Brahma* is rewards to helpers; the tongue is *hota*; *prāṇa* is *udgāta*; the eye is *adhvaryu*⁶; the mind is *brahma*⁶; the ear is *agnidhra*⁶; taking only so much food as will keep the body and soul together is *diksha*; what he eats and drinks is drinking the *soma* juice; the pleasure of sexual intercourse is *upasad*; his going about, his sitting, his standing are *pravargya*⁷; his mouth is the *ahavaniya*⁸ fire; his knowledge is *homa*; his taking food morning and evening is *samidh*⁹; his evening, morning and midday are *savanas*; his day and night are *darsa*¹⁰ and *purnamasa*¹⁰; his half-months and months are *chaturmasya*¹¹; groups of two months are *pasubandha*¹²;

¹ A name given to the twigs of the *asvattha* or *palasa* tree to be offered into the sacred fire.

² *Vedi* is the place between the *garhapatya* and *ahavantya* fires, on which the materials for offering are placed.

³ *Berhis* is the handfuls of *darbha* grass spread on the *vedi*.

⁴ *Veda* is a handful of *darbha* grass with a not in the middle for cleaning the spoons with which offerings are made.

⁵ *Yupa* is a post to which the sacrificial goat is tied.

⁶ *Hota*, *udgata*, *adhvaryu* and *brahma* are the principal helpers in a *soma yāga*, the first of each group. The business of the first is to recite *mantras*, when offerings are made; of the second to sing *vedic* songs; of the third to prepare the materials and make the offerings, and of the last to watch over the whole of the operations and to see to their proper performance. *Agnidhra* is an assistant of *brahma* with some special functions.

⁷ *Pravargya* is a subsidiary *karma* done before the *upasad*.

⁸ *Ahavaniya* is one of the three fire maintained, into which most of the offerings are made.

⁹ *Samidh* - see note 4 on page . The twigs are known by this name; while *idhma* is the name given to them collectively.

¹⁰ *Darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa* are three offerings made on the first day after the new and full moons.

¹¹ *Chāturmāsyā* is a variety of *darṣa* and *pūrṇamāsa*. It consists of four parts, which are done with an interval of four months between every two portions.

¹² The offering of a membrane and of certain parts of a goat's body.

years are *aharganas*¹; or *satra*¹ in which all his property is given away as rewards; his death is *avabhrita*; his ending with old age is *agnihotra*² and *satra*. When one, that thus meditates, dies in the half-year of the sun's northward progress, he attains the greatness of the *devas*, and beomces like the sun. Next, one, that dies in the half-year of the sun's southward progress, attains the greatness of the *pitris* and becomes like the moon. The *Brāhmaṇa*, that meditates, overcomes both the greatness of the sun and the moon; and after that he attains the greatness of *Brahma*.

SUB-SECTION 13

Chāndogya - VI - 15

Next, whether in regard to them (the meditators on *Brahma*) the ceremonies connected with the disposal of their corpse are done or not, they go to light³; from light to the day; from the day to the half-month, when the moon waxes; from the half-month to the half-year of the sun's northward progress; from the half-year to the year; frm the year to the sun; from the sun to the moon; from the moon to lighting. That *purusha*, who is not human (verse 5).

Carries these to *Brahma*. This is *devayana*, *brahmayana*; those that go by this path do not return to this human whirlpool⁴ (verse 6).

Chāndogya - V-10

Those, that thus meditate on it (the nature of the *jeeva*), and these, that in a jungle meditate on *tapas* (*Brahma*⁵) with eagernes, go to light; from light to the day; from the day to the half-month, when the moon waxes; from the half-month to the half-year of the sun's northward progress (verse - 1).

From the half-year to the year; from the year to the sun; from the sun to the moon; from the moon to lightning. That *purusha*, who is not human, carries them to *Brahma*. This is the path *devayana* (verse 2).

¹ *Ahargana* is the name given to a *soma yaga*, when the principal *soma* offerings are repeated on more than one day. If they take place on twelve days, it is known as *dvadasaha*; if more than this, the *yaga* is known as *satra*.

² *Agnihotra* - daily offerings morning and evening.

³ This and other terms denote *devatās* sent down by the highest *Ātmā* to carry the *jeevas* to be freed from *karma* to the highest heaven.

⁴ This means what is known as *samsāra*, in which birth and death come round and round like a whirlpool.

⁵ See sub-section 13 of chapter III, section 3.

SUB-SECTION 15

Bṛihad āraṇyaka V - Section 4

Next, *Ushasta Chakrayana* asked him ‘*Yajnavalkya* ! Tell me about Him, who is *Brahma* directly,¹ who is eternal² and omnipresent, and who is the *Ātmā* within all.’ ‘He³, who is your *Ātmā*, is within all’. *Yajnavalkya*! How⁴ is He, who is within all’. ‘He⁵, who with *prāṇa* does the work of *prāṇa*, and is your *Ātmā*, is within all; He, who with *apāna* does the work of *apāna*, and is your *Ātmā*, is within all. He, who with *udāna* does the work of *udāna*, and is your *Ātmā*, is within all. He, who is your *Ātmā*, is within all (verse 1).

Ushasta Chakrayana said “Like one⁶ that says ‘this is a cow; this is a horse,’ this has been stated,” and then he repeated the question. *Yajnavalkya* gave the same reply as he did at first; but being pressed, he replied - “Do not see⁷ him that sees; do not hear about him that hears; do not think about him that thinks; do not meditate on him that meditates. He that was

¹ In the primary sense of the word.

² The meaning implied in the term *aparokshat*, i.e., present before one’s view; and this will be possible only, if the object be connected with all places and with all portions of time.

³ This is *Yājñavalkya*’s reply.

⁴ This is *Ushast*’s question again. He means - What you say may be. I do not know what is your conception of him. I am an aggregate of the body, the senses, *prāṇa* and *Ātmā*; do you mean that any one of them is my *Ātmā* and is within all, or is he other than all of them. The expression “Your *Ātmā*” no doubt conveys the information that he is other than the body, which is present before the speaker; but the doubt remains whether He is one of the rest.

⁵ This is *Yājñavalkya*’s reply. His meaning is - He, who uses *prāṇa* and the rest as His instruments, and does the work, that they are supposed to do, is your *Ātmā* and the same is within all. From the mention of *prāṇa* as an instrument (for the term is in the instrumental case) it is clear that He is other than *prāṇa*. In deep sleep, during which the mind, the senses and the organs of action suspend their functions, *prāṇa* is wide awake, and its functions go on as before. Hence, he who uses *prāṇa* as an instrument is other than them all. Also, as the *jeeva* does not then do any work, he cannot direct *prāṇa*, and He who does is other than the *jeeva*.

⁶ The meaning is-what you, say is as absurd, as one’s pointing to a cow, and saying ‘This is a horse’. For the *jeeva* is atomic and is different in different bodies; how can he be the *Ātmā* of all.

⁷ The meaning is - Do not regard him that does seeing, hearing, thinking and meditation as the person that does the work of *prāṇa*, using it as an instrument. He, that is the object of seeing and the rest, is not he that sees, hears, etc.

referred to by the words 'who is your *Ātmā*,' is within all; other than He is miserable." Then *Ushasta Chak rayana* ceased to ask any more questions (verse 2).

Section 5

Next, *Kahola Kaushitakeya* asked him, repeating the same question,¹ and adding the particle *eva* (only) to show that the question was no other. *Yajnavalkya* replied "He is within all, who transcends² hunger and thirst, grief and confusion, old age and death. Knowing³ this *Ātmā*, *Brāhmaṇas* rise from attachment to son,⁴ attachment to property and attachment to the world, and live by begging for food. For what is⁵ attachment to son is attachment to property; what is attachment to property is attachment to the world; for these two attachments⁶ alone exist. Hence, one learned in the *veda* should attain *panditya*⁷ and remaining like a child⁸ should desire to attain *brahma-vidyā*. Attaining *panditya* and the nature of a child, he should be a *muni*⁹. Attaining the nature of *muni* and what is other than this,¹⁰ he attains *brahma-vidyā*. This person attaining *brahma-vidyā*, by what¹¹ means does he become so. By which means it was stated that he becomes, by that means

¹ The further mark stated by *Yājñavalkya* to distinguish the *Ātmā*, who is within all, from the *jeeva* was not sufficient in *Kaholas* opinion. For the sentences are capable of being understood as affirming that he that is *jnāna* (self-proved) possesses also *jnāna* as attribute. And this will apply to the *jeeva* also. Hence his repetition of the question.

² Who transcends by nature, and is not under obligation to any one for the possession of the attributes.

³ This states a further mark for the same purpose.

⁴ This includes attachment to wife also (See *bṛihad aranyaka*, III-4-7). Rising from the three attachments is to renounce the world.

⁵ One leads to the other, and is inseparably connected with it.

⁶ The three attachments are reducible to two only.

⁷ The possession of knowledge attained from a teacher, and worked up to such a degree as to lead to discrimination of the real from the unreal and to desirelessness for worldly objects.

⁸ Without parading his own knowledge and worth.

⁹ That is - He should recall the object of meditation, when he is disengaged, and dwell on it. The object is to prevent the mind's going to worldly matters.

¹⁰ That is - *Panditya* and the nature of a child.

¹¹ This is *Kahola's* last question. His doubt is whether there is any other means.

only. Other than He is miserable". Then *Kahola Kaushitakeya* sank into silence (verse 1).

SUB - SECTION 17

Chāndogya I - Section 1

Meditate on this syllable (known as *pranava*), which is part of *udgītha*¹. For, one begins with this syllable and sings. Here follows a commentary² on it (verse 1).

Of these beings the earth ³ is the essence; of the earth water ⁴ is the essence. Of water plants⁵ are the essence; of plants man⁶ is the essence; of man speech⁷ is the essence; of speech *rik* is the essence; of *rik sāman* is the essence; of *sāman udgītha* is the essence (verse 2).

It is the best essence of essences; it is the last.⁸ This eighth⁹ *adgitha* deserves¹⁰ the place of the highest *Ātmā* (verse 3).

The enquiry is made - how is *rik*; how is *sāman*; how is *udgītha* (verse 4).

Speech¹¹ alone is *rik*; *prāṇa* is *sāman*; this syllable (*prāṇava*) is *ulgitha*. (Speech and *prāṇa* form a couple¹²; also *rik* and *sāman* (verse 5).

¹ The terms *aksharam* (syllable) and *udgitha* are in apposition in the original; but as they are not identical, one or the other should be understood in a secondary sense. As the former term occurs in the closing verse of this section also, it is the more important; and the other term is understood to mean a part of *udgitha*. This is the second out of five parts into which every *sāman* is divided.

² Explaining how the meditation should be done and what is its fruit.

³ As it is the support of all.

⁴ As earth is evolved from water.

⁵ As they grow with water and are its products.

⁶ As his body is a product of plants.

⁷ As it is of the greatest use of man.

⁸ There is no essence beyond this.

⁹ Eighth from earth, see verse 2.

¹⁰ Because it is meditated on as the highest *Ātmā* is.

¹¹ As *rik* has to be recited by the organ of speech. *Sāman* requires in singing the holding up of breath.

¹² Speech (*uak*) being in the feminine gender, and *prāṇa* in the masculine gender, they form a couple like man and women.

This couple (*rik* and *sāman*) is connected with this syllable (*prāṇava*). When the couple comes together, they satisfy each¹ other's desire (verse 6).

He, that thus knows this and meditates on the syllable of the *udgītha*, enables one to attain his desires (verse 7).

This is the permission (*anujnā*) syllable; for when one permits anything, he uses the syllable only. This, which is permission, the very same is abundance². He, that thus knows this and meditates on the syllable of the *udgītha*, causes the *yajamana* to attain whatever he desires to have (verse 8).

With the help of this the *karma* enjoined by the three-fold *veda* proceeds. The *adhvaryu* says *asravaya* with it; the *hota* recites *rick* with it; the *udgāta* sings *sāman* with it to do worships to this syllable possessing the greatness of being the best essence (Verse 9).

With the help of this both do their work - one that thus meditates on this, and one that does not meditate. Meditation and no-meditation are different³. Whatever is done with meditation, with faith and with knowledge of everything being ruled from within by the highest *Ātmā*, that alone becomes most efficacious⁴. This is the commentary on this syllable (verse 10).

SUB-SECTION 19

Taittirīya - Nārayaṇa

Section 10

There is in the middle of the city⁵ a small lotus bud, free from sin, the residence of the highest *Ātmā*: the small *ākāṣa* in it free⁶ from grief and what is within it should be meditated on (verse 23).

That ⁷ *svara*,⁸ which is uttered in beginning recitation of the *veda*, which is invariably found at the end of the recitation, and which takes the

¹ This is a well-known fact. The syllable also causes one to attain desire through the instrumentality of the couple, with which it is connected.

² Because only one that has abundance gives permission.

³ Yielding different fruit.

⁴ To be efficacious means to be able to yield its fruit without obstruction by a more powerful *karma*.

⁵ The meditator's body, and the lotus is the heart.

⁶ This expression brings up the other seven attributes stated in the *chāndogya* in regard to the small *ākāṣa*.

⁷ This verse states who the *devatā* is that is meditated on in the *dahara vidyā*, and adds His attribute of being the great ruler.

⁸ The syllable known as *prāṇava*.

form of its source¹, the Being denoted by it is great ruler (verse 24).

Section 11

He is a thousand-headed *deva*; with eyes every-where; the source of the happiness of all. *Nārayaṇa-deva* is everything; *aksharam*, the highest Lord (verse 1).

Nārayaṇa is greater than everything; eternal; He is everthing; He is hari. *Purusha* alone is all this; all this lives by Him² (verse 2).

He is lord of all; He is master of Himself; He is unchanging bliss; *Nārayaṇa* is the great object to be known; He is the inner ruler of all; He is the highest goal (verse 3).

Nārayaṇa is the highest *Brahma*; *Nārayaṇa* is the highest *tatva*; *Nārayaṇa* is the highest light; *Nārayaṇa* is the highest *Ātmā* (verse 4).

Whatever in this world is seen or heard about, *Nārayaṇa* stands pervading it all within and without (verse 5).

He has no limitations; He is without destruction; all-knowing; with His abode in the ocean; the source of the happiness of all (verse 5).

The heart, of the form of a lotus bud, and hanging with its tip downwards below where the neck is joined to the head, and above the region of the intestines, in a place as long as a span (*vitasti*), know that heart to be the great abode of Him, who is everthing (verses 6 and 7).

It resembles a lotus bud slightly opened, and hangs by blood vessels set close together. At its tip there is a fine hole, in which the All abides (verse 8).

In its middle there is a great fire,³ the light of which spreads everywhere, and face of which is everywhere. It is ever awake; it ever crackles; it divides the food taken by man, and itself eats it (verse 9).

It heats its body from the foot to the head; in its is the middle top of the fires very subtle, with its top pointing upward (verse 10).

Like a streak of lighting appearing in the middle of a blue-rain-cloud, shining, as then as the top a grain of hivara, there is a being gold-coloured and peerless (verse 11).

In the middle of the top of the fire the highest *Ātmā* abides; He is *Brahma*; He is *Siva*; He is *Indra*; He is *akshara*;⁴ He is the highest; He is one not subject to the control of *karma* (verse 12).

¹ The letter, a from which all sounds that form words spring. It denotes *Vishnu*, who is the *devatā* and who is the great ruler.

² As the is the inner ruler of all.

³ The fire in the stomach.

⁴ The freed jiva.

SUB - SECTION 20

Agnirahasya - Chapter I

That (mind) saw 36,000 worshipful¹ fires, belonging to itself, made of thought and known as *manaschit* (mind-made) (verse 9).

In these by ² mind alone the fire was established; by mind alone the altar was made; by mind the *soma* juice was taken in them (mind-made vessels); by mind *vedic* songs were sung; by mind verses were recited (verse 10).

Whatever *karma* is done in a *kratu* (sacrifice), whether the principal *karma*, or subsidiary *karma*, by mind alone it was done mentally in those mind-made (*manaschit*) (verse 11).

Hence whatever these beings³ think with the mind, they are the making of them alone (verse 12).

All persons do what is useful to the mind-made fires; they establish the fire; they made the altar; they take the *soma* juice in them; in them they sing *vidic* songs; in them they recite verses (verse 13).

These are the things subject to the mind; these are the things made by it; this is the greatness of mind (verse 14).

Of these 36,000 worshipful fires each one alone is as capable as that preceding⁴ one is (verse 15).

In regard to one that thus meditates all persons at all times make them even when he sleeps (verse 16).

With *vidyā* alone of one that thus meditates these are made (verse 17).

¹ One's life, assuming it to consist of one hundred years, is made up of 36,000 days; the thoughts that pass through the mind in each day are to be meditated on as the sacrificial fire in a *kratu*.

² In a *kratu* the operations enumerated take place; in this mind-made *vidya* they were all made by the mind. To reconcile this statement with that made in verse 9 it must be understood that some thoughts are the fires, and that the other operations of the mind are the operations of the *kratu*.

³ The meaning is that one, that does this *vidyā*, should look upon all mental operations of all persons as sacrificial fires and as operations of the *kratu*. They will therefore all of them help him in the meditation as the sacrificial fire.

⁴ The fire on the brick-made altar. The meaning is that this fire will procure through the *kratu*, with which it is connected, whatever fruit is procured by the fire on the brick-made altar through its real *kratu*.

N.B. : Réference is made in the *Sribhashya* to fires made of speech, *prāṇa*, eye, ear, organs of action and the stomach; but where they are to be inserted in the body of the *upanishad* is not clear.

CHAPTER III

SECTION 4 - SUB-SECTION 1

Chāndogya II - 23

Three are three places that help in the doing of *dharma*; *yajna*¹ (offering), reciting the *veda* and making gifts form the first; *tapas*² alone is the second; He³, that expends his body completely in the house of his teacher, leading a disciplined life, is the third. All these attain the world to be reached by good deeds one that meditates on *Brahma* attains immortality (verse 1).

SUB-SECTIONS 5 AND 6

Bṛihad āraṇyaka VI - 4

In continuation of what will be found under Chapter I-4-3.

Him (the highest *Ātmā* thus described) *Brāhmaṇas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yajna* (offering), by the making of gifts, and by *tapas* in the form of absence of desire. Knowing Him alone one becomes a *muni* (one that meditates). Desiring this fruit alone (the highest *Ātmā*) men renounce the world. Those, that lived before and knew this, did not desire children; for they thought thus "What shall we do with offspring, to whom this *Ātmā*, this happiness, exists." They rise from attachment to son, attachment to property, and attachment to the world, and live by begging for food. What is attachment to son is attachment to property; what is attachment to property is attachment to the world; for these two attachments alone exist. This *Ātmā* is not only this; is not only this; He is other than those that can be perceived by other means; and He is therefore not perceived. He is other than those that fall to pieces, and He does not therefore fall to pieces. He is other than those that are attached, and He is therefore not attached. He is other than those that suffer, and He does not suffer nor perish. These thoughts do not touch one, that meditates on the highest *Ātmā* as thus described: "From this (the need of maintaining the body) I have done bad deeds; from this I have done good deeds"; For even here He has gone beyond

¹ This refers to the house-holder's stage.

² This refers to those known as *vaighānasas*, and to those that renounce the world. Both classes have to do *tapas* as the principal thing; and this consists of diminution of bodily enjoyment.

³ This is the student's stage.

them. Good and bad deeds do not make him suffer through their fruits¹ (verse 22).

Regarding this (transcending good and evil) the following verse has been stated 'This greatness of one that mediates on *Brahma* remains ever afterwards. One, that knows His nature, does not increase with (good) deeds; he does not decrease (with bad deeds). One that knows this (the greatness of the meditator) (is not polluted with evil deed.

Hence, one that knows this, should control his mind; he should control his senses; he should withdraw from worldly pursuits (doing what is prohibited and what is pointed out as the means to worldly enjoyment); he should take good and evil with serenity; he should make the mind one-pointed. Being all this, he should see in himself Him, who is his *Ātmā*. He should see Him as all - i.e., as the inner ruler of all. Him (the seer) evil deeds (in the form of good and bad deeds) do not reach; he transcends all evil. Evil deeds do not make him suffer; he burns up all evil. He, the meditator, becomes free from *karma*, from desire, from doubt. He becomes *brahman* (meditator on *Brahma*). He is *brahma*, the world, great king. Said *Yajnavalkya*. (The kind said) 'I give you, revered sir, the *videha* country; I give you myself also, to do service to you' (verse 23).

He, the Being described, the great unborn *Ātmā*, gives food, gives wealth. He that meditates thus obtains wealth (verse 24).

He, the Being described, is the great unborn *Ātmā*, free from old age, death, *samsara*, fear, and is *Brahma*, i.e., immeasurably great; for *Brahma* is free from fear. He, that knows this, becomes free from fear, and becomes *brahma*, i.e., like *Brahma* (verse 25).

Chāndogya, I - 10

Ushasti, the son of *Chakra*, during a famine caused by hail-storm, lived with his young wife in the village of elephant-drivers in a starving condition (verse 1).

He begged of an elephant-driver, who was eating boiled gram. He replied "There is no other than this, which is placed before me. What shall I do" (verse 2).

Ushasti said "Give me of these." The elephant driver gave him. He said "Take this water to drink". *Ushasti* replied "My drinking it will be drinking what is polluted" (verse 3).

¹ See notes on *brihad aranyaka* V-4 under III-3-15 page 622.

The elephant-driver asked "Are not these also polluted". *Ushasti* replied "I would not live, if I did not eat these. To drink the impure water would be to yield to desire" (verse 4).

Having eaten some of the gram, he gave the remainder to his wife, who having already taken her meal, received the same and kept it (verse 5).

On rising from his bed next morning, *Ushasti* said "If I can get food, I shall get a little wealth. This king is about to do a *yāga*. He will ask me to do the work of all the helpers" (verse 6).

His wife said to him - "Husband! here is the same gram." Eating it, he went to where the *yāga* was being done (verse 7).

Chāndogya, VIII-15

Brahma (the four-faced one) taught this to *Prajāpati*; *Prajāpati* to *Manu*; *Manu* to his children. After learning the *veda* in the house of the teacher, in accordance with the rules, and when time could be spared from his service, let the student perform the ceremony known as *samavartana*, and lead a house-holder's life in a pure place, reciting his *veda*,¹ making (his sons and students) do *dharma*, with drawing all his senses from what is other than the *Ātmā*, and without causing pain to anyone, except what may be permitted. Thus passing all his life, he attains *Brahma* world and does not return (verse 1).

¹ This includes all other duties of his stage of life.

SECTION - 2 SUB-SECTIONS 1 TO 4 AND 6

Chāndogya, VI - Section 8

The speech of the person, my dear, that' departs (from this world), unites with the mind; the mind with *prāṇa*; *prāṇa* with the element fire; fire with the highest *Devatā* (verse 6).

SUB-SECTION 5

Bṛihad āraṇyaka, VI - Section 3

As a cart fully laden leaves (the place where it was and goes on, in the very same way this embodied jiva, the all-knowing¹ *Ātmā* having mounted on him, leaves (the body) and goes on, when his breath is about to come up (verse 35).

This happens, when this body becomes thin with old age, when it becomes thin from a burning fever.

Then as a fruit of the mango, *udumbara* or *pippala* is loosened from its stalk, in the very same way this person is loosened from these limbs, and goes on, as he came, towards the womb of a mother, so that he may live (verse 36).

Then, as hearing that the king is coming, *ugras*,² servants ordered to deal with offenders, *sutas*² and heads of villages await him with food, drink, and lodging, saying 'He comes; he comes', in the very same way all³ elements await this *jeeva* experiencing the fruit of *karma*, saying "This *jeeva* comes; he comes" (verse 37).

As *ugras*, servants ordered to deal with offenders, *sutas* and heads of villages proceed towards the king, who is about to go, in the very same way all *prāṇas* at the time of death proceed towards this *jeeva* - i.e., when his breath comes up at the end of his life (verse 38).

Section 4

When this *Ātmā* (*jeeva*) becomes extremely weak and begins to lose consciousness, then these *prāṇas*⁴ approach him. Taking the senses, he comes

¹ The all-knowing *Ātmā* is the highest *Ātmā*. He is like the driver, the *jeeva* being like the cart.

² Members of particular castes.

³ Those that make up his body.

⁴ The senses and motor organs.

to the heart. When this dying¹ person turns away (from objects), he no longer sees colour and other qualities (verse 1).

People say “He becomes one with it; he does not see”; “He becomes one with it; he does not smell”; “He becomes one with it; he does not taste;” “He becomes one with it; he does not speak”; “He becomes one with it; he does not hear”; He becomes one with it; he does not think; “He becomes one with it; he does not feel touch”; “He becomes one with it; he does not know”. In this condition the tip² of his heart shines.³ With that light this *Ātmā* gets out, through the eye, through the top of the head or through other places in the body. Him rising from the body *prāṇa* follows out of the body; *prāṇa* rising from the body after the jiva, all *prāṇas*⁴ follow out of the body. He thinks⁵ (of the mother’s womb to be reached); him so thinking the group of the senses follow. Him his *vidyā*⁶ (meditation) and *karma* contact and go with him; also the tendencies generated (verse 2).

As a worm⁷ goes to the end of a piece of grass,takes hold of another support, and draws in the hinder part of its body from the grass, in the very same way this *Ātmā* leaves this body unconscious,⁸ takes hold of another support and withdraws from the body (verse 3).

¹ The term in the original is ‘Person present in the eye’, and this is a mark of his departure presently.

² By this reference is made to the entrance to a blood vessel, through which the dying man goes out.

³ The light of all the senses, which have been gathered together in the *Jeeva*, makes the entrance shine.

⁴ The senses and motor organs

⁵ This thought is generated by the *karma* of the departing *jeeva*. It is only one that meditates on *Brahma* that can command what thought should then be in his mind.

⁶ These two are to bring up to the *jeeva*’s mind in his new birth ‘the objects in which he will find enjoyment, and the third, known as a *vasana*, is to give him facility to act or enjoy. For no one is able to do or to enjoy any thing without this tendency previously acquired. These three things correspond to the provision for the journey, which the cart takes, and are to serve the *jeeva*.

⁷ The original has the term *trina alayuka*, which refers to a particular worm found in grass.

⁸ The original has in addition ‘Killing this body’. It is stated that it is meaning is leaving it unconscious.

As a goldsmith takes a portion of gold already available, and makes it into a new article prettier than the original piece, in the very same way this *Ātmā* makes this body lifeless and makes of it a new body prettier than the old one, be it the body of a *pitri*¹ of a *gandharva*, of a *deva*, of *Prajāpati*, of *brahma* or of other beings (verse 4).

This same *Ātmā*, self-proved and a knower, though by nature like *Brahma*², is connected with ³ mind, with *prāṇa*, with the eye, with the ear; he is full of earth,⁴ full of water, full of air, full of ether, full of fire, full of other than fire (i.e., *mahat* and *ahamkara*). He has the attributes - desire, and what is other than desire (resolve, etc.) anger, and what is other than anger (pleasure), *dharma* and what is other than *dharma* and everything. He is engrossed in this (world) and in the other (world). What was his wont to do⁵ or to act, that he becomes. One that did good deeds attains a good body;⁶ one that did evil deeds attains a bad body. One does good deeds having done good deeds in the past; one does evil deeds having done evil deeds in the past. Other people say - "This person is indeed full of desire". Whatever desire he has, he resolves to attain it; whatever he resolves to do, that he does; whatever he does, he attains its fruit (verse 5).

On this subject this verse is current - "To what fruit his mind is attached, attached to the very same he goes at death with the *karma* done to procure it".

"Whatever *karma* he does here, reaching by enjoyment the end of that *karma*, he returns from that world to this world to do *karma* again." Thus fares, one that desires. Next as to one that does not desire. Of him that is without desire, from whom desire has departed, has no further desired and whose desired is centred on the *Ātmā*, *pranas* do not depart; being *brahma*⁷ alone, he attains *Brahma* (verse 6).

On this subject this verse is current: "When all the desires that were in his heart are released, then the mortal becomes immortal; here he enjoys *Brahma*". As the skin of a snake thrown off on its hole lies lifeless, in the

¹ A body fit for enjoyment in the world of the *pitris*.

² Having the attributes of *Brahma* - i.e., freedom from *karma* and the rest.

³ Owns the mind as an instrument.

⁴ Is connected with earth, one of the elements that make up his body.

⁵ To do *agnihotra* and the like; to act - to perform such acts as confer on him a qualification for doing *agnihotra*.

⁶ Like the body of a *brāhmaṇa*.

⁷ Attaining the form of *Brahma*, i.e. attaining freedom from *karma* and the rest.

very same way this body¹ lies. Next,² he is without³ a body; he is without death; though bearing *prāṇa*, he is *Brahma*⁴ alone; he is light⁵ alone" "I will give you a thousand (cows) said *Janaka*, king of the *videhas*" (verse 7).

On this subject there are these verses - "That ancient path, difficult to know by other means, but described fully in the *vedānta*, touching me, the meditator, and known by me during meditation - by it mediators full of perfect knowledge, released from this (body), reach the *svarga*⁶ world, which is above this (all worlds) (verse 8).

The say - 'On this path (is the sun), white, blue, yellow, green and red.' This path is connected with *Brahma*. By this goes one, that has done good deeds, and is enabled to meditate on *Brahma*; and he also goes that mediates on fire - i.e., does the five-fires *vidyā* (verse 9).

Those, that concentrate their attention on mere good⁷ deeds, enter dense darkness.⁸ Those that find pleasure in *vidyā* alone, they surely enter darkness⁹ denser than the other (verse 10).

These worlds have not a drop of happiness in them, and are covered by dense darkness. At death they go towards them, who do not know the highest *Ātmā*, nor the true nature of the *jeeva* (verse 11).

If one knows himself 'I am so and so,' desiring what (for himself), to procure the desire of whom (wife, children and the like) will he trouble his body? (verse 12).

By whom the *Ātmā* (i.e., himself) is known, and is meditated on, though he has entered this body full of misery, he is the maker¹⁰ of all; for he is the world - i.e., the support of Him, who is the maker of all (verse 13).

¹ The body of the meditator. It is no longer the subject of the feeling 'I am this', and is practically abandoned by its owner; but to those that look on it appears as his body.

² After meditation is established - i.e. becomes as *vivid* as sense perception.

³ Like one without a body - even before death.

⁴ He enjoys *Brahma*

⁵ Without *ajñāna* - i.e., absence of knowledge

⁶ The world of the highest *Ātmā*.

⁷ Deeds done for the enjoyment of the heaven - world.

⁸ The wheel of births and deaths without any prospect of getting out of it.

⁹ The intention is to show that both good deeds and *vidya* are necessary, but not either to the exclusion of the other.

¹⁰ He will be respected like the highest *Ātmā*, the maker of all.

We, remaining here alone, know it, i.e., *Brahma*; if we did not know, it would be a great loss. Those that know this become immortal; others reach only misery (verse 14).

When one sees Him well, who shines, who is the inner ruler of all, and who controls the past and the future, he does not turn away with disgust from any one (verse 15).

Bṛihad āraṇyaka, V - Section 2

At the court of king *Janaka Yajnavalka* was questioned by several persons, of whom *Jaratkarava Artabhaga* was one. The first question was "How many are the *grahas* and how many are the *atigrahasa*. The reply was "Eight are the *grahas* and eight are the *atigrahasā*. The next question was "What are they" (verse 1).

The reply was *Prāṇa*¹ is a *graha*. It is seized by *apana*,² the *atigraha*; for controlled by *apāna*,² it perceives smell (verse 2).

Speech is a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* name; for with speech one pronounces names (verse 3).

The tongue is a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* taste; for with the tongue one knows tastes (verse 4).

The eye is a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* colour; for with the eye one sees colours (verse 5).

The ear is a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* sound; for with the ear one hears sounds (verse 6).

The mind is a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* desire; for with the mind one desires objects of desire (verse 7).

The hands are a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* action; for with the hands one does action (verse 8).

The skin is a *graha*; it is seized by the *atigraha* touch; for with the skin one feels touches. These are the eight *grahas*, the eight *atigrahas* (verse 9).

¹ This refers to the sense of smell, on the ground of likeness, both the sense of smell and *prāṇa* being connected with the nose. The term *graha* means a sense organs, and *atigraha* means sense object.

² Smell.

The next *question* was - "All this is the food of death; who is the *devatā*, to whom death is food?" *Reply*. "Fire¹ is death; and it is the food of water. He that meditates thus overcomes untimely death' (verse 10).

The next *question* was - "When this person dies, do *prāṇas* go out of him or no." The *reply* was - "No; in him alone they become one. He swells,² is filled with outside air, and inflated, lies dead" (verse 11).

The next *question* was - "When this person dies, what is it that does not leave him". The *reply* was - "Name; for names have no end; *visve*³ *devas* have no end. One by this (knowledge) conquers the world without end" (verse 12).

The next *question* was - "When of this dying person speech unites with *agni*, *prāṇa* unites with air, the eye unites with the sun, the mind unites with the moon, the ear unites with the quarters, the body unites with earth, the ether within the body unites with the air outside, the hair on the body unites with plants, the hair on the head unites with trees, and blood and semen are deposited in water, where is this person then?" Without giving a reply, *yajnavalkya* said "Give me your hand, my dear *Artabhaga*!" and taking it, he added "Let us two alone know (the reply) to this. This (question and reply) of ours need not be said in this assembly". they went out and consulted together. What they said was karma alone; what they praised was *karma* alone. One gets a good body with good deeds; one gets a bad body with bad deeds. They *Artabhaga* ceased to ask more questions (verse 13).

SUB-SECTION - 9

Chāndogya, VIII - Section 6

Now, the blood vessels of the heart are filled with the fine essence of food and drink, yellow, white, blue, gold-coloured and red. This sun is yellow; he is white; he is blue; he is gold-coloured; he is red (verse 1).

As a long high road enters two villages, this and that in the very same way these rays of the sun enter two words - this and that. They extend from that sun, and enter these blood vessels; they extend from these blood vessels and enter that sun (verse 2).

¹ For fire burns up everything; and it is destroyed by water.

² These take place in the body, but do not relate to the departing *jeeva*. The verse identifies the body and the *jeeva*.

³ *Visve devas* are the *devatās* of names.

When he sleeps, drawing to himself all the sense, and with a serene mind sees no dreams, he then enters these blood vessels. Him no evil¹ deeds touch; for he is then united with *tejas*² (verse 3).

Next, when he becomes weak, those seated around say to him - "Do you know me; do you know me." So long as he does not rise out of this body, so long does he know (verse 4).

Next, when he gets out of this body, then he goes up only with these rays (of the sun). He utters the *prāṇava*, and is carried up by the rays. While the mind thinks one thought, by that time he reaches the sun. To the mediators he is indeed the door leading to the highest world. To the non-mediators he is a bar (verse 5).

On this subject there is this verse "There are one hundred and one blood vessels of the heart; of them one goes to the top of the head. He that rises through it attains immortality; the other blood vessels are for other ways of getting out" (verse 6).

¹ They have no power to yield their fruits.

² The highest *Ātmā*, as He is self-proved.

CHAPTER - IV

SECTION - 3 SUB-SECTIONS 1 TO 4

The *devayana* is described in two texts of the *Chāndogya*. See under chapter II, section 3, subsection 13.

Bṛihad āraṇyaka VII - Section 10

When a person goes for good from this world, he reaches *vayu*. To him *vayu* then shows an opening in himself of the size of the hole in the wheel of a chariot; through it he goes up and reaches the sun. To him the sun then shows an opening in himself of the size of the hole in the musical instrument known as *adambara*; through it he goes up and reaches the moon. To him the moon then shows an opening in himself of the size of the hole in a drum; through it he goes up and reaches a place, which is without grief, without snow. There he dwells for endless years.

Bṛihad āraṇyaka, VIII - Section 2

The following verse is taken from the five - fires *vidyā*:

Those that meditate on this in this manner, and those that in a jungle meditate on *satya* (the highest *Ātmā*) with earnestness, they reach light; from light they go to the day; from the day to the half-month in which the moon's rays fill; from the half-month to the half year in which the sun goes northwards; from the half-year to *devaloka*; from the *devaloka* to the sun; from the sun to the person in lightning; the person in lightning, known as *amanava* (not human) comes and carries them to *brahma-loka*. In these worlds they dwell in the enjoyment of indescribable bliss, but subject to the highest *Ātmā*. For them there is no return (to *samsara*) (verse 15).

Kaushitaki, I - Paryanka vidyā

Chitra, a *kshatriya*, the son of *gargya*, requested *Aruni* to help him to perform a *yaga*. he sent his son *Svetaketu* in his place. When he was seated, *Chitra* asked him "Is there anything concealed from public gaze in that world, in which you will place me or another by the *yāga*, and what is the path to it". he was unable to reply, and went to his father for instruction. The father being equally ignorant, the father and son came to *Chitra* himself for instruction. *Chitra* taught them as follows (verses 1 to 8).

"Those, that depart from this world, reach, all of them, the moon alone (verse 9).

The moon is nourished by the good¹ deeds done by them in the bright fortnight; in the dark fortnight he satisfies them with his *kalas* (rays) (verse 10).

The moon is indeed the door of the world *svaraga* (verse 11).

He permits him to go forward, who gives a satisfactory reply; him, who does not give a satisfactory reply, he sends down as rain. He is then born as a worm, as an insect, as a bird, as a tiger, as a lion, as a fish, as a domestic beast, as man, or as something else in these places (verse 12).

He asks him, who comes, according to his *karma*, according to his *vidyā*, "Who art thou" He will reply (verse 13).

"Oh seasons² I am semen,³ coming out of the knowing father during his sexual intercourse, and nourished with the mother's blood, after having passed through the five stages (verse 14).

Do not make me remain in the form of semen in a man emitting it. Do not make him emit semen, so that I may have a body (verse 15).

I was born many times, coming out of the womb, having remained i it twelve or thirteen months (verse 16).

Having come out at the end of the twelfth or thirteenth month, I served every parent that emitted semen to give me a body (verse 17).

Oh seasons! Hence do not give me again to *samsara* (verse 18).

Blessed by that *Satyam* (the highest *Ātmā*) pleased with my appeal to him (*tapas*)⁴ I am the season; I am what come into existence in the seasons; I am *ka*⁵ (*brahma*) the four-faced one; I am thou (verse 19).

He (the moon) permits him to go on (verse 20).

He, reaching the path known as *devayana*, goes to the world of *Agni*; he goes to the world of *Vayu*; he goes to the world of *VARuṇa*; he goes to the world of the *sun*; he goes to the world of *Indra*; he goes to the world of *Prajāpati*; he goes to the world of *Brahma* (verse 21).

¹ The term used in the original is *prāṇais*, i.e., with the senses and motor organs - i.e., with good deeds done with their help, such as *yāgas* and works of public utility. the moon fills for fifteen days, and for the next fifteen days he satisfies his worshippers. This goes on against and again.

² The means the moon, as he measures the month; and the plural ending is used as a mark of respect.

³ That is I have semen as my body. This shows that the speaker refers to the changes described in the five fires *vidyā*, and that he has meditated on the nature of the *jeeva* as distinguished from his body.

⁴ Appeal to the highest *Ātmā* for release from *samsāra*. Compare with the text Hence *nyasam* excels all this *tapas*.

⁵ This means that he realises his identity with the highest *Ātmā* as his inner ruler.

APPENDIX I

See note 1 on page 8. The question for consideration is what is the meaning of the term *Ādeṣa* in the *Chāndogya* text - 'Did you enquire about that *Ādeṣa*, hearing about who everything not heard before is hard' (VI-1-3).

2. The word is made up of the prefix *a*, the root *dis* and the termination *a*. This being the termination known in *Paniniâs* grammar as *ghan*, and it being one of those known as strong terminations, the vowel of the root is changed to *e*; and we have the form *Ādeṣa*. The meaning of the root with the prefix is to control, direct or to issue a command, and the termination denotes the doer (*karta*). Hence the word means the controller.

3. *Objection.* The termination cannot denote the doer (*karta*); for *Paniniâs sutra*, III-3-19 states that it should be added to a root to denote a *karaka* other than the doer (*karta*). A *karaka* is what helps in the doing of an action (*karma*), such as the object (*karma*) the instrument (*Karana*) and place of action (*adhikarana*) Reply : True but the doer (*karta*) is regarded as instrument (*karana*) as he is the most efficient instrument in the doing of an action. This has the support of grammarians, who state that the kind of a *karaka* in a particular case depends upon the intention of the speaker.

4. *Objection again.* The view cannot be accepted. The instrument (*karana*) may be regarded as doer (*karta*), as in the sentence 'The knife cuts'; but the reverse is not sound; for to regard the doer (*karta*) as the instrument (*karana*) would be like regarding the king as his servant. To regard the instrument as doer would be like regarding a servant as the king; and this is recognised as proper in *Badarayana's sutra* (IV-1-5). Further, the author of the *mahabhashya* (commentary on *Panini's sutras*) observes - We say 'the pot cooks', regarding the *adhikarana* (place of action) as doer (*karta*); but this does not lead to the regarding of the doer (*karta*) as the instrument. For the doer belongs to a different class, being the person who handles all the instruments. Hence the termination denotes the object of the action (*karma*). The root means to teach (*upadeṣa*); and the word means what has to be taught. The root *dis* with the prefix *a* is used in this sense in the following text 'Next the teaching (*Ādeṣa*) regarding meditation on *Brahma* as I' (*chando.*, VII-25).

1. The author of the *mahabhashya* also states, referring to the word *upĀdeṣa* in *Paniniâs sutra*, 1-3-2, and the word *Ādeṣa* in *sutra*, I-1-56, that the root means to utter.

Reply. The words *Ādeṣa* and *upadeśa* are used in the following sentence 'This is *Ādeṣa*; this is *upĀdeṣa* etc. They must therefore have different meanings. There is a precedent for this in *Badarayana's sutras*. In the text 'From this came for the *prāṇa*, mind, all the senses, ether, air, fire, water and the all-supporting earth (*munda*., II-1-3) the words *prāṇa* and air are mentioned separately; and for this reason it is decided that they are different substances, though *prāṇa* is a variety of air (*sutra*, II-4-8). The term *Ādeṣa* refers to a statement, the non-carrying out of what is stated therein will be visited with punishment. The word is used with reference to one in authority, *adisati* (he commands). The author of the *nyasa* gives his support to the distinction herein pointed out between *Ādeṣa* and *upĀdeṣa*. He states that the word *Ādeṣa* is used, when the benefit goes to one that issues an order, and the word *upĀdeṣa*, when the benefit accrues to one that receives the order. This distinction should not be ignored on the strength of stray cases of the use of the word *Ādeṣa* in the sense of *upĀdeṣa*. This being so, having regard to the primary meaning of the root, we may overlook the objection pointed out in regard to the treatment of the doer (*karta*) as instrument (*karana*). The root occurs first, and is therefore more important than the termination, which comes later. There are precedents for this. In the text 'The seers (*rishis*) are indeed *prāṇasā* considered in *Badarayana's sutra*, II-3-1 the term *rishi* means a seer, and refers to the all-knowing *Brahma*. The plural termination, being unsuitable, is ignored. In the *purva mimamsa* also there are precedents. The text 'Five times fifty are the *trivrit samvatsaras*, etc., enjoins a *kratu*. The term *trivrit* refers to the number (nine) of vedic songs to be contained in a *stotra* sung by the *udgāta* in the *kratu*; and is then extended to the day in which all the *stotras* contain that number of vedic songs. The term *samvatsara* means a year; but as a *kratu* with a thousand years cannot be enjoined to a mortal, the word is taken to denote a day with reference to the term *trivrit*, which occurs before it (VI-7-13).

4. *Last objection.* There are also precedents the other way. In the offering of grains made of gold boiled in ghee to the *devatā surya*, there is the text 'Give to *brahma ekadha*. In the offering of a *puroḍāṣa* (ball of fried rice flour) to the *devatā Agni* in the *darsa ishti* a small portion is offered; and from what remains a grain is given to *brahma* first. Then a small portion is distributed among the four helpers, including *brahma*, and the person that does the *ishti*. Lastly, what remains is divided into four parts and given to the four helpers only. In regard to the offering to the *Surya devatā* no procedure is prescribed; and the *ritual* for the offering to the *devatā Agni* is adopted. Now in the text quoted the term *ekadha* may mean either once or at the same time. If the former meaning be adopted, the remains of the

offering would be given to *brahma* but once; and the second and third givings as well as the times of the giving would be ignored. if the latter meaning be adopted, the portions to be given to him on all the three occasions would be given at the same time; and what is ignored is only the time. It is therefore decided that the term *ekadha* means at the same time (*purva mimamsa*, X-2-4). Here the term *ekadha* is *sruti*, and a meaning suitable to the adoption of the *ritual* of the *agneya yāga* is taken, though this is of less importance. Similarly, a meaning for the root *adis* may be taken suitable to the termination.

Reply. In the case stated there is no conflict between the meaning of the term *ekadha* and the ritual adopted; and as the word has two meanings, that suitable to the ritual is adopted. But in the case of *Ādeṣa*, the only meaning of the root is to command; and as the termination conflicts with it (for there is no one that can command *Brahma*), we treat the doer as instrument.

5. The objection raised may be got over by forming the word *Ādeṣa* to mean the action command (for the termination denotes action); and then adding the termination to denote possession. The word would then mean one that has the action command, i.e., one that commands.

See note 7 on page 12. We have to explain the expression *anena jivena Ātmāna* (as the inner ruler of this *jeeva*) in the *Chāndogya* text 'I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jeeva* and make diverse names and forms' (VI-3-2).

2. The term *Ātmāna* (by myself) refers to the speaker, who is *Brahma* here. The term *jivena*, being put in apposition with it, should refer to the same Being; and it therefore means the *Ātmā* (inner ruler) of the *jeeva* (see paras 13 to 16 of the final decision on pages 186 to 191 of *Sri Bhashya*).

3. *Objection.* The three words in apposition have the termination of the third case; and this termination is added, when the doer (*karta*) or instrument (*karana*) has to be denoted (*Panini*, II-3-18). The addition should be made, when the doer is not denoted by any other word (*Ibid.*, II-3-1). In the text under consideration the termination in the participle *anupravisya* shows that the entry in to the three *devatās* and the making of diverse names and forms were by the same Being; and the doer (*karta*) is denoted by the termination is the verb *karavani*. Hence the addition of the termination of the third case is not sound. Here an explanation is offered by a by-stander. The doer is denoted not the case of the making of names and forms; but not in the case of the entry into the three *devatās*. The addition of the termination of the third case is not therefore objectionable. This explanation cannot be accepted. If it were sound, we might say *maya* (by me) *bhuktva* (having eaten) I go; but this is not regarded as correct.

4. The correct explanation is: The term *Ātmāna* means by the *svarupa*, and the term *jivena* by the inner ruler of the *jeeva*; and the sentence will then mean 'entering, by the *svarupa*, which is the inner ruler of this *jeeva*, etc'. Though this *svarupa* does not differ from the maker of diverse names and forms, yet it is regarded as separate from Him. Compare with the sentence 'The jar by its own *svarupa* differentiates itself from other.' Opponent. In this sentence the termination of the third case denotes the instrument (*karana*); and this is into denoted by the termination in *karavani*. Reply. The same explanation applies to me also.

5. This may be explained in another way. The term *Ātmāna* means by the body; and the term *jivena* means merely by the *jeeva*; and the sentence means 'entering by the *jeeva*, who is My body, etc.' Compare with the sentence 'Entering by a spy, I will ascertain the strength of the enemy's force'. Still another explanation. The terms *jivena* and *Ātmāna* mean by the *jeeva Ātmā*; and the term *anena* meaning 'by this' 'draws attention to the fact

that he forms the body of *Brahma* as stated by vedic texts. The sentence will mean 'Entering by the *jeeva Ātmā*, who is my body, etc.' Compare with the sentence 'Cooking by devadatta, it is eaten by *chaitraâ*. The entry is by the *jeeva*, who is made to enter by *Brahma*; and in this action of *Brahma*, the *jeeva* is an instrument, and the termination is added to denote this. Of the two actions stated by the sentence *Brahma* is the doer directly in regard to the making of names and forms; in the entry into the three *devatās*. He is the doer indirectly through the *jeeva*; and the termination in the participle *anupravisya* appropriately connects the two actions as the work of the same Being.

APPENDIX III

Please see note 5 on page 112. The *vidyā* taught by *Prajāpati* serves all *brahma-vidyās*, and not merely *dahara-vidyā*. Here are two precedents:

1. The text 'Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*' mentions three attributes, which describe the *svarupa* of *Brahma*; and though it occurs in the *ānandavalli* (I-1), in which a particular *vidyā* is enjoined, it has been decided that these attributes should enter into all *brahma-vidyās* (chapter III, section 3, *sutra* 11).

2. The text 'Him *Brāhmaṇas* wish to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yāgas*, etc. occurs in the *Bṛihad āraṇyaka* (VI-4-22); yet it has been decided that the practices enumerated herein should serve all *brahma-vidyās* (Chapter III, Section 4, *sutra* 26).

3. Similarly, the *Prajāpati-vidyā*, though mentioned in connection with the *dahara-vidyā*, serves all *vidyās*. The *jeeva* has to meditate on his own nature as a part of *brahm-vidyā*, whatever be the *vidyā* adopted by him; and *prajāpti-vidyā* teaches what that nature is. This is the authority known as *linga*, and it prevails over *prakarana*, i.e., statement in the same context.

See notes on *Bṛihad āraṇyaka* V-4 under III-3-15 Page 622.

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